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ABSTRACT
This is a study o f political com petition in one PN G  Highlands society, that o f Hagen, within 
which som e o f the country’s m ost powerful and wealthy m en operate. It is about how and why 
people in Hagen com pete for prestige, pow er and influence. The study examines the major 
arenas, fields and sub-fields o f com petition within Hagen politics.
This study examines state-society relations from  a local perspective. It is a study o f competing 
legitimacies, o f  conflicting identities and loyalties, and o f parallel moral wodds. It is a study o f 
political strategies, subcultures, and inteigenerational power struggles within a weak state.
The study explores the interactions between ‘traditional’ Hagen and m odem  PN G  state 
structures, through a systematic analysis o f the major arenas o f political com petition and 
cooperation within which individuals and their groups compete for prestige, pow er and 
influence. Political com petition and leadership roles are analysed in a num ber o f contexts, 
specifically by studying political action by prom inent individuals, in both ‘traditional’ and 
m odem  spheres o f com petition. The ‘traditional’ arenas o f com petition and cooperation, such as 
ceremonial exchange, group warfare and the various types o f compensation payment, now exist 
side by side w ith, and in many ways have been incorporated into, new forms such as elections 
and business enterprise.
The study deals with questions o f  how  and to what extent one system has captured the other, if 
at all, and also examines the wider implications o f such developments, particularly in the context 
o f state-society relations and com peting legitimacies o f political systems. It also addresses some 
key issues, such as the conflicting role o f politicians in local conflicts and the use o f state 
resources in prom oting local interests, thereby raising questions o f conflicting loyalties between 
state and society. In the final analysis, the state itself has been incorporated into the Hagen 
political com petition.
Several case studies are presented in this thesis to  show that ‘traditional’ Hagen ideologies and 
cultural practices have been useful in rationalising political strategies adopted by groups and 
individuals in attem pting to achieve political goals. The Hagen ideology o f  tepam nga kangm 
(‘father’s son3) has been used in justifying claims to  leadership status, even in cases where there is
clearly no  indication that a claim ants father was a leader; just as that o f  tepam tenta; mema tenta 
(‘one father; one blood3) ideology governing group solidarity. G roup solidarity, o r tribal loyalty, 
as expressed in  block-voting and in  warfare, is a central feature in both elections and in inter­
group warfare and peace-m aking in the case studies presented here. A bove all else, the 
reputation o f  the group m ust n o t be allowed to  suffer: group solidarity is the overriding political 
value. Leaders m anipulate this ideology for their individual enhancem ent Massive financial and 
o ther resources are used in attem pting to  extend personal prestige, pow er and influence. 
H ageners, like o ther H ighlands peoples, often justify huge disparities in personal wealth and the 
flaunting o f  such wealth during elections by using the ‘traditional3 ideology o f  big-m en as a 
m agnet for attracting wealth, expressed in M elpa language as kung~mel mbo wua nmm kin petim 
(‘pigs and other w ealth stays w ith the big-men!).
This is essentially a study o f political change and cultural continuity, o f how  Hageners react to 
structural changes im posed upon them , o f  their engagem ent w ith state systems and o f how  at 
tim es they subvert the state w hen it suits th em  Ultimately these political responses and cultures 
affect the strength and viability o f the state o f  Papua New Guinea, w hich, despite its weakness, is 
far from  collapsing.
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Introduction
The Papua New Guinea Highlands region has a history o f perm anent human settlement, based 
on agricultural intensification and surplus production, that goes back nearly 10,000 years. And 
the people have a reputation for remarkable cultural innovation, vigour and resilience. But some 
o f the m ost revolutionary changes —  such as colonisation bringing a state system and the cash 
economy —  have occurred during the last sixty-five years. The analytical focus o f this study is 
on the resilience o f indigenous political fields o f competition and the innovative m anner in 
which Highlanders have responded to  the massive changes that have accompanied the transition 
from  pre-colonial autonomy to  colonial autocratic kiapdom to post-colonial statehood, with 
particular emphasis on the last decade.
The social and political implications o f such changes, however, are no t quite fully understood, 
despite num erous studies covering various aspects o f Highlands societies. Much o f what is 
presently written about the Highlands people comes initially from ethnographic accounts by 
social anthropologists and secondly from  m ore specifically focused studies on particular topics 
by observers from  other disciplines in the social sciences. It is however evident in the literature 
that m ost observers have failed fully to appreciate the complex processes that take place when 
state systems are superimposed on to tribally fragmented societies, which are sometimes called 
acephalous, literally ‘headless’, w ithout centralised political structures. A major contributing 
factor lies in the historical emphasis on Euro-centric approaches to analysing non-westem  
societies.
In  political studies, the application o f W estern models o f state and society in the analyses o f 
Third W odd societies has proved less fruitful than perhaps originally anticipated The 
‘modernisation’ approach, for instance, was based on the assumption that newly decolonised 
countries would develop progressively towards ‘m odem ’ state-hood, replicating those found in 
W estern societies. Despite political and cultural diversities, people in the newly created nations in 
Africa, South East Asia, Latin America and Oceania were expected to integrate quite sufficiently 
in order to  form  national identities, to foster common ideas o f purpose and pride in national 
achievements, and to create undivided loyalties and acceptance o f the state’s authority and 
m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force. But why has it no t happened in PN G , or wider 
Melanesia, and indeed the rest o f the Third World? Chazan et al (1988:15) quite rightly rebuked 
developm ent theorists for even thinking about such a direction in development: “the 
supposition that the W estern model o f development was both feasible and desirable smacked o f 
a type o f arrogance no t easily acceptable in countries that had only recently emerged from a 
period o f  colonial rule”, especially when newly created nations and their leaders at independence 
inherited from the colonial powers poorly developed infrastructure, underdeveloped economies
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primarily based on agriculture and extractive mineral exploitation, severely limited and poorly 
equipped social services facilities, and a predominantly illiterate population (including a largely 
unskilled labour force).
A nother problem  area is the traditional epistemological issue in anthropology: the personal and 
professional dilemma faced by field-observers in attempting to  deal with the contradiction 
between ‘inside* and ‘outside* perceptions o f society; how to reconcile presumed differences 
between how people perceive themselves and anthropological interpretations o f them. Despite 
the best intentions o f anthropologists to report on the ‘native’s point o f view*, the social science 
literature on the PN G  Highlands represents almost exclusively an outsider’s view o f society. As 
one anthropologist asked: “How is anthropological knowledge o f die way natives think, feel, 
and perceive possible?**, o r “if  we are going to cling to die injunction to see things from die 
native’s point o f view, where are we when we can no longer claim some unique form o f 
psychological closeness, a sort o f transcultural identification, with our subjects?” (Geerfcz 
1983:56).
W hilst it is possible for fieldworkers to develop a close attachment to members o f their host 
communities, they probably can never fully relinquish their own cultural identities, for doing so 
would o f course undermine their own socialisation processes. And, their interpretations are thus 
largely influenced by their own cultural values, personal experiences, and educational 
backgrounds. As a member o f one Highlands society and having benefited from both 
indigenous Melanesian and the introduced W estern systems o f socialisation (often called the 
‘informal* and ‘formal* education systems), I present here a study o f  state-society relations —  o f 
com peting legitimacies and parallel moral worlds —  from the perspective o f an ‘insider*. An 
‘insider* who sometimes operates on the ‘outside*, but one who is equipped with ‘academic 
blinkers* with which to lo o k  in* from the ‘outside*. My interpretations are also influenced by 
cultural and educational factors, but if the study suffers, or conversely, becomes strengthened by 
these, then it is because I share with Highlanders their cultural values and understand their 
political practices. But, as with outside observers, an insider’s view o f society can also suffer 
from limitations o f objectivity: for example, a certain aspect o f human behaviour that may 
appear quite striking to an outsider may not be considered by an insider as o f great significance 
because it occurs every day and may not be seen as anything other than ordinary. However, 
where an insider can make a valuable contribution is in combining inside knowledge o f how 
members o f society operate, taking into account the norms and values that govern political 
behaviour, enriched by insights gleaned from the literature —  the methodological discussions, 
theoretical approaches, and comparative studies o f Third W orld societies. That is, combining
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abstraction w ith empirical knowledge, o r in Geertz’s (1983) formulation, ‘experience-near’ with 
‘experience-distant*.1 This is precisely w hat I attem pt here.
Highlanders have, over the centuries, developed complex social and economic networks 
through which knowledge, valued scarce resources and surplus products have been passed from 
one group to  another. Specialised knowledge and economic resources are rare commodities and 
thus universally valued. An almost inevitable and somewhat endless pursuit o f power to control 
such commodities is the stuff o f Highlands politics, as is the case in all human societies 
throughout the world. Those who gain control o f  such networks invariably rise to the top, 
regardless o f w hether societies are hierarchical in structure, as in feudal Europe, o r egalitarian in 
ideology, as in pre-colonial Highlands societies.
In  many parts o f the PN G  Highlands, those who dominated exchange networks became leaders 
o f groups, coalitions and factions. Such individuals were identified by anthropologists as ‘big- 
men*, on the basis o f certain attributes —  principally entrepreneurial skills in surplus production, 
the manipulation o f  wealth and pre-eminence in ceremonial exchange, oratorical abilities and 
forceful personalities, (see A.J. Strathem 1966a, 1969b, 1971; see also Ryan 1961; Lowman- 
Vayda 1971; Sillitoe 1979; Rappaport 1984 [originally 1968]; and Feil 1987). According to this 
m odel o f leadership, big-men were perceived as managers and directors o f corporate activities 
upon which group prestige and individual renown are derived. These particular type o f leaders, 
whilst appearing to some as almost obsessively preoccupied with exchange relations, are claimed 
to have been at the apex o f the political order when confronted with new challenges brought 
about by the incorporation o f their universe into the national and global economy nearly 65 
years ago (For some early impressions, see Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8; Gitlow 1947; 
Simpson 1954. See also Standish 1978 and 1992; A.J. Strathem 1984; G ordon and Meggitt 1985; 
and Feil 1987 for discussions on how the indigenous political and economic systems may have 
been radically altered by the impact o f colonisation).
Since European contact in the early 1930s, PN G  Highlands societies have experienced dramatic 
and m onumental changes in the sphere o f politics, and their social, religious and economic 
systems. Some o f the changes have had almost catastrophic effects on indigenous economic and 
political systems. In fact, there has been some interpretation that indigenous systems may have 
been substantially tampered with, o r radically altered, or corrupted by foreign influences. A
1. Adopting a distinction formulated by the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut between what he called ‘experience- 
near* and ‘experience-distant’ concepts, Geertz views an experience-near concept as one that “an 
informant might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, 
imagine, and so on, and which he would readily understand when similarly applied by others.” And 
experience-distant concept, he says, “is one that specialists o f one sort or another —  an analyst, an 
experimenter, an ethnographer, even a priest or an ideologist —  employ to forward their scientific, 
philosophical, or practical aims” (1983:57).
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num ber o f observers from  various disciplines and sub-disciplines within the social sciences, with 
differing views and theoretical approaches, have all commented on the devastating and far- 
reaching effects o f colonisation, particularly by the deliberate flooding o f the local economy with 
large quantities o f  shells during the first two decades o f Australian rule in the Highlands and its 
im pact on the exchange networks which are a major element in Hagen politics (see A.J. 
Strathem  1966a, 1971; Hughes 1978; Standish 1978; and Feil 1982). “European tam pering with 
rates and the supply o f exchange valuables”, as argued by Feil (1987:95), directly led to  the 
“destruction o f indigenous economies and polities during the early colonial period”, which 
means that the so-called ‘traditional’ leadership patterns observed by anthropologists from  1945 
onwards may have no t been so ‘teaditional’ after all. This argument is pardy based on the 
assumption that anthropologists who worked in the 1960s may have been guilty o f 
overemphasising particular aspects o f leadership while down-playing the democratising effects 
o f  colonial rule (see Standish 1978; and Feil 1982), a significant point to which I shall return later 
(see Chapter Two).
The Hagen2 people —  whose cultural values and practices, political strategies and ideologies, 
and social networks are currently under scrutiny here —  received special attention from the 
com bined efforts o f gold prospectors, Michael and Dan Leahy, Lutheran and Catholic 
missionaries, and colonial administration officers. Early accounts o f Hagen society by Ross 
(1936), Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8) and Gitlow (1947) indicate that in pre-colonial times 
there was a rather high degree o f social stratification, involving well-defined classes o f ‘rich and 
powerful’, a large ‘middle class’, ‘poor*, ‘serfs’ o r ‘servants’ and even ‘slaves’ (compare A J. 
Strathem  1971,1987; Feil 1987).
Men o f the upper class were described as chiefs, who passed on the power to their eldest sons 
and comprised about six per cent o f the total male population (Gitlow 1947:35; quoted in Feil 
1987:118). Feil {ibid) Haims that these men alone were members o f the moka ceremonial 
exchange community and controlled the large pearlshells, the m ost prestigious and power
2 . I use ‘Hagen’ to  refer generally to the administrative district (formerly sub-district) and its inhabitants, 
‘M ount Hagpn’ for the town and provincial headquarters, Hagen society* for die cultural-linguistic area, 
which includes both Melpa and Temboka speakers. Such usage o f terms is quite consistent with the way 
Hagpners view themselves: not as Melpa or Temboka but as Hageners who speak different dialects o f the 
same language; and also consistent with the analysis o f the Strathems (see, for example, A J. Strathem 
1971, 1972; A M . Strathem 1972a). The cultural-linguistic area called Hagen had a population o f over 
160,000 during die 1990 Census and covers two districts: Hagen Central (Hagen Central, Anglimp and 
Nebilyer Census Divisions) with a population o f 99,549) and Hagen North (Mul and Dei Census 
Divisions) with a population o f 60,653 (excluding Baiyer-Lumusa, pop. 25,479, who are Enga speakers). 
M ount Hagen town, which had a population o f 17,500, and Kagamuga station, with 1,572 persons in 1990, 
were not included in Hagen district because o f a predominantly migrant population (see National 
Statistical Office 1993; 1994),
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concentrating items o f  value.3 Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8) and A.J. Strathem (1971) were 
virtually in agreement that before European contact big-men monopolised shell moka payments 
in Hagen. This situation, some say, was later modified by the presence o f Europeans (A.J. 
Strathem  1971:205), more specifically through the im portation by the colonisers o f large 
quantities o f shell valuables (see, for example, Hughes 1978; Connolly and Anderson 1987).
lik e  shells during the eady colonial period, more recently it has been the incorporation o f cash, 
cattle, beer, m otor vehicles and guns —  as highly valued economic resources —  into arenas o f 
political competition that has had a major impact on the indigenous political and economic 
systems. Equally significant had been the incorporation o f Hagen and other small-scale societies 
into a national entity to form the m odem  state o f Papua New Guinea. The cumulative effect o f 
all these processes involving phenomenal transformations has been the radical alteration o f the 
political status quo o f  pre-colonial Hagen society, perhaps not once but several times over.
This study looks at the ‘transformed’ or ‘altered’ Hagen, which is changed fiom  what essentially 
and commonly —  and sometimes incorrectly —  is viewed by social scientists as ‘traditional’ or 
‘pre-colonial’ society. Tre-colonial’ strictly refers to the period before colonisation, but what we 
often find in the PN G  literature are models and depictions o f society heavily modified by the 
presence o f foreigners. It is extremely difficult, even where fairly reliable oral historical accounts 
are available, to reconstruct pre-colonial society because no one knows the exact details o f pre­
colonial political and economic systems. Some o f these terms require clarification. In discussing 
politics, I use ‘indigenous’ to distinguish systems o f Hagen origin from introduced systems such 
as the state, ‘pre-colonial’ for the situation and practices that existed before European contact in 
1933, ‘traditional’ for customary practices whose origin predates the colonial period, and 
‘historical’ for processes and networks with roots gping back to pre-colonial times. Rather than 
using historical evidence to reconstruct pre-colonial Hagen society, this study focuses on 
contem porary political strategies and traces backwards in search o f the historical origins o f 
cultural values and ideologies that are regulady utilised in contemporary situations. It is therefore 
a study o f contemporary Hagen politics and the ways in which current practices and political 
behaviour have been shaped by historical processes and greatly influenced by relations between 
local groups, factions, neo-traditional coalition-style alliances and their leaders.
a . Moka is the Hagen term for reciprocal exchanges o f wealth between partners, in which the rule is that a 
main gift should exceed an initial or initiatory one (A.J. Strathem 1981:10). The Hagen moka system 
involves a complex network o f individuals, as pivotal points o f linkage between different groups, through 
which periodical exchanges o f wealth items o f live pigs, cash and other economic resources are exchanged. 
Hagen leaders traditionally acquire their eminence by virtue o f oratorical abilities and through success in 
competitive exchanges, particularly through moka, reparation payments and warfare (see A>J. Strathem 
1966a; 1969a; 1971; Brandewie 1971; 1981; Burton and Keher 1997). Moka, however, does more than 
build up big-men; it acts to create links o f debt and trust between individuals in an otherwise atomised 
society (Burton and Keher 1997:156). For further discussion on leadership roles in moka, reparation 
payment and warfare, see Chapter Five.
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M ore specifically, this is basically a local-level study which deals with questions o f how and why 
Hageners com pete for prestige, power and influence. The com petition is often expressed 
through both positive and negative reciprocity, where <positive> includes reciprocal gift 
exchanges and ‘negative’ includes payback killing. Such exchanges are conducted within the 
rarefied confines o f highly developed indigenous spheres o f com petition, now linked to state 
systems by way o f systematic merging o f ideologies and political practices (though, paradoxically, 
influenced by often conflicting sets o f values).
A fundamental reason for such com petition lies in the Hagen conviction that a person’s local 
group’s ‘name m ust no t go down’ {mbi mana nepangkd)> as expressed through localised support 
for politicians even after they may have been dismissed from office an d /o r jailed for 
m isconduct It is mainly because o f  the particular concept o f ‘the name’ and pride in group’s 
reputation that a lot o f  corrupt and incom petent politicians get re-elected, that massive resources 
are gambled (and lost) in elections, and that violence is regularly preferred over m ore peaceful 
avenues for resolving conflicts. M obilisation o f support for im portant events such as warfare, 
ceremonial exchange and elections are usually organised in the name o f the group. M ost 
members o f a group tend to agree that their clan o r tribal ‘name’ is far more im portant than 
themselves, even where prom inent individuals clearly do stand to benefit personally from 
making such com m itm ent It did not m atter in the W estern Highlands, for instance, that only 
few businessmen were in a position to prosper under the national administration o f local man, 
Paias W ingti, and that the province as a whole probably did not get as much attention as it 
deserved, because in the final analysis the voter regulady sacrificed personal benefits to gain ‘the 
name’ or renown that goes with the office o f the prime ministership. For the Hagener, the 
expression, ol lain Hagen hotim praim minista (the Hagen ‘line’ has the prime ministership), had a 
nice ring to it. W hy worry about lack o f developm ent o r the appointm ent o f non-Hageners or 
non-Highlanders as departm ental heads, when, after all, you have got the prime ministership? 
Paias W ingti, a clever political strategist who outmanoeuvred Michael Somare to gain re-election 
as Prime M inister in 1987 (see Turner and Hegarty 1987), apparently saw no great danger in 
overlooking senior Hageners and other Highlanders for top public service jobs. Some o f them 
eventually turned against him , including fellow Jika tribesmen, but his stunning defeat in 1997 
was ironically at the hands o f a rather mild mannered Catholic priest who comes from  the same 
group as Michael M el— a form er Treasurer who was endorsed by W ingti in 1997 in attem pt to 
block Paul Pora in Hagen Open. Although all o f his opponents played a part in Wingti’s election 
loss, that defeat is now seen by many Hageners as resulting from a major conspiracy to  pull 
W ingti down to  their level o f politics because he, like Iambakey Okuk in 1982, was seen as 
becom ing far too big for a Hagen big-man.
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Traditional ideas, infighting and practices thus becom e factors in contem porary state political 
institutions, just as m odem  econom ic resources and commodities have entered traditional 
cerem onial exchanges. T he incorporation o f  new econom ic resources into indigenous arenas o f 
com petition, such as the use o f  cash, cattle and m otor vehicles in moka exchanges, is a 
m anifestation o f  cultural continuity. But the use o f  cash itself and being part o f  the world 
econom y indicates change in society. These simple examples are essentially a m irror image o f a 
m uch broader change in society, involving a significant merging o f ideologies and cultural 
practices. A  m ajor case o f  merging or, m ore precisely, incorporation, presented in this study is 
the way in which Hageners have skilfully orchestrated 'traditional’ local events, such as 
cerem onial gift exchanges and com pensation payments, to  coincide w ith, and culminate in, both 
national and provincial governm ent elections.
Local groups have thus created w hat I call a Hagen m egacycle in which the state and its events 
have been incorporated into their political system, whereby Hagen values seem to be overriding 
state values, and political action at provincial and national levels is heavily influenced by 
com petition at the local leveL Several case studies on warfare and elections show that existing 
military alliances, strengthened by frequent intermarriage and intense moka exchange, are die 
prim e resources which aspiring politicians seek to  mobilise o r con tro l This is because election 
campaigns are essentially tied in w ith moka sequences, reparation payments for losses in warfare 
and military alliances. I t is based on the principle that once you fight one way, you are bound to  
vote the same way because it speeds up the reparation paym ent process. In practice, however, 
there are inherent problem s which m ust be overcome. Individuals, by virtue o f their free 
wheeling and dealing nature, can sometimes act as loose cannons, defying corporate policy to  
support candidates o ther than the one sponsored by the group. Such practices, on the one hand, 
highlight the contradictions between ideology and practice and between loyalty and betrayal, 
w hilst on  the other hand, emphasise the diverging goals and interests o f  individuals and groups, 
thereby reinforcing CTHanlon’s (1989:57) point that the ideally solidary group in fact harbours 
w ithin it traitors.
Essentially, the study contains an analysis o f  political com petition between powerful individuals, 
backed by even m ore powerful groups, factions and coalitions. M ost o f these groups have over 
the last decade accumulated arsenals o f sophisticated firearms w ith which they can hold their 
ow n against any force— including that o f the state. Some o f  their leaders, w ho are distinguished 
from  the masses by enorm ous wealth and power, can be described as 'super-big-m en’. These 
type o f  leaders, w hilst operating in patron-client relations with other types (such as businessm en, 
big-m en, fight-leaders, and leaders o f  raskol gangs), control the coffee and tea industries, in 
addition to  real estate, haulage, retail, and other business in Hagen and elsewhere in the country.
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By examining the com position o f  local groups and the m ajor arenas o f political com petition and 
cooperation w ithin which members o f such groups and their leaders interact, this study provides 
significant insights into the processes which take place when stateless, pre-capitalist societies 
come into contact w ith W estern state systems and the market economy. It is fundamentally a 
study o f  state-society interaction; o f how  people in Hagen deal with the superimposition o f 
m odem  state structures onto their tribally fragmented groups. By analysing political com petition 
at the local level where nationally prom inent leaders such as Paias W ingti, Michael Mel and Paul 
Pora operate, this study presents valuable insights towards understanding the behaviour o f  
politicians w ho interact within and between two separate moral realms.
Furtherm ore, this study explores the level and extent o f interpenetration between state and 
society in order to determ ine w hether one system has dominated the other. National politics, for 
instance, is characterised by parochial struggles, nepotism  and the various types o f  clientelism, 
while at the same tim e being concerned —  at least in name and law — with the governance o f 
the country o r nation as a whole. Clearly these are manifestations o f  a wider process o f  
com peting legitimacies, particularly when one set o f moral values is superimposed onto another. 
Parochial loyalties overriding national sentiments and the pervasive practice o f looking after 
people o f  the same language, tribe, clan and lineage are deeply entrenched in Melanesian cultural 
traditions. The prevalence o f  nepotistic patronage in governm ent, for instance, is a manifestation 
o f  a wider cultural practice in PN G  called wantok system. As noted by Standish:
Most PNG people retain a mind-set o f primary attachment and loyalty to their clan and tribal 
groups, sometimes known as wantoks, the Tokpisin word for people who speak the same 
language. Wantok identities extend into notions of region, such as the Highlands and the New 
Guinea Islands, and often lead to the belief that nepotistic patronage prevails in government 
(Standish 1994:60).
As expressed through the re-election o f numerous politicians after being found guilty o f 
m isconduct in office, the PN G  voters seem to have a remarkable capacity for forgiveness. An 
explanation may be found in the concept o f ‘us-versus-them’, whereby crimes against the state 
o r similar organisations are deemed morally acceptable, whilst offences committed against 
members o f one’s own group are n o t In Hagen society, the origins o f such ethical beliefs are 
firmly rooted in traditional rivalries between groups with a recent remembered history o f 
warfare. T hat is, stealing from  rival groups (and the state is very much viewed in the same way as 
another clan o r tribal group) is no t only acceptable but also encouraged because o f the virtual 
certainty that some o f die wealth will find its way into the local economy. Public servants who 
abuse their privileged positions to maximise personal gain are n o t branded as thieves but rather 
are adm ired for inking advantage o f their opportunities. PN G  however is no t unique in 
developing such a system o f largesse, based on the conflicting roles o f public servants and 
politicians w ho themselves, as members o f local communities, are tom  between their social
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obligations towards their kinsmen (rnntoks) and their official duties as public office holders. A 
similar type o f  wantok system has been reported in an African context
Most educated Africans are citizens o f two publics in the same society. On the one 
hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they 
give only grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which 
they derive htde or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give 
generously and do give materially. To make matters more complicated, their 
relationship to the primordial public is moral, while that to the public is amoral.. .A 
good citizen of the primordial public gives out and asks for nothing in return; a lucky 
citizens of the civic public gains from the civic public but enjoys escaping giving in 
return whatever he can. But such a lucky man would not be good man were he is to 
rharmel all his lucky gains to his private purse. He will only continue to be a good man 
if he channels part of his largesse from the civic public to the primordial public. That is 
the logic o f the dialectics. The unwritten law of the dialectics is that it is legitimate to 
rob the civic public in order to strengthen the primordial public (Ekeh 1975:108).
Parochial political culture thus impacts on national politics. And because practices such as 
wantoks looking after wantoks at national and provincial levels are largely based on, o r justified by, 
ideologies o f custom  and group solidarity, one may ask: can the behaviour o f national politicians 
be viewed as instances o f  local values dom inating state values? O ther similar issues and 
questions raised here are:
•  Com peting values and duties (kinship obligation versus outright bribery and corruption). 
D oes fulfilling a kinship obligation leads to bribery o r corruption? Kinship obligation 
requires m oney, hence corruption (theft) o r the acceptance o f bribes. Are cash handouts 
during elections perceived as bribery o r the fulfilment o f kinship obligations?
•  The often conflicting roles held by politicians, policemen and other state officials (as 
gnyernm ent legislators o r state employees, and as tribesmen). Should legislators always 
uphold the laws they make o r do they have a deeper obligation to their group to 
participate in local arenas o f com petition such as tribal warfare? Are there short-term  
gains in instigating warfare and the use o f raskol gangs in intimidating rivals and their 
supporters? D oes involvem ent in local conflicts ultimately underm ine their integrity as 
national leaders?
•  D oes w hat I call the Hagen m ode o f politics (largely based on nepotistic patronage o r 
wantok system, horse-trading after elections and tribal loyalties), ultimately contribute 
towards bankrupting PN G , morally and economically? Such a process may well be 
under way but is surely far from  complete.
W hile these questions may relate to politics in Hagen, the answers relate to other parts o f Papua 
N ew  Guinea, arid indeed help explain politics in many Third W orld societies. In  fact, the 
answers should help explain the PN G  political culture, and by implication, higjiligfit the
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similarities and differences between Ih ird  World societies, different types and styles of 
leadership and their modes of operation. Understanding local politics, however, requires a good 
knowledge of cultural values and practices. Whilst the Hagen cultural values and practices will be 
discussed in the relevant parts of the thesis, it is necessary here to briefly outline the cultural- 
linguistic area called Hagen (see Map 2, below).
M ap 2: The H agen Cultural-Linguistic Area
Sourve: AJ. Strathem (1971) and Merlan and Rumsey (1991).
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Some notes about H ageners
H ie  cultural-linguistic area known as Hagen is situated in the Central Highlands region o f Papua 
New Guinea. A  population o f over 160,000 people (1990 Census) occupy part o f the central 
valley system o f the Highlands. Hageners live in homesteads and villages on the fertile floor and 
the side walls o f the m ajor valleys (upper Wahgi, Nebilyer and eastern Baiyer), the Togoba 
(pronounced Tokpa in Melpa) and Ogelbeng plains, and the foothills o f M ount Hagen. M ost 
settlem ent in these areas, as noted by Burton and K eher (1997:154), is at an altitude o f 1,500 to  
1,600 metres.
The people are predom inantly subsistence fanners who depend almost exclusively on the land 
for their livelihood. Land is communally owned and individual access to gardening land is by 
virtue o f membership o f local groups, tribes and clans. Although access to clan land, especially 
that covered by virgin forest, was traditionally regulated by the principle o f usufructuary rights, it 
is nowadays commonly inherited through immediate family ties. An explanation for this may be 
found in the fact that “shifting, forest-fallow cultivation is virtually unknown in these areas and 
the population densities rise locally above 100 persons per square kilometres” (Burton and 
K eher 1997:154). The population density on the floor o f the Wahgi and the Ogelbeng plains is 
believed to be much higher, perhaps at 200 o r m ore persons per square kilometres. However, in 
the absence o f any systematic study linking population pressure to land tenure, it is difficult to 
make any firm statements about land rights and population growth in this part o f the country.
The principal sources o f monetary income for these people are cash crops o f coffee, tea, 
cardamom and food crops, including a large variety o f tropical fruits (such as bananas, 
pineapples, pawpaws, guavas, avocados, oranges, mandarins, lemons, passionfruit, tomatoes, 
marita pandanus) and numerous types o f vegetables (lettuces, cabbages, abiha> beans, pumpkins, 
cucumber, com , capsicum, carrots, broccoli, cauliflower, chilli peppers, winged bean) in addition 
to  tubers (notably the staple sweet potato, and taro, yams, husbin (tuber o f winged bean), cassava, 
Kngtish potato, ginger) and some nuts (mostly peanuts and occasionally karuka pandanus) and 
sugarcane sold at local markets. Some o f these food crops are freighted in trucks and planes to 
the coastal towns o f Lae, Madang and Port Moresby where they are sold at exorbitant prices.
Coffee is the principal cash crop in Hagen. Like bananas and sugarcane, coffee is a 
predom inantly ‘male-crop7, grown by men and, although the cherries are picked from  the trees 
and prepared mostly by women, the proceeds from the sale o f dried beans are largely controlled 
by men. Accordingly, coffee is an im portant status symbol: for example, a man who has many 
coffee gardens is regarded with high esteem, while one who has none is treated with contem pt 
The exceptionally high value placed on coffee is reflected in the speeches made by big-men. In
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public oratory, for instance, it is culturally fashionable for orators to associate leadership with 
lo n g  pigs houses’ {kung manga rukJ) and ‘ocean o f coffee trees’ (kvpi pana kutd)> thereby 
suggesting that coffee has now  been accepted as an im portant political resource, like pigs, cash 
and previously peadshells.
In  the w ider context, coffee is an im portant symbolic indicator o f the incorporation o f the 
Hagen people into the global economy. As a primary source o f income, coffee helps ease some 
o f  the pressures o f  the capitalist economy. Recurrent expenses, including im ported food items, 
travel and clothing, in addition to  constantly increasing school fees, airfares and fuel prices, can 
only be m et by the proceeds from  coffee. In  recent years, however, the small-holding coffee 
industry has been m arred by marginally diminishing returns. Despite recent increases in coffee 
pnces, the returns have been relatively poor due to  years o f  neglect o f  the coffee trees.
The people o f Hagen speak Melpa, a Non-Austronesian language classified as part o f the 
Central Language Family, East New Guinea Highlands Stock, Trans-New Guinea Phylum 
(Wurm and H attori 1981). People in the neighbouring Nebilyer Valley speak a closely related 
language called Tem boka (see M edan and Rumsey 1991). Some Hagen groups —  including the 
Jika, Kukilka and Penam be tribes —  are split across this m inor linguistic and cultural boundary. 
M oreover, as noted by A.J. Strathem , Hageners themselves make a num ber o f  distinctions 
w ithin and pardy cross-cutting this linguistic classification:
They divide themselves into speakers of Melpa, Temboka and Kowul [also pronounced 
as Kami, or Kawigfl. Temboka talk’, with a number of named sub-dialects, is spoken in 
the Nebilyer Valley and by persons who belong to groups which have migrated 
northwards from the Nebilyer. ‘Kouwul talk’ belongs to certain groups along die slopes 
o f Mount Hagpn, stretching across to TambuL Melpa talk’ is co-extensive with Wurm’s 
Hagen language. Around Hagen township people are often bilingual in Melpa and 
Temboka, and if they understand the latter they can follow ‘Kowul talk’ (and 
Imbonggu) also. Within this category o f Melpa, which they are more likely to refer to as 
mbo-iky [‘stock talk5] or ‘native talk’, the people distinguish further between Kama (or 
Komd)-ik and Kopon-ik. The high plains rolling down from [the foothills] of Mount 
Hagen out to the Wahgi Valley are the Kama or ‘cold region’, where a dialect or sub­
dialect which is closer to Temboka-talk is spoken. Over the range of hills which bounds 
this region on its north side, is the area spoken of as Kopon, bush country’, and thought 
of as hot and heavily forested; although the people in this area themselves reserve the 
tprm Kopon for the much low-lying Jimi Valley and refer to their own area as ‘Korka- 
place’ (AJ. Strathem 1971:6; see also Medan and Rumsey 1991:21-22 for comparable 
discussion).
The Korka-kona (‘place o f scarcity’) is in fact a term  used n o t by people who live there, but by die 
K opon people when referring generally to people w ho live on the southern slopes o f the Sepik- 
W ahgi Divide. In  contrast w ith their own tem perate zones at a relatively low  altitude o f less than 
1,500 m etres above sea level, where food —  particularly the marita fruit pandanus, taro and 
breadfruit —  is thought o f as being plentiful, the Korka-place on the m ountain slopes has fewer
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varieties and people here are seen as being dependent on those in the Kopon-roan-kona (hum id 
tropics’) for tropical fruits and vegetables.
Andrew and Marilyn Strathem  distinguished die K om a and K opon areas as die Central and 
N orthern M elpa, respectively, and it was at the Kawelka territories at Mbukl —  a ridge 
overlooking the W ahgi, Baiyer and Jim i valleys —  within this northern part o f the Melpa- 
speaking area diat m ost o f  their initial w ork was done (see, for example, A j. Strathem  1971:6; 
A J. and A M . Strathem  1971:12*13. The distinction is o f course a geographical one and 
linguistically does n o t apply to  some groups, such as the Kawelka, w ho have territories in both 
K opon and K om a areas and are currently in dose association w ith some Jika groups with whom 
they have intensive marriage and exchange relations. F or m e, there is no difference between 
Kum a and K opon "talk’, as I speak ‘modem* Melpa, which is a com bination o f  both K opon (my 
father's sub-dialect) and Kum a (my m other's sub-dialect), as well as Tem boka (my maternal 
grandm other's dialect) and can understand Kauil ‘talk'.
Ideally, people in Hagen live in territory-claiming nam ed groups. These groups, called tribes in 
English, are made up o f  (at least nominally) patrilineal dans which often claim rem ote com m on 
ancestry (see Chapter Four). These groups can be very competitive and often try to  outdo each 
other with gifts o f m oney and pigs in the never ending politics o f  reciprocal exchanges (see A J. 
Strathem  1971; see also A J. & A.M. Strathem  1971:3; R ubd and Rosman: 1978:195-196). The 
M ount Hagen moka ceremonial exchange system is one such arena o f  inter-group com petition 
bu t electoral politics is arguably fast becom ing an attractive arena for such com petition in the 
m odem  era.
Why Hagen?
The selection o f M ount Hagen as an area o f  study for this thesis was intentional and purposeful 
Hagen is a significant choice for this study no t only because I, as a m em ber that sodety, have 
‘inside’ knowledge o f how  the system operates, but m ore importantly because o f the following 
factors. Firstly, M ount Hagen is believed to  be the birthplace o f  agricultural intensification, 
which initially gave rise to  the exchange complex, upon which political com petition is largely 
based.4 Ceremonial exchanges o f  wealth item s, such as pigs, previously pearisheUs and nowadays
The evidence for Kuk, near M ount Hagen, as a “sort o f the birthplace’ o f PN G  Highlands agriculture and 
the efflorescence o f social and cultural associated with an intensified agricultural regime” (Fell 1987:18), 
comes from Jack G obon’s archaeological work at Kuk, which places the origins o f agriculture at the 
surprisingly early date o f 9,000 years, agricultural intensification at around 6,000 years, domestication o f 
pigs at around 2^00 years, and the adoption o f sweet potato at 300 years ago (see G obon 1977, 1981, 
1982; see also SwadKng 1981:31, 1998; Swadlmg, Golson and Muke 1998; Feil 1987:Chap.2). In other 
words, PN G  Highlanders were among die earliest —  perhaps the very earliest— gardeners in the world 
(see Turner 1994:117), and the intensity o f Hagen agriculture, exchange systems and political competition 
may well have a  deeper time span than what m ost people think.
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cash, are particularly highly elaborated in Hagen, where they have crystallised into a specific 
institutional form  known as the moha, in which groups and individuals attem pt to repay gifts at a 
higjher level than those received previously (see A.J. Strathem 1992). The link between moha and 
a type o f leadership called ‘big-men’ (uma mum in  Melpa language) and its remarkable resilience in 
the face o f  rapid social change has impressed many people, including Andrew Strathem , a keen 
observer o f  Hagen politics since 1964, who recently w rote that:
This has introduced a pervasive process of competition for prestige, and those individuals 
most successful at moha emerge as £<big-men”, or leaders o f factions, networks, and at times 
even segmentary groups. Far from disappearing as a result of social change, moka exchanges 
has tended to effloresce and ramify. They have made their own contribution to the widening 
of spheres of political action in contemporary society (AJ. Strathem 1992:231).
Despite the m ajor transitions in Papua New Guinea and the constant economic pressures 
exerted on the people’s lives by the harsh realities o f the imposed capitalist economy, Hageners 
continue to  use moha as an im portant arena for political competition and, at times, incorporating 
state systems and resources into their exchanges.
Secondly, this is a chance to  study the innovative m anner in which Hageners have captured and 
modified the state system to suit their lifestyle which may have few parallels anywhere in Papua 
New Guinea, o r in Melanesia, o r elsewhere in the w odd.5 Cleady there are local mechanisms at 
w ork here, such as:
•  In  m obilising support and resources for elections, candidates rely heavily on big-men from 
within their own group, as leaders o f their own factions, to secure assurances o f support 
from  other leaders o f similar factions in other groups with which they often have exchange 
ties. It is the local big-men, with oratorical skills and historical knowledge o f relations 
between groups (either o f alliance o r enmity), who tend to be successful in making 
arrangements between groups, ensuring that one group supports the other’s candidate and 
n o t endorse its own. By applying the principles o f moka, such support creates a 
disequilibrium (of obligation) which m ust be balanced through reciprocal action on the part 
o f the group that receives the support The support itself may even take the form o f moka, as 
occurred in a recent election (see Chapter Eight),
•  Huge economic ‘investment’ to ensure group allies’ support, including thousands o f kina 
and hundreds o f pigs, in election campaigns.
5 . As pointed out by Bill Standish, there are some parallels (for example, Simbu). State politics in Simbu is 
perhaps not as integrated with an exchange cycle, but neither Paula Brown, nor Standish, nor anyone else 
had studied the links in detail (personal communication, December, 1997).
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T he ever increasing use o f force, including threat o f force and actual physical violence, as a 
m eans to  coerce voters to  vote in a certain way, is in part associated w ith the use o f  massive 
am ounts o f econom ic resources.
The ideology o f  group solidarity, as often expressed through the practice o f ‘bloc-voting’ for 
a trib e /d an  candidate. This becomes the candidate’s ‘base-vote’. Defectors are neady always 
punished for w hat is commonly perceived as betrayal o f tribal o r dan  loyalty. In die Hagen 
world view, defecting from  a local candidate and supporting the opposition is like betraying 
a fellow tribesm an o r clansman to  enemies during warfare.
Elections are, in fact, viewed as a form  o f warfare which requires the full cooperation o f all 
members o f  the group, especially when a lo t o f things are at stake here, induding the 
reputations o f leaders and the group whose ‘name m ust no t go down’ {min mana nepanhd).
W hile the big-man, orators and factional leaders —  representing the interests o f churches, 
youth, wom en, and ‘name-list’ groups —  play an im portant part in mobilising support for 
candidates, politicians rely on other types o f leaders to convert assurances o f support into 
actual votes. H ere, candidates depend heavily on despotic councillors and fight-leaders, 
mskol gang leaders and other violent and ‘hot-headed’ (pcng kuncti) men to protect the ‘base- 
vote’ and to  direct voters along parochial lines so that no one votes for the ‘wrong’ 
candidate.
Politicians also depend on a variety o f other (modem) organisations, such as business 
developm ent associations, political parties and large business corporations for financial 
assistance in elections.
Politicians may even use weapons, especially firearms, to intimidate and solidify the vote.
The incorporation o f ‘traditional’ Hagen ideologies and cultural practices into elections, 
whereby obligations are created through the exercise o f voting for a certain candidate. Again, 
following moka principles but on individual basis (as opposed to group), this is based on the 
understanding that such obligations m ust be repaid somehow, conceivably through the 
disbursem ent o f  governm ent funds (in the event o f the candidate being voted into office), o r 
alternatively, through personal means (for losing candidates, although no t all o f  them  will 
honour their obligations); and
An apparently higher priority placed on elections, above almost every other arena o f political 
com petition (and cooperation), as indicated by mutual truce agreements reached by warring 
groups during both national and provincial governm ent elections, and m oreover, by the 
m anner in which moka sequences and the cycles o f war reparation payments have been
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skilfully orchestrated to  coincide with elections. A num ber o f cases involving truce 
agreements mutually reached by warring groups are discussed in the relevant chapters o f the 
thesis.
Thirdly, the W estern Highlands is the second m ost populous province in Papua New Guinea. 
T he province has a land area o f 8,897 square kilometres and in 1990 had a citizen population o f 
335,592, com prising 285,946 persons bom  in the province and 49,646 persons bom  in other 
provinces, and a non-citizen population o f 586 persons (National Statistical Office 1993,1994). 
The W estern Highlands Province, with a total population o f over 336,000 persons, “is now  24.5 
per cent o f  the population o f the Highlands region and 9.3 per cent o f  the population o f  PN G  
excluding N orth Solom ons Province” (NSO 1994:7). A t the time o f the 1990 Census the 
province had a physiological (nutritional) population density o f 81 persons per square kilometre 
for all sectors and a density o f  76 persons per square kilometre for the rural sector (NSO 
1994:30).6 However, in m ost parts o f the province, especially where large populations are 
concentrated on the floor o f the W ahgi valley and on the Ogelbeng plains around M ount 
Hagen, the population density is believed to  be much higher at around 200 persons per square 
kilometre.
Fourthly, the provincial capital, M ount Hagen, is the main commercial centre for the Highlands 
region, providing banking, transport and communication facilities for individuals and businesses 
operating in Enga, Simbu and Southern Highlands provinces. The airport at Kagamuga, which 
now  offers a direct route to Cairns in Australia, is the main point o f entry and departure for 
these provinces, and hence the town has becom e the main service centre for the oil and gold 
exploration and exploitation. Economically, the W estern Highlands Province is Papua New 
Guinea’s largest producer o f  coffee and tea (Turner 1994:228), a point echoed in a recent study:
Its rural economy accounts for half of Papua New Guinea’s coffee exports and almost 
all of the tea crop, while the provincial capital, Mount Hagen dominates h e  regional 
business economy by virtue of its favourable location on the highlands road network, a 
plentiful supply of land for subdivision near the town, an airport capable o f handling jet 
aircraft, and a service sector primed for expansion by the size of h e  plantation sector.
If5 by h e  mid-1980s, Mount Hagen did not surpass Goroka in hese respects, gpld, oil
6. O n land area in h e  Western Highlands Province, h ere  is a discrepancy between h e  National Statistical
Office figure o f 8,897 square kilometres (1994:29) and a recent figure o f 9,147 square kilometres given by 
Burton and Keher (1997:155). O n h e  basis o f h e  NSO figure, it was calculated h a t h e  crude (arithmetic) 
population density, which is defined as h e  num ber o f persons per square kilometre, was 38 persons per 
square kilometre at h e  time o f h e  1990 Census (NSO 1994:30; Table 11:30). As pointed out by .h e  
National Statistical Office, “crude population density gives however a rather misleading picture o f h e  real 
population-land situation and problems, particularly in a province like Western Highlands Province where 
m ost people are engaged in agricultural activities. A far more meaningful measure o f population density in 
h e  case o f W estern Highlands Province is h e  num ber o f persons per km2 o f land which can be used for 
agriculture, (arable land*)” (NSO 1994:29). Citing a 1986 CSIRO figure o f only 4,135 square kilometres o f 
land in the province being effectively used for agriculture, NSO arrived at h e  physiological population 
density figure o f 81 persons per square kilometre (NSO 1994:30; Table 11:13).
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and gas developments to the west at Porgera and Mount Kare, in Enga, and at Iagifu 
and Hides, in Southern Highlands, have since given rise to an investment boom which 
has assured Mount Hagen an unchallengeable position as the primary service centre of 
the Highlands region (Burton and Keher 1997:152).
The coffee industry alone, comprising large locally-owned plantations —  notably Gumanch, 
Kinjibi, K otna, Penga, W urup, Kindeng, Aviamp, Kimil, Warn Kar, and Kudjip —  and small­
holdings maintained on an individual basis, is w orth about K250 million per annum, a figure 
which includes other provinces.7 Significantly, all o f these are located in the upper and middle 
parts o f  the W ahgi valley. The operations in two other large plantations, Tigi in the eastern 
Baiyer Valley and Korgua in the Nebilyer Valley, have been disrupted by tribal warfare.
Fifthly, the leaders o f the country’s m ajor political parties are based in M ount Hagen, with party- 
aligned interest groups clearly at work here, perhaps reaching a level o f political integration that 
is much m ore cohesive than in other parts o f the country. Names such as Paias W ingti, Paul 
Pora and Michael Mel go way beyond local boundaries. A history o f competition between party- 
aligned interest groups has been analysed in the context o f the W estern Highlands Provincial 
G overnm ent and the rivalry between the People’s Democratic M ovement (PDM) Party and the 
National Party (see Chapter Seven). Both PDM , headed by Paias Wingti, and the two factions o f 
the National Party, headed separately by Paid Pora and Michael Mel, have strong following in 
the M ount Hagen Central area, but are no t as strong in other parts o f the province. The other 
m ajor PN G  parties with Hageners as leaders are: Pangu Pad (with Kombukla tribesman, Pati 
W amp, as the national president); and the People’s Progress Party (PPP, with Jika Milakamb 
r1ansmar>? G len Komomga, as its national president). Both Pangu and PPP are relatively weak in 
term s o f  party following in Hagen because m ost people view them  as the nambis or coastal 
parties and their nominal Hagen leaders as mere window dressing (bibs tasol). It is nonetheless 
the com petition between such men and their followings and the problems that stem from such 
behaviour which form  the focus o f this study.
Although Hagen politics may be influenced by unique circumstances, it has strong implications 
for PN G  political culture because Hagen leaders such as Wingti, Pora and Mel also operate at 
provincial, regional and national levels. Furthermore, Hagen shares with other Highlands 
societies common historical, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Conversely, there is
also considerable variation within the Highlands and at times Hays s (1993) fuzzy-set’ seems 
applicable. According to Hays, ‘“the New Guinea Highlands’ as used in anthropological 
discourse exemplifies well what cognitive psychologists would call a ‘fuzzy set”’, which means
7 . As indicated by Turner (1994:58), coffee is by far the m ost important cash crop in Papua New Guinea, 
and the K103 million worth o f beans exported in 1990 (55,000 metric tons) represented 9.2 per cent o f 
total PN G  exports. Every adult male in Hagen may be engaged in coffee smallholding. Tea, by contrast, is 
no t viewed as attractive because o f poor prices, and it is therefore grown by plantations. According to 
Turner (1994:212), in 1990 K6.7 million worth o f tea was exported, mainly to Australia.
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that “despite attempts to specify attributes (elevation, population density, agricultural techniques, 
staple crops, settlement types, or social institutions such as ceremonial exchange), when 
anthropologists assign societies to ‘the Highlands’ these attributes are less often truly diagnostic 
than loosely employed, with weightings on sliding scales” (1993:145).
While the cultural delineation o f the PN G  Highlands may be blurred by overlapping 
characteristics, the geographical, political and administrative region called the PN G  Highlands is 
made up o f  five provinces: Eastern Highlands, Simbu, Western Highlands, Enga and Southern 
Highlands. Initially starting as the Central Highlands District, the area was divided into Eastern 
Highlands, Western Highlands, and Southern Highlands Districts in 1952. Enga and Simbu 
provinces were subsequently creations from Western and Eastern Highlands, in 1966 and 1973, 
respectively (Iamo and Ketan 1992:22). It is easily the most densely populated region in PNG. 
The resident population o f  the Highlands region in 1990 was 1,371,000 persons, or 36.7 per cent 
o f  the total PN G  population o f  3.7 million (NSO 1994). The highest concentration o f 
population in the Highlands, according to the 1990 Census, is illustrated below (see Figure 1. /).
Figure 1.1: PNG Population by Region (1990)
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There are some seventy-two linguistic groups, ranging from the smallest (Some and Abaga), with 
only 150 speakers, to the country’s second largest (Enga together with Kyaka), with over 200,000 
speakers. There is a tendency for linguistic groups to become larger going from east to west in 
the central mountain valleys, while the language groups on the Highlands fringe remain small 
(Iamo and Ketan 1992:22; see also Feil 1987:140-167). The cultural, linguistic, geographical and 
administrative region described here as the PN G  Highlands is indicated in Map 3.
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M ap 3: T he Papua New Guinea H ighlands Region
Source: lam o and Ketan (1992).
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Ethnographic Sources
To date, the literature on PN G  Highlands societies in general, and the Hagen area in particular, 
is quite substantial, both in volume and in the richness o f observation and analysis it contains. 
M uch o f this literature contains anthropological debates on characteristics o f ‘traditional’ PN G  
Highlands societies, ranging from  descent and kinship relations to group structures, social 
organisation, leadership and politics. A significant part o f this literature extends back to the early 
years o f European contact Much o f social scientists’ knowledge o f pre-colonial and post­
contact Hagen society is owed to the writings o f Lutheran missionaries, Geoxg Vicedom 
(Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8) and Herm ann Strauss (Strauss and Tischner 1962). Vicedom 
was based at Ogelbeng from  1935 onwards and his work covers a wide range o f themes, ranging 
from  myths and genealogies to  ceremonial exchange and leadership. H e worked mostly with the 
Jika and Yamka groups around Ogelbeng and, mainly on the basis o f genealogies and origin- 
myths, concluded that they were descendants o f a ‘master race* which colonised Hagen from the 
West*. Vicedom, however, did no t know that the W est’ from which Jika and Yamka came from 
was in feet the Kaugel and Tambul areas, not some distant foreign places as he may have 
thought (see A.J. Strathem 1987:253). O f particular interest is his picture o f Hagen with a high 
degree o f stratification. H is publication, Die Mbowamb is massive (three large volumes), and o f 
considerable value if  read with a critical eye, for example, to its full-blown master race theory 
(see M edan and Rumsey 1991-30-31; see also A.J. Strathem 1971, 1987 for a critical review o f 
Vicedom’s material o f stratification and his ‘light-skinned master race* theory). Vicedom’s 
countryman and missionary colleague, Strauss came to Ogelbeng in 1936 and his Die Mi-Kulture 
is largely a study o f Hagen cults, but contains observations on ceremonial exchange and other 
aspects o f  Hagen society as w ell Strauss worked mostly among the Nengka people o f Mul 
Council. N oting discrepancies between Vicedom and Strauss’s interpretations, A.J. Strathem 
says:
D espite the fact th at they w ere m issionaries o f  the sam e church and the sam e nation, 
thpir pictures o f  H agen society differed considerably and it clear th at a political 
dim ension underlies th is difference o f view. V icedom ’s hierarchical, blood-based, 
picture reflects m ore the G erm an ideology o f  the tim e. Strauss, w riting w ith  m uch 
b etter contro l o f  the language and  better rapport w ith the people, as w ell as the defeat 
o f  his country in  the w ar behind him , gives an  account w hich is closer to  those o f the 
academ ic anthropologists w ho w orked in  neighbouring areas o f the H ighlands in  the 
1950s and 1960s (A J. S trathem  1987:254).
O ther early works were by the Catholic missionary Father Ross (1936) and Gidow (1947), an 
American military officer stationed in M ount Hagen during the war, whose knowledge o f
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‘Hagen econom ic relations* comes from  Ross* notes (see Simpson 1954; A J. Strathem  1987; 
M edan and Rumsey 1991).8
Professional anthropologists began w orking in Hagen during the 1960s, w ith Marilyn and 
Andrew Strathem  am ong Hagen Central and D ei Council groups and E. Brandewie am ong Mul 
Council groups. Brandewie conducted his fieldwork in 1963-65 among the Kum di people o f 
W estern Melpa. H e has recently published a general ethnographic account o f the Kumdi, with 
special emphases on  marriage and exchange. Andrew and Marilyn Strathem  have consistently 
worked in Hagen since 1964. Their initial fieldwork in 1964-5 and 1968 (18 m onths) was 
conducted mainly am ong my people, the Kawelka o f N orthern and Central Melpa. From  this 
and subsequent visits over the years, the Strathem s have published extensively, counting at least 
ten books and countless papers. Having read their work for m ore than 15 years, I have benefited 
quite significantly from  their w ork, particularly Andrew Strathem ’s, which has had a m ajor 
influence in my academic life.9 H is book The Rope of Moka (1971) is a study o f ceremonial 
exchange and leadership, while One Father, One Blood (1972) looks at group structure and 
ideology. Some o f his o ther Hagen volumes are Ongka: a Self-account by a New Guinea Big-man 
(1979b), translated by A,J. Strathem ; A  Line of Rower (1984), a study o f political and social change 
in Hagen and Pangia; Ru: Biography of a Western Highlander (1993), translated by A.J. Strathem. Self 
Decoration in Mount Hagen (1971), in collaboration w ith Marilyn Strathem , is a study o f facial and 
body decoration as art in Hagen. Marilyn (A.M.) Strathem  has produced four volumes: Official 
and Unofficial Courts (1972a), a study o f  indigenous and introduced dispute management 
procedures; Women in Between (1972b), a study o f Melpa marriage and the role o f wom en as links 
between different groups; No Money on Our Skins (1975), a study o f Hagen migrants in P ort 
M oresby; and The Gender of the Gift (1988), a comparative study o f exchange addressing 
anthropological theories o f gender in Melanesia.10
9
10
According to Colin Simpson (1954), Abraham L. Gidow, “a war history officer o f the U.S. Far East Air 
Service Command” visited M ount Hagen during the Second World War. “Gidow who had been trained 
as an economist and was to study anthropology on his return to  America, remained at M ount Hagen for 
several weeks” during which “he gathered a great deal o f material on the native way o f life, m ost o f it from 
Father William Ross, and he was also helped by Major George Greathead” (1954:106). I take up the 
discussion in Chapter Two and Chapter Six, but at this stage it should be pointed out that both Ross and 
Gidow’s material in particular must be treated with caution and we can question die validity o f their data in 
view o f their lack o f training in anthropological fieldwork and Gidow’s in the context o f his severely 
restricted time frame o f “several weeks”.
In hindsight, it was perhaps no co-incidence that my high school headmaster presented me with brand 
new copies o f A J. Strathem’s major volumes, The Ripe o f Moka (1971) and One Father, One Blood (1972), 
during the 1982 Sogeri National High School Graduation, a ceremony which A J. Strathem kindly 
attended at the school’s invitation.
Both Andrew and Marilyn Strathem are amazingly prolific writers and whilst it is difficult to give an exact 
figure, in 1993, at least for Andrew Strathem I counted 18 books, 138 articles, 10 comments, 91 reviews 
and 8 papers in progress (all complete manuscripts, some submitted for publication).
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I have also drawn from  studies on people in neighbouring areas, notably Francesca Medan and 
Alan Rumsey’s (1991) work am ong the Nebilyer, John Muke’s (1994) study on warfare among 
die Kuma o f South Wahgjt; Michael O ’Hanlon’s (1989) work among the Komblo o f N orth 
WahgL O ther studies, including Marie Reay’s (1959) work on the Kuma, Roy Rappaporfs 
(1984[originally 1968]) w ork am ong the M ating and Paula Brown’s (1963; 1972) work in 
Chimbu, are m entioned in the relevant discussions.
PNG Political Studies
Studies on PN G  politics can be classified into two broad categories, depending on traditional 
disciplinary emphasis on different levels o f political competition. O n the one hand is the study 
o f local-level, tribally-based politics, while on the other hand is the narional-provindal-level 
politics. Generally, the form er involves competition between individuals and groups in local 
arenas o f competition and cooperation, such as warfare and ceremonial exchange. This is the 
kind o f stuff which anthropologists have traditionally been interested in. And the latter involves 
com petition within state structures and legitimising processes o f governance. That is the kind o f 
stuff which political scientists have traditionally been interested in. Recent evidence indicates a 
third category which we may call ‘transitional studies’, involving changing and continuing 
patterns o f  leadership and political behaviour. Examples o f local-level studies can be found in 
Bem dt and Lawrence (ed. 1971), for ‘transitional studies’ (see, for example, W ard ed. 1970; A.J. 
Strathem  1984; G ordon and Meggitt 1985; Warry 1987; Standish 1992), and for national- 
provincial-level, there are numerous election studies (Bettison, Hughes and van der Veur, eds. 
1965; Epstein, Parker and Reay, eds. 1971; Stone ed. 1976; Hegarty ed. 1983; Turner and 
Hegarty 1987; King ed. 1989; Oliver ed  1989; Saffu e d  19%). The election studies cover the 
seven national elections between 1964 and 1992 and all, except Turner and Hegarty (1987), 
contain a collection o f papers by anthropologists, political scientists and others on different 
electorates within the country. The problems that stem from electoral behaviour and other types 
o f com petition have also been analysed (see, for example, Clifford, Morauta and Stuart 1984; 
D innen 1996b); as have Australian responses to PN G ’s security problems (see, for example, 
Anderson ed. 1990; Thom pson ed. 1994). In addition, there are some useful general studies 
(Domey 1990; Mangi 1992) as well as those dealing with specific themes, such as political parties 
(Wolfers 1970; Loveday and Wolfers 1976; Loveday 1976); political decentralisation and local- 
level governments (Conyers 1976; Standish 1979; Wolfers, Conyers, Larmour and Ghai 1982; 
Larm our and Qalo eds. 1985; Ghai and Regan 1992; Peasah 1994; May and Regan eds. 1997); 
developm ent associations (Gerritsen, May and W alter 1981; May ed. 1982); social stratification 
(AJ. Strathem  e d  1982; May ed. 1984); alcohol consumption and associated problems (Marshall 
e d  1982; Iamo and Ketan 1992); the cultivation and sale o f the marijuana drug (Iamo 1991); 
domestic violence (Toft and Bonnell 1985; T oft e d  1986); election-related violence (Iamo ed.
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1992; D ianea 1996a; Ketan 19%; Standish 1996); tribal warfare (see, for example, Standish 1973; 
K erpi 1976; M eggitt 1977; A.J. Strathem  1977; 1992; G ordon 1983; Rappaport 1984 [originally 
1968]; G ordon and M eggitt 1985; Burton 1989b, 1990a, 1990b; Muke 1994); raskol gangs (see 
Reay 1982b, 1987a; M orauta ed. 1986; H am s 1988; Ketan et al 1988; G oddard 1992 and 1995; 
D innen 1993a, 1993b, 1995 and 1996b; Rulick 1993; Borrey 1994); and different types o f 
conflict resolution procedures (see A.M. Strathem  1972a on ‘official and unofficial courts’; 
Scaglion ed. 1981 on ‘homicide com pensation’; and T oft ed. 1997 on ‘com pensation for 
resource developm ent3).
My study contains elements o f all three categories, linking local-level com petition to  national 
politics. T he approach I have taken here, in looking at the different ways in which local groups, 
coalitions, factions and their leaders interact w ithin and between local and national arenas o f 
com petition, is som ewhat similar to that taken by Andrew Strathem  and Bill Standish (see, for 
example, A.J, Strathem  1984,1992, 1993; Standish 1983, 1989, 1992). But there are im portant 
differences between their studies and mine. It is, for instance, evident in their studies that there is 
significant emphasis on rigidity and solidity in A.J. Strathem ’s as well as Standish’s picture o f 
society and groups in relation to the various spheres o f com petition and cooperation. 
D iscussion o f arenas such as ceremonial exchange and elections reflect an extraordinarily high 
quality o f  analysis, yet neither A.J. Strathem  nor Standish was able to consistently link them  
together in a systematic fashion because o f  the disciplinary nature o f their studies. I have 
deliberately selected these two observers because their work is directly relevant to this study and 
if  I appear to be hypercritical o f their work, then it is because o f the great influence their studies 
— the m ajor works on PN G  bridging local and national politics— have had on my w ork
A.J. Strathem  and Standish have consistently worked in the Highlands —  their observations 
spanning three decades —  and whilst they both recognised the resilience o f indigenous 
institutions and remarked on the innovative m anner in which Highlanders have coopted 
introduced and state resources for deploym ent in local arenas o f com petition, the interactive 
relationship between com ponents o f the state and indigenous political institutions has no t been 
fully explored. For them , the ‘boundaries’ o f  the various arenas o f com petition seem to be quite 
constant and the types o f leaders w ho operate within them  appear clearly defined as ‘big-m en’, 
o r ‘despots’, ‘fight-leaderi, o r whatever, that is, o f one particular kind in a given context, no t 
‘com binatory’ o r ‘generalised’. The nature o f ‘group’ needs further exploration too. A J. 
Strathem , for instance, looked at groups (and their leaders) and the way they relate to  each other 
through warfare and moka exchanges. Although he did point out the shifting nature o f alliance 
systems, his considerations for political groups was mainly in solidary terms —  almost as if  these 
were ready-made units.
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This study differs from  theirs by cleady dem onstrating that political fields and the groups who 
operate w ithin them  are basically political ‘constructions’ which are created by different types o f 
leaders for different purposes. The boundaries o f political competition are therefore constantly 
shaped and reshaped by die actions o f leaders. And it is im portant to realise that the same ‘big- 
men* w ho manipulate wealth to  gain prestige can also be shockingly despotic at times, or take on 
other attributes when it suits them. In  other words, this study differs from A J. Strathem’s by 
arguing that ‘big-man’ is no t (and perhaps never has been) die defining character o f Hagen 
leadership. It will be argued that there are other types o f leaders and also that one leader can 
assume different attributes at different times and in various contexts.
By studying electoral politics, Standish, like m ost other political scientists, was looking at the 
output side o f political action (not the input side). From  his detailed study o f different paths to 
pow er in Simbu (Standish 1992) and other similar studies, especially the numerous election 
studies (Standish 1976; 1983; 1989; 1996), it is quite possible to understand the process at work 
here. It is evident from  these studies that success in elections has its rewards, the reverse o f the 
pain and suffering that failure brings. Also evident is the pervasive process o f patronage and 
com peting values attached to the management —  and mismanagement —  o f state resources. 
Election studies and other similar studies that concentrate on the output side o f political action 
are im portant because they present us the opportunity to understand the process involved in the 
legifimisation o f  leaders’ claims to govern states. Such studies, however, offer little insight to the 
processes which take place before elections. This is precisely where the current study can make a 
contribution. It offers insights into the dynamics o f local politics and the way it relates to state 
politics. In  particular, it examines the processes that take place before elections, including the pre­
selection phase, and the reasons why some groups cooperate in order to compete against others.
By looking at the contemporary network o f power blocs operating in diveiging political fields 
—  such as Dei, Mul and Hagen electorates —  and the proclaimed historical ties between key 
players (core groups and their leaders), this study is bringing into the literature a new phase (of 
escalation and integration) o f Hagen politics. Despite their continued interest in political 
developments in Papua New Guinea, the main strength/focus o f A.J. Strathem s major studies 
on Hagen politics, like Standish’s in Chimbu, was the 1970s. There was in fact a massive amount 
o f academic work in the era o f independence, but then a general decline in interest In this study 
I attem pt to help rectify that situation by looking at the trends o f the 1980s and their 
manifestations in the 1990s.
Trends and Patterns of Political Competition
An examination o f the patterns o f political competition in Hagen indicate that the m odem  state 
o f PN G  remains at a very rudimentary level o f integration and its leaders face major difficulties
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in  dealing w ith m ounting problem s o f internal security. Recent developm ents, including 
escalating levels o f violence in the PN G  Highlands and other parts o f the country, raise 
considerable concern and, m oreover, indicate that the PN G  state exists in the m idst o f a very 
turbulent society (Standish 1994; Ketan 1995; Saffu 1996). The problem s associated w ith the 
secessionist m ovem ent in Bougainville, the resurgence in tribal warfare in the five Highlands 
provinces, and o f urban crime and violence in P ort M oresby, Lae and other m etropolitan 
centres are well know n through extensive media coverage, both locally and internationally. But 
international observers in Australia, N orth America and Europe hear very litde about the 
enduring trials and tribulations o f the liberal democratic process in the m odem  state o f Papua 
N ew  Guinea. A  glance at die recent literature on the PN G  Highlands, however, shows a 
consistent pattern o f  violence and lawlessness as a direct consequence o f political action by 
prom inent individuals and groups com peting for pow er and influence (see, for example, 
Standish 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997; A.J. Strathem  1992, 1993; Ketan 1995, 1996; and D innen 
1996a, 1996b). W hilst this study on M ount Hagen is a small contribution towards identifying 
some o f the problem s that result from  political action, which means that it does no t drastically 
differ from  those m entioned above, it does, however, provide special insights into the 
underlying traditional norm s and ideologies behind the political practices o f local groups and 
their leaders. In other words, this study involves a shift in emphasis from  one based on w hat 
people are and w hat they do to why they do the things they do. This, in my view, is taking a step 
further along die lines o f T .E . Hays’s (1993) plea for a shift from studies o f m orphology to 
studies o f process.
Although the thesis basically comprises interlinking case studies o f mainly local-level politics, it 
does cover the much wider issues o f com peting legitimacies and state-society interactions. 
Escalating levels o f violence and the deliberate infringem ent o f PN G  electoral regulations are 
discussed in the context o f electoral manoeuvring by powerful individuals, as an innovative 
extension o f rivalry between equally powerful and, in some instances, party-aligned interest 
groups operating within well established local arenas o f com petition and co-operation.
It can be argued, on the basis o f  case studies on Hagen conflict and political action, that the 
post-colonial PN G  state has continuously failed to take control o f conflict situations in an 
authoritative m anner, thereby exemplifying Migdal’s (1988) m odel o f V eak state versus strong 
societies’ (see also Standish 1993,1994,1996; D innen 1994,1996a, 1997b). Increasingly violent 
elections, blatant disregard for electoral regulations, coupled with gun warfare and the general 
breakdown in law  and orderi are prim e indicators o f governm ent without political strength and 
con tro l W hen societies op t for com pensation —  as well as m ore violent means such as payback 
killings —  as an avenue for conflict resolution, this suggests a lack o f confidence in the state 
judicial system, which was never fully in control o f  the society. Having realised the relatively
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weak nature o f  the state, the people have on num erous occasions taken the law into their own 
hands. A nd many have gone unpunished. Elections, as will be shown, are a farce. Violence is 
com m onplace and voters are coerced to  vote in a particular way.
Similarly, in tribal warfare, the police are often powerless to intervene. Available data suggest that 
no  m ajor armed conflict has been resolved as a result o f  state intervention. Instead, it has been 
local groups themselves w ho have reached peace agreements (often with local Christian mission 
leaders acting as mediators). Politicians, to  whom  people could look for guidance, are themselves 
caught up in intricate webs o f social relations which undermine their integrity as leaders. It is 
widely believed that som e o f them  (and some policemen also) have supplied guns to  tribesmen 
as part o f  electoral manoeuvring. They on the one hand are lawmakers and on the other hand 
are held responsible for lawlessness (see A J. Strathem 1993; see also Standish 1992 and 1996).
Recognising that “many o f these problem s are political, and involve complex social and state 
structures” (Standish 1994:51), PN G  Highlands disorder can be best understood from a ‘state- 
society interaction’ perspective. Accordingly, explored here are questions o f how and why 
people in Hagen respond to elections, and in ways that may seem peculiar to outsiders. Why, for 
example, are elections such extravagantly expensive exercises, coupled with correspondingly 
high levels o f  violence? W ho are the key players and what are the rules, if  any at all, involved? It 
can be argued that one cannot satisfactorily answer such questions w ithout understanding the 
cultural and historical background o f PN G  Highlands societies. Electoral behaviour on the one 
hand is tied in w ith traditional norm s and ideologies o f group solidarity in com petition for 
tem porary advantages and on the other hand influenced by new economic resources and the 
wider process o f socio-political change. In a general context, people in Hagen and the 
Highlands, as in other parts o f the country, are trying to come to terms with the rapid transition 
from  traditionally subsistence agricultural-based societies to a capitalist economy. But more 
specifically, this study is about the strategies and ploys o f individuals and groups in competition 
for pow er and control over valued scarce resources.
From  1980 to 1995, provincial governm ent elections formed an im portant arena o f competition 
for local leaders and their groups, and success in elections meant access to governm ent funds 
and resources, but the abolition o f the provincial governm ent system by the national 
governm ent in July 1995 has somewhat altered the level and possibly the intensity o f the 
com petition. The background to  the demise o f the system o f elected provincial governm ent in 
general and the W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent in particular will also be explored in
this thesis.
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National and Regional Significance
W hile the thesis is primarily based on field research conducted in just one part o f the PN G  
Highlands, and my discussions are based on Hagen cases and events which may be influenced 
by unique circumstances, the issues raised here are o f  both regional and national significance. 
Accordingly, this study provides some new evidence on wider state-society interaction in Papua 
N ew Guinea. Some election strategies m entioned here, such as sponsorship o f a candidate by a 
clan other than his own (as form  o f solidtory gift requesting reparation payment from  an ally for 
war deaths), the courtship o f ‘name-list* groups and the protection o f a candidate’s ‘base-vote5 
area, have no t been previously reported elsewhere. Evidence presented here and elsewhere 
(Ketan 1995; Standish 1996) suggests that elections in recent times have no t been free and fair. 
W hile some observers (Reay 1987; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; A.J. Strathem 1993; and 
D innen 1996) and the participants themselves are aware o f the problems such as voter coercion 
and punitive and retaliatory raids organised by supporters o f losing candidates, these kind o f 
stories are rarely brought to the attention o f authorities in the capital Port Moresby, and 
international observers probably hear much less.11
Competing Themes and Questions
The key question here is w hat happens when the state (usually the colonial state) comes into 
contact w ith ‘traditional5 (so-called stateless), pre-capitalist, indigenous societies? W hen analysing 
society’s reaction to structural changes, one m ust consider the relative strengths and weaknesses 
o f society, including its capacity to absorb, ignore and subvert state authority, and its resilience to 
change. In  Hagen, as in other parts o f PN G  and in Melanesia, it has been a combination o f 
resilience, as dem onstrated by a remarkable capacity to absorb change, and ‘strength5, as 
expressed through subversive challenges made against state authority, disdainfully ignoring the 
state’s traditional W eberian claim to a m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force (including 
violence) and, m oreover, clearly and forcefully calling the state’s legitimacy into question.
A m ost remarkable part o f  externally induced social change in the PN G  Highlands is the 
resilience o f  indigenous prestige institutions like the Hagen ntoka, Enga tee; o r the Simbu bugia 
gende ceremonial exchange systems. Equally remarkable is the constant use o f local ideologies —- 
o f  customary use o f  violence in conflict resolution, or o f dan  solidarity as expressed through 
bloc voting, o r o f leaders as magnets for attracting and distributing wealth —  to justify political
11. In view o f an official tendency for brusqueness and scant regard for information on election-related 
violence and the state’s incapacity o r weakness for maintaining public order, it was reassuring to read ihe 
Electoral Commissioner's report to the sixth parliament on the 1997 National Election. Unfortunately, die 
rather obscure and elliptical reference to “problems that continue to plague the conduct o f elections in the 
country" in Kaiulo (1997b) does little towards finding ways to  solving such problems.
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action in contem porary arenas o f com petition. Such processes have been described by some 
observers as indigenous values and ideologies ‘penetrating’, ‘capturingf, o r ‘colonising’ the state 
(see, for example, G ordon and Meggitt 1985; Standish 1992; 1994; D innen 1997a; 1997b). While 
these are useful ways o f explaining some o f  the m ore complex processes at work in PN G  and in 
Melanesia, I would suggest, on the basis o f  data presented in this study, that the overall situation 
is one o f incorporation rather than each having colonised com ponents o f the other.
My use o f  the concept ‘incorporation’ is indeed appropriate for Hagen, as it represents an 
accurate summation o f the material presented here. By incorporation, it means that the state has 
been fitted into the Hagen political system, thereby emphasising the ‘mutually transform ing’ o r 
mutuality aspect o f state-society interactions (see Migdal et al 1994). It is therefore necessary to 
analytically distinguish ‘incorporation’ from ‘penetration’ (as in the penetration o f the state by the 
Enga; G ordon and Meggitt 1985:181), ‘capture’ (which implies taking hold o f something), and 
‘colonisation’, as in the “PN G  State being colonised by Simbu political values” (Standish 
1992:250), o r by “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies” (Standish 1994:60); o r “the 
system (state and business) by the Melanesian ‘lifewodd’ [society]” (Dinnen 1997a:16; 1997b:22). 
These are definitely powerful concepts which can capture the imagination o f the reader, yet in 
themselves represent a somewhat misleading picture o f state-society relations. In seeking to 
correct the Euro-centric view o f the colonial state which denies the ‘agency’ and autonomy o f 
indigenous society, they tend to give an impression o f a one-way process, whereby the mutuality 
o f state-society interactions is no t adequately represented.
The incorporation o f the PN G  state into Hagen society is, in essence, what this thesis is all 
about It is a detailed local-level study about how and why local groups, coalitions, factions and 
their leaders have brought the state into the Hagen moral universe, incorporating components 
o f  the state and the m odem  economy, as part o f their competition. This study deals with 
questions o f how  and to  w hat extent one system has ‘captured’ the other, if  at all, and also 
examines the wider implications o f  such developments, particularly in the context o f state- 
society relations and com peting legitimacies o f political systems. Also addressed are some key 
issues, such as the conflicting role o f politicians in local conflicts and the use o f state resources in 
prom oting local interests, thereby raising questions o f loyalty between state and society. Such 
reactions to change are certainly no t unique to Melanesia, as there are examples in Africa and 
other parts o f  the world (see, for example, Ekeh 1975; Randall and Theobald 1985; Chazan et al 
1988; Boone 1994).
Some Analytical Concepts and Approaches
The contem porary relations between the PN G  state and the various indigenous political units 
involve a high degree o f complexity and their description requires the use o f a range o f analytical
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tools w ith some proficiency. But even the m ost accomplished analysts have encountered serious 
problem s com ing to  term s with trends and patterns in PN G  and the Third W orld, so one can 
imagine how  difficult it is for a novice like me coming from  a general social science background. 
It is, however, hoped that my work can take an interstitial position between anthropology and 
political science, and thus will draw from both fields as well as from  other disciplines within the 
social sciences in order to construct suitable explanations for developments and associated 
problem s in PN G .
The difficulties encountered by social scientists in dealing with state-society relations in PN G , 
tropical Africa and other parts o f the Third W orld is chiefly attributed to the inherent limitations 
o f theoretical approaches. It is possible to distinguish two broad views, reflecting opposite sides 
to  the debate. O n the one hand is the overly optimistic view o f development fostered mainly by 
the 1960s m odernisation and political development theories, which hold that recently 
decolonised countries would progress to the level o f W estern societies, while on the other hand, 
is a rather pessimistic view fostered by the 1970s dependency and underdevelopment theories, 
which hold that Third W orld states were economically dependent on the First W orld and for as 
long as they maintained ties with their form er colonial rulers, they would remain underdeveloped 
and heavily dependent on foreign aid. As indicated by Chazan, et al (1988:14), modernisation 
theories emanated from  the W est and were closely related to developments in the U.S. political 
science in the 1950s.
The m odernisation approach seems to have been heavily influenced by early social theories o f 
societies, w ith a particularly disturbing evolutionary twist to i t  Randall and Theobald (1985:2) 
noted that it was probably inevitable that the pronounced evolutionary strain inherent in classical 
sociology be transmitted via its contem porary exemplars to the study o f the Third W orld. They 
further say that:
A  basic and usually explicit assum ption o f the m odernisation theories w e have been 
considering was th a t the ‘developing’ societies o f  Asia, A frica, and L atin A m erica w ere 
in  the process o f  being transform ed in to  stable dem ocracies o f  the w estern pluralist 
type. T here can be little doub t th a t the already-industrialised w orld, especially the US, 
provided the m odel fo r political m odernity just as fo r m odernity in  general T he 
dem ocratic ideal, it seem ed, had reached its zenith in the W est and  this was the 
condition  tow ards w hich the societies o f  the T hird W odd w ere evolving. T he traum as 
and strains o f  th is transform ation are frequently intense b u t they are w orth  enduring fo r 
the goal, once arrived at —-  and arrival was thought to  be inevitable —  w ill be m ore 
than  adequate com pensation (1985:2).
Basically, the W estern liberal democracies in Europe and N orth America were seen in the 
W eberian sense as ideal-types and it was hoped with a fervent optimism that the form er 
European colonies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific would ultimately end up as 
‘carbon copies’ o f the political systems found in the W est The inherent fallacies o f this
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approach were recognised by both neo-Marxist and dependency theorists, among others, in 
Africa and Latin America. Drawing from their own experiences with economic conditions in 
Third W orld societies, particularly the hardships caused by scarce resources and unequal 
distribution o f wealth from extractive mineral development projects, Africans and Latin 
Americans were sceptical o f the rewards promised by modernisation theorists.
Theories o f dependency, with roots in neo-M arxist political theory, and underdevelopment 
originating especially in Latin America were developed in direct opposition to the assumptions 
o f the development theory. In Africa, for instance, it was noted that:
T heories o f  dependency and underdevelopm ent cam e in to  vogue as a reaction to  the 
prem ises and sources o f political developm ent theory and were based o n  the opposite 
assum ption th a t A frican progress has been, and continues to  be, im peded by forces 
(international a n d /o r dom estic) ben t on  the ongoing exploitation o f the continent and 
its resources. A nd m oreover, these, prim arily capitalist, interests could only be held at 
la y  if  the global system  underw ent a fundam ental change th at w ould alter the structural 
relations betw een the T hird W orld and the industrialised w orld (underdevelopm ent) o r 
betw een the m asses and the dom inant classes w ithin A frica (dependency). T hus, in  
stark contrast to  the m odernization approach, these theorists have focused n o t on  the 
process o f developm ent b u t o n  the roo ts o f  underdevelopm ent (Chazan e td 1988:16).
Recent comments on PN G  in Australia have tended to emphasise either optimism or pessimism 
without much causal analysis. One is the rather paternalistic and benevolent view that 
characterise PNG-Australia relations, a situation which many PN G  politicians and bureaucrats 
feel uncomfortable about This view is deeply rooted in the modernisation approach and holds 
that with a bit o f help from Australia, PN G  can overcome its problems and climb up that noble 
path to good governance and economic prosperity (see, for example, Anderson ed. 1990).
The other is the apocalyptic, or to use the Australian Channel Nine’s Current Affairs presenter 
Ray M artin’s concept, ‘tinderbox’, view fostered by the international media, which holds that 
PN G  is dangerously and precariously poised at the brink o f an abyss. Here I sketch that view, in 
order to  contextualise my own study o f how local politics works in PNG.
Although ‘brinkmanship’, the practice o f gping near the edge o f the abyss before recovering, is 
common in PN G , Australians have a tendency towards overreacting to crises situations, judging 
from recent events associated with the infamous Sandline controversy o f March 1997 when 
elements o f the PN G  Defence Force rebelled against the ministers responsible for hiring 
mercenaries ostensibly to eliminate rebel leaders on Bougainville. For instance, there were 
reports that the Australian Defence Force was preparing to invade the capital, Port Moresby, 
during the March 1997 political crises caused by the Sandline issue. In a subsequent Australian 
Bulletin report, Brett Martin revealed that ‘Operation Baritone’ was set up to seize the Jacksons
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airport in Port Moresby and evacuate up to 10,000 foreigners (including 5,000 Australians) 
deemed ‘at risk* (1997:20).
N oting that the political and civil malaise in PN G  that led to the drafting o f Operation Baritone 
goes deeper than the Sandline controversy, Brett Martin wrote:
C orruption is rife, m orale in  the [PN G ] defence force is low  and the general population 
is angry th a t politicians have failed to  deliver prom ised prosperity. A ustralian defence 
analysts fear any perceived discrepancies in  this m onth’s elections may be the trigger for 
a m ilitary coup o r popular rev o lt P N G  is a dangerous place fo r foreigners in  norm al 
circum stances, b u t the lives o f  A ustralians and o ther foreign nationals w ould be 
seriously threatened in  any m ajor uprising (M artin 1997:20,22).
Such a view o f PN G  is not uncommon in Australia, despite PN G  having dealt with the issue in 
the June 1997 election, as it is evident in another Bulletin news article, in which Trevor W atson 
reported that:
“T he m onster is dead”, read the banner draped on  the fence surrounding defence 
headquarters in  P o rt M oresby to  m ark C han’s stunning election defeat T he form er PM  
w as perceived as arrogant, detached h o rn  his people, to lerant o f  high-level corruption 
and incapable o f  m anaging P N G ’s econom y. B ut m ost observers see h is defeat as 
stem m ing from  the chaos that follow ed his decision to  spend $46 m illion hiring the 
Sandline m ercenaries to  kill fellow  Papua N ew  G uineans on  Bougainville (1997:32).
PN G  leaders, having grown accustomed to  constant criticisms that accompany Australian aid, 
are no longer surprised by the pessimistic picture o f PN G ’s future as depicted in the media by 
journalists. All, however, cannot be dismissed as sensational journalism, because there is some 
truth in reports o f violence and civil unrest in PNG. The apparent weakness o f the state is 
forem ost among topics o f interest for PN G  observers, and demands explanation.
So here I sketch several analytical concepts which may be useful in constructing suitable 
explanations for the PN G  situation, which have previously considered by others (see Hegarty 
1989; Ashton 1990; Standish 1994). They are: (1) Myrdal’s (1968) idea o f the ‘soft stated (2) 
Tinker’s (1965) concept o f the ‘broken-backed’ state; (3) Lindblom’s (1959) notion o f ‘muddling 
through’; (4) the notion o f ‘upward colonisation’, or ‘Melanesian values colonising the state’ 
(Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Standish 1992); (5) Migdal’s (1988) concept o f V eak state versus 
strong society5; (6) Filer’s (1992) notion o f ‘political disintegration’; and (7) A.J. Strathem’s 
(1993b) concept o f ‘disintegrative integration’. From this local level study I add to these my own 
notion o f the Tlagen megacycle’, where the state and its events have been incorporated into the 
Hagen political system.
David Hegarty (1989) found three concepts or notions derived from the social science literature 
useful: Myrdal’s ‘soft state’, Tinker’s ‘broken-backed’ state, and Lindblom’s ‘muddling through’. 
Hegarty says that “when liberally interpreted and appropriately modified, these concepts provide
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a collective to  both the overly pessimistic o r catastrophic view and to ovedy optimistic view, 
which holds that PN G ’s problem s are akin to  ‘growing pains”’ (1989:13).
A  *soft state3?
Myrdal’s notion o f a ‘soft state’ is characterised by: a capacity for planning but little ability for 
implementation; difficulty in enforcing laws; populist rhetoric for reform  (land, population, etc.); 
piecemeal policy action; a low level o f social discipline; and a tendency for corruption to increase 
as opportunities for acquisition increase and standards o f probity among high-placed politicians 
and officials is perceived to decline (Myrdal 1968; quoted in Hegarty 1989:13).
A  ‘broken-backed’ state?
Tinker’s notion o f a ‘broken-backed’ state entails “a form o f quasi-government which will 
become familiar in the coming years” (1965:114). Tinker predicted that “the centralised state will 
cease to be” and that “the simulacrum o f governm ent will continue in the capital, but within 
twenty miles there will be a total divorce between appearance and reality. The man with the gun 
will have taken over” (1965:117). H e says that:
R epresentatives o f  the central governm ent w ill be stationed in  the districts. They w ill sit 
u p o n  the verandahs o f  the im posing bungalow s o f the old E uropean district officers, 
and they will be called d istrict officers, b u t their w rit w ill n o t run  as far as the 
com pound wall. T he real pow er in  the districts w ill be exercised by m en o f  force. Some 
o f  these w ill be m inisters, w ho run  their ow n sm all private arm ies, and w ho levy tribute 
from  all the local m erchants and traders, great and sm all T hen  there will be d ie 
underground o r resistance leaders, w ho are quite frankly bandits, and w ho levy their 
tribute from  the peasants as w ell as the tow nsfolk. Finally, there will be arm y o r m ilitary 
police detachm ents, sen t to  p ro tect the rural folk, and exercising their p ro tection  w ith a 
heavy hand (T inker 1965:116).
Despite considerable violence and disorder, diminishing legitimacy o f the state and an almost 
complete breakdown o f the national machinery, society will not disintegrate into a state o f 
anarchy. life  will continue (as usual) in the rural areas (perhaps because o f the ‘strength’ and 
resilience o f indigenous societies?). Tinker attributed this to the loose’ (or generalised?) nature o f 
non-western societies:
W here the w eb o f  governm ent and econom ic life is so m uch loose, and indeed m ore 
perfunctory  than  in  ou r com plex, highly integrated w estern system s, does n o t entail a 
gim ihr breakdow n in  local life. A nd so there is no  dram atic national collapse: there is 
just broken-backed governm ent. Very few w estern journalists have understood this 
proposition. . . .  B roken-backed governm ent may seem  a p o o r th ing to  those fortunate 
enough to  live under m ore dynam ic system s o f  governm ent B ut it has a  quality w hich 
hard-bitten  politicians rate highly, survival (1965:118-119).
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H ie  ‘broken-backed’ state offers a model o f what might happen to the pluralist Third W odd 
state if  ‘things fall apart*, yet Hegarty was probably right in saying that Tinker presents a ‘bad 
case*, rather than a V orst case* outcome:
In  a ‘broken-backed’ state a form  o f quasi-governm ent exists; central institutions are 
w eak; the constituent elem ents (provinces) border o n  secession and are interm ittently o r 
sem i-petm anendy rebellious, b u t are capable o f  cooperating w ith the centre w hen 
necessary (H egarty 1989:13).
Tinker’s concept o f the broken-backed state is applicable where the state cannot exert its 
authority throughout the country and the application o f law is uneven (see Standish 1994:61). 
According to  Chris A shton, a Sydney-based freelance journalist with African experience, PN G  is 
becoming a broken-backed state:
T hat m eans th a t w hile a governm ent w ill continue in  P o rt M oresby, funded by foreign 
aid and revenues h o rn  resources developm ent projects, its w rit outside the capital will 
recede. Its relations w ith  its provinces w ill be shaped by fluid, ad hoc arrangem ents 
betw een national and regional politicians holding pow er, rather than by over-arching 
authority o f  governm ent in  P o rt M oresby (A shton 1990:35).
Ashton also suggested that PN G  could look forward to growing inequalities o f wealth stemming 
from the mining boom  o f the 1990s, assuming it proceeded; to rising unemployment and 
popular resentm ent at failure by the government to meet rising expectations; and to interm ittent 
challenges to the central government’s diminishing authority by localised groups seeking greater 
autonomy (1990:36).
Some o f these claims will be considered in the relevant chapters o f the thesis, but it should be 
noted here that recent problems in PN G  —  notably the Bougainville secession crises, the 
Sandline controversy and the alleged corrupt deals involving Prime Minister Bill Skate and 
Police M inister Thomas Pelika —  suggest that a modified version o f the ‘broken-backed’ state 
may be applicable.
\Muddling through V
The third concept which Hegarty says that he finds useful in correcting the extreme views —  
overly optimistic or overly pessimistic —  on PN G  is Lindblom’s notion o f ‘muddling through’, 
which was developed in the context o f decision-making and administrative theory. He defines it 
in the following manner:
A s an approach to  governing, ‘m uddling through’ w ould include an increm ental and n o t 
necessarily ‘rational’ decision-m aking style, ‘ad hocery’ and ‘seat-of-the-pants’ sem i­
strategies fo r problem  solving, d ie choice o f  ends appropriate to  the available m eans 
^ h e r  than  a choice to  adjust the m eans, crises resolution through a trial-and-error 
application o f  sanctions and inducem ents o r sim ply by sitting o u t the crises, and a 
definite tendency tow ard the ‘slow  fix’, o r even ‘no  fix’ rather than the ‘quick fix’.
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Political and bureaucratic practices becom e m odified (in th is instance, M ehnestamsed) 
to  su it th e  political culture (L indblom  1959; quoted in  H eggrty 1989:14).
*U pward colonisation*or M elanesian values colonising the state*?
G ordon and Meggitt’s (1985) notion o f ‘upward colonisation’ is similar to  Standish’s (1992) 
concept o f  ‘Melanesian values colonising the state’, though both views were reached 
independently, despite communications between G ordon and Standish. While commenting on 
state-society interpenetration between the PN G  state and Enga, G ordon and Meggitt claim that:
T he beliefs o f  Engp. obviously d o  n o t fit to o  com fortably w ith their enforced entry in to  
the larger, contem porary w orld, w hether colonial o r post-colonial As w e have said, 
perhaps the persistent p roblem  o f  the breakdow n o f law and order in  E nga Province 
should be related n o t so m uch to  th e  penetration  o f  the state in to  the local affairs o f 
Enga as to  d ie  infiltration o f  agencies o f  the state by Enga in  a process o f  upw ard 
colonisation (1985:181).
In  a  sim ilar way, Standish (1992) explains the m anner in which Simbu values have been utilised 
within the new arenas created by the state and the use o f new political resources deriving from 
the state within Simbu political arenas, competition and conflicts. N oting the mutuality o f state- 
society interaction and particularly the dominance o f Simbu values in state politics, Standish says:
T he process w as thus one o f interpenetration. I t  could even be argued th at d ie 
introduced state has been co-opted in to  Sim bu politics, o r been colonised by Sim bu 
political values (1992350).12
W eak* State and ‘Strong* societies?
Melanesian societies’ remarkable capacity for resilience in the face o f rapid social c h an ^  has 
already been noted above. It is this tenacious character o f society, its ‘strength’, when opposed to 
the relative ‘weakness’ o f the state that has contributed to much o f PN G ’s current problems. 
The concept o f  the Sveak state’ was developed by Joel Migdal (1987, 1988, 1994). He defined 
strength in te rm s o f state capabilities, which include:
. . .  to  penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and
appropriate o r use resources in  determ ined ways. S trong states are those w ith  high 
to  com plete these tasks, w hile weak states are o n  the low’ end o f a spectrum  
o f  capabilities (1988:4-5).
Arguing from a state-society interaction perspective, Standish (1994), using MigdaPs 
terminology, suggested that Papua New Guinea has ‘strong’ societies, autonomous but divided 
The state, by contrast, is ‘weak’ (Migdal 1988; Standish 1994).
12 See also Standish (1994:60) for “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies having colonised die state”;
and Dinnen (1997a;16 and 1997b:22) for “Melanesian Hfeworid having colonised the system”).
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In a book on internal security in Papua New Guinea, several observers noted the distance 
between a relatively ‘weak’ state and ‘strong  societies (see, for example, Dinnen 1994; Lawrence 
1994; Standish 1994). As Lawrence says, the loose attachment o f individuals to the national state 
and the strong attachment to the clan, family and language grouping has emphasised the Veak 
state/strong society’ dichotomy (1994:118). The PN G  state, according to Standish (1994:60), 
does not conform  to Max W eber’s ideal type, which suggests the state has a monopoly on the 
legitimate use o f force. Quoting an approach proposed by Hewison etal for whom the state is:
... an amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements organised in a 
particular manner. In this sense the state is not so much a set of functions or a group of 
actors, as an expression of power (quoted in Standish 1994:60).
Standish described “the loosening o f those relationships in PN G  and the reduction o f state 
power” {ibid).
The state-society model as applied by Standish is based on the assumption that Papua New 
Guinea Highlands societies, whilst fragmented by political and cultural-linguistic differences and 
w ithout any overarching central authority, were individually strong in terms o f social control and 
a num ber o f other ways (see Figure 1.2). Despite all its impressive state structures and systems 
and the raw power that it wields in terms o f superior firepower and a ready-made fighting force, 
the state has been unable to assert its authority in conflict situations. Those issues are explored in 
this study in relation to conflict resolution in Hagen (see Chapter Five", see also Chapter Six).
Figure L2: T he state-society  m odel
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The state-society m odel shows that PN G  societies are individually strong but divided by cultural 
and linguistic differences, and in the PN G  Highlands there were no centralised systems that 
could have been used to graft local politics onto the introduced colonial state.
The colonial administration utilised the divide-and-rule tactic with some degree o f success, 
which perhaps overemphasised its apparent strength. Assuming that the ‘traditional* PN G  
societies, like Hagen were strong in themselves, precisely how strong is not dear. I f  they were 
previously strong, then are they still strong? Indeed the whole concept o f the strong sodety 
needs examination. It is true that local groups, like tribes and dans, have grown bigger in size 
(see Chapter Three), but can the same thing be said o f their political integration and the strength o f 
their political institutions, especially in reference to the accumulation o f guns, the control o f large 
businesses, and access to resources through their connections with the outside world? These and 
other questions will be considered in the relevant parts o f the thesis.
P olitical and social 'disintegration* or Cultured Innovation f
The notion o f ‘political disintegration’ (Filer 1992) is slightly similar to the pessimistic view, 
though perhaps no t as apocalyptic as the journalistic view o f PNG. Filer, as Standish (1994:60) 
observes, “writes with serious whimsy o f the ‘bits* o f the ‘Humpty Dumpty state* fallen from the 
wall’*. In his unusually dry sense o f humour, Filer adds a typically British kindergarten 
melodrama to what is an otherwise serious problem  in a Third W orld context Both Filer and 
Standish write about the PN G  state as an alien construct, as having failed to retain or assert its 
authority at the local level, and stress its inability to perform  its functions and deliver basic social 
services (Filer 1992; Standish 1994; see also G ordon and Meggitt 1985 and Dinnen 1994, 
1996b).
But the m ost consistent and vocal proponents o f the disintegration theory comes from the 
commentaries o f B.A Santamaria (1989), who believes that the current problems in PN G  will 
bring about the collapse o f the state. The ‘doomsday scenario* is also prom oted by some 
y jylpmifis formerly at the National Centre for Development Studies, at the Australian National 
University (see, for example, Cole 1993; quoted in D innen 1996b:284). While there are many 
variations o f the disintegration theory in circulation in PN G  today, Dinnen (1996b) has broadly 
classified them  according to their relative emphases upon what he calls institutional, cultural or 
material symptoms o f disintegration:
Institu tional disintegration highlights the progressive w eakening o f the state and, in  
particular, the incapacitation o f state controls. Problem s o f  order, from  this perspective, 
are view ed largely in term s o f d ie absence o r dysfunctionaBty o f the state. Cultural 
disintegration, cm the o ther hand, draw s attention to  the im pact o f  W esternisation upon 
residen t social form s and the m anner in  w inch M elanesian societies are collapsing under 
th e  w eight o f  rapid change. This view  attributes problem s o f  o rder to  the corrupting
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influence of external forces and their impact on ‘traditional’ social values. Material 
disintegration emphasises economic dysfunctionality, growing levels o f unemployment, 
failure of entrepreneurship, mismanagement and die manner in which these have 
contributed to the marginalisation [of some groups] and accompanying conflict [within 
communities] (1996b:284).
D ata from  the case studies and from  the literature will be used to confirm o r reject such claims. 
But I should m ention here that some o f these processes seem to be currently under way, which 
means that while a composite picture o f social change and cultural continuity is possible, 
measuring or quantifying such processes, however, is difficult But one should be able to 
conclusively say w hether or no t the system has disintegrated to levels o f absolute chaos or 
anarchy, and I will, in the concluding chapter.
‘D isintegrative integration* o r cW idening spheres o f political com petition’?
Both concepts are A.J. Strathem’s (1992, 1993b), though he develops the later more fully than 
the former, which he explained in the following words:
By integration here I refer to the incorporation of local areas into district, provincial, 
and national political structures and processes. By disintegration I mean that the very 
processes that link local dans to the state also produce within and between dans a 
heightened potential for conflict through competition for resources and political office 
(1993:57).
My own concepts o f ‘incorporation’, ‘merging spheres o f competition and cooperation’, and 
‘megacycle’ are somewhat similar to A J. Strathem’s (1992) Videning spheres o f political 
competition’. In  the expanded field o f competition, a num ber o f processes are at work. The first 
is the actual merging o f spheres, where one event (for example, a reparation payment) follows 
another (such as warfare), and the cycle finally culminates in elections, or may even further 
develop into ramifying sequences o f ntoka exchanges. O n the one hand, local events are built 
around elections, while on the other hand, elections have been incorporated into the local 
megacycle. Secondly, what appears to be an integration into the PN G  state system is in fact a 
process o f  ‘tribalisation’, where new power blocs are continually created as a result o f the 
incorporation o f the Hagen people into a centralised national state (see A J. Strathem 1992:230). 
A third process at work here is the physical or geo-political widening o f the sphere o f 
com petition, where ‘traditional’ fields o f competition expand to  link into other fields, which 
even extend beyond electoral boundaries. As indicated by A.J. Strathem (1992:236), die physical 
widening o f the political field is associated with the adoption o f guns in local conflicts and the 
ambiguous role o f politicians —  as lawmakers and as suppliers o f guns —  particularly in the 
context o f electoral manoeuvring. The systematic integration o f such local and state political 
events is w hat I call the Hagen ‘megacycle’.
Methodology
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This study is based on my personal experiences as a Hagener and eight months specific 
fieldwork; two m onths in 1992 during the National Elections, with the help o f funds from the 
PN G  Electoral Commission and the PN G  National Research Institute (NR3); and a further six 
m onths between August 1994 and January 1995, with the help o f a scholarship from  the 
Australian International Developm ent Assistance Bureau (AIDAB, recently renamed Aus-AID), 
and research funds from  the PN G  National Research Institute.
Initially, I had entertained the idea o f a survey, but the inter-actional nature o f Hagen political 
com petition, which made the idea o f impersonal and objective research untenable, dictated that 
case studies was the best approach available to me. The local-level, o r ‘bottom -up’ approach that 
I chose was no t dictated by a predetermined epistemological position: either from ‘outside’ or 
‘inside’ perspective. Rather, it was a position which I eventually arrived a t an ‘insider’s 
perception, o r a Hagen world view, o f events and processes that make up the phenomena o f 
local political behaviour. It was a ‘best-fit’ approach, one based on decisions about the best 
possible strategies to  collect data required for analysis. It was determined by questions o f how and 
why Hageners behave in a particular way. By observing and participating in particular events, 
such as voting in elections, I was able to document the different ways in which Hageners 
compete for prestige, power and influence.
The main arenas o f  competition and cooperation which I paid particular attention to were 
ceremonial exchange, warfare, compensation payment, bridewealth payments, elections and 
business developm ent associations. I personally participated in two election campaigns, a m inor 
mokoy several bridewealth payments and the initial stages o f a major reparation paym ent 
Although I observed the devastating effects o f warfare, including two spectacular funeral 
ceremonies for war deaths, and documented the introduction o f guns into Hagen warfare, I have 
never experienced com bat and therefore relied heavily on interviews. Similarly I have mostly 
used interviews for data on business development associations.
For details o f particular events that took place outside o f the fieldwork penod, o r where it was 
no t possible to personally observe, I relied on die knowledge o f those who participated. After 
returning to  Australia, I have consistently followed events that began in 1994 through coundess 
telephone interviews (running my telephone bills into thousands o f dollars). W hilst my 
interpretations are largely influenced by the various approaches in the social sciences, the thesis 
is simply a record o f the knowledge that Hageners collectively carry around in their heads. W hat 
I have done here is basically following in die footsteps o f Hagen leaders who constantly 
m onynlatp information to  prom ote their positions. I have merely collected and reoiganised their 
knowledge to  enhance mine in order to make some general statements about Hageners so that 
other observers can leam m ore about my people, my country, and our politics.
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Outline of the Study
Political com petition and leadership roles are analysed in a num ber o f contexts, specifically by 
studying political action by prom inent individuals, in both ‘traditional* and m odem  spheres o f 
competition. The ‘traditional* arenas o f competition and cooperation, such as ceremonial 
exchange, group warfare and the various types o f compensation payment, now exist side by side 
with, and in many ways have been incorporated into, more m odem forms like elections and 
business enterprise. In  fact, there are instances o f merging or widening o f political spheres o f 
com petition, as indicated by the m anner in which major ‘traditional* events such as exchanges 
and warfare are skilfully orchestrated to coincide with and culminate in elections, thereby 
resulting in the creation o f a megacycle. O ne such megacycle o f im portant events presented here 
covets a period o f fourteen years (1984-1997) during which a sequence o f events took place, 
beginning with a seven-year period o f contracted alliance warfare between 1984 and 1990, briefly 
punctuated by mutually reached truce agreements in June 1987 and in December 1988, followed 
by a com bined church and state-sponsored one-year truce period (1989-1990) during which two 
separate peace settlements were reached between the combatants, and a six-year period o f 
intensive reparation payments and gift exchanges (1990-1996) in an attempt to secure assurances 
o f support for the 1997 national elections. Two election studies, one national and the other 
provincial, and two case studies o f group warfare illustrate these processes o f merging and 
widening o f spheres o f political competition and die co-optative existence o f the political 
systems.
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. The major themes and questions have been 
introduced here in this opening chapter. In the second chapter I present a brief sketch o f what is 
essentially a retrospective view o f pre-colonial leadership, taking into account the differences in 
emphasis placed on various attributes o f leadership, and the major changes in spheres o f 
com petition over time. It provides an historical account o f the pre-colonial Hagen political order 
and the power o f leaders, die dem ocratizing effects o f colonial rule, and the structural and 
institutional changes that accompanied decolonisation in Papua New Guinea.
The third and probably the m ost im portant chapter o f the thesis deals with the major levels o f 
social organisation in Hagen society. It is im portant in the sense that, like a kind o f blue-print, 
the chapter establishes the parameters o f discussion in the rest o f the thesis. Basically, it 
identifies the boundaries o f the various arenas, fields, and sub-fields o f political competition in 
Hagen. The chapter begins with a critical review o f the literature on Highlands social structure, 
with a view to assessing the applicability o f certain theoretical models, including the so-called 
‘A frican models*, prevalent in the literature. It then moves on to deal with two different types o f 
groups: (1) ‘traditional* groups such as tribes, dans, sub-dans and lineages; and (2) ‘neo­
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traditional’ groups such as the coalition-style alliances which were set up in the early 1970s to 
take advantage o f the plantation acquisition scheme. The coalitions and their factional leaders are 
the major players in Hagen politics, with their activities often systematically linked to state 
politics. Because some o f these local leaders are also national leaders, the two systems, Hagen 
and the PN G  state, feed o ff each other through the exchange o f ideas, values and resources.
Many o f these neo-traditional coalition-style alliances (cf. A.J. Strathem 1984), initially built on 
somewhat vague historical ties, have now consolidated into cooperative business groups, with 
interests in coffee plantations, real estate and haulage. Chapter Four examines these registered 
business associations. The separation between Chapters Three and Tour is therefore an artificial 
one because the discussion on cooperative business ventures follows on from that o f the groups 
and alliances— the owners o f these businesses.
In Chapter Five I present two case studies on Hagen warfare in the late 1980s. It is a big chapter, 
coveting a wide range o f  issues, including the contexts o f leadership and the use o f new 
resources such as guns in inter-group warfare. Hagen warfare is viewed here as a cycle, with 
different phases o f conflict, escalation, military engagement, casualties, compensation, moka> and 
peace. A common trend in all o f these phases is the conspicuous absence o f the state, despite 
the m ost concerted effort on the part o f local groups to challenge the state’s claim o f monopoly 
over the legitimate use o f force. The military alliances form the core groups o f the coalition-style 
alliances-cum business cooperative ventures described in Chapters 3-4.
N ext, Chapters 6-8 are case studies on elections. In Chapter Six I present an overview o f Hagen- 
style electioneering, with an emphasis on political strategies, including the skilful use o f the 
Hagen megacycle for mobilising support Also noted in this chapter is the rising costs o f 
election campaigns and the correspondingly high rate o f election-related violence —  with 
predictions that the abolition o f provincial governments may in fact raise the intensity o f 
com petition in Hagen and elsewhere in the country. The general discussion on election 
manoeuvring is followed by a case study o f the 1992 national election in Chapter Seven,, with 
special emphasis on the military nature o f alliances and the different types o f election-related 
violence. In Chapter Eight I present a special case study on the 1995 W estern Highlands 
provincial governm ent election, with a view to provide special insights to understanding the pre­
selection phase o f  electoral politics. In the latter I present a 'fine-scale analysis’ (cf. Burton 1989a) 
o f campaigning and voting in the Kotna-Tiki constituency o f the W estern Highlands Province. 
It is p rimarily focused on the organisation o f the election campaign o f a particular candidate, 
William Pik, who ultimately became deputy premier o f the province.
The final chapter o f  the thesis explores the process described earlier as the Hagen megacycle, 
with a view to dem onstrating that local values and practices have been transferred to state
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politics, in exchange for the use o f state resources in local politics. The chapter begins with solid 
empirical evidence, but then progressively becomes m ore speculative as it considers the wider 
implications o f this study, in view o f contem porary events in Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
It concludes by pointing out that, despite having a V eak state’ and the apocalyptic predictions by 
certain com m entators in Australia, the nation-state o f Papua New Guinea is a robust democracy 
which is far from  collapsing. Yet it warns that the problems that PN G  is currently facing could 
be far m ore serious than m ost observers actually think. W hat this means is that, if  we are not 
careful, we could end up the same way as those in tropical Africa, where state collapse, which 
was unthinkable only a decade ago, could become a reality (cf. Ng’ethe 1995:256; Zartman 1995).
C h a p t e r  2
BACKGROUND TO  HAGEN LEADRSHIP AND POLITICS
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Introduction
This chapter introduces the discussion o f traditional Hagen politics and provides essential 
background information for subsequent chapters o f the thesis. It is primarily concerned with the 
historical context o f Hagen political competition and the different types o f leaders who operated 
within the various phases o f Hagen history. Basically, the chapter deals with changing styles and 
patterns o f leadership brought about as a result o f the colonially-imposed structural changes 
which accompanied state formation, including the superimposition o f state political institutions, 
which created new arenas, fields and sub-fields o f political competition. The state political 
institutions such as local government councils and village courts offered aspiring leaders new 
opportunities, while existing and new local groups and their leaders were introduced to new 
arenas o f competition and cooperation such as cooperative business ventures and elections. The 
new political fields and sub-fields o f competition, as indicated in the next chapter, were 
established through the creation o f local government councils, provincial government 
constituencies, and national government electorates.
The analytical focus o f this chapter is on the different phases o f Hagen history —  from 1933 to 
1997 — • in order to establish the parameters o f this study. With particular attention to the 
contrast between ‘old style’ versus ‘new style’ leaders, the chapter examines the powerful external 
forces that shaped contemporary Hagen society, and especially its political institutions such as 
the moha ceremonial exchange system. By studying the activities o f the old style, colonial era big- 
men such as Parua Kuri and Mek Nukuntz, in relation to new style, second generation, younger 
and educated leaders such as Melchior Pep, Matrus Mel and William Pik, this chapter starts to 
outline the basic changes and continuities in Hagen political values and practices explored 
throughout this thesis.
Particular attention is paid here to the impact o f colonialism on indigenous leadership and 
politics, the traditional economy, and the principal arenas o f political competition such as 
warfare and ceremonial exchange. Accordingly, the relevant literature on PNG Highlands 
leadership is reviewed, so as to ascertain whether the ‘big-man’ model adequately accounts for 
Hagen leadership patterns. In light o f the considerable variation in contemporary leadership 
types and the markedly contrasting modes o f operation evident in the Hagen case studies 
presented in this study, the chapter concludes by arguing that the ‘big-man’ model, if  sufficiently 
modified, can be used to explain only a particular type o f leadership, but is otherwise 
inappropriate because o f inherent fallacies within this m odel
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Phases of Hagen History
The recent history o f Hagen society can be viewed as an erratic cycle, alternating between times 
o f peaceful inter-group relations and traumatic periods o f turbulence and violence (see Figure 
2.1). Each period facilitated contrasting forms o f reciprocity, which we may call positive and 
negative reciprocity. In times o f peace there was positive reciprocity between the high-level 
named groups, which involved the competitive exchange o f wealth items in moha transactions, 
frequent intermarriage, and the exchange o f cultural innovations such as dance styles and 
costumes. But in times o f warfare such positive exchanges were not possible and thus replaced 
by negative reciprocity such as pay-back killings, and frequent accusations o f poisoning; these 
were times when marriage partners were being chosen from either within the tribe or from 
am ong allies, rather than from enemies, because wives, as evident in A.M. Strathem (1972b), can 
be a ‘toad’ for the exchange o f economic resources as well as poison.
In each phase, it can be argued that a certain type o f leader with special skills rose above the rest 
D uring warfare, for instance, fight-leaders and despots tend to be more dominant than other 
types o f  leaders, while big-men (who manipulate wealth to gain prestige) appear more prom inent 
during exchange cycles (cf. Standish 1978a). That other types o f leaders lack prominence during 
warfare does no t mean that fight leaders and despots are the defining types o f leaders in some 
societies, as reported by some early observers (see, for example, Salisbury 1964; W atson 1971). 
Similarly, when we fail to find other types o f leaders in societies where elaborate exchange 
relations and big-men are dominant, it would be a mistake to conclude that the big-man type is 
necessarily the defining type o f leader in such societies. This obviously raises serious questions 
about the kind o f debate on leadership which began in the 1960s, a significant point to which I 
shall return later in this chapter (see section on Big-man Modek see also the concluding section o f 
this chapter).
Anthropologists began working in the PN G  Highlands during the 1950s and 1960s when the 
kiaps, the colonial district officers, banned warfare and licensed ceremonial exchange.1 W hat *
Systematic programmes o f anthropological research in the PNG Highlands were launched from Sydney 
University and the Australian National University beginning in 1950 (see Hays 1992, 1993). A t the 
Australian National University the Nadel program (in honour o f S.F. Nadel) which, according to Paula 
Brown, whilst “then competing with anthropological research programmes at Sydney and Washington”, 
concentrated on the Highlands “because o f the concentration o f population and the excitement o f 
studying people whose areas, social systems, and response to contact [with the outside world] could be 
traced while Australia brought them into the modem world” (comment in Hays 1993:149). The program 
at Sydney University was headed by E.P. Elkin. Both programmes, as noted by Hays, were “informed by 
‘structural-functional’ agendas”, with “a major emphasis on social organisation” (1993:160). Many pioneer 
Highlands ethnographers were sent out by Elkin and Nadel during 1950-1955, including. Mervyn Meggitt 
and Ralph Bulmer in Enga; D ’Arcy Ryan in Mendi; Robert M. Glasse in Huli; Marie Reay among the 
Kuma o f South Wahgi; Catherine and Ronald Bem dt (m addition to James and Virginia Watson, who 
were from a different institutional base) among the Kainantu; and Kenneth Read and Richard Salisbury in 
the Goroka area (see Hays 1993:160). In their foot-steps followed Paula Brown, the geographer Harold
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they observed then was a new and almost an artificially created period in which organised 
warfare remained dorm ant, large-scale ceremonial exchange prospered, and self-made leaders 
called big-m en’, economic entrepreneurs, were perceived as having a monopoly over exchange 
networks and thus could establish themselves at the apex o f the prestige scale (see A.J. Strathem 
1966a; 1969a; 1971; see also Read 1959; Bulrner 1960; Brown 1963; Salisbury 1964; Meggitt 
1971). As noted by Feil (1987:97), such writers described either specific societies, o r the wider 
Highlands region; all using the term  big-m an’, they debated the best depiction o f Highlands 
leadership.
For Hagen society, and probably for many other PN G  Highlands societies, it was the radically 
altered political order o f the 1950s, swiftly transformed by the presence o f foreigners and new 
economic resources, which became accepted —  perhaps uncritically —  into the canon o f social 
science literature as the defining character o f <traditk>naT or pre-colonial Highlands societies. It 
seems likely that many observers, apparently in pursuit o f evidence to support the big-man 
model, either neglected or paid little attention to the monumental and revolutionary impact o f 
European colonialism, the imposition o f state structures, and the seductive powers o f Western 
consumerism on stateless societies such as Hagen. While some o f the problems and issues raised 
in die literature are specifically addressed in the relevant parts o f this and other chapters o f the 
thesis, it is w orth mentioning here that Hagen and other Highlands societies are in practice 
much m ore flexible, innovative, and structurally less rigid than they appear from the ideological 
and analytical constructs prevalent in the literature. W hat this means is that common 
characteristics may often blind observers from seeing im portant variations within and between 
the various Highlands societies.
The different phases o f Hagen history, perhaps best described by the words ‘erratic cycle’ 
because o f its alternating periods o f violence and peace, are schematised below. Figure 2.1 
represents a simplified version o f what is in essence a very complex situation. It should therefore 
be viewed as an analytical tool with which to  explain some o f the complexities o f Hagen history 
and its political economy as it has developed over a time span o f some 65 years, an era in which 
remarkable changes were experienced by its people.
Brookfield and die linguist Stephen Wurm in Simbu beginning in 1958; Andrew and Marilyn Strathem 
(field-work from 1964 onwards) and E. Brandewie (fieldwork in 1963-5 and 1968) among the Hagen 
(Melpa); and numerous others in subsequent years (see Hays 1992; Brown’s comment in Hays 1993).
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F igure 2.1: M ount H agen  history  as an erratic  cycle
Pre-1933 a n d  1933-40 1940s a n d  1950s 1960s a n d  1970s 1980s and  1990s
European Contact in 
1933: ‘First Contact5 
made with Leahy and 
Taylor patrol; 
Colonisation; the 
establishment o f  
Christian Missions 
(Catholic at Wilya and 
Lutheran at Ogelbeng); 
and the great shell 
trade.
Colonial Administration: 
Pacification, Conversion 
to Christianity and the 
adoption o f  western 
education;
Incorporation into the 
global econom y via the 
establishment o f  coffee 
plantations and later 
local Small-holdings; 
and first trade stores.
Establishment o f  Native 
Local Government 
Councils, Self­
Government, Political 
Independence, and the 
establishment o f  the 
Provincial Government 
System; Intensified 
commercial activities, 
such as coffee buying, 
trade stores, and the 
competitive purchase o f  
m otor vehicles.
Post-Independence:
Rapid localisation o f  the 
public service; together with 
the proliferation o f  
Businesses and Christian 
Missions; Acquisition o f  
Expatriate-owned coffee 
and tea plantations, in 
addition to the 
impoundment o f  State land 
and property; and Abolition 
o f  Provincial Governments.
WAR PEACE PEACE T H E N  WAR WAR
Endemic Warfare: 
Despots and Fight­
Leaders.
Compensation o f  Minor 
Enemies, Ally- 
Reparation Payment, 
and Ceremonial 
Exchange: Big-men.
Ceremonial Exchange, 
Sporadic Warfare, and 
First Elections: Big-men, 
some Fight-Leaders, and 
‘Older-style5 Politicians.
M odem (Electoral) Politics, 
Big Business and Warfare: 
Big-men, Super-big-men or 
Econom ic Leaders, and 
some Despotic Fight­
Leaders.
Bosbois (or headmen) 
chosen by government 
and missions preceded 
village officials (i.e., till 
the end o f  World War 
IT).
Luluais and Tultuls 
(Village Constables in 
Papua); First luluais and 
tultuls appointed post­
war.
Local Government 
Councillors, National 
Parliamentarians and 
Provincial Assembly 
Members, and Village 
Court Officials.
Politicians, Millionaire 
Businessmen, Official State 
leaders such as Bureaucrats 
and other Educated Elites, 
Criminal Raskot Gang 
Leaders, Gunfighters, 
Despotic Councillors, and 
others.
The Hagen area’s prehistory is o f course far richer in terms o f the considerable time depth o f 
agricultural development around the surprisingly eady date o f 9,000 years before present (cf. 
Golson 1977, 1981, 1982) and the complex political institutions that arose from agricultural 
intensification and the exchange o f surplus products (cf. Feil 1987), but that topic, though
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immensely intriguing, is unfortunately beyond the scope o f this study. I shall only deal with 
matters o f written —  and remembered —  history here.
For the post-1930s decades, Figure 2.1 shows different phases o f Hagen history since European 
contact in April 1933. In  chronological order, the analytically distinct but otherwise overlapping 
phases are:
•  o f first contact with Europeans, people from Eastern Highlands and M orobean societies 
and, perhaps m ore importantly, the colonial state in 1933, followed by the establishment 
o f Catholic and Lutheran missions in 1934 and 1936, respectively, which was followed 
by the great shell trade;
•  o f colonially-imposed pacification in the 1940s and the subsequent incorporation o f 
Hageners into the global economy through the establishment o f coffee and tea 
plantations in the 1950s and the introduction o f store goods;
•  o f  intensified state-sponsored politics and state-imposed political integration through the 
establishment o f local governm ent councils in the early 1960s, the territorial House o f 
Assembly in 1964, followed by self-government in 1973, which culminated in political 
independence from Australia in September 1975, and the subsequent establishment o f 
the provincial government system in 1977;
•  o f frenzied commercial activity through the setting up o f road-side trade stores in the 
late 1960s, the incorporation o f new economic resources such as cash, cattle, beer and 
m otor vehicles in moka exchanges in the early 1970s, the competitive purchase o f m otor 
vehicles during the 1970s coffee boom , and the acquisition o f expatriate-owned 
plantations in the mid 1970s and early 1980s;
•  o f the proliferation o f both genuine Christian and pseudo-Christian missions during the 
1970s-1980s period, a trend which continues into the 1990s; and
•  o f  intensified competition through business, warfare, reparation payments and elections, 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the abolition o f the provincial gpvemment system by 
the National Parliament in July 1995.
The cumulative effect o f these multi-dimensional processes led to an expansion in spheres o f 
com petition, a key condition which undoubtedly facilitated the creation o f the Hagen megacycle, 
a significant point to which I shall return later in the concluding chapter o f this thesis. It suffices 
here to say that the widening sphere o f competition, which involve geographical/administrative 
linking o f political fields as well as the systematic merging o f traditional arenas o f competition
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with m odem  ones, resulted in the proliferation o f different types o f leaders. The new types o f 
leaders, some o f which have no t been encountered before, include ‘super-big-men’ (or 
millionaire businessmen), criminal raskol gang leaders, military strategists and gun fighters, 
despotic councillors, senior bureaucrats, professionals (such as academics, doctors, lawyers, 
accountants), and a new generation o f highly sophisticated politicians with university degrees 
and connections with the outside world as well as with the internal underworld.
These new types o f leaders seem to have replaced colonial style big-men-cum-politicians— men 
like Parua K uri and Mek Nukuntz —  who initially built their political careers through pre­
eminence in moka exchanges during the 1960s and 1970s, but later denounced moka in favour o f 
cooperative business ventures.
O lder style politicians like Kuri and Nukuntz owed their success partly to the colonial 
administration policies o f banning warfare and licensing ceremonial exchange. Parua Kuri 
epitomises aspiring leaders o f the 1950s whose initial power was derived from the colonial 
administration through their association with haps. Parua himself made the perfect transition 
from  boshoi in the 1950s to local government councillor in the 1960s to member o f assembly and 
national parliamentarian in the 1970s. Parua Kuri has played a dominant role in Dei Local 
Governm ent Council. H e has been a vice president since its inception in 1962 and president 
since 1966 (cf. A.J. Strathem 1976:268). Parua Kuri first got elected to the House o f Assembly in 
1972 (A.J. Strathem 1976) and held the Dei Open seat for three consecutive parliamentary terms 
(1972-1987).2 A son o f a pre-eminent big-man, Kuri o f the Tepuka Keitipi dan, Parua built his 
renown through selective use o f colonial and traditional networks and resources. As noted by 
A.J. Strathem (1984:149), Parua still gives die impression o f being the m ost im portant decision­
maker in D ei Local Governm ent Council, since retaining his ordinary councillorship after being 
elected as MP. But Parua Kuri’s dominant role in Dei politics has been consistently challenged 
by younger rivals from  within his own tribe as well as from other tribes in D el His m ost ardent 
rival is a young university graduate, Matrus Mel, who comes from the same tribe as Parua, but 
leads a faction opposed to Parua’s faction in Dei politics and business (see Chapters 3-4). The 
Parua faction has also been opposed by a former deputy premier o f W estern Highlands 
Province, William Pik, who comes from a tribe which has a special alliance with Parua’s tribe. 
Both Mel and Pik, w ho were in a patron-client relationship with Melchior Pep as patron, played 
significant roles in Parua’s election loss to Pep during the 1987 national election, as well as in
2. For some eariy accounts o f Parua’s political career, see A J. Strathem (1970:562-564; 1976; 1984:149-152); 
see also H.K. and P. Colebatch, M. Reay, and A.J. Strathem (1971:253-260) for a discussion o f Parua’s first 
attem pt at state politics during die 1968 elections. I provide a more detailed account o f Parua’s dominant 
role in the Dei field o f political competition in the relevant parts o f the diesis. See, for example, his role in 
the creation o f coalition-style alliances (Chester Three), business development associations {Chapter Lour), 
inter-group conflicts and electoral manoeuvring {Chapters 5-8).
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Parua’s son, Reuben’s election losses in 1992 and 1997 elections (see Chapters 3-4; and Chapters 7­
8). In  this way the personal history o f a few men indicates major changes in Hagen society over 
several decades.
By contrast, the new-style politicians o f the 1990s owe their success to a num ber o f factors such 
as education, unequal access to wealth through international and criminal connections, and 
pillage o f state resources. These rashol politicians have consolidated their positions through 
selective use o f patronage, largesse, intimidation, and terror. Some o f them owe their continued 
existence in state politics to support from criminal gangs rather than by the legitimising process 
o f a free and fair electoral system. A large part o f the contemporary PN G  political culture is thus 
based on nepotistic patronage, parochial loyalties, and what I call gutter-politics.3
This obviously raises difficult problems and issues for PN G  leaders and peoples in their attempt 
to construct a nadon-state from politically and cultural-linguistically fragmented societies. An 
explanation for the competing value systems in Papua New Guinea, especially the conflicting 
allegiances o f individuals who are caught between parallel moral realms, may be found in the 
writings o f an anthropologist some 26 years ago* h i comparing political systems Peter Lawrence 
pointed out that in W estern society “the state rests on one concept: that o f the dtizen-isolate, 
the person w ho, by acknowledging his obligations to the state, to which he surrenders his title to 
use force in return for its protection, is automatically guaranteed rights and privileges equal to 
those accorded all other persons similarly accepting the state’s authority” (1971:5; see also 
Lawrence 1969:18-19). By contrast, as will become dear in the succeeding chapters o f this thesis, 
m ost, if  no t all, Papua New Guineans have strong attachments with their primary kin-groups 
and have yet to develop into dtizen-isolates. However, Lawrence may have been right in 
suggesting that it is in the towns such as Port Moresby and Lae where the “individual is 
beginning his metamorphosis from kinsmen to dtizen-isolate” (1969:37), owing to factors such 
as education and employment, acculturation, and interaction with people from other parts o f the 
country. Questions o f loyalty and sliding levels o f identity will be addressed in the next chapter. I 
now turn to the phases o f Hagen history.
3 . Gutter-politics is a term used here to refer to the use o f criminal gang; by raskol politicians to solidify their 
vote by intimidating and terrorising voters and rival politicians. These raskol politicians may have criminal 
backgrounds or strong connections with local raskol gang? and even with international criminal 
organisations. For a  detailed analysis o f the relations between politicians and raskolgmgs, see Harris (1988); 
see also Dinnen (1996b) for an integrated approach to the analysis o f criminal gangs, high-level corruption, 
and other problems as challenges o f order in a weak state. In Chapter Five; I present a discussion on the 
role o f politicians as a vital link between warfare and the illicit trafficking of firearms and drug?.
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Prior to colonial rule there was a period characterised by endemic warfare in which despots and 
fight-leaders were prom inent in inter-group relations o f enmity. This was die period just before 
European contact in the 1933 and Australian Colonial Administration-imposed pacification in 
the 1940s. Although it is extremely difficult to  reconstruct pre-colonial Hagen society, oral 
accounts o f  warfare and the evidence o f population dispersal show that pre-colonial Hagen 
warfare was m ore than a political game, that stakes were high, and winning and losing meant 
everything to the combatants and their groups (see Chapters 5-8 for parallels between warfare and 
elections). However, as will become clearer in Chapter Five, Hagen warfare was never an 
uncontrolled descent into Hobbesian chaos, nor an indication o f social disintegration, 
retrogression, o r societal collapse. It still provides an im portant arena o f competition and 
cooperation for local groups and their leaders, and thus remains a highly coordinated political 
affair, regulated by definite ‘rules o f  tile game’ (c£ Bailey 1969), and is now systematically linked 
to  other spheres o f com petition, such as business and elections (see Chapters 3d).
Phase II: 1940s and 1950s
Between the 1940s and 1950s many groups were involved in converting relations o f enmity into 
those o f exchange, and intermarriage between some groups even intensified. The Hagen area 
was effectively padfied by the 1950s, owing laigely to the efforts o f local leaders who had grafted 
themselves onto the colonial administration for personal interest Many o f them  became bosbois 
before the Second W orld War and after the war became iuhids and tukuls (appointed village 
officials). In  his study o f contemporary politics and political change in Chuave, Wayne Warry 
was able to  trace the development o f institutions and organisations that have arisen since 
European contact
By 1953 the adm inistration had began replacing bosbois w ith  M uds and UdMs w ho w ere 
responsible to  the kiap a t C huave patro l p o s t Som e bosbois becam e M uds bu t, a t least in 
C huave, the adm inistration com m only appointed younger m en w ho w ere better 
T okpisin  speakers, o r w ho had served the adm inistration as interpreters o r carriers on  
patrols. T he adm inistration first appointed M uds as tribal leaders and tultuls as d an  
leaders, b u t later appointed M uds fo r each clan, occasionally, m ade one param ount M ud  
(ndlpus) fo r d ie  tribe, and assigned tuM s to  act as assistants to  the bdud w ithin the clan.
These officials oversaw government roadwork, the building of rest houses and aid 
posts. They were also responsible for settling disputes and for enforcing government 
regulations pertaining to the proper care and maintenance of villages (Warry 1987:72).
The Hagen situation was quite similar to Chuave, except there were no paramount bilud. The 
first appointm ents in Hagen were o f headmen, known locally as bosbots, who were initially 
selected by the kiap, but later the bosbois were allowed to ‘mark’ im portant m en who were known 
for their ‘strong talk’ (ik rondoki) to  become bosboi (see A.M. Strathem 1972a:43-44). It seems that
Phase I: Pre-1933 and 1933-1940
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some o f  the earliest appointm ents were o f men who were already leaders in indigenous spheres 
o f com petition, while a few may have been fearless warriors.
Phase HI: 1960s and 1970s
H ie  1960s and 1970s period was one o f relative peace, except for one major war between two 
large Hagen tribes, the Jika and Yamka, during the early 1970s. The significance o f that war —  
right next to M ount Hagen tow n —  was enormous: (a) because o f extensive media publicity in 
both radio and newspapers; and (b) even m ore remarkably, it exposed the soft underbelly o f die 
supposedly ‘hard’ colonial state. The link between the crumbling o f the autocratic kiap system 
and die resurgence o f  warfare in the Highlands during this period was noted by A.J. Strathem:
In  th e  early 1970s it w as o ften  stated th at one o f  the m ain reasons fo r the outbreak o f  
inter-group fights w as the erosion o f  the system  o f  ‘hard-fisted’ adm inistration by 
generalist patro l officers, w ho originally held bo th  police and m agisterial pow ers. T hese 
m en w ere able to  act as judge, gaoler, and jury in  m atters involving breaches o f  N ative 
Regulations, and o n  their patrols could m ete o u t sw ift punishm ent to  offenders, and 
prevent sm all disputes from  escalating (1984:26).
This period was also characterised by an intensification o f ceremonial exchange and the 
incorporation o f new economic resources as they became available through the adoption o f a 
capitalist  economy, thereby emphasising the resiliency o f traditional institutions. But there were 
im portant changes, too. The major structural changes and associated social issues become more 
clearly expressed when events o f the sixties are examined separately from those o f the seventies.
Phase IU(a): 1960s
The 1960s was a decade o f  relative peace in Hagen. Local government councils were established 
during the early 1960s. Hagen and Kui councils were set up in 1961 and 1962, respectively, but 
later merged in 1964 to form  a joint Hagen Council, covering the areas immediately north and 
east o f M ount Hagen; Dei Council was established in 1963; Mul Council, paired since 1968 with 
Dei to form  a single O pen electorate for the House o f Assembly, began in 1964 (AJ. Strathem 
1970:549; A M . Strathem 1972a:ll). Dei was later removed from Mul because o f hostilities 
between the Mul and Dei people, and since 1972 has remained a separate Open electorate, with 
its own representative to the National Parliament (AJ. Strathem 1976:269-270; 1984:143).4 *I
4 . As described by A J. Strathem, “not long before the 1968 elections, relations between Mul and Dei 
councils were set in jeopardy by the killing o f a driver from Mul Council while he was travelling inride 
DeT (1976269). Although a large compensation was made to relatives o f the M il driver, retaliatory action 
was taken against fee pre-eminent Dei leader, Parua Kuri, Airing the opening ceremony o f the Mugjamp 
police post in 1970. For further information on this matter and its political dimensions, see H.K. and P. 
Colebatch, M. Reay, and A J. Strathem 1971:253-254; see also A J. Strathem 1984:25; and Ketan 1996259).
I present a brief discussion o f Dei-Mul relations in Chapter Seven.
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Phase ni(b): 1970s
The 1970s was also a decade o f increased state-related political activities. It was a decade o f state- 
im posed political integration, through the creation o f a separate O pen electorate in Dei in the 
1972 elections, followed by national self-government in 1973, political independence in 1975, 
and the establishment o f the provincial governm ent system in 1977. The cumulative effects o f 
these were a marked increase in political awareness and the subsequent incorporation o f 
com ponents o f the state and its events into Hagen arenas o f competition and cooperation (see, 
for example, discussion on the Hagen Megagck in the concluding chapter o f this thesis). Elective 
office, for instance, was recognised as the ultimate source o f wealth and power. And, as becomes 
evident in Chapters 3A , leaders responded by encouraging their groups to form into coalition- 
style alliances in order to compete m ore effectively for state resources.
Such intensified com petition between groups which were ardent rivals, with recent remembered 
histories o f  warfare, almost inevitably led to a resurgence o f warfare in the 1970s, a trend which 
continued into the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapters 3-6). The underlying causes o f turbulence in the 
1970s have been summarised by Standish:
In the 1970s land pressures and fears of shortage arising from cash cropping and 
population growth, a general loss of earlier optimism for an exciting new life in die 
modem economy, combined with a growing sense of insecurity in die period of mass 
education, and also political decolonisation, have ad increased social tension in the 
highlands. Despite the government’s best intentions, from 1972 to 1977 there was a 
great deal of large-scale clan warfare in a significant return to die old ways (1978a: 19).
The resurgence o f warfare in the Highlands and its undedying causes has in fact formed the 
focus o f an im portant debate in recent times (see, for example, Standish 1973 and 1992; Kerpi 
1976; A.J. Strathem 1977, 1992 and 1984; Meggitt 1977; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Burton 
1990; Muke 1994; and O ’Hanlon 1995). I review this literature in Chapter Five. Standish, for 
instance, goes on to say:
My own work indicates that the resurgence of warfare was promoted by clan elders. 
Politically, it not only promoted these men back into political prominence, but it also 
reinforced the dan as a political unit to an extent probably for greater than that which 
had existed in the early to mid 1960s (1978a:19).
In addition to  intensified competition and warfare, the decade saw the rise o f  new types o f 
leaders such as businessmen, church elders, educated elites, government officials and politicians, 
gome o f which are the ultimate products as well as perpetrators o f such competition. All o f these 
types o f  leaders now exist side by side with, and sometimes in opposition to , traditional types o f 
leaders such as big-men, orators, fight-leaders and ritual experts.
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The 1980s and 1990s was a period o f intensified commercial activity in Hagen. The period saw 
an expansion in agricultural activity through the establishment o f large locally-owned coffee 
plantations, in addition to further acquisition o f expatriate-owned coffee plantations and the 
conversion o f tea estates into coffee plantations. Local business development corporations 
established in the mid 1970s prospered through diversification and intensification o f their 
activities during the 1980s. But, as evident in Chapters 3A , in the 1990s many o f these business 
groups have been plagued with internal power struggles between leaders o f factions, thereby 
resulting in the bankruptcy o f some companies.
Politically, this period was perhaps the m ost im portant in terms o f both integration and 
disintegration. Elections, for instance, became increasingly violent as people realised that it was a 
zero-sum , winner-takes-ali game (cf. Standish 1996:320); that there is no room  for half­
heartedness o r complacency in politics which m ust therefore be approached with the same 
commitment and passion that one takes to the battleground; and that the state can be milked in 
order to feed the prim ordial community (cf. Ekeh 1975). Although the state is still not the mean 
game, it is nonetheless an im portant prize in local competition.5 The abolition o f the provincial 
governm ent system in 1995 has somewhat increased the intensity o f competition. The political 
implications and local dimensions o f the abolition o f provincial governments in Papua New 
Guinea are discussed in Chapter Six.
Furtherm ore, the 1980s and 1990s brought a further resurgence o f group warfare. It was a 
period o f  turbulence and violence, which saw the resurfacing o f despotic leaders and fight­
leaders, apart from politicians, businessmen and others. This is perhaps a trend which m ost 
anthropologists and other observers least expected. Turbulence o f some sort may have been 
expected as a consequence o f rapid social and political change but few expected the resurfacing 
o f despotic fight-leaders. I take up the discussion on despotic fight-leaders and the rise o f a new 
generation o f  gunfighters, political strategists, and politicians in Chapters 3-8, but shall now turn 
to an analysis o f the different types o f leaders.
Phase IV: 1980s and 1990s
5. There is an apparent contradiction between elections as zero-sum, winner-takes-all game and the state as a
prize in local competition but not the main game. This can be resolved through the separation o f 
individual interests from group interests. For individual leaders and their primary kin-groups, elections 
represent major investments —-  or gambling o f massive resources and is indeed a zero-sum, winner-
takes-all game. Yet for the wider groups, who have a minor stake (including group prestige), the state and 
its events are valued as a prize, and whilst they do agree that such a prize is worth fighting for, they also 
realise that it is not the main game in local competition. See Chapter Nine for further exposition o f this 
paradox.
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Types o f Leaders: Big-men, Despots and Others
My interpretation o f leadership types is slightly similar to Daryl Feil’s (1987) configuration: that 
different conditions gave rise to different types o f leadership models. But there is an im portant 
distinction between his interpretation and mine: he argued, for instance, that conditions 
conducive to despotic leaders were superseded in societies where big-men and ceremonial 
exchange were prevalent; while I argue that both types, among others, can exist side by side 
within the same period. Arguing from  an evolutionary perspective, he proposes th a t
An evolutionary continuum of key features of social life can be demonstrated and is 
based on significantly divergent paths of economic and agricultural 'development' in the 
prehistoric and historic past Types of leaders may, therefore, vary accordingly, and this 
variation can be linked to these same historical processes (Feil 1987:92).
H e w ent on to say that archetypal big-men, those who manipulate wealth in exchange, occur 
mainly in the western part o f the Highlands where intensive production o f pigs has been long 
established and where polities are linked in exchange transactions by men o f influence and high 
standing in ceremonial institutions like the Enga tee and the Hagen moka. He then claims that 
despotism occurs in those societies o f the eastern part o f the Highlands where production and 
exchange o f valuables are not intensive pursuits and where permanent agriculture and settlement 
are no t as old as they are in the western part o f the Highlands (see Feil 1987:98-99). He further 
argues:
Despotism, like big-manship, is an historically specific form of leadership in societies 
where production for exchange remains nascent; is recent, and where, furthermore, 
groups are rigidly bounded and defined, and individuals in them 'disconnected' horn 
others in symmetrically replicated groups. Endemic warfare occurred in the eastern 
Highlands and despotic leadership was a response to constant threat despots built up 
followings and ensured security which was impossible by means other than domination, 
intimidation and audacity (1987:99).
Contrastingly, followings built on the exchange o f valuables, he says, fell to big-men in the 
western part o f the Highlands, comprising Hagen, Enga and Mendi societies (ibid). I
I disagree with the evolutionary twist in Feil’s argument, and suggest that this is not an accurate 
assessment o f  the situation in the Highlands, as there is evidence o f despotic leaders in societies 
such as Hagen where —  on his model —  they should not be found at all It is im portant to 
realise that leadership is generalised: that a fight-leader can also be a leader in exchange 
transactions, o r a skilled orator, or, nowadays, a businessman or a politician, depending on a 
given situation. In the Hagen world view, a successful leader is one who, like an axe blade (rui 
anbel), can fit onto any handle: for productive work (like gardening); or for destructive work (as 
in battle), just as there are productive leaders and destructive ones in m odem  societies. 
Accordingly, leaders, as shown in Figure 2.1, take on whatever role required by their groups.
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D uring warfare, for instance, groups look to strong leaders, often daring fighters, for leadership. 
As Standish argued for Chimbu society:
When its very existence is in peril, in a state of war or near-war, a society is dependent 
upon its leaders for survival. The group pulls together, and tightens itself into a 
coherent force. It needs the best leadership it can muster and must follow that 
leadership or face extinction. This is not a situation which allows rivals the luxury of 
competing for followers in a state of ‘anarchy’, but one where the group needs leaders 
and will find the best available, to perform essential roles (1978a:19).
This use o f  ‘anarchy* is obviously in reference to an earlier interpretation o f Chimbu politics 
which concluded that tribal leadership changed in a generation from the absence o f any fixed 
authority —  a state o f ‘anarchy* —  to a system o f ‘satrapy*, where government-appointed 
officials were given the opportunity to dominate, during the colonial period (Brown 1963).
W hen warfare is formally concluded either by mutual truce or by way o f externally imposed 
‘pacification*, as occurred during the 1940s, leaders turn their energies to other activities to 
establish their influence and compete. The archetypal big-men, for instance, become more 
dom inant when relations o f  enmity are converted into those o f wealth exchanges. Furthermore, 
when groups redirected their attention to  new arenas o f competition and cooperation such as 
the competitive purchase o f m otor vehicles and coffee buying during die 1970s coffee boom , it 
was the mission-educated small businessmen such as Goimba K ot (see Chap. 3-4) and Ru Kundil 
(see A J. Strathem 1994) who became prom inent Nowadays it is the university-educated 
politicians and millionaire businessmen like Michael Mel, Paul Pora and Paias Wingti who are 
prom inent, which reflects the very high contemporary Hagen cultural value placed on education, 
business, and elective office (see Chapters 6-8).
Colonial Impact on Hagen society
European colonialism from the mid 1930s, symbolised by the autocratic ‘kiapdom* comprising 
Australian patrol officers and their bunch o f ‘native* assistants (including die despotic village 
bosboisy later replaced by hducds and tu/tuis), came as a rude shock to many Hageners, like many 
others throughout the country. Although die Germans and British, and later die Australians, did 
no t actually control the large areas they claimed rights over, their influence often spread beyond 
die small urban centres from  which the colonial territories o f New Guinea and Papua were 
administered.
The people o f  Hagen, as in other parts o f the Highlands, interacted with the colonial 
aHministTatfon for three baric reasons: (1) they were fearful o f the white men s superior 
firepower, as it was often demonstrated through the shooting o f pigs in front o f huge gatherings; 
(2) they were in awe o f  the mystique o f the white ‘persons-of-wealdi* (m l tvamh), as they were
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generally associated with the spirit w odd because o f their skin colour and their seemingly endless 
wealth, whose source could no t be explained in Hagen terms; and (3) when the fear o f firepower 
was conquered and the mystique wore thin, interaction continued because o f self-interest, taking 
advantage o f an opportunity for personal gain, a strategy which continues to the present O thers 
have made similar observations (see, for example, Brown 1972:66-67; Finney 1973:Chap.2; A.J. 
Strathem  1984:Chap.2; 1993b:42; G ordon and Meggitt 1985:163; Standish 1992:33-34; 
O ’Hanlon 1993:21-22).6
The interpretation o f  the whitemen as Sky People from the spirit wodd was a common initial 
reaction, but, as noted by G ordon and Meggitt for Enga, “we would be mistaken to conclude 
from  this that Enga were wholly overawed by the presence o f these Sky People” (1985:163). 
Rather, it was “pragmatism, nurtured in a milieu o f widespread suspicion and backed up by a 
quick understanding o f the fire power o f .303 rifles and a desire for useful objects ranging from 
steel axes to steel bridges, that led to the comparative ease o f the first pacification in Enga” (ibid). 
Indeed, the fear o f spirits and guns is no longer there, but what is still pursued today is the “self­
interest part o f the equation” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:42).
The flooding o f the local economy w ith shell valuables
The Hagen people —  initially those from Jika, Yamka, Elti, Mokei and other tribes around the 
present M ount Hagen township —  first made contact with Europeans during the much 
celebrated Leahy-Taylor patrol o f April, 1933.7 Soon after this alien intrusion, the local economy 
was flooded with shell valuables. Between 1933 and 1945, hundreds o f thousands o f peadshells, 
bailer, nassa and cowries were flown in from the coast by private entrepreneurs (principally the 
Leahy brothers who were working on an alluvial gold deposit at Kuta), missionaries (Ft William 
Ross at the Wilya Catholic Station and Georg Vicedom and H ebert Strauss at Ogelbeng 
Lutheran Station), and also by the Australian colonial administration. Connolly and Anderson 
(1987:250) estimated that the Leahys alone in 1936 were flying in about five hundred kina shells
6 . For a general discussion on die reactions o f PNG Highlanders to European contact, see Simpson’s (1954) and Connolly
and Anderson’s (1987) accounts o f the much celebrated Leahy-Taylor patrol; See also Leahy (1994) for a personal 
account ofhts adventures; and Souter (1963) for a general account o f patrols in Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya.
7 . It is evident from a particularly well-researched narrative account —  based on interviews with the Leahy
family as well as first-hand accounts o f Highlanders who actually met district officer James Taylor, the gpld 
prospector Michael Leahy and his brother Dan, the surveyor Ken Spinks, and more than ninety carriers, 
armed police and Leahy's armed Warns from Morobe (some o f them accompanied by their Bena Bena 
wives) —  that the Roklaka, Yamka, Elti, Penambi, and Mokei (possibly in this order) were some o f the 
first Hageners to see people o f European origin (see Connolly and Anderson 1987). Yamka Maepkang 
Afiti o f Kelua, who is said to have “travelled several miles to the east to attend a funeral” (almost certainly 
at Gumanch among the Roklaka) on 16 April 1933, claimed to have heard news o f the aliens from a 
Roklaka man who announced: “The sun always rises! The river always flows in its banks! And the rocks 
have always been there! But the makers o f all these things are coming up now. Perhaps they are spirits, 
perhaps they will eat us all, but I am bringing them” (quoted in Connolly and Anderson 1987:99-100; as 
recited to them by Yamka Maepkang Min).
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a m onth to m eet their food and labour bills. Although no one knows for sure the exact number 
o f  shells flown into Hagen and the Highlands during this early colonial period, it is generally 
accepted that between 1933 and 1942 at least five and possibly ten million shells o f all types were 
im ported by die European community into die Highlands region to pay for food and labour 
(see Hughes 1978:315; Connolly and Anderson 1987:250; Feil 1987:118).
Despite the inevitable devaluation, in the first ten years o f foreign occupation, there seems to 
have been no upper limit to the demand for more shells, a situation which was thoroughly 
exploited by the intruders. It is, for instance, evident in Connolly and Anderson (1987) that apart 
from  settling their food and labour bills with shells, some Europeans —  notably the Leahy 
brothers —  and many coastal carriers and guards used shells also to pay for sexual favours from 
local women, thereby introducing prostitution, something which never existed in pre-colonial 
H agai society.8 Q uoting from Michael Leahy’s diary, Connolly and Anderson noted that there 
were marriages and casual sexual encounters in the early years o f European occupation:
As Leahy noticed, the normal bridewealth for a marriage was five peadsheQs and a 
tomahawk. But a knife and a few smaller shells would pay for a short visit to the pilpiL 
This was a specific response to the arrival of the strangers. Sex on a casual basis was 
very much frowned upon in Hagen society, and sex for payment was absolutely 
unheard of. To the women involved it would have been a strange and possibly 
humiliaring experience, perhaps tempered by the satisfaction of knowing they were 
bringing wealth to their dans. Men say today die women were not feared to participate, 
but, gjven their position in society, young girls would have found die pressure very hard 
to resist In their desire to get tome of die new wealth it seems husbands, uncles and 
brothers had taken to prostituting their women (1987:142).
A t first the presence and economic activities o f these seemingly incredibly wealthy foreigners 
had a ‘democratising’ effect on political competition, whereby the road to wealth and power 
which had previously been monopolised by big-men was now open to anyone who could 
obtain shells (see A J. Strathem 1966a). Obtaining shells was easy: many more men could get 
enough to obtain a second wife, o r to repay debts simply by exchange o f garden products, o r by 
working for Europeans and earning them  as wages, in addition to prostituting their wives, sisters 
and daughters. In other w ords, since die 1930s the system became m ote egalitarian —  for men 
at least— providing access to wealth to  individuals who may have otherwise been squeezed out 
by the minority who controlled the traditional networks through which shells and other 
resources flowed.
Before die arrival o f  die European, die shells which were circulated in moka networks came 
through extended traditional trade routes via die Southern Highlands. As valued scarce
8 Connolly and A nderson, how ever, did n o t m ention th a t at least one pioneer missionary in Hagpn was also 
involved in the exchange o f shells for sexual favours, which proved his fertility. I t is widely believed that a now deceased 
prr̂ rrwfVMifr whrtp r a t h o f c  prfest was the biological father o f at least one child. His daughter and grandchildren Eve h i  a
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resources, the shells are said to  have been controlled by those who held onto the ‘ropes’ o f 
moka. For instance, in 1964, the Tepuka Oklembo big-man and councillor Rokla listed for 
Andrew Strathem  some 23 men who were the only ones in the Tepuka and Kawelka tribes to 
have peadshells in their possession ‘about the time the European arrived’: and it is likely that his 
account actually relates to a time shortly after the arrival o f the Leahys and Taylor (A.J. Strathem 
1971:108). This account, as A.J. Strathem (¿bid) says, agrees with that o f Vicedom and Tischner 
(1943-8, VoL2), who argued that before European contact big-men monopolised shell moka 
payments in Hagen.
Inflation o f the moka
The flooding o f  the Hagen economy had far-reaching implications on indigenous political 
institutions and leadership systems. An immediate consequence o f the massive circulation o f 
shell valuables, as noted by an early observer, was th a t
The native of the Hagen area became the millionaire. He could go to the fringe of the 
area and buy wives with the shells he was gradually hoarding. Where a chief would 
formerly be a great man with three wives, now he could buy 8 or 10. Young men who 
formerly had no standing could now raise their status by working for the white man, 
receiving payment in shells (Ross; quoted in Gidow 1947:72-3; cited in Feil 1987:119).
Citing A.J. Strathem (1966a) and his own work, Feil goes on to say that “peadshells were 
devalued and the moka system which [had] provided wealthy, powerful leaders and furthered 
exploitative class-like relations, underwent a profound ‘democratic’ change once again” 
(1987:119).9 Both Standish (1978a) and later Feil (1982) argued that it was this drastically altered 
situation which anthropologists first encountered and described as the milieu o f big-men, a time 
when plentiful peadshells increased the num ber o f players in competitive exchanges, and when 
warfare was officially banned. But, as argued by Feil (1987:119-20), it was a situation which had 
been transform ed many times in the past
In  the end, it was inevitable that inflation set in and the shell economy was completely destroyed. 
By the late 1960s shells had definitely lost their economic value among groups around Mount 
Hagen, where once highly valued items such as gold-lipped shells were considered as being 
good only for adornm ent and display purposes. Some observers have, for instance, commented 
on the rather conspicuous absence o f kina shells during moka prestations during the 1970s:
Large-scale moka involving kina shells were still going on in the early sixties, but then 
they quickly lost their prestige value. In 1965 the anthropologist Andrew Strathem 
watched men from the Tepuka dans, who lived in an outlying district of Mount Hagen, 
give mote than eleven hundred kina shells in moka to exchange partners from the
9 For com parable discussions and an elaboration o f  this point, see A.J. Strathem (1971); and Standish (1978a and 
1992).
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Kawelka people. In 1974, those shells were ‘forgotten’ when the Kawelka came to 
reciprocate. They had gone out of fashion and lost their value. Pigs, money and motor 
cars were the featured items. Cash was the thing and what it could buy (Connolly and 
Anderson 1987:281; no specific references given).
Despite the destruction o f  the shell economy by the Europeans, Hageners moved onto new 
arenas o f political com petition, often experimenting with new ideas and economic resources, but 
social scientists seem to have been sucked into a black-hole o f academia called the ‘big-man’ 
model. This particular model has been so thoroughly applied, even in instances where it does 
n o t fit, that it is now accepted even by members o f the societies which have traditionally formed 
the subject o f scholarly inquiry. That PN G  Highlanders and many other Papua New Guineans 
commonly refer to leaders as bikman in Tokpisin (English: ‘big-man’) is ample evidence o f how 
deeply entrenched the big-man concept is in discussion o f  PN G  societies. I now turn to the 
‘big-man’ m odel in order to assess its applicability in Hagen.
The Big-man Model
As a typological concept, the term  ‘big-man’ was first made popular by Marshall Sahlins (1963). 
A t a time when social Darwinism was still very much the trend o f thought, Sahlins sought to 
establish an evolutionary point in his comparison o f self-made leadership in Melanesia to that o f 
inherited Polynesian chieftainship. According to Sahlins, Melanesia represented a more 
rudimentary type o f  leadership structure when compared with the more advanced chieftainship 
system in Polynesia (1966:160-163),10 While the contrast between big-men, especially the self­
made bourgeois, and chiefs, the so-called titled and well-bred ones, remains an im portant 
insight, critics were quick to point out the gross generalisations involved in lumping all 
Melanesian leaders into one category o f achieved leadership and Polynesian ones into another 
ascribed leadership categpry. Many Melanesian leadership systems, as aptly pointed out by Feil 
(1987:93), have ascriptive elements and some Polynesian systems achieved ones; it is their 
relative emphasis that varies. For example, in the PN G  Highlands where “the big-man model 
still reigns supreme, despite many problems not yet confronted” (Feil 1987:93), statistical data
Marshall Sahlins’s comparison o f “developed Polynesian and underdeveloped Melanesian polities” was 
based on differences in scale, political structure, historical performance, and quality o f leadership 
(1966:161-163). He claimed that (1) “Melanesian polities” were smaller, numbering “seventy to three 
hundred persons” in Melanesia in general, and, in the Highlands, “up to a thousand, occasionally a few 
thousand people”, compared with Polynesian chiefdoms which “might claim ten thousand, even tens o f 
thousands” (p.161); (2) that Melanesian “tribal plan is one o f politically unintegrated segments”, by 
contrast with integrated, hierarchical structures in Polynesian (p.162); (3) that “only the Hawaiians, 
Tahitians, Tongans and, to a lesser extent, the Fijians successfully defended themselves” against 
“European cultural pressure in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, by evolving countervailing, 
native-controlled states” (p.163); and (4) that “the Melanesian big-man seems ... thoroughly bourgeois, so 
reminiscent o f the free enterprising rigged individual o f our own heritage”, compared with the Polynesian 
titled and well-bred chief (p.164). All o f these broad, rather simplistic and almost superficial comparisons 
are inappropriate, as there is considerable internal variation within both Melanesia and Polynesia, just as 
there are broad similarities between these two cultural areas.
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provided by Strathem  (1971:209) on Hagen leadership show that, despite the absence o f a 
formal rule o f succession, 27 out o f 36 major big-men had fathers who also were big-men. My 
data collected 30 years later conform s to  this pattern (see discussion on Hereditary* Leadership in 
die next section). Similar cases were reported by Reay (1959) for the Kuma o f South Wahgi and 
Lowman-Vayda (1971:339) for the Maring o f  the Jim i and Simbai valleys. For the Kuma the 
ideal is that the eldest son should succeed his father as the leader o f the sub-subclan (Reay 1959). 
A recent paper by Reay reinforces this point:
Every ‘small group’ had a leader its members recognised as ‘first man* (yi kwnnd).
Ideally, and often in feet, he was descended in a direct line of eldest (kwma) sons from 
the elder (kumrtd) of the two brothers who founded the ‘small group’ (1984:36).
Likewise, among the Maring the position o f big-man, which goes with special “knowledge o f 
rituals concerned with fighting” (Rappaport 1984:29), passes from father to son. The contrast 
between Melanesian leadership systems and those o f Polynesia, as previously mentioned, is 
therefore less real than apparent (Standish 1978a; Douglas 1979, Chowning 1979; Iindstrom  
1981,1984; Allen 1984; cf. Feil 1987:93).
As noted by one Highlands observer, for much o f the 1970s the m ost influential model o f 
leadership was the essentially meritocratic one developed by Andrew Strathem to describe the 
Hagen system (O’Hanlon 1989:35). Michael O ’Hanlon, who him self conducted fieldwork 
during 1979-81 and 1986 among the Komblo o f N orth Wahgi (immediate eastern neighbours o f 
A.J. Strathem ’s N orthern Melpa), notes:
The typical Hagen leader, ‘big-man’, was both a compelling speaker and a wealthy 
polygynist, particularly talented at investing the pigs reared by his wives in the ramifying 
moka system of ceremonial exchange. From a male perspective, the system was 
mfritrvTatir in that, though a big-man might give his sons a flying start in their careers 
by providing them early on with a wife or two, such a start was neither necessary nor 
sufficient to attain big-man status (1989:35-36).
According to  A.J. Strathem (1971:187), there is a proliferation o f terms describing attributes and 
actions o f big-men am ong the Hagen, and the m ost general term, which one hears m ost often, is 
mta nyim (also spelt mini)* That is the term which A.J. Strathem translates as ‘big-man’. It should, 
however, be noted that the word ‘big-man’ is not an exact translation o f the Melpa term nma 
mum*, but the big-man concept approximates to all that mum entails. I have translated the term 
wua mum as leaders, which is consistent with the way Hageners themselves equate the wua nmm 
concept with all types o f leadership. Thus, orators may be referred to as ik nga wua nmm (leader 
in speech-making); senior public servants and politicians as gapman nga wua ntdrn (leader in 
governm ent), and outstanding businessmen as bisnis nga wua mum (leader in business). These are 
w hat Hageners call ‘different types o f m ini (mim elepa-elepa moromen), which clearly implies that
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the economic big-men w ho are generally associated with the moka ceremonial exchange system 
can —  and m ust— be distinguished from  other types o f leaders.
N onetheless, A.J. Strathem’s statement that both ‘rich man’ and ‘chief are inappropriate as 
translations for tvm num is m ost probably an accurate assessment at least o f his own 
observations. H e rightly argued that it is not the fact o f wealth but its deployment which is 
im portant and that the big-man occupies no definite office o f headship over specific numbers o f 
subjects (A. J. Strathem  1971:187). Hagen big-men are essentially economic entrepreneurs 
continuously engaged in mastering support and marshalling resources for ceremonial exchange. 
O ther terms used by Hageners when referring to leaders, mostly big-men, emphasise wealth, 
oratorical skills, and generosity. It is w orth quoting A.J. Strathem here in full:
The Hagen terms for big-men employ concepts o f size and physical well-being as well 
as referring directly to the financial status and power to speak and propose plans which 
big-men are supposed to have. It is notable also that the greatest spread of terms occurs 
at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy, and that rubbish-men, who are at the 
bottom, are often described by symbols which make them the opposites of major big- 
men, who are at the top. Thus, the major big-men have strong heads, while those of 
rubbish-men are soft they are like strong forest trees while rubbish-men are like 
humble, weak ones; they know how to speak whereas rubbish-men do not And big- 
men in general ‘make grease’ —  which carries connotations of both health and wealth 
— whereas rubbish-men are dry, like ash (1971:187-188).
Simply, this can be interpreted in the following manner. Owing to the competitive nature o f 
society and big-men being such fierce competitors, Hageners perceive big-men in association 
with success. Rubbish-men are regarded as weaklings because o f their lack o f ability to succeed. 
A big-man’s success, retrospectively, comes with wealth, knowledge and ability. In the words o f 
Roy Rappaport, “these are primarily the fruits o f the same abilities —  intelligence, vigpur, 
forcefulness —  that make a man a frequent decision-maker” (1984:29). Although he was writing 
on the M ating who are perhaps culturally and linguistically much closer to the Wahgi and 
Chimbu than o f Hagen peoples, Rappapords assertion that “big-men are ... intelligent men o f 
forceful personality” {ibid) is quite an accurate summation o f the situation in Hagen. These 
abilities appear to mark the difference between big-men and those o f other categories.
However, w hat A.J. Strathem does not mention is the fact that Hageners have two im portant 
terminological categories o f big-men: one called ik nm  (lit: ‘speech man5) and die other mel m a  
(‘material wealth man5). In their view, both the orator and the wealthy man are important, their 
positions often complementary. Hageners maintain that in times o f need one comes up with the 
necessary goods while the other has the power o f speech with which to highlight the value o f 
those goods during prestations. It is the deployment o f goods that makes them  both big-men. 
W hile the two kinds o f big-men represent distinct categories, it is also possible that a successful 
big-man can play both roles to perfection, depending on the nature o f the occasion. If, for
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example, the occasion calls for bridewealth payment, the immediate kinsmen o f the husband will 
come up with the pigs and money while a renowned orator, not necessarily from within the 
subdan, will make a speech on their behalf, during the prestation.
Traditional leadership, according to A.J. Strathem’s model, was largely defined in terms o f 
ceremonial exchange. Warfare, as an arena for competition and cooperation, was largely ignored. 
Fight-leaders are virtually non-existent in his reports o f 1960s fieldwork. The present study 
should help rectify this situation by providing some fresh insights into the different contexts o f 
leadership, both in fighting and non-fighting capacities (see Chapter Five).
Unlike in other societies such as Bena Bena, where the main emphasis is on fighting skills 
(Langness 1971:309), and Mating, where the position o f big-man goes with possession o f rituals 
concerned with fighting (Rappaport 1984:29), in both Enga and Hagen bold warriors are 
admired but are rarely big-men. In Hagen, for instance, A. J. Strathem (1971:75) noted that 
fighting ability alone could no t give a man claim to being a nma nyitn (‘big-man’). Financial and 
oratorical ability were also required (¿hid). In this respect the Hagen are similar to the Chimbu, 
where the daring fighter is admired and is im portant in time o f war but does not always attain a 
following (Brown 1967:46-47; 1972:43-44). Instead, the Chimbu, like the Hagen and Enga, place 
m ost emphasis on entrepreneurial skills. Managerial capacity involving coordination and 
foresight for planning agricultural activities and accumulation for large distributions, abilities to 
represent the group forcefully (which involve possession o f a good oratory style), the stance o f a 
bold warrior, and a certain aesthetic flair required in displays and ceremony are all essential 
characteristics for a big-man (Rubel and Rosman 1978:165-166). From this, it is clear that being 
a bold warrior, although an im portant characteristic o f Chimbu leadership, does not necessarily 
guarantees one o f big-man status.
Yet, in times o f instability and endemic warfare, we find the emergence o f certain men o f 
violence who maintain power with force and threat o f violence. These warrior-type leaders, 
dubbed by anthropologists as despots (see Salisbury 1964; see also Read 1959; Brown 1963; A.J. 
Strathem 1966; W atson 1971), were violent men who were o f real value to their groups in times 
o f warfare. Despots were reported in Eastern Highlands and Simbu provinces. One 
anthropologist (Salisbury 1964) even suggested that although the indigenous ideology in 
Highlands societies was one o f egalitarian competition for leadership, before European contact 
leadership was in practice characterised by the serial despotism o f powerful big-men, which 
effectively prevented other aspiring big-men from reaching the top (quoted in A. J. Strathem 
1971:224). This view, although at the time rejected by others (such as A. J. Strathem 1971), has 
recently been revived by Feil (1987). Theoretically, once warfare is removed die value o f violent 
men correspondingly drops (A. J. Strathem 1971:224). It will be interesting to see if this
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occurred during and after pacification. I take up the question o f despotism as a form o f 
leadership in Chapter Five: Here I refer to re-examination o f A.J. Strathem’s big-man model by 
Standish and others.
H ie  meritocratic model o f leadership developed by A.J. Strathem does not sufficiently account 
for variability in contemporary leadership types, nor does it account for those hereditary and 
despotic aspects o f leadership emphasised by eady accounts o f Hagen society by Vicedom and 
others (see Standish 1978a). Although A J. Strathem himself had rejected Vicedom’s account o f 
class stratification as highly rigid, Standish (1978a) and later Feil (1982) suggested that A.J. 
Strathem and others who conducted fieldwork during the 1960s had failed fully to appreciate the 
democratising effects o f colonial rule. Part o f Standish’s and Feil’s argument was summed up by 
O ’Hanlon:
By imposing peace, the Australians had removed leaders’ power over refugees; by 
imposing massive quantities of shells, they had undermined their power over trade and 
exchange networks. The big-men observed by Strathem and others were substantially 
colonial creations (1989:36).
Standish and Feil believe that the hereditary and despotic character o f leaders was down-played 
by A.J. Strathem and others. Standish has been particularly influential in the reconsideration o f 
the big-man model. Citing Chimbu informants’ statements that in pre-colonial (and colonial) 
times there was an ideology o f inheritance within leading families, and pointing out that such 
statements are quite consistent with early accounts o f missionary-anthropologists Bergmann in 
Kamanegu (Chimbu) and Vicedom in Hagen, and more recent studies by Reay among the 
Kuma (South Wahgj) and A.J. Strathem himself among the Melpa (Hagen), Standish pointed 
out the major weakness o f the big-man model:
The central core of the ‘Big-man5 theory is the open nature of the competition for 
leadership, which is achieved on merit rather than ascription. In the highlands, 
manifestations of operative hereditary principles have been identified in several areas, 
and practical demonstration shown not only of the mechanics of advantage for 
members of certain lineages, but also several instances of succession. ‘Hereditary 
advantage’ is perhaps a better term for the findings presented. If there is no requirement 
for a strict rule of primogeniture before we use the term ‘hereditary’, then adequate 
evidence has been presented to aigue that hereditary elements are strong in the 
emergence of leaders, as well as meritocratic factors (1978a:32-33).
My data suggests that there is a combination o f both personal ability and hereditary advantage 
involved in leadership status. In fact, trie pervasive principle o f succession in Hagen provides 
sufficient grounds for reconsidering approaches to the study o f leadership in Papua New 
Guinea. Others have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, Criowning 1977; Douglas 
1979; and May 1997). I now turn to discuss the empirical data on hereditary leadership in Hagen,
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but will return to a reconsideration o f the big-man model in die concluding section o f this 
chapter.
‘Hereditary* Leadership
Evidence presented in this study shows that whilst leadership status is pardy competitively 
achieved through individual ability, hereditary iqualifications>, as indicated below, are also strong 
factors in leadership status. Table 2.1 contains data on 319 leaders in 1994-5 in eight Hagen tribes 
comprising 31 dans: Tepuka (8) Kawelka (4); Minembi (7); Kombukla (8); Welyi (1); Remdi (1); 
Kumungaka (1); and Gulke (1). Although the first three were covered in A.J. Strathem’s 
compilation o f statistical data in 1964-5 on 97 big-men in 14 clans, specific comparisons 
involving three or more generations o f leaders are not possible because he did not indude actual 
names o f the big-men represented in his analysis. The names o f the leaders and clans 
represented in my data are given in Appendix III. His data, as mentioned earlier, shows that 27 
out o f 36 major big-men were the sons o f big-men, while 31 out o f 61 minor big-men had 
fathers who were also big-men —  a total figure o f 58 out o f 97 men who succeeded their fathers 
as big-men (see A.J. Strathem 1971:209). This data, when compared with similar data collected 
thirty years later (Table 2. /, below), should tell us whether or not there has been any change in 
patterns o f ‘succession' or hereditary advantage.
Table 2.1: Hereditary advantage in Leadership Patterns
Groups Total
Number of 
headers
Bag-men Other type 
o f leader
Father 
was a big 
man
Father was 
another type 
<fleader
Father was 
not a leader
Father's 
status not 
known
Tepuka 95 92 3 75 — 18 2
Kawelka 56 52 4 46 1 9 —
Kombukla 63 56 7 61 — 1 1
Minembi 58 56 2 52 — 2 4
Welyi 12 12 — 11 — 1
—
Remdi (Dei) 15 15 — 12 — — 3
Kumungaka 11 11 — 9 — 2 —
Gulke 9 8 1 8 — 1 —
Totals 319 302 17 274 1 34 10
There are two im portant issues involved here: (1) the rule o f succession; (2) hereditary 
advantages. O n the first point I agree with A.J. Strathem (1971:210) that there is no rule o f 
succession in Hagen. O n the second issue, sons o f leaders have real advantages over others in
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com peting for leadership status. It is also fair to say that since there is now inheritable wealth, in 
addition to advantages o f education, and access to offices and roles in the state, there is a strong 
tendency towards inheritance in both ideology and practice which may not have been there 
before (c£ Brown 1987). However, it is perhaps w orth mentioning here that the data presented 
in Table 2.2 should be treated with some caution because it is only a statistical frequency (based 
on higjüy subjective judgements o f who is a leader and whose father is/w as a leader) which 
tends to confirm  a greater likelihood o f leaders being sons o f leaders. But not all sons o f leaders 
are leaders, o f  course.
Despite the absence o f any rule o f succession, data presented here shows that 275 out o f 319 —  
o r 86 per cen t— o f current leaders had fathers who were also leaders. O n the basis o f his 1964­
5 data, A.J. Strathem suggested that major big-men had a 3:1 chance o f being the sons o f big- 
men, and for m inor big-men the chances were almost even, 1:1 (1971:210). I have not made the 
distinction between major and m inor big-men, nor have I sought out leaders as big-men. Rather, 
I sought inform ation on leaders' in general {ol Uda man in Tokpisin, or wua nuim in Melpa), but, 
for comparative purposes, leaders with oratotical abilities and those pre-eminent in ceremonial 
exchange were tagged as ‘big-men'.
It should be noted, however, that many o f the leaders mentioned here as ‘big-men' are (or were) 
also local governm ent councillors, national parliamentarians, provincial assembly-men, village 
court magistrates, peace officers, church pastors, circuit councillors, businessmen, orators, fight­
leaders, and so forth —  in other words, these are different types o f leaders. As Hageners say, 
they are ‘men with names' (nm mbi pi)9 whose renown extends beyond local boundaries, and 
who are therefore influential in decision-making processes. My data suggests that current leaders 
have a 8:1 chance o f being the sons o f leaders. Figure 2.2 shows comparable data on ‘succession', 
between 1964-5 and 1994-95.
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Figure 2.2: Pattern of 'succession in leadership status, 1965-1995
1964-5 1994-5
PERIOD (YEARS)
Source. Based on data complied by A.J. Strathem in 1964-5 (1971) and similar data which I compiled in 1994-5.
This represents a marked increase in sons succeeding fathers as leaders since A.J. Strathern 
conducted his statistical analysis on leadership in 1964-5. Despite the absence o f any systematic 
study on the reasons for this improvement in chances o f sons o f leaders becoming leaders 
themselves, there is the virtual certainty o f sons being encouraged —  and with decided 
advantage in socioeconomic privileges such as education, inherited wealth and the right 
connections —  to succeed as leaders. Moreover, the Hagen ideology o f ‘the son shall replace the 
father as a leader’ is vigorously pursued by aspiring leaders. In fact, “major big-men certainly do 
place value on the idea that at least one o f their sons should take their place” (A.J. Strathem 
1971:212). In the Dei Council area, for instance, there is strong evidence o f succession being 
advocated and practised by leaders. Furthermore, the Tepuka Keitipi big-man and former Dei 
MP, Parua Kuri, whose father was a pre-eminent big-man, and his son, Reuben Parua, only 
recently ousted as Dei MP, are clearly a case in point The Highlands leader, Iambakey Okuk, 
who claimed to be the son o f a leader, although his biological father was not known to the 
colonisers as a leader, represents a clear case o f the advocacy o f succession (Standish 1992:101).
In Hagen, all leaders (and others too) hope that first their wives will give them sons and, second, 
that at least one o f their sons will become a leader o f some sort. Accordingly, leaders tend to 
become polygynists and often encourage their sons to do likewise, thereby ensuring that at least
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one wife will produce a son to ‘take the father’s place’ (tepam nga kokl He moklombd). Whilst it is 
generally true that all men value the idea o f a son ‘taking their place’ (iepam nga kokl He moklombd), 
leaders in particular do tend to encourage their sons to replace them. Thus, if a renowned 
orator’s son shows signs o f oratorical abilities, people will say ‘the orator’s son will take his place’ 
(tepam ik-wua nga kangem kokl He moklombd), or, more generally, a leader’s son exhibiting some 
leadership qualities will be thought o f as ‘taking his father5s place’ (tepam rum nuim e nga kangem 
kokl ile moklombd). The frequency o f polygyny among leaders, despite the hostility towards this 
practice by Christian churches, is shown in Table 2.2.
T ab le  2.2: L eadership  and  Polygyny
Groups Total
Num ber o f 
Leaders
Polygynist men Wives who are 
in polygynous 
marriages
Monogamist
men
U nknomi Total number 
o f wives
Tepuka 95 52 (55%) 117(73%) 41 (43%) 2 160
Kawelka 56 30 (54%) 79 (75%) 26 (46%) — 105
Kombukla 63 27 (43%) 79 (69%) 35 (56%) 1 115
Minembi 58 27 (47%) 71 (70%) 29 (50%) 2 102
Welyi 12 7 (58%) 21 (81%) 5 (42%) — 26
Remdi (Dei) 15 9 (60%) 23 (79%) 6 (40%) — 29
Kumungaka 11 4 (36%) 8 (53%) 7 (64%) — 15
Gulke 9 5 (56%) 13 (76%) 4 (44%) — 17
Totals 319 161 (50%) 411 (72%) 153 (48%) 5 (2%) 569
Half the 319 leaders are in polygynous marriages, accounting for 411 out o f 569 wives (72 per 
cent), at an average ratio o f 2.6 wives per polygynist The relatively low range o f 36-60 per cent 
o f polygynist leaders suggests that polygyny is neither the prerogative o f leaders, nor a 
prerequisite for the achievement o f leadership status. In fact, it is perfectly normal for aspiring 
leaders to become successful managers o f their personal networks without the complications o f 
extra privileges and obligations that goes with polygynous marriages. Yet it is customarily 
fashionable in Hagen society, as in other parts o f the Highlands, for leaders to have more than 
one wife. As some would say: Em pasin bilong ol Haibns bikman (‘It is the way o f the Highlands 
big-men7).
Correspondingly, all eight groups covered in this survey recorded significantly high percentages 
o f wives in polygynous marriages, with a range of 53-81 per cent. A large majority o f Hagen 
leaders, as indicated in Appendix 111, have an average of 2-3 wives, but a few may have as many as 
10 wives. The most outstanding leader in the Dei Council area, Parua Kuri, for example, has 
only four wives, although his father had ten wives. By contrast, Hagen businessman and Pangu 
Party president, Pati Wamp, who may be nationally known but has far less influence than Parua
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in the Dei Council political field, has seven wives.11 The percentages o f leaders and wives in 
polygynous marriages are shown in Figtire 2.3.
</>LU
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of Leaders and wives in polygynous
marriages
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There are many reasons why traditional Hagen leaders and ordinary men married more than one 
wife. The most commonly given reasons were: (1) to build up a cheap supply o f labour; (2) to 
extend moka networks; (3) to create and strengthen alliances between groups; (4) to raise sons 
who may replace them; (5) to build up numbers in their groups; and (6) as a status symbol.
In contemporary Hagen society, politicians and businessmen practice polygyny for neady the 
same reasons: (1) to extend personal networks for votes; (2) to create and strengthen political 
alliances; (3) to raise sons; (4) to build up numbers for their groups; and (5) as a status symbol. 
Although most politicians and businessmen do not use their wives as cheap labour, some of 
their wives are income earners in the capitalist economy, which is important because elections, 
as evident in this study, can be expensive exercises, costing massive amounts o f cash and other 
economic resources (see Chapter She, see also Chapter high!). *
There are significant differences between Pati Wamp and Parua Kuri, for example, in age, wealth, sphere 
o f  influence. Parua is older and perhaps less wealthy than Wamp, and his sphere o f  influence is D ei while 
Wamp operates at the national level. But what 1 cannot demonstrate here is whether or not material 
factors override physical attractiveness in the decisions that young women and their relatives make when 
choosing married men as prospective husbands over single men. Despite his age and lack o f  formal 
education, Parua is certainly a more striking figure and better looking than Wamp, but do women interpret 
such characteristics as physical attractiveness? Unfortunately I am not qualified to comment on that but it 
is fair to say that political and economic factors are important considerations in decisions to do with 
marriage in Hagen society.
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Significantly, w hat is common to both traditional and m odem polygynists is in the infringement 
o f their wives* constitutional right to vote freely. Despite considerable acculturation and the 
influence o f  Christian missions, Hagen is still a male-dominated society. Accordingly, Hagen 
m en have considerable influence over their wives in voting during elections. Because o f the ever 
present threat o f retribution from supporters o f losing candidates, coupled with kinship and 
economic obligations, families stand to  gain or lose as a unit so it is not surprising that women 
follow their husbands in their choice o f candidates. In respect o f ‘recalcitrant* women —  
regardless o f w hether they are highly educated, ‘liberated*, or whatever the case might be —  a 
blow over the ear with a pointed knuckle is usually a sufficient physical reminder that good 
Hagen wives should always vote the same way as their husbands.12
A m ajor difference between traditional leaders and m odem leaders is that a big-man often had 
the consent o f his first wife who provides the pigs with which to acquire a second wife in order 
to assist her in pig rearing which is a laborious task. By contrast, first wives o f m odem  politicians 
often bitterly oppose the idea o f  a second wife and do put up nasty fights, thereby, in their view, 
protecting their rights to occupy the front seat o f the ministerial vehicle, or to occupy the official 
residence. Many aspiring leaders, including some highly educated ones, m any more than one 
wife because they see the acquisition o f a collection o f wives as an im portant status symbol, 
w ithout o f course realising that there are serious obligations that go with such a practice. The 
first wife may be highly educated, whereas later wives are usually village women. In urban areas 
where housing is a major problem, and also rising costs o f school fees and consumer items, 
polygyny has caused real economic hardship for many families, even for wealthy businessmen 
and politicians. An increase in domestic violence, for instance, has been attributed to the 
problems caused by polygyny. Surveys by the PN G  Law Reform Commission identified 
polygamy as a major cause o f divorce in the Highlands region, and as a factor in domestic 
violence (see T oft and Bonnell 1985; see also Ranck and Toft 1986). Violence against women, 
despite the official tendency to pay less than adequate attention, is a real and pressing problem in 
Papua New Guinea, an im portant subject which unfortunately cannot be taken up here because 
o f the analytical focus o f this study.
Conclusion
There were several im portant issues raised in this chapter. First, there are different phases o f 
Hagen history, characterised by alternating periods o f peace and warfare, with two particular
When caught up in the excitement o f elections, such behaviour can easily go unnoticed by even the 
keenest observer. W ithout attracting attention to themselves, Hagen men can be quite effective in 
reinforcing their policies through both subtle and crude, yet discreet, means. See Chapter S ix  for a detailed 
discussion on voter coercion and retributive actions taken agiinst defectors, and the wider implications o f 
such behaviour.
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types o f ‘traditional’ leaders, despotic fight-leaders and big-men, being prom inent in inter-group 
relations o f negative and positive reciprocity, respectively.
Second, the political situation observed by anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s was an almost 
artificially created situation, drastically altered by the impact o f colonialism. By banning warfare, 
which in pre-colonial times gave prominence to despotic fight-leaders, the colonial state 
significantly altered the political status quo by (a) elevating big-men through the licensing o f 
ceremonial exchange; and (b) opening the doors o f opportunity by introducing cash, cash-crops, 
education, Christian missions, plantations, local government councils and elections. All o f these 
provided aspiring leaders with new paths to prestige, power and influence.
Third, these new opportunities directly resulted in the proliferation o f many different types o f 
leaders. I f  in the past there were only a few powerful types, such as big-men, fight-leaders and 
ritual experts; now there is a multitude o f leaders, including councillors, village court magistrates, 
parliamentarians, businessmen, bureaucrats, professionals, academics, church elders, and 
criminal raskolgang leaders including politicians with criminal backgrounds and connections), in 
addition to orators, big-men and fight-leaders.
Fourth, in view o f the considerable variation in contemporary leadership types and the wide 
range o f arenas o f competition in which they operate, it is fair to say that the big-man model 
does no t adequately account for Hagen leadership. Furthermore, the importance o f fathers o f 
leaders as a factor in leadership patterns —  evidence o f succession being advocated and 
practised —  is hard to reconcile with a model that is primarily based on the open nature o f 
competition for leadership. There is no conclusive evidence to support the argument that there 
was equal opportunity for everyone to enter arenas o f competition for leadership status. Quite 
contrarily, sons o f leaders seem to have unfair advantages in both pre-colonial and 
contemporary contexts.
Admittedly, the situation is further complicated by emerging social stratification caused by 
disparities in wealth and power, unequal access to wealth and education, and the inheritance o f 
wealth. As recently pointed out by Ron May, “simplistic versions o f the big-man model thus 
require substantial qualification to take account of, first, the effective continuum in (and 
common mix of) leadership patterns, from hereditarial or ascriptive to competitively achieved; 
secondly, the range o f leadership styles, from the ruthlessly despotic to leader-as-steward, and, 
thirdly, the existence o f varying degrees o f social stratification” (1997:5). H e further notes:
This qualification having been made, however, it is probably still true that, compared to 
other largely ‘tribal5 societies, including those of neighbouring Polynesia, traditional 
leadership in Papua New Guinea can be generally characterised as largely dependent on 
personal qualities (and as a corollary only partly susceptible to inheritance), and 
substantially constrained by competition, by specialisation of leadership roles, by the
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prevalence of communal modes o f decision making, and by communal demands on 
leaders and resentment of leaders who attempt to raise themselves too far above other 
members o f society (May 1997:5; my emphasis).
Indeed, it is possible that, with the above qualification, the big-man model can be applied to 
Hagen and other Highlands societies, but only to a particular leadership type: the traditional big- 
men, those who gain prestige through ceremonial exchange, and orators who are influential 
decision makers in peace negotiations, dispute settlements, and compensation payments. In 
other words, the big-man model, whilst applicable to traditional big-man type leadership, is 
inappropriate to describe the full spectrum o f contemporary Hagen leadership. Given their 
shared history o f colonialism and its legacies, the same argument can be applicable to other 
societies in the Highlands and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea and Melanesia.
Finally, in view o f recent comments by A.J. Strathem (1987) in discounting claims o f early 
evidence o f stratification in Hagen, the debate on leadership is certainly far from over. 
Hopefully, future research in this area should take into account o f (a) the wide range o f 
leadership types, their modes o f operation, and respective arenas o f competition; (b) the 
dichotomies o f  internal and external forces that shape leadership patterns; and (3) social 
stratification. In the next chapter I deal with an equally important debate, that concerning social 
structure, which began in the 1950s and 1960s, before moving on to Hagen case studies on 
business, warfare, and elections (all o f which are discussed here as arenas o f competition and 
cooperation) in subsequent chapters o f the thesis, which are contemporary examples o f Hagen 
leadership and o f Hagen groups in action.
C h a p t e r  3
HAGEN GROUPINGS, OLD AND NEW: TRIBES, CLANS, FACTIONS,
ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS
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Introduction
According to their ideal-type model, the people who belong to the cultural-linguistic area around 
M ount Hagen live in territory-holding named groups called reklaep (line’, or Vow5), which are 
poly-segmentary in nature. In practice they largely conform to this model, despite considerable 
variations, as in the size o f the groups. The Hagen reklaeps vary significantly in size, ranging from 
below 200 to neatly 20,000 persons, and function. Members o f such groups often refer to 
themselves as o f ‘one stock’ (mbo tenta), usually share a common origin-myth and observe a 
particular taboo substance. The segments or sub-units are constantly engaged in competition 
(mduding warfare) with each other, but may occasionally cooperate in sponsoring large-scale 
sociopolitical or economic events. Inter- and intra-reklaep rivalries are most commonly expressed 
within well established arenas o f competition and cooperation, such as warfare, compensation 
payments, ceremonial exchange, business and elections.
The way in which Highlands people here organise themselves politically and the nature o f their 
social and analytical constructs has formed a major focus o f academic debate in recent times. 
Researchers from a Western cultural and educational background, for instance, have been forced 
to deal with sociopolitical systems quite unlike their own. In attempting to analyse these complex 
systems, researchers (mostly social anthropologists and political scientists, but others too) have 
had to rely on conceptual frameworks and terminology derived from other similarly ‘simple’, 
‘non-industrialised’, o r ‘stateless’ societies, notably from the European colonies in Africa. Thus, 
for example, ‘trading’ between groups and individuals became ‘exchange’, armed conflict 
between groups became ‘tribal warfare’, and pre-eminence in ceremonial exchange equated with 
a ‘political leadership’ type called big-m an’. Furthermore, the social groupings, from the highest 
and m ost inclusive level to the lowest, were labelled ‘tribe’, ‘clan’, ‘sub-clan’ and ‘lineage’.
This somewhat carefree and bulk borrowing —  rather than adopting or developing conceptual 
‘tools’ based on local concepts —  has directly resulted in a sad situation where foreign words 
and concepts are now almost permanently established in the literature as well as in daily 
conversations (among Hageners too, especially educated ones). While I find concepts such as 
‘reciprocity’ (give and take), ‘warfare’ and ‘ceremonial exchange’ useful analytical tools in 
discussing Hagen political competition, some o f the established anthropological terms for the 
various forms o f social groupings in the literature may need some reconsideration.
This chapter begins with a discussion o f the major problems encountered by early 
ethnographers in attempting to apply anthropological concepts derived from mainly African 
studies to Papua New Guinea Highlands social structures. It is essentially a brief but critical 
scrutiny o f the literature on Highlands social structures, with a view to demonstrating how and
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why Highlands social organisation may be different (or similar) to other societies in PN G  and 
elsewhere in the world. It involves an examination o f the main levels o f social and political 
otganisation in Hagen, beginning with the high-level named groups, tribes and clans, and 
discussing alliance systems, such as coalitions, factions and confederacy-type alliances.
The chapter then moves to a description o f the major alliances between these dan and tribal 
groups which have become the major actors in contemporary Hagen competition, whether in 
warfare, business o r elections. The major coalition-style alliances are analysed in the context o f 
political competition between groups and their leaders. Also explored here is the prodaimed 
relationship between traditional military alliance systems, the business development associations 
that were formed in the mid-1970s, and contemporary political networks vis-a-vis the constant 
shifting allegiances o f non-aligned voter blocs in elections. This is mainly to determine the 
presence or absence o f any significant linkages between them, that is, to identify any common 
bonding ‘threads’ which may run through these organisations.
The final part o f this chapter looks at the Dei Open electorate as a fidd o f political competition, 
emphasising the diverging sub-fields (provincial constituendes) and the problems encountered 
by the various power blocs and their leaders in attempting to maintain cohesion. In particular, 
the discussion concentrates on the military alliances operating within this political field in order 
to find explanations for the development o f rifts within them —  and their political implications 
for corporate activities in other arenas o f competition such as elections.
The chapter concludes by identifying a number o f salient features o f Hagen political 
organisation, and suggests that groups, factions and coalitions are ultimately created to serve 
specific functions and goals. Moreover, it is argued that leaders play an important role in the 
construction and maintenance o f these groups, a significant point which I think has been down­
played by those in search o f descent models in the Highlands region. A further argument is that 
Highlands observers failed, also, to recognise the Hagen notion o f the hame-must-not-go- 
dow ri, which is a significant factor in the composition, recruitment, solidarity, and continuity o f 
local groups. Such processes, once having been identified, are then built into the overall theme 
o f the study, that o f competing legitimacies (and competition for the allegiances o f individuals) 
in state-sodety relations.
The Hagen Social Structure
One o f the first and perhaps most impressive things that Westerners may have leamt about 
people in Hagen (and many other parts o f the Highlands) is the way in which members o f a 
local population may identify with, and oiganise themselves into, a high-level named group, in 
relation to other ymfyir groups. Indeed, for many anthropologists, who must have been
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impressed by elaborate hierarchy or set o f structures, these groups resembled ‘segmentary 
lineage structures' o f some African societies. Individuals, for instance, belong to an elaborate set 
o f progressively more inclusive named groups, such as ‘tribes’ which have a segmentary structure 
(A.J. Strathem 1971:Chap.2; 1972:18; Burton 1989:256; Medan and Rumsey 1991:Chap.3; Muke 
1994:Chap.6; Ketan 1996:243). Despite some difficulties encountered in eady attempts to 
categorise the various units according to size and functional criterion, these group levels, from 
the largest to the smallest, are: coalition-style alliances, tribe-pair, tribe, tribe section, dan, clan section, sub­
dan, sub-sub-clan, and lineage (cf. A.J. Strathem 1971; 1972).1 In an eadier paper, A.J. Strathem 
(1966a356) identified eight main levels o f group segmentation: tribe, major section o f tribe, 
minor section o f tribe, clan, clan-section, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, and lineage. These terms, he 
says, are usually sufficient to deal with all levels found in a particular group (ibid). A revised and 
more detailed version was published in his book, The Rope ofMoka, in which he identified ten 
levels: great-tribe, tribe-pair, tribe, major section o f tribe, clan-pairs, clan, clan sections, sub-clan, 
sub-sub-clans, and lineage (A.J. Strathem 1971:19-27).
Although Hagen social organisation is supposedly based on ‘tribes’ (see Burton 1989a), I have 
included coalition-style alliances and tribe-pair as levels above the tribal level because o f their 
relevance to the discussion on political organisation. Hageners have no direct translations for 
these terms although there is definite organisation (and cleavage) along these lines. However, as 
indicated by A.J. Strathem (1972), they do have words for other levels: the tribe is referred to as 
reklaep tenta (‘one line3); dan as tepam tenta (‘one father*); sub-dan as manga rapa tenta (‘one men’s 
house5); and the lineage as tepam-kangemal (‘father and his sons’).
Reklaep tenta (wan lain in Pidgin) is a term that can also be used when referring to other group 
levels, including major section (e.g, Jika Maipngel line5) and clan (e.g. Jika Milakamb line5). But 
this is more a matter o f expression rather than an actual social construct, which means that the 
term reklaep, when applied to ‘tribe’ is more consistent with the way Hageners think o f 
themselves (as a line’ in dance, war, elections, etc.). O ther idioms applicable to the whole range 
o f group levels are: mbo tenta (‘one stock’ or ‘one kind3); mbi tenta (‘one name3). Andrew Strathem 
has previously published a more comprehensive discussion on Melpa idioms and group
As argued by Merlán and Rumsey (1991), any attempt to “distinguish analytically among various levels of 
the segmentary hierarchy and to establish a standardised set o f terms for units at each [level]” may meet 
with less than satisfactory results. A major problem is the fact that there is considerable difference in size 
(and function). In Nebilyer, for instance, “the maximally inclusive named units (‘tribes) differ greatly in 
size: from under 100 to over 7000 people, with a corresponding variation in the number of named sub­
units” (Merlán and Rumsey 1991:38). Likewise, Hagen groups, as indicated earlier, differ significantly, from 
under 200 to nearly 20,000 persons. One may distinguish levels according to functional criteria, but here 
too one encounters problems, which are discussed later in this chapter (see subsection on the Differences in 
Si%e and Function in this chapter, see also Merlán and Rumsey 1991:Chap3 for comparable discussion of 
Nebilyer tribes).
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structure so it is not worth going over the same ground here.2 Suffice it to say that the idioms 
Strathem recorded for my group, the Kawelka, have not changed much in thirty years, but the 
structures certainly have, as evident in Figure 3.2. The changes in structures, as will be aigued, 
correlates with population growth, which is also a factor in the formation (and shifting nature) o f 
Hagen alliance systems.
Anthropological concepts such as <tribe,, ‘dan’, and ‘lineage’, whilst initially borrowed from 
elsewhere and applied by early ethnographers as useful analytical tools, are now deeply 
entrenched in the literature —  however flawed or imprecise they may be in some cases. When 
dealing with societies like Hagen it is important to note that such terms only roughly 
approximate to existing social structures and must therefore be used rather cautiously. 
Accordingly, I have used local terms where appropriate, but reverted to anthropologically 
established terminology in instances where I feel there is clearly a need for greater edification for 
the vast majority o f readers who are not familiar with Hagen idioms. If, by using such concepts, 
one appears to be keeping in line with the anthropological tradition I have criticised earlier, then 
I am doing so rather reluctantly and only as, I believe, originally intended —  as useful analytical 
tools.
The H agen reklaep
The Hagen reklaep is the same as the Nebilyer talapi (Medan and Rumsey 1991:Chap.3). I have 
no doubt that reklaep and talapi have the same meaning and are slight variations in 
pronunciations o f the same concept Medan and Rumsey (1991:36) have literally described talapi 
as line’, ‘row*, or ‘column’. All o f these are applicable to reklaep, which, like talapi, “is a broad 
generic term”, as “nowadays it is used for provincial, national, and even geo-political identities in 
so far as these are known”: ol lain Jika (‘the Jika line’); lain bilong Simbu (line o f Simbu5); even 
Australia lain (‘Australian line*).
The established anthropological usage for this term, as indicated above, in both Hagen and 
Nebilyer is ‘tribe’. Suggestive as this image o f ‘line’ {lain in Tok Pisin) might be for descent 
theorists, Medan and Rumsey have warned that:
...in  Ku Warn [Nebilyer] discourse the point of contact between the more and less 
literal senses of talapi is not —  as they might assume —  in some notion of a line of 
descent by which each member of a group is linked to its apical ancestor. What is locally 
relevant is not a vertical, genealogical line, but a horizontal, tactical one: the line of men 
who form a single flank on the battlefield and dance as a single row at ceremonial 
exchange events (1991:36).
2 See A J. Strathem (1972:Chap.l); See also Medan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.3) for comparable discussion of
the talapi [‘line’] structure in the neighbouring Nebilyer valley.
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The local teems for social groupings in three closely related cultural and linguistic areas in the 
Western Highlands Province are given in Tigure 5.1. Listed below are local terms which roughly 
approximate to the anthropological concepts. The stacked structure o f the diagram reflects the 
conceptual relationship between the various categories: Hagen and Nebilyer being very similar in 
cultural-linguistic terms (albeit with minor differences in pronunciation), while Hagen, being in 
an interstitial position, shares some attributes o f both Wahgi and Nebilyer. All three cultural- 
linguistic areas, however, have similar social groupings, which are functionally and analytically 
equated with the anthropological concepts of tribe, clan and sub-clan. However, it is important 
to note that these are less than precise translations, even though they have now been accepted 
into the canon o f the anthropological literature.
Sources. Based on AJ. Strathem (1972); Merlan and Rumsey (1991); and Muke (1994).
All these groupings are described in the lingua franca, Tokpisin, as lain (line). Indeed, as it will be 
made clear in the next section (see discussion on The Tribe) and in subsequent chapters, line’ is a 
solid entity to which members owe their first loyalty, especially in critical situations when one is 
forced to choose between his own group and another (including the state). Yet, and somewhat 
paradoxically, Tine’ often fails to direct members to support each other in group events, thus 
echoing O ’Hanlon’s (1989:54-56) point that there may be ‘shadow communities’, with divided
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loyalties, and even traitors within the ideally solidary group.3 As evident in the case studies on 
warfare and elections, not all members o f a Tine’ will participate in warfare, nor will they all 
support a home candidate in an election. But will they go over to the other side? That depends 
on who or what constitutes the other side. And also on the type o f competition and on 
undedying historical relations between the participants. In Hagen warfare, for instance, one or 
m ore segments may choose not to fight alongside other segments o f a reklaep mainly because o f 
cross-cutting kinship ties, but will rarely assist the opposing side. There is even evidence o f 
segments (mostly at the dan level) having teamed up with the other side to fight against their 
fellow tribesmen. That happens in very rare instances, especially when a dan (or section) may be 
structurally part o f one tribe but dosely associated with a dan (or section) from another tribe 
(and both tribes would be rivals in major warfare, dections and business). During 1986-1990, the 
Minembi Kimbo clan, for example, allied themselves with the Kawelka and fought against an 
alliance o f Minembi clans because there was more ‘warmth* (mukl-tnukl eteni) in their association 
with the Kawelka Kundmbo dan (with whom they are currently paired) than the Minembi tribe 
(among whom they are structurally part, but against whom they have also fought in pre-colonial 
warfare). See Chapter Five for a detailed analysis o f military alliances; see also Chapters 6-8 for 
shifting allegiances o f non-aligned voter blocs in elections, which generally follows military 
alliances.
O f course, there is an element o f degree o f size involved here: smaller groups tend to be more 
united than large ones, yet the ‘name-must-not-gp-down* principle is important to all Hagen 
groups. In other words, being a member o f a reklaep has its privileges and obligations —  and one 
may o f course vote, fight and die as a Jika, Mokei, or Yamka —  but it is important to recognise 
that ‘line* membership does not necessarily dictate automatic partidpation in such group 
activities.
Is the H agen reklaep based on descent?
The reklaep, as argued below, is not based on descent Hagen is an area where people have 
tremendous difficulty tracing descent for whatever its worth (which may pragmatically be o f little 
value in the overall scheme o f things). Except for a few older leaders (usually orators) who can 
trace their genealogy beyond the fourth generation, most people’s knowledge can be as shallow
3 . O ’Hanlon (1989:54) says that ‘Svithin any clan there are likely to be sets o f individuals who identify 
themselves as the ‘cuttings’ of, and indebted to, each o f the other major groups with which that clan has 
intermarried”. As a member o f a ‘shadow community’ within his dan, “a man may experience divided 
loyalties when his clan is at odds with that o f his blood”’ {ibid). Such a situation would be true for Hagen, 
as it is for North WahgL For example, the sons o f women from the Jika Mikkamb clan in Remdi Jikamho 
dan may refuse to fight if these two dans ever declared war on each other. Traitors, which O ’Hanlon 
discussed in the context o f betrayal (1989:Chap.3), are another matter. I discuss these matters in terms o f 
contradictions: between group and individual interests; loyalty and betrayal; ideology and practice (see 
concluding section o f this chapter).
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as three o r four generations at the m ost It is also an area where people tend to place much 
weight on the numerical strength o f a group. These are the major reasons why descent is stricdy 
not a charter for recruitm ent As a result, not all members o f a reklaep can claim common 
descent
W hen reviewing the relevant literature on Hagen group structures, it might  be useful to posit 
two basic questions: (1) is descent relevant to group recruitment; and (2) is descent a primary 
principle governing group identity? In his study o f descent and group structure among the 
Melpa, A.J. Strathem (1972) made an important distinction between principles o f group 
recruitment and those o f group identity. Based on fieldwork conducted in the 1960s (between 
1964 and 1968) in mostly Hagen Central and Dei Council areas o f Hagen district, A.J. Strathem 
(1972) asserted that ‘descent* was irrelevant to the former, but operative in the latter. Medan and 
Rumsey, who jointly conducted seventeen months o f fieldwork (between June 1981 and 
November 1983) in nearby Nebilyer Valley, tend to agree with A.J. Strathem on the first point 
but beg to differ on the latter. Based on their observation o f Nebilyer groups, Medan and 
Rumsey claimed that “neither die talapi (line*), nor the Iku tapa (men’s house), nor any other 
social unit in the Nebilyer entails descent as a structural basis”. They further went on to say:
., .the sharing of a common apical ancestor is not even imputed as a notional principle 
of ‘group identity’ among people who share a common segmentary identity (are of ‘one 
line5), at least not at the level of ‘tribe’ (i.e., named segmentary identity of the most 
inclusive order). Rather, where common ancestry is explicitly posited by origin myths, 
these almost always involve pairs of ancestors who are related as brothers... Though we 
assume such pairs of brothers would have had a common father, he is not named or 
even mentioned in most such stories. From this and other evidence, we conclude that 
the image of relatedness which they project is not one of ‘common descend, or even 
filiation to a common stock, but brotherhood per se (1991:37; italics in original).
Apart from this particular discrepancy, Medan and Rumsey (1991) were otherwise virtually in 
agreement with A.J. Strathem (and also with Marilyn Strathem) on many other points. So why 
the discrepancy? Is it because o f structural differences between Hagen and Nebilyer? O r is it 
because they differ in cultural, linguistic, or any other aspect o f society? O r is it because there are 
sign ificant  differences between the observers rather than the people who form the focus o f their 
observations? The last question is a general one which may be applicable here as it would in 
other parts o f the Highlands, PNG, and elsewhere in the wodd. And, I might add, it is probably 
best left unanswered. However, in relation to the second and third questions, I see no real 
difference between Nebilyer and Hagen. At least on the basis o f social structure and cultural- 
linguistic evidence, I suggest that Hagen does not differ significantly from Nebilyer. Except for 
m inor linguistic differences, as evident in different ways o f expressing the same concepts (for 
example: reklaep and talapi for line’; mangp rapa and Iku tapa for men’s house), Hagen and 
Nebilyer are very similar in almost all aspects o f society.
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Can the discrepancy be explained in terms o f differences in research methods? Again, I see no 
real difference here. Medan and Rumsey’s research methodology, for instance, was generally no 
different to A.J. Strathem’s. Both studies, for example, relied on the traditionally tried and tested 
technique o f ‘participant observation’ and ‘selective interviews’. As well, both do not seem to 
differ significantly in their utilisation o f anthropological concepts: Medan and Rumsey, like A.J. 
Strathem (and Marilyn Strathem), identified the most inclusive social unit in the ‘segmentary 
order as the ‘tribe’.
However, it is worth mentioning here that their works were greatly influenced by differences in 
theoretical emphasis, reflecting the times in which the studies were conducted. Andrew and 
Marilyn Strathem, for instance, conducted fieldwork during a period when descent theory 
dominated social anthropology. Some o f their eadiest and most detailed studies were focused 
primarily on group structure and its relation to patterns o f residence, marriage, ceremonial 
exchange, political leadership, dispute settlement, warfare, and so forth (see, for example, A.J. 
Strathem 1971, 1972; and A.M. Strathem 1972a, 1972b). Their work epitomised the general 
PN G  Highlands ethnography that emerged during this period. Medan and Rumsey, however, 
seem to have benefited quite significantly from the Strathems’ contribution to exchange theory 
(A.J. Strathem 1971; 1979a and A.M. Strathem 1972b, 1988). While the central focus o f Medan 
and Rumsey’s study was on the form and content o f Highlands oratory, their study was largely 
influenced by exchange theory, which in their words, “has provided a valuable corrective to 
segmentary lineage theory” (1991:3). Segmentary lineage theory, according to Medan and 
Rumsey, “included the presupposition that what holds together’ the segmentary system —  the 
principle by which social groups are defined —  is ‘descend, i.e., common connection through 
more o r less extended series o f parent-child (read: father-son) links to common ancestors” 
(1991:3). They claimed that “no such principle was evident here [in Nebilyer]” (¡bid). I
I shall return to the question o f descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory in a short while, but 
meanwhile here is my contribution to the debate on descent as a principle governing group 
recruitment and group identity. I will argue, on the basis o f case studies (on warfare, elections, 
business, etc.), that some o f the explanations put forward are inadequate, just as the principles 
considered as gpveming group recruitment and identity are inherently deficient The way in 
which the different arenas o f competition and cooperation —  ranging from the more traditional 
forms such as warfare and ceremonial exchange to modem ones like elections and business 
development associations —  have merged in recent times suggest that there are (at least now) far 
m ore significant factors other than those put forward by anthropologists (e.g. ‘descend, 
‘exchange’, etc.) involved in the ‘construction’ and ‘maintenance’ o f groups. And the fact that 
such groups are constantly competing against each other as well as with the PNG state for the
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allegiance o f individuals is o f direct relevance to this study (see the final section o f this chapter 
for further elaboration o f this theme).
Like A.J. Strathem (1972) and Medan and Rumsey (1991), I found no evidence suggesting that 
descent is the key organising principle o f Hagen society, nor do I accept that die principle o f 
agnation, or patrilineal descent (through father’s line), sufficiently accounts for group 
membership. Confusions and misunderstandings are almost inevitable in areas like Hagen where 
people may say things in a particular way, but actually do things in a different sort o f manner. 
For instance, it is not unusual for people o f the same ‘tribe’ to describe themselves as o f ‘one 
stock’ (mho tenía), w ithout necessarily implying that they originated from the same ‘stock’ or 
ancestor. Similady, people o f a particular ‘clan’ may speak o f themselves as o f ‘one father, one 
blood’, and therefore cannot marry within because o f the common bloodlines; yet we find that 
not all o f them can claim common descent Perhaps the best example comes horn the most 
minimal unit, tepam kangemal (‘father and his sons’), where cleady one would expect to find a 
father and his sons and their families. N ot quite so! It is more often (than not) the case that there 
are non-agnates in all levels, including the m ost minimal unit
Descent, therefore, is not die sole criteria for group membership, especially in recruitment (see 
sections on The Tribe and The Clan). In relation to A.J. Strathem’s point on descent as a principle 
governing group identity, I suggest that descent, or the idea o f having a common origin, comes 
into play as an ideology o f group solidarity. As evident in the case studies on warfare and 
elections, it is an ideology utilised by individuals, especially leaders, to drum up support for 
activities in which they stand to benefit personally. Furthermore, I suggest that descent is not die 
only factor in group solidarity. Following Muke (1994), I would argue that ‘patrilineal descend as 
a factor in group solidarity can be matched by a factor called ‘matrilineal ascend. Taking a crucial 
step further from Muke and especially Medan and Rumsey (on their endorsement o f the 
exchange theory), I would argue, also, that there are far more important pragmatic factors in the 
‘construction’ and ‘maintenance’ o f social units than those put forward by A.J. and A.M. 
Strathem on Hagen, Medan and Rumsey on Nebilyer, and Muke on South Wahgi groups. I shall 
return to this point later, but now turn to Muke’s Ka structure.
John Muke, who describes himself as a ‘native anthropologisd, conducted fieldwork in the late 
1980s among his own Kuma people o f South Wahgi. From the standpoint o f an ‘insided, Muke 
presented an interesting model o f the Ka (tribe/clan) structure (1994:Chap.6). By utilising the 
analogy between the growth o f a plant (sweet potato) and the social reproduction process, Muke 
asserted that groups developed in the same way as a plant does and their structures were 
therefore named accordingly, thus the comparable terms: Ka (tribe/clan) for base; Kip (main 
section) for shoots; Kamrn (sub-clan) for vines.
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The term Ka (as in KaweLka, Kondiyksr, or Yamkd) is a commonly recurring suffix to group 
names in both Wahgi and Hagen, which Muke (1994:177) believes is an archaic word for sweet 
potato.4 Likewise, Hagen group segment names often end with mbo, which means ‘stock*, or 
‘shoot o f something planted* (A.J. Strathem 1972:42). In attempting to explain the origin o f this 
phenom enon, Muke (1994:178), after A.J. Strathem (1972), says that this ideology relates to 
planting o f maternal substances and states that the name o f the female ancestress is taken and 
the suffix mbo added to  it to form a new segment in a tribe. In deed, Hageners do speak o f the 
female substances, which include kopong (‘grease*) and mema (blood), as transplants taken from 
the m other’s group (for which a certain form o f gift exchange has been instituted for the 
purpose o f honouring such obligations). However, my data on Hagen groups suggest that the 
suffix mbo is far more commonly attached to the name o f the group into which the female 
ancestress (or usually a number o f diem) was bom , rather than her personal name.5 A number o f 
examples can be identified in Figure 3.2; at its most minimal, or sub-sub-dan, level can be found: 
Dakap-mbo (after Dakapkae), Kiklpukla-mbo (after Kiklpukla); Elti-mbo (after Elti), Minembi- 
mbo (after Minembi), Romalke-mbo (after Welyi Romalke), Tipuk-mbo (after Tepuka) and 
Penambi-mbo (after Penambe). One only needs to consult the segmentary structures given in 
Appendix I  to see that this is the case throughout Hagen society.
Nonetheless, as far as the Wahgi and Hagen Ka structure goes, a sister’s children are also 
described as ‘cuttings’ o r ‘shoots’ taken from the father’s group and being transplanted when 
they shift residence back to their mother’s agnatic group. Here, Muke’s discussion o f the 
checker-board-type sweet potato gardens (angha doog) direcdy corresponds to the Hagen idea o f 
men being organised according to pana ru (‘garden ditch’, or ‘division*). A.J. Strathem expressed 
this point very clearly:
There is the image of the whole clan as a ‘garden division’ (pana ru) and the idea that 
persons who change membership ‘plant* themselves, or are planted by big-men 
sponsors in a new ‘garden division’. The emphasis here is on the territorial nature of the 
land-holding and on a symbolisation of residence which states that joining a group
4. His suggestion that the sweet potato (ipomea batatas) being the plant which may have served as the 
botanical metaphor for the Ka structure was made on the assertion: “It is quite possible that the word 
Angka, used in South Wahgi to describe mature sweet potato tubers, can be separated, just like proper 
genealogical names can be separated from the suffix idioms o f the groups” (Muke 1994:177). In noting the 
similarities in the word for sweet potato in neighbouring languages, such as: Kda (in Chimbu), Oka (in 
Melpa), Angkri (in East Kambia), Kep (in North Wahgi), and [Ngai (in Temboka)], he says that the 
metaphor could be an archaic word for the base or matures o f the sweet potato crop, which is associated 
with the checker board (doog) agricultural practices (ibid). But the kaukau, as pointed out by Bill Standish, 
came only came a few centuries ago. Other crops have stock, roots, stems, etc, so it is possible that the 
names predate kaukau. (personal communication, August 1997).
5 . The Nebilyer, as pointed out by Alan Rumsey, use the suffix m b  (woman) in stead o f mbo, which once 
again highlights the prominent role o f women in the ‘creation’ of new segments within groups (personal 
communication, August 1997).
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implies making ‘roots’ with it, as a plant roots itself in a garden (1972:222; cited in Muke 
1994:183).
A.J. Strathem further noted that “this idiom becomes fused at certain points with the Melpa 
concept o f kinship, since the lexeme pukl can mean both a physical root and a kinship link. 
Hence sisters sons have a particularly strong ‘root’ with their mothers’ dan groups” (1972:222; 
see also A.J. Strathem 1971:35). While A.J. Strathem’s emphasis was largely on the individual’s 
connections to the land, Muke associates the botanical mode o f kinship expressions with a 
‘matrilineal ascent5 system:
Generally the expression ‘men within a square’ (yi googmi) implies a segmentary group 
division, an historical process which is based on the notion of balance, static and 
gradual changes. The composition of groups at each structural level is thought of as 
squares in a field system, just like die checker board field systems in sweet potato 
gardens (Muke 1994:183).
Muke’s Ka model is far more detailed than what is given here and moreover he suggested the 
antiquity o f the structure at 300 years (about the same time as the introduction o f the sweet 
potato). Unfortunately it is not possible to work out the kinship system that preceded the Ka 
structure, but we can at least benefit from this particularly refreshing approach to analysing 
Highlands social structures from a different perspective. In particular, Muke made two important 
points which should be kept as pointers to future studies on this subject matter:
•  The composition o f groups at each structural level (tribe, clan, sub-clan etc.) can be 
thought o f as squares in a field system, just like the checker-board-type field systems 
in sweet potato gardens. Accordingly, high-level named groups in Wahgi, such as 
Dambnge, Kuma and Nene, may have historically operated as squares but are now 
seen as ancient field systems. As population increased over time these origin groups 
divided into Ka squares. Each Ka unit operated as a square unit in relation to other 
Ka squares and once the population within each o f the units reached beyond the 
carrying capacity o f the size o f a square, the expanding groups divided into Kup unit 
The same principle applies to other levels, such as the Kup and Kanem segments (see 
Muke 1994:183).
•  Since the Ka, Kip and Kanem are field systems superimposed upon one another, one 
can peel each layer and define them as independent functioning units; Ka being the 
m ost ancient structure and Kanem the recent functioning one. Therefore an interval 
o f time can be determined for each o f the structural levels: approximately 100 years, 
which suggests that the Ka structure may be 300 years old (see Muke 1994:198,199).
Although there is a difference in emphasis between their interpretations, I see A.J. Strathem’s 
discussion on the Hagen idea o f ‘planting’ a person in a new group as quite complementary to
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Muke’s Ka structure. An important idea emerging from both Wahgi and Hagen kin categories, as 
aptly stated by Muke (1994:183), is the emphasis on the planting substance which, in another 
way, refers to the reproductive capacities o f women. This leads us to the point where a sister’s 
offspring, particularly sons, become significant factors in group solidarity. A sister’s sons, as 
pointed out by A.J. Strathem (1972), have particularly strong roots with the mother’s clan (see 
discussion on the clan in the next section). lik e  those o f agnatic descent, a sister’s sons will have 
no trouble in marshalling support for group events such as warfare or ceremonial exchange. In 
fact, many are known to have gone on to establish themselves as leaders in their mothers’ natal 
groups. likew ise, members o f a group founded by a group o f clan sisters often stand together as 
a solid unit in group events. The principles o f ‘patrilineal descent’ and inatrilineal ascent’ are 
therefore both o f direct relevance to group solidarity.
However, as will be demonstrated by the numerous cases studies discussed in subsequent 
chapters, there are many other factors —  pragmatically even more significant than the principles 
o f ‘descent’, ‘ascent’, or ‘exchange’ —  which determine the composition o f a group. It can be 
argued that neither the principle o f descent, nor exchange, nor ‘ascent’, nor population size can 
adequately account for both group recruitment and group identity. My argument is simply based 
on the two m ost fundamental characteristics o f groups: first and foremost is the fact that all 
groups are ultimately created to serve certain functions and in some instances to achieve specific 
goals; and secondly, all groups are shifting in nature, in a constant state o f flux and wane, as old 
members are lost (via death, marriage and outward migration) and replaced by new ones (via 
births, marriage and inward migration). This raises serious questions about the value o f debate 
on descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory, an important point to which I shall return later (see 
Conclusion in this chapter).
Moving away from the Hagen-Nebilyer-Wahgi area o f the Western Highlands, I now turn to the 
more general discussion on PNG Highlands literature, with a view to establishing some working 
definitions for social groups found in Hagen.
Some general com m ents on an ancient paradox
Difficulties in the use and definition o f group structures have warranted much attention. 
Fundamentally, the m ost prolonged debate in all o f the anthropological literature is whether the 
Highlands social structure is exclusively based on (1) a patrilineal descent system or (2) a descent 
dogma based on a cognatic system. Under the latter an individual can claim dual membership 
(through both the father and the mother), whilst under the former one can in theory claim group 
membership only through the father’s line. The controversy over the nature o f PNG Highlands 
group structure encountered various twists and turns, but ethnographers have made gallant 
attempts in salvaging some logical explanation from this paradox (see Barnes 1962; 1967;
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Langness 1964; Sahlins 1965; Meggttt 1965; Scheffler 1966; 1973; de Lepervanch 1967-68; A.J. 
Strathem 1969b; 1972). As previously noted by others, Bames (1962), for instance, “questioned 
the use o f African models in the New Guinea Highlands, pointing out that in many respects the 
Chimbu and their cultural relatives [such as Wahgi, Hagen and Enga] were different from the 
Tiv, Nuer, Tallensi, and other Africans: genealogical reckoning was shallow, non-agnates were 
easily incorporated into groups, segmentary processes and the ways o f conceptualising them 
seem different” (Keesing 1975:58; see also Langness 1966 [1964]:131; A.J. Strathem 1969b:37; 
Feil 1987:128). Bames went on to generalise that:
•. • although som e H ighland societies are appropriately classified as agnatic, the area as a 
w hole appears to  be characterised by cumulative patrifiliation rather than by agnatic 
descen t . ..  B ut in  m ost, though n° t  in  all, H ighland societies the dogm a o f descent is 
absent o r is held only weakly; the principle o f recruitm ent to  a m an’s father’s group 
operates, bu t only concurrently w ith o ther principles, and is sanctioned n o t by an appeal 
to  the notion o f descent as such bu t by reference to  the obligations o f kinsfolk, 
differentiated according to  relationship and encom passed w ithin a span o f only tw o o r 
three generations (1966[1962]: 120-21).
Cumulative patrifiliation means that a man would normally become a member o f his father’s 
group, but if  due to circumstances he affiliated with his mother’s or paternal grandmother’s 
group, his children’s rights in that group would be secure. For they, though not related by 
patrilineal descent, were related by patrifiliation to the group he had attached himself to (see 
Keesing 1975:58-59). Although Barnes’s (1962) generalisation was statistically supported by 
empirical evidence (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1972:104-105; 218-219), other writers 
pointed out that factors such as matrifiliation, co-residence, and participation in exchanges and 
warfare or in cult rituals can all be important also in determining affiliations (see Brown 1962; 
Langness 1964; de Lepervanche 1967-8; A.J. Strathem 1969b, 1972 and 1979a; Scheffler 1985; 
O ’Hanlon and Franklin 1986; Feil 1987; O ’Hanlon 1989; Medan and Rumsey 1991; Muke 
1994).
After Barnes’s (1962) insightful article and especially in light o f more recent work on exchange 
theory as a “corrective to segmentary lineage theory” (see Medan and Rumsey 1991; see also A.J. 
Strathem 1979a; and A.M. Strathem 1988), one may wonder whether the above debate was ever 
relevant at all? Segmentary lineage theory, needless to say, was always going to be inadequate 
when it comes to understanding PNG Highlands social structures. Despite its eady popularity 
among certain academic circles during the 1950s and 1960s, segmentary lineage theory was 
fundamentally flawed in its application because anthropologists either ignored or refused to 
recognise some basic facts about PNG Highlands social structures.
As noted earlier, it was based primarily on the principle o f descent, and it was thought (quite 
incorrectly) that descent was the key organising principle that held a group together. As a
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member o f not one but several progressively more inclusive named groups, it came as no real 
surprise to me when I read Medan and Rumsey’s report o f the absence or irrelevance o f descent 
as a principle by which social groups are defined in Nebilyer. Their suggestion that exchange 
theory, unlike segmentary lineage theory, can be used to explain Highlands social structure is a 
useful one, though I do not agree that it sufficiently accounts for group composition. While it is 
true that groups, factions, and coalitions are created for, and as a consequence of, exchange 
transactions, it is equally true that such groups are ‘constructed* and maintained for specific 
purposes (see the concluding section in this chapter).
It should be noted that many o f the problems encountered by eady Highlands ethnographers 
were o f their own making. The application o f Western anthropological concepts onto Highlands 
group structures, or trying to explain Highlands societies using African models, was a common 
mistake made by many eady ethnographers. However, to continue the inquiry along this fine 
would be pointless. Suffice to say, what appears to outsiders as bewildering makes perfect sense 
to Highlanders and one need only to ask the people themselves how and why some things are 
done in a particular way. Hageners, for example, agree that some o f the members o f their 
lineages are wua-nt-mei (‘bom  o f the man5) while others are amb-nt-mei (horn o f the woman*, Le., 
the sister), without implying that the latter are formally ‘second-class members* (A.J. Strathem 
1966a:357; 1971:35).6 This cleady indicates that group membership in Hagen is not restricted to 
agnatic descent (father-to-son), even though the lineage (tepam kangemal, ‘father and his sons3) is 
described that way. In practice, a sister’s sons as well as others, including war refugees, can gain 
membership in a group without necessarily tracing descent to an apical ancestor. (Examples o f 
sons o f the sister having gone back to her father’s group are given in Chapter Eight). However, 
m ost members o f a group, especially at the levels below the tribe, can claim common descent to 
a putative male ancestor.
W hen dealing with questions o f agnatic descent, or the ability to trace one’s fine through the 
father to a founding male ancestor, or genealogical structures in general, it is important to realise 
that (1) such questions are o f far less pragmatic value to a Hagener than it might appear to an
Elsewhere A J. Strathem notes that “man and woman in this contrasted pair are not husband and wife but 
brother and sister, and the idiom relates to the feet that, although a sister normally moves into 
patrivirilocal residence at marriage, if she subsequently returns to her own natal group and brings her 
children with her, they can become amb-nt-mei members o f the group. If  her sons stay at her natal place 
and become amb-nt-mei members their children in turn become ma-nt-mei, ‘man-bearing members, fust as 
are those who are putatively descended from a longer genealogical string o f male group members” 
(1972:18-19). W hether this has always been the practice in Hagen society or is a consequence o f recent 
events such as the impact o f colonialism is however hard to tell. The Kawelka, who form the basis o f A J. 
Strathem’s analysis, were dispersed through warfare (see Appendix IV ). An explanation for the high 
number o f non-agnates indicated in Chapter Eight (see also AJ. Strathem (1972) may be found in the 
history o f warfare and population dispersal. Whether or not the Kawelka are an unusual case can be 
determined through comparative studies o f group membership, for example, by comparing historically 
relatively weak groups with relatively strong groups, but this I cannot demonstrate here.
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observer; and (2) a claim o f common descent must not be confused with the ability to actually 
trace one’s lines to either male or female founders o f a group. My experience with Hageners is 
that there is a sliding scale o f memory or amnesia when it comes to tracing lines. That is, the 
lower the level, the more the people who can claim common ancestry, but less than half will 
have difficulty tracing their lines. For instance, in a sub-clan, or manga rapa (man’s house), just 
over fifty per cent o f all males may claim to have descended from one putative ancestor (usually 
named), but only about five per cent or even less will be able to trace an unbroken line with any 
degree o f success. In the Kawelka Membo clan (c.2,000 pop.), for example, only one old man, 
U1 Korombe (Kaimbkul), could manage to deliver a comprehensive account o f clan history 
(including genealogy) while two others could only manage to recall their own sub-sub-clan 
histories.7
The Tribe
In spite o f all the difficulties, the language of descent used in ethnography o f today when describing 
social units is still littered with words such as lineage, clan, tribe, and phratry (see Feil 198734; see 
also Barnes 1962; A.J. Strathem 1969b; 1971; Scheffler 1985), While accepting that there is 
considerable difficulty in putting these terms to use, some working definitions will suffice here. 
A tribe can be defined as a politically or socially coherent and autonomous group occupying 
land or claiming a particular territory (R A I1951; Burton 1988; Muke 1994). In fact, it is true in 
some areas that the tribe is the most cohesive and autonomous political group. While this is 
usually the case in areas where there are many small tribes, with average populations o f fewer 
than 500 persons, those with larger populations are typically less cohesive and more fragmented I
I had the benefit o f four older informants among the Kawelka. Three were big-men while the fourth was 
a man o f exceptional knowledge o f Hagen culture. My big-men informants here were once regarded as the 
three most important Kawelka Kumapei (‘those who live at Kuma’, or the Upper Wahgj) leaders —  
Goimba Onombe, Ken Ripa and Toa Pani —  who are generally accepted as the mae tepam (‘father of 
land*) or maepukl tvm  (1and-root-man’, or ‘owner of land*) o f the Kawelka territories at Kuk in the Upper 
Wahgi Valley. All are now over seventy years and have quite considerable influence in land ‘ownership’ 
among the Kawelka. Goimba, whose father Onombe and grandfather Kund Mend (together with other * 
Kawelka) were brutally evicted from Kuk during pre-colonial warfare, took advantage of the presence of 
the Australian Colonial Administration by reclaiming his forefathers’ land in the 1960s (see Górecki 1982 
for a more detailed discussion o f the reoccupation o f Kuk). That was done through the use of historical 
information (and genealogies) and Goimba in particular has a very good knowledge of Kawelka history, 
yet neither Goimba, nor Ken, nor Toa could trace their own genealogies beyond the third generation. It 
was partly complicated by the fact that both Ken and Toa, are non-agnates, originally o f Klamakae 
Kopimbo and Tepuka Kengeke clans, respectively, but have gone on to establish themselves as influential 
leaders among the Kawelka. My fourth and non-big-man informant U1 Korobe, on the other hand, is an 
exceptionally culturally-oriented person. N ot only can he, now known by his Christian name Kaimbkul, 
gjve a full account o f clan genealogy, but he is also gifted in the construction and use o f traditional 
artefacts, as demonstrated to ANU researchers (see Swadling 1981:39, picture o f Kaimbkul and another 
Kawelka man, Korowa of the Kurupmbo clan, with 300-400 year old wooden spades found at the Kuk 
archaeological site).
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—  in which case, the level o f cohesiveness in corporate activities is often found to be most 
effective at the clan and sub-dan levels.
Segm entary structure o f th e trib e
Tribes, as indicated in Figure 3.2, have a segmentary structure and may, depending on size, be 
subdivided into several levels o f sections, dans and sub-clans (A.J. Strathem 1972; Burton 1988; 
1989). Following Medan and Rumsey, my use o f 'segm entar/ is in the simple sense: that within 
a single reklaep or tribe, '‘distinctions are made among multiple, homologous, named sub­
groupings, each o f which is divided in the same way, etc” (1991:36). Hagen groups, for instance, 
are functionally and ideologically divided into subgroups (as in the case o f ideology governing 
group solidarity), which are further divided into sub-subgroups and so forth. Accordingly, the 
rekhep (tribe) is the m ost indusive level within the 'segm entar/ structure. Within the reklaep may 
be found sections, often a pair o f them (in instances where they have been founded by brothers) 
which are cleady named and distinctions are made between them. There is no direct translation 
for ‘sections’ in the M dpa language, but the m ost commonly used concept is raid (a pair o f 
them), a term which is applicable to all levels o f pairing.
In each o f the sections are the various named 'dans’ which, as we shall see in the next section 
and in successive chapters, are major units in political competition. As indicated above, 'dan’ is a 
term which best equates with the Hagen ideology o f tepam tenía nga fo f one father3), or having 
origjinated from a single putative ancestor to whom most —  but not all —  members can claim 
descent8 As a result, certain taboos are observed, including the rule o f exogamy (where one 
must no t marry from within the clan); the virtual absence o f major warfare between these 
subdivisions (clans); and because o f the absence o f warfare, moka exchanges are generally 
conducted between clans rather than within themselves. Within the clan are the men’s houses 
(manga rupá) which tend to  be territorially localised (see Medan and Rumsey 1991:41-44 for 
comparable discussion on land tenure in Nebilyer).
8 A J. Strathem’s compilation o f data on 258 adult or near-adult Kawelka men in 1964 shows that 95 or 37 
per cent were non-agnates (1966a:357; 1972:104). I give some examples in Chapter Eight
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Figure 3.2: A typical H agen segm entary structure: th a t o f the Kawelka
KAWELKA
Kundmbo
Roklambo
•- Kumapei
Puntmbo
Mandembo
Klambo
Membo
Roklambo
Dakapmbo
Kumbambo
Kiklpuklambo
Eltimbo
Minembimbo
Oyambo
L- Akelembo
Kurupmbo
r  Rokmbo
Romalkembo
Tipukmbo
Katmbo
Penambimbo
Kalmbo ingk
-  Oyambo
Roklambo
Oyambo ingk
Keiyambo
_  Elpuklmbo
_  Keiyambo ingk
TRIBE MAJOR SECTION CLAN (EXOGAMOUS) SUB-CLAN SUB-SUB-CLAN
Source: Based on A J. Strathem (1972:35); Ketan (1996:246); and information supplied by Ben Konts, 
Kawelka Membo Oyambo sub-clan.
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The manga rapa, which roughly approximates to ‘sub-clan’, is generally the m ost im portant and 
frequently operative social unit in Hagen society. While levels such as section, clan, sub-clan, 
sub-sub-clan and so forth come within the overarching umbrella o f the tribe, this in no way 
suggests that each level is functionally or otherwise subordinate to the next m ost inclusive level. 
In other words, the tribe must not be viewed as a corporate management structure, where each 
franchise or division can be directed to meet certain demands, nor can it be compared with that 
o f an interest group. Why not? Because there is no overarching authority; it is not a power 
structure. It is basically a ‘functional’ structure, which simply means that different functions are 
performed at the various levels, depending on the size o f the rekhep. Cooperation in major 
arenas o f competition such as warfare, ceremonial exchange and elections is mainly on a 
voluntary basis, although this is clearly complicated by factors such as loyalty, group pride (that 
is, ‘the name must not go down3) and, above all, self-interest
It is also necessary to distinguish the reklaep structure from the African-derived notion o f 
‘segmentary lineage system’. As noted by Merlan and Rumsey:
This African-derived notion of ‘segmentary lineage system’ involves concepts of 
‘descend and ‘apical ancestor7 which are analytically distinct from the notion of 
‘segmentary’ per se, either in our general sense or in the sense we distinguished as 
segmentaryi. It is important to keep these features separate if we want to develop useful 
ways of comparing, not only the range of societies found in Africa but societies as 
different as those of Africa and Highland Papua New Guinea (1991:36).9
Furthermore, they argued that “notions o f descent and apical ancestor are o f little or no 
relevance in the Nebilyer area” (Medan and Rumsey 1991:36). Likewise, in Hagen the notions o f 
descent and apical ancestor are o f limited consequence, even though the principle o f descent can 
occasionally be used by prominent individuals to justify their efforts in mobilising resources and 
groups for sponsoring large-scale events such as warfare and elections.
Differences in  size and function ofH agen tribes
The tribe is probably the most important political and military unit in Hagen society. It is an 
alliance o f clans which may or may not claim common descent, and membership is ideally by * 
agnatic descent (through the father’s line). Its members may live in territory-holding dans and
Following Durkheim (1964), Merlán and Rumsey (1991:35) considered “the concept ‘segmental’ or 
‘segmentary’ to be far more general and widely applicable than ‘segmentary lineage’” which portrays an 
image o f a “hierarchically ramified tree-like organism”. In the more general sense the term ‘segmentar/, as 
originally suggested by Durkheim (1964), is used when referring to “social differentiation by the 
multiplication o f (or division into) like parts” (Merian and Rumsey 1991:35). In the more restricted sense, 
which Merian and Rumsey called segmentary \̂úc\ “the term refers to internally ramified structures, where 
two or more segments at one level comprise a single segment at a higher level, etc.” However, they did 
quite cleariy state that their “usage o f the term does not presuppose such ramification, although most o f 
the social identities which we call segmentary do in fact exhibit if’ (¿bid).
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access to land for coffee plots, food-crops, and homesteads are based on both usufructuary 
rights and through inheritance. Hageners speak o f ‘tribe’ as something to be reckoned with in 
terms o f warfare, ceremonial exchange, commercial enterprise and modem politics. In the event 
o f war, tribesmen may have to defend their territory together or face decimation. Apart from this 
military function, a tribe may stage a tnoka or a singsing as a single un it It can also sponsor 
candidates to contest elections as well as promoting business enterprise. While it is true that 
these functions are currently being performed at this level in smaller tribes, they have been 
transferred down to the section or clan level in bigger tribes. Jika as a tribe, for example, is so 
laige and fragmented that in 1986 gun warfare broke out within its Maipngel section in which 
the Komb-Akelemb dan-pair were subsequently routed by an alliance o f Komapi, Opromb, 
Milakamb and Muklmana dans.10 As well, candidates have been sponsored by the respective 
clans against each other in 1987,1992 and 1997 national dections. That Paias Wingti, who was 
then the incumbent MP for Hagen Open and Prime Minister o f PNG, had opted for the 
Western Highlands Provincial seat rather than accepting Paul Pora’s challenge in Hagen Open 
during the 1987 dection was partly because o f his fear o f losing to Pora, but perhaps more 
importantly because he was unable to obtain assurances o f support from within his Jika tribe.
In Hagen, the biggest tribes, in order o f numerical strength on the basis o f 1997 population 
estimates, are: the Jika and Mokei o f the Hagen Central area, with nearly 20,000 and 15,000 
persons, respectively; the Kumdi o f the Mul Council area, with a population o f about 10,700; the 
Minembi o f the Dei Council area, numbering around 7,000; and the Kuli o f the Anglimp-South 
Wahgi area, with over 5,000 persons. The Dei Council area is characterised by relatively smaller 
but more numerous tribes than the Hagen Central area which has thirteen tribes, induding the 
three large ones, Jika, Mokei and Yamka.11
Jika has three major sections: Andapunts, Mukaka and Maipngel (which is easily the largest) with an 
estimated 1997 population o f more than 10,000 persons. Maipngel has two minor sections: 
Andakelkam, which is made up of the Komh-Aklemb clan-pair and the Tokpa-based Roklamb; and 
Rukumb, which is made up of five clans (Parklemb, Opromb, Komapi, Muklmana and Milakamb). 
Although the war was mainly fought along this minor sectional line, the two Tokpa-based clans, Roklamb 
and Parklemb did not participate because “they physically live in between the Mukaka clans at Togoba 
{Tokpa] — and speak their language — while the other Maipngel dans are located in the Ogelbeng-Hagen 
Tech area in the centre o f the (Hagen Open] electorate, some ten kilometres away. At any rate, the 
Roklamb-Parklemb are now more interested in the political scene around Togoba (Tokpa], with its 
national dimensions, than in the more distant and parochial struggle going on near Hagen” (Burton 
1989a:263-64). In spite o f this conflict, Maipngel is unusual in the sense that it has remained as an 
exogamous unit at the sectional level while others are usually exogamous at the clan level. Only once was 
this rule broken: in the early 1980s when a woman from the Komb clan married a Milakamb leader, the 
late Brass Wak, a candidate for the Hagen Open seat in 1987 and son o f the pre-eminent Jika big-man, 
Wak. See Burton (1989a) for segmentary structures o f Hagen Central tribes and the issues and 
circumstances surrounding Brass Wak’s death.
There is a discrepancy between the figures given here and those given in a recent paper by Burton and 
Keher (1997). According to their population estimates, the “Jika, who number some 12,000”, may be 
broken down into three exogamous sections”, and die other two large tribes, “the Mokei, with about 
11,000 people, and the Yamka, with about 3,500, are demographically important [m Hagen politics]”
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Some o f these large tribes have been successful in warfare and occupy huge continuous 
territories across minor linguistic boundaries. For example, some clans within the largest Hagen 
tribe, Jika, speak Melpa while others, including Paias Wingti’s Mukaka clan, are Temboka 
speakers. As indicated in Table 3. /, the smallest tribes, which have been decimated in warfare, are 
closely associated with, or almost incorporated into, larger ones from which they sought and 
were given refuge.
T able 3.1: G roups associated w ith, or incorporated into, larger ones
J ik a M okei Kum di Rem di K entpi
Kungunka Epilkae Kungunka Klalka Kumungaka
Palka Elti Kenapka Milaka Gulke
Milaka Jika Komb-Akelemb Fund Kiklpukla Punti
Teiya Ndilika Prandike
Jika in the past gave refuge to many groups, including Elti-Penambi and Kungunka-Palka, but 
only sections o f Milaka and Teiya were fully incorporated into its Milakamb clan.12 Some 
Kungunka-Palka clans are almost incorporated into Milakamb as well (cf. A.J. Strathem 
1971:230; Appendix 1.2; and Burton 1989a).
More recent instances o f ‘incorporation’ are: (a) the Jika Komb-Akelemb pair into Mokei 
Andakelkam section; (b) a large group o f Poiyaka-Aiyaka tribesmen into Kawelka at Kuk; (c) 
Tipaka tribesmen into Tepuka in Dei; and (d) some Enga and Simbu migrants into Remdi at 
Muglamp. However, only the Komb-Akelemb ‘incorporation" into Mokei was a direct 
consequence o f warfare, while the others have been largely motivated by economic and
(1997:156). It is however not clear from their discussion whether these figures were taken from the 1990 
population census, or from more recent estimates. In any case, their figures appear much too conservative, 
suggesting underestimation on their part. My estimates o f  20,000 Jika, 15,000 Mokei and 5-6,000 Yamka in 
1997 would be more accurate, considering that there was widespread underenumeration in Western 
Highlands during the 1990 census, in addition to the fact that many members o f  these tribes work and live 
outside the province.
According to an account given to me by an older Milakamb informant, Makinda o f  Bomri village, the 
Milaka and Teiya are linked to Milakamb through an historical alliance. The Milakamb are in fact said to 
have been originally part o f  the Nebilyer-based Milaka. Some members o f  the Teiya, also a Nebilyer group, 
came with the Milaka to settle in Milakamb territories near the Hagen township. Descendants o f  Teiya 
migrants who have gone on to establish leadership status among the Jika Milakamb are Glen Komonga 
(businessman and national president o f  the People’s Progress Party) and Kuimbakul Piandi (Deputy 
Commissioner o f  Correctional Institutional Sendees). Other prominent Milakamb leaders (though not o f  
Teiya origin) are Malcolm Culligan (former Secretary for Western Highlands), Bob Nenta (former 
Commissioner o f  Police), Ogla Makindi (former President o f  Gutnius Lutheran Church, Enga, and 
current District Coordinator, Baiyer River area), to name but a few o f  many outstanding Milakamb leaders.
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demographic factors (see Chapter Five). The term incorporation, if  strictly applied, suggests that 
some sort o f  merging has taken place. In this case, all four cases given here may be more 
accurately described as being closely associated rather than incorporated because none o f them 
seem to have relinquished their original structural identities. O f course, this may happen over 
time, perhaps in future generations, but individuals at the present time have assumed refugee 
status and will live and die as Komb-Akelemb, Poiyaka-Aiyaka, Tipaka, or Rngart or Simbu. 
Upon death, it is likely that in m ost cases, their bodies will be returned to their agnatic groups, 
and should they die fighting alongside their hosts, reparation payments will be made by the host 
group to relatives o f  the deceased.
Some smaller tribes, although dispersed through warfare, have remained autonomous, while 
others have regrouped in recent times. Although the remnants o f some groups, such as the Elti- 
Penambi pair o f tribes and the Kawelka, have regrouped and consolidated their numbers since 
coloniaUy-imposed pacification in die 1940s, many others, including Kopi, Punti, and 
Kungunka-Palka remain split groups. Smaller groups such as Klalka, Kiklpukla and Ndilika have 
almost lost their autonomy as tribal units. Table 3.2 shows the smaller groups which have been 
dispersed through warfare and as a consequence have dual residency, usually beside larger and 
m ore powerful groups from which they sought refuge; in cases where bigger groups have dual 
residency is usually a result o f conquest (for example, the Jika are said to have acquired m ost o f 
their land around the Ogelbeng plains and those in the upper Wahgi valley through military 
conquest).13
Jika appears to  have been far more successful than other groups in warfare. Some o f their present 
territories which were acquired through conquest are: Ainya, Kehia, Kimimnga, Kala, Krukramp, Kuamp, 
and Kenta. The Kimka (also known as Ainya Kimka) originally lived at Ainya, west o f Ogelbeng, currently 
occupied by the Jika KomapL The original residents o f Kala were the Anglimp-South Wahgi group, 
Menjpi (sometimes called Kala Menjpi), together with their historical pair partner, the Kemi (also known 
as Kala Kemi who are now paired with Kukilka).
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T able 3.2: D ual R esidency. G roups w ith m ore than  one territory
Local Group Territories District/ Census Division Geographical Location
Elti-Penambi Baisu, Kenta Hagen Upper Wahgi Valley
Kelua, Kumunga Hagen Ogelbeng Plains
Kuta Hagen Kubor Range
Kilinga Nebilyer Nebilyer Valley
Kukilka Moitemp Dei Gumants Valley
Bakl Hagen Upper Wahgi
Kuklinga, 'Tepkla Hagen Ogelbeng Plains
Tiriya, Nebilyer Tokpa Plains
Kopi Tiki Dei Baiyer Valley
Welya, Kum Hagen Upper Wahgi
Kailge Nebilyer Nebilyer Vallley
Nokpa Wump Anglimp South Wahgi
Kailge Nebilyer Nebilyer Valley
Tepuka Ambukla, Nunga, D ei Muka Valley
Kulkaramp Dei Jimi Valley
Baisu, Raemp Hagen Upper Wahgi
Kawelka Mbukl Dei Sepik-Wahgi Divide
Kuk-lVlbakla Hagen Upper Wahgi
Kuningramp Baiyer Baiyer Valley
Welyi Kotna, Kentkena Dei Muka Valley
Kenamb-Keiya Dei Jimi Valley
Kul Baiyer Baiyer Valley
Klamakae Angkukl Dei Baiyer Valley
Ruin a Dei Jimi Valley
Kindeng-Muneng Anglimp South Wahgi
Kiklpukla Kul Baiyer Baiyer Valley
Muglamp Dei Gumanch Valley
Roklaka Gumanch Dei Gumanch Valley
Penda Dei North Wahgi
Mokei Keltiga, Ripamul Hagen Klgomet Plains
Baisu Hagen Upper Wahgi
Raemp Dei Gumanch Valley
Rouna Baiyer Baiyer Valley
Jika Ketiga Hagen Tokpa Plains
Ogelbeng Hagen Ogelbeng Plains
Kenta Hagen Upper Wahgi
Jika Komb-Akelemb Pulkimb Hagen Ogelbeng Plains
Ruti-Rapung Dei North Wahgi
Poiyaka-Aiyaka Tokpa Nebilyer Nebilyer Valley
Baisu Hagen Upper Wahgi
Punti Mala Dei North Wahgi
Tiki Dei Baiyer Valley
Mapkla Mul Baiyer Valley
Note: During a recent war against the Jika Maipngel section in the 1980s, the Kukilka were brutally evicted from
their Kuklinga and Tepkla territories and have since joined their fellow tribesmen at Bakl and Moitemp. 
This happened soon after the Jika Komb-Akelemb pair were routed from their Puklimb territory. Some 
Komb clansmen have moved to their Ruti-Rapung settlements in Dei —  where they are closely associated 
with the Nelka tribe —  while m ost have taken up residence with the Mokei Andakelkam section.
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Originally dispersed through warfare, m ost o f the groups indicated in Table 3.2 had sought and 
were accepted as refugees, while a few are closely associated through special alliances. Elti and its 
pair-partner Penambi were initially given refuge by Jika, after routed by sections o f the Mokei, 
but later joined a friendly Mokei section and some Elti relatives were incorporated into the 
Mokei Nambka clan. After a major war in the early 1920s, the Elti-Penambi pair were driven 
from  the Nebilyer Valley up to the Ogelbeng Plain by a powerful coalition o f Mokei, (<Kum5) 
K opi and some other neighbouring groups (see A.J. Strathem 1971:66-67; Connolly and 
Anderson 1987:109). According to accounts given by some Mokei informants, the former 
W estern Highlands MP Raphael D oa’s clan was directly descended from Elti refugees. D oa o f 
course went on to become not only an im portant leader o f the Mokei Nambka clan but the 
entire Mokei tribe and virtually the whole o f Hagen, which reinforces the point that non-agnates 
and their descendants can rise to leadership status.
The Clan
Opinion on the usage and definition (functional or however defined) o f the clan is divided but 
m ost anthropologists agree that the dan  is strictly the largest exogamous unit in any given 
structural hierarchy (Lowman-Vayda 1971:322; Brown 1971:212; Meggitt 1971:196; A.J. 
Strathem 1972:18; Rubel and Rosman 1978:187; Burton 1988:1.5). Exogamy is the rule which 
requires that individuals m ust seek a marriage partner outside the group. It is a cleady named and 
historically autonomous group, which means that members cannot marry from within the clan 
because o f a common acknowledgment o f dose blood relationship (Burton 1987). While this 
narrow definition fits some Highlands societies, it may not be a useful one for others. It is 
therefore necessary to consider much broader approaches. G ting Vicedom and Tischner (1943­
8:2:9-10) and A.J. Strathem (1971:33), Rubel and Rosman noted that for the Hagen:
A clan is usually occupies a single territory and fights as a unit to defend that territory.
Ideally, there should be no lethal fighting within the clan. The clan is the exogamous 
unit Men o f a clan organise m ka exchanges as a group. There is a clan cemetery that is 
the location for sacrifices made to clan ancestral spirits. Clansman are obliged to take 
blood revenge and must contribute to compensation paid to allies for men lost in 
warfare on their behalf The clan operates as a unit at cult performances, and dances as a 
unit at festivals. Clans stand towards one another as major or perpetual enemies or as 
minor enemies who can become allies. The clan will also have a major ceremonial 
ground. In terms of descent dogma, the dan is spoken of as tepam tenta (founded by a 
single father) and this dogma is referred to as the basis for rules of exogamy, and 
cooperation in warfare and ceremonial exchange (1978:187).14
For further discussion on these matters, see A J. Strathem (1966a:357; 1972:18); and AM . Strathem 
(1972a.*ll-12); see also Brown (1972:35-37); O ’Hanlon (1989:26-27); Medan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.3); 
and Muke (1994:Chap.6) for comparable discussion on Chimbu, N orth Wahgi, Nebilyer and South Wahgi 
groups, respectively.
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W hile the clan still perform s some o f these functions, it no longer makes sacrifices to dan 
ancestors at cemeteries. Instead, it may now have a church adjacent to the ceremonial ground to 
worship die Christian God. In addition to its military function, the clan also operates as a single 
unit in elections and business enterprise.
Major characteristics o f the clan, according to Vivelo (1978) are: (1) based on unilineal descent 
(one-line descent; tracing o f descent through one parent and that parent’s same-sexed 
progenitors, Le., all males o r all females); (2) from this can be formed local o r residence groups 
(of people living together); (3) may be a corporate group, Le., they may control some valued 
commodity (such as land); (4) may be exogamous (cannot marry from within the group); (5) 
often have group taboos (a proscription, a ‘don’t7, which, usually, carries with it supernatural 
sanctions); and 6) contain members o f both sexes originally but, following the rule o f exogamy, 
one sex must leave the group upon marriage (Vivelo 1978:162-3; see also Keesing 1975:31).
Using these general characteristics as a check-list, an examination o f Hagen social structure 
shows that none o f  these fit perfecdy but, with some modifications, the first four points and the 
last one may be applicable. In this way, one may conclude that in Hagen the clan is a land­
holding local group o f which the core members are related by ‘patrilineal descent7, tracing 
bloodlines to  a common male ancestor, which means that one cannot marry from within the 
group. Descent, however, is not the only criterion o f membership because marriage into the 
group also provides members, while marriage out o f the group results in loss o f active 
membership (see Vivelo 1978:163).
A  major problem  with this definition is its disregard for exceptions to rules gpveming this type 
o f organisation. Hageners, for instance, describe the clan (and levels below the sub-dan) as o f 
tepam tenta, mema tenta (‘one father; one blood7) but that does no t mean patrilineal descent is the 
sole charter for recruitment, nor can all its members claim common descent. Females bom  into 
the dan, upon marriage gain membership to a husband’s group, but never entirely relinquish that 
o f their own, and are addressed by using the name o f their descent group as a prefix to their 
personal names. Clansmen rely on their married sisters for assistance in staging laige events, 
such as ceremonial exchange, and often encourage them  to shift residence, together with their 
husbands and children, back to their place o f birth. A sister’s sons, in particular, ate usually 
encouraged to return to his maternal kin and sponsored by their uncles to  do so. This and other 
factors show how flexible Highlands groups are when it comes to defining their social 
structures.
This flexibility and continuous evolution can be seen all around. Some groups are clearly named 
and historically autonomous. The Tungei o f South Wahgi are a gpod example (Burton 1988). 
But others have developed into large exogamous tribal sections, such as Jika MaipngeL A tribal
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section in the making is the Kawelka example shown earlier in Figure 3.2. The three Kawelka 
clans K undm bo, M andembo and Membo —  can be m ore accurately described as tribal 
sections rather than clans because the Kawelka themselves do not have a name for this level 
today. Currently the m ost commonly used names are Membo Keiyambo, M embo Oyambo, 
K rupm bo, Klambo and Kundmbo. This cleady indicates that Krupm bo and Klambo, previously 
sub-clans, have now almost assumed dan status while Keiyambo and Oyambo, former sub-sub­
clans, have evolved into sub-clans and possibly clans. This leaves Kundm bo which remains as a 
clan.
The change in structures thus correlates with population growth. The Kawelka, which had a 
population o f about 860 persons in 1964 (A.J. Strathem 197232), has experienced considerable 
population growth over the last 33 years. It had a 1990 population o f some 4,100 persons, 
induding some Tepuka, Poiyaka and Aiyaka migrants at Kuk (see Table 3.3; see also Table 3.4). 
The other reason for structural changes lies with exchange relations, a factor which is related to 
population growth. Sub-groups are created and separately named by leaders in order to receive 
larger shares during distribution o f wealth items from compensation payments, ceremonial 
exchange, bridewealth, and pork from festivities. Similady, rival leaders may also influence sub­
divisions to be divided into further sub-sub-divisions by deliberately presenting them with 
separate initiatory gifts in order to receive large amounts o f wealth items in moka. The former 
D ei M P, Parua Kuri, a pre-eminent big-man and exceptionally skilful moka strategists, devised 
and utilised such a strategy among his m other’s people, the Kawelka. Kawelka leaders often 
express fears o f unnecessary fragmentation brought about in this manner. Such fears are 
reflected in a statement made by the Kawelka Membo big-man, K ont, who says that “We are all 
one small group here but Parua has divided us into tiny little groups because he wanted to eat 
from  as many o f us as possible” (personal communication, January 1995). I
I have thus far discussed the major levels o f traditional social organisation in Hagen, noting that 
within the tribe are im portant subdivisions, such as clans and sub-clans, which all exhibit 
considerable variation in size and function. How these groups work together in contemporary 
Hagen politics is the focus o f the next section. Different types o f alliances, both old and new —  * 
which we may call ‘traditional’ and ‘neo-traditional’ —  are analysed in the context o f the major 
arenas o f  competition and cooperation (particularly warfare, business and elections) within a 
particular field o f political competition (Dei Council/O pen electorate).
Coalitions and Factions
Above the tribal level is a loosely organised level which I have previously described as ‘phratry’, 
meaning an alliance o f tribes which do not necessarily claim common descent but may have 
corporate property and functions (Ketan 1996:248). I am aware o f the discrepancies between
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this and other m ore ‘orthodox* definitions (see, for example, Brown 1972:35; Keesing 1975:150), 
which emphasise com m on origin-myths as a basic criteria for distinguishing ‘phratry* from other 
level o f groups, including tribes. Thus, a more accurate term  for these Hagen groupings would 
be coalition-style alliances to describe coalitions, based on military alliances, formed in the early 
1970s to  achieve specific goals. Undoubtedly there are many ways o f defining coalitions, but the 
one which best sums up the Hagen situation was given by Jeremy Boissevain:
The coalitions which people form in their drive to attain their goals are temporary 
alliances. Although their internal structure and organisation vary enormously, all 
coalitions am built by individuals who are dependent, in different ways, cm each other.
Because the very existence of a coalition depends not only upon the specific anH varied 
goals and resources of individuals who compose it, but also on the relations between 
them, they are unstable. In time, goals alter, resources shift and relations between people 
change. Moreover, the ad hoc nature of coalitions makes them ideally suited instruments 
to exploit new resources in changing situations. Coalitions may thus reflect changing 
circumstances, they may bring about change, and, by their very nature, are constantly 
subject to change. They may disappear as certain goals are achieved, or they may evolve 
into social forms of a different structural order, such as more permanent associations, 
often transforming their social and cultural environment in the process (Boissevain 
1974:170).
Generalisations are visually way o ff the mark, but this one is spot on.15 As evident in the business 
developm ent associations o f the 1970s (discussed in Chapter Four), the coalition-style alliances o f 
D ei are explicitly gpal-oriented, highly personalised in key areas o f operation, and their stability 
has been threatened by disruptive power struggles between leaders o f different factions within 
them. Although some o f their goals have been achieved, relations between the various factions 
(headed by prom inent individuals) have not been warm. Rifts do occur, predictably along 
structural lines, yet the coalitions —  somewhat strengthened by recent bouts o f warfare in the 
eighties —  seem far from disappearing. Rather, they have hardened into semi-permanent 
associations. And while they have been a driving force in transforming their social, cultural and 
natural landscape, their internal structures seem to have changed largely because o f shifts in 
corporate goals, personal interests, and common perceptions o f economic disparity between the 
leaders and their people.
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, there are three major coalition-style alliances operating in Dei. 
Significantly, they all have major business investments (see Chapter Four). These are: (1) the 
Pipilka, an alliance o f mainly Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes, which has an estimated 
population o f around 5,000 and controls the giant Gumanch Plantation and M ount Hagen Paris: 
Motel, am ong other businesses; (2) the Welyi-Kuta, an alliance o f mainly Welyi and the 
Kombukla-M inembi pair o f tribes, which has an estimated population o f around 14,000 and
For a m ote detailed discussion o f coalitions, in committing resources and how this affects power relations, 
see Boissevain (1974:Chap.7); and A J. Strathem (1984) on coalitions in the Dei Council area.
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business interests in coffee plantations; and (3) the Raembka, an alliance o f mainly Tepuka, 
Kawelka, Nelka and several other small tribes, with an estimated population o f 18,000 and has 
business interests in coffee plantations and plantation management agencies.
The population data, by core groups, is given below (see Table 33 ), though the 1990 Census 
figures should be treated with some caution as it is evident that there was widespread 
underenumeration in W estern Highlands Province. Some o f these groups, for example, appear 
to  have grown by over 100 per cent in 11 years, which clearly needs explanation. Two Raembka 
groups, the Kawelka and Kentpi tribes, appear to have experienced extraordinary population 
growth o f 156 and 153 per cent, respectively, while a third, die Welyi o f  die Welyi-Kuta alliance, 
appear to have doubled its population size in eleven years. There is likely over-enumeration 
involved here. Firsdy, it is possible that Kawelka may have been enumerated twice, both at 
Mbukl and Kuk, in addition to  a large population o f migrants at Kuk, numbering 500 or more 
persons, which were counted at the Kuk census p o in t Secondly, the large increase in the Kentpi 
population may have been caused by the inclusion in the 1990 census o f several small tribes 
(including Prandike, Gulke, Punti, and perhaps Mungapke) who may have been counted 
separately in 1979. It is also likely that migrants at Kinjibi and Nunga plantations were included 
in Kentpi. Thirdly, the 110 per cent increase in Welyi population is believed to have been caused 
by large m igrant populations at Penga, Mamgoig and K otna plantations.
Hagen Groupings: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions 101
T able 3.3: C oalition-style alliances: Core groups by population  data
Groups 1979a 1990b Difference (%) Adjusted 1997c
RAEMBKA 8,111 14,502 78% increase 18,500
Tepuka 2,575 3,351 30% increase 5,000
Kawelka 1,631 4,168 d 156% increase 4,500 d
Kumungaka 514 374 e 28% decrease 1,000
Kentpi 2,040 f 5,158 f 153% increase 5,000 f
Nelka 770 1,116 45% increase 1,500
Kkmakae 581 335 e 42% decrease 1,500
PIPILKA 2,369 1,523 e 36% decrease 4,700
Remdi 988 587 e 41% decrease 2,000 g
Kimka 600 936 56% increase 1,200
Roklaka 781 Not counted N /A 1,500
WELYI-KUTA 7,334 10,657 45% increase 14,500
Kombukla 2,262 2,939 30% increase 4,000
Minembi 3,596 4,609 28% increase 7,000
Welyi 1,476 3,109 110% increase 3,500
Sources and notes:
x  Provincial Data System, National Statistical Office (1982);
b. 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993; 1994);
c. Estimates by author;
d. Including some Tepuka, Poiyaka-Aiyaka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at KuL;
e. Likely underenumeration in 1990 Census;
£ Including Prandike, Gulke, Punti, and possibly Mungapke. 
g. Including Kiklpukla and Ndilika.
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The elparaka or major warfare disjunction, as indicated in Figure 3.3, is the major line o f fissure, 
which means that the different tribes and clans, except for a particular case (that o f the Mmembi 
Kimbo clan), have litde choice as to which alliance they can join. Individuals and factions, 
however, enjoy considerable freedom in shifting allegiances from one candidate to another in
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elections, yet such freedom o f selection cannot be exercised in warfare. Military alliances tend to 
be m ore stable than election alliances, though the latter is clearly based on the former. An 
im portant rule in warfare is that reparation payments may be made to  m inor enemies, thereby 
converting relations o f enmity into exchange o f wealth items (and eventually into alliance), but 
one does no t and cannot compensate major enemies for war deaths. Thus m inor enemies in one 
conflict can be allied against a common major enemy, whilst m ajor enemies maintained relations 
o f enmity (see Chester Five; see also A.J. Strathem 1971:Chap.4; 1972:Chap.4). Whereas in 
elections, some individuals are known to have supported candidates sponsored by major 
enemies, in warfare, the rules are virtually set: that is, once your group considers itself as a major 
enemy o f another (or vice versa), there is no t much you can do about i t  Yet, there are some 
inspiring stories about cross-cutting kinship ties and individual courage in initiating peace 
settlements between warring groups (one such narrative which appears in Chapter Five is that o f
two PN G  Defence Force soldiers’ role in negotiating peace between die Remdi and Minembi in 
1989).
A llian ces in  action
The major coalition-style alliances o f Dei, as noted earlier, were formed by prom inent 
individuals in the early 1970s to  achieve specific goals. Their composition is schematised in 
Figures 3.4-6. They were initially set up as business development associations, whose membership 
was founded on what A J. Strathem described as “neo-txaditional coalition-style ties between 
existing large groups” (1984:87). The ties are mainly o f a military nature and their somewhat 
vague historical roots suggest that they may well be fairly recent formations. W hat is not vague is 
their role in contemporary politics, in addition to business and warfare.
The Tepuka-Kawelka pair form the core o f the Raembka alliance, which is in competition with 
Welyi-Kuta in mainly warfare, business and elections. The Tepuka-Kawelka pair have fought 
against the Kombukla-Minembi pair in major warfare since pre-colonial times (see Chapter Five). 
Parua Kuri, the first Dei MP since the creation o f the Dei electorate in 1972, came from within 
the Tepuka-Kawelka pair. Kuri held the seat for three consecutive five year terms, from 1972 to 
1987. M elchior Pep, the man who replaced Kuri during the 1987 elections, is from the 
Kombukla-M inembi pair, which forms the core o f the Welyi-Kuta alliance. Pep held the seat 
between 1987 and 1992, but chose to resign after charges o f misconduct were laid against him 
under the PN G  Leadership Code. By resigning, he ceased to be a leader* under the Code. He 
was thus able to  stand in 1992, because he had not actually been found guilty o f breaking the 
Code. But on his re-election, the charges were revived and he was found guilty, thereby 
precipitating a by-election. In 1993 Kuri’s son, Reuben Parua, succeeded Pep.
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The situation since 1993, however, has changed. Although Reuben Parua won the 1993 Dei 
O pen By-Election as a Raembka candidate, in 1997 he was forced to seek re-election as a 
Tepuka candidate, because the Kawelka had sponsored their own candidate (William Pik). 
Furtherm ore, the agreement he had with former Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby, now no longer 
stood, as the Kentpi, too, sponsored their own candidate (Paul Koi) in 1997. Similarly, Melchior 
Pep, w ho consolidated his position as a Welyi-Kuta strongman during his term  as a minister in 
the national government, was forced to contest the 1997 election as a Kombukla candidate 
because the Nambka clan o f the Mtnembi had their own candidate (Maj. Pun Kaip). An update 
o f the political situation in Dei O pen electorate in the 1997 election is given in Chapter Seven.
Unlike the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, none o f the core members o f the Pipilka alliance are 
traditional enemies o f those in the Welyi-Kuta alliance. The major warfare disjunction indicated 
in Figure 33  is therefore a ‘modem* one, taken from the context o f more recent cases o f warfare 
between the three principal partners o f the Pipilka alliance and the Kombukla-Minembi pair (see 
Case 1 in Chapter Five), The Remdi Jikambo clan and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair form the core 
o f Pipilka, which combines with a faction o f Raembka against the Welyi-Kuta alliance in warfare, 
but competes against both Raembka and Welyi-Kuta in business and elections.
The Pipilka alliance, created in c.1973, appears to have been far more successful than the other 
two in business but has virtually failed to replicate such success in elections. Their principal 
candidate, K oi Ranpi, has unsuccessfully contested every election since 1977 (see Chapter Seven). 
Before Ranpi, and during pre-Pipilka times, a prom inent Roklaka leader, Pirn Koldpi, 
unsuccessfully contested the Mul-Dei Open during the 1968 elections and the Dei Open in 
1972. In  1968 Koldpi scored only 456 votes —  compared with eventual winner, Mek Nuginte 
(3,029) and the runner-up, Parua Kuri (2,315) —  and was therefore eliminated after the first 
count, under the preferential voting system (see H .K  and P. Colebatch, M. Reay and A.J. 
Strathem 1971 i274; Table 15). In 1972 Dei was separated from Mul, thereby creating two new 
electorates.16 Pirn Koldpi was among seven candidates who contested the Dei Open seat He 
came third, with 1,422 first preference votes, compared with the winner, Parua Kuri (2,131) and
A brief history o f the Dei Open is given in A.J. Strathem (1976). In 1964, as A.J. Strathem notes, the 
people o f Dei Council “had voted within the Minj Electorate and had helped Kaibelt Diria to  win his first 
electoral contest” (1976:265). For die next election in 1968 Dei was paired with the neighbouring Mul 
Council to form an electorate separate from both the Hagen and Wahgj areas {ibid, see also H.K and P. 
Colebatch, etdY TiX ). A J. Strathem writes that “owing to a series o f confrontations between groups and 
individual leaders in Mul and Dei, in which the two main rivals for the position o f House o f Assembly 
Member in 1968 [Mek Nugintz and Parua Kuri] were closely involved, the Dei Council President [Parua 
Kuri] asked that Dei and Mul be made separate electorates for 1972; and, because o f the evident bad 
relations between the two councils, this request was granted by the visiting Electoral Boundaries 
Distribution Committee” (1976:265; for Mul-Dei relations, see also A.J. Strathem 1984-24-25; 1992£36- 
237; Ketan 1996:259).
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the runner-up, Gapa Wai o f the Minembi tribe, who polled 1,819 votes (see A J. Strathem 
1976:283; Table2).
Mek Nugintz’s election victory in 1968, with a score o f 5,675 votes, over Parua Kurt, who polled 
3,108 votes, after the fifth and final count (ibid), cannot be described as an election success story 
for the Pipilka alliance because (1) Mek is a member o f the Mul Coundl-based ‘Upper Remdi’ 
section o f the tribe which is not part o f the Pipilka alliance; and (2) his victory came before the 
formation o f the Pipilka coalition, which was a genuinely new aggregation o f groups.
But how do we explain Pun Ruing’s victory in Dei O pen during the recent national elections in 
June 1997? Ruing’s success, despite a strong challenge from  within Pipilka via the candidacy o f a 
Remdi candidate, Willie W undaki, came about as a result o f unique circumstances and personal 
ability.17 As will be argued, there are several im portant factors which contributed to Ruing’s win, 
but none o f which point towards Pipilka as a base-vote. The rift within Pipilka and other 
underlying factors (including power struggles between faction leaders) are discussed in Chapter 
Four, while the reasons why Puri Ruing’s personal triumph was not a Pipilka-wide corporate 
victory are argued in Chapter Seven.
The Pipilka alliance, in particular, came about as a result o f the plantation acquisition scheme. 
The historical relationship between its two main factions is not quite clear, as indicated by the 
difficulties encountered by informants when trying to make historical connections between 
them. O ne faction is made up o f Dei Council-based groups, such as the Remdi Jikambo clan 
and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, while the other is composed o f the Nebilyer, Hagen and 
Anglimp residents, the Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair. Apart from cooperation between the two 
factions in business activities, they act separately in other spheres o f competition such as warfare 
and elections because their members are divided by electoral and local government council 
boundaries and, in some ways, they can be described units divided by electoral geography. The 
Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction operates within the Dei Open Electorate, while the Kopi-Nokpa 
pair o f tribes are split across both the electoral and council border between Hagen and Anglimp.
Thus, the apparent lack o f cooperation in warfare and elections can be attributed to diverging 
fields o f political competition within which these groups and their leaders interact The Nokpa 
group and its leaders, notably Michael Mel and his elder brother Peter Wama, operate mainly 
within Anglimp-South Wahgi, but its pair partner, Kopi, belongs to the Hagen O pen electorate. 
The K opi are in a very similar position to the Remdi who are split across the Dei-Mul electoral
As pointed out to me by his adviser, Richard M el— an accountant who himself was unsuccessful in 1997 
in attempting to oust fellow Kumdi tribesman Robert Nagle in Mul-Baiyer Open —  all o f Puri’s rivals in 
general, and William Pik and Pun Kaip in particular, played important roles in Puri Ruing’s win (personal 
communication, October 1997).
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bolder. O ne half o fK op i, also known as ‘Kum K opi’ live and operate in central Hagen and are 
paired with N okpa, while the other half, also known as TCopon Kopi* reside in Dei and are 
currently in close association with the Kawelka Kundm bo and Minembi Kimbo dans, with 
w hom  they share some tem tories around Tiki in the Baiyer valley. Special alliances such as 
pairing and dose associations are described in the next section (see discussion on The Dei Council 
Field of Political Competition), but I should m ention here that electorate, local governm ent council, 
o r other similarly arbitrarily created administrative boundaries that ignore either ethnic, cultural 
o r linguistic variations have caused considerable problems for some groups and their leaders.
Although Michael Mel appeared no t to have been impeded by such difficulties in 1987 when he 
w on the Anglimp-South Wahgi O pen seat, his unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1992 and 
subsequent switch to Hagen O pen in 1997 indicate that a divided popular-base is indeed an 
im pedim ent to  success in dections.18 After losing the Anglimp-South Wahgi O pen seat to 
William Ekip (a Port Moresby-based businessman and Tsekieng tribesman) in 1992, Michael 
Mel switched to Hagen O pen in 1997, but was beaten to third place by the incumbent and Mel’s 
form er National Party colleague, Paul Pora, who polled 10,038 votes (28.98%), compared with 
Mel (6,571) and the runner-up, K ing Kela (also known as Stanley Nui), who polled 8,143 votes 
(see Kaiulo 1997a:103).
Like Pipilka, the Raembka alliance’s vague historical roots suggest that this could well be a recent 
formation. In  feet, m ost Raembka inform ants that I have spoken to  had great difficulty tracing 
historical links, militarily o r otherwise, between die various member groups. While some groups 
can be linked historically through military alliances, especially in the context o f tribe-pairing and 
limited coalitions o f three or four small tribes, there is no historical evidence o f a confederacy- 
type alliance having been in existence during pre-colonial times. The Raembka alliance, like its 
rivals Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta, became popular only in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. As a 
m atter o f  rhetoric, it is now fashionable in public oratory for Raembka leaders to  give the 
im pression that theirs is a united and powerful alliance. As pointed out to me by an emerging 
Raembka leader, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, in January 1995:
The Raembka coalition, with a membership of some seventeen tribes, is easily die 
biggest group in die Dei Council area. It is named after a strong jungle vine called 
raembka kan which grows in the Jimi valley. Raembka leaders often claim that direre is 
‘an extended group’ —  just like the raembka vine —  stretching far and wide, drawing 
membership from Wariki Kuiyake, near Tiki in the Baiyer valley, to Old Temb Keri, 
near Kirml in the upper North Wahgi. Orators frequently refer to this long vine of 
groups’, when appealing for group solidarity during national elections fas well as at
The same can be said o f warfare: diverging political fields o f competition can be an impediment to both 
elections and warfare. The recent war efforts o f the Pipilka and at least one faction o f Raembka were 
hampered by geographical and political boundaries, an important point to which I shall return in Chapter 
Five.
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other large-scale events such as tmka exchanges, compensation payments, and peace 
settlements] when el-ik ( fight talk3) speeches are delivered [tn which extravagant rlajms 
are deliberately made to belittle rival groups and their leaders].
H e further explained that Raembka is metaphorically thought o f  as having either a head and a 
tail/bottom  (using anthropom orphic image), o r as having a shoot/top  and roots/base (m plant 
metaphor). The R a e m b k a /^  (head) o r mm  (shoot, top), according to Mel, is made up o f six 
high-level nam ed groups, while the Raembka por (tail, bottom ) o r pukl (roots, base) has eleven, 
altogether a total o f seventeen groups (with a combined estimated 1997 population o f some 
30,000 persons).19 An im portant point to  make here is that laige coalitions are good for military 
and electoral support, yet they can be very bad for business, as they are far too difficult to keep 
together. It is, however, no t unusual for politicians to  embrace as many groups as possible.
Thus, the discrepancy between these figures given by Matrus Mel and those presented earlier in 
Table 3.3 can be explained in terms o f personal interest o f informants, changes over and 
perhaps varies with the inform ants degree o f knowledge o f local politics.20 It is im portant to 
recognise that leaders generally and politicians in particular tend to associate with as many 
groups as possible, mainly through contem porary personal networks, but such networks can 
also be built on historical relations between groups. Leaders are not only responsible for the 
creation and maintenance o f such groups but also adding new members in attempting to extend 
their personal networks. O ne consequence o f  extensive networking, as argued later in this thesis, 
is the creation o f confederacy-type alliances, often cutting across electoral boundaries (see 
Chapter Five and Chapter Nine). As well, what is physically evident is a recent increase in the 
num ber o f groups aligned with Raembka, including groups which are structurally part o f those 
in opposing alliances (e.g. Minembi Kimbo clan) and numerous others that were previously
19 . Matrus Mel, in feet, gave actual names o f the groups which make up the ‘head’ and ‘tail3 o f Raembka. 
Raembkapeng (head), he says, is made up Tepuka, Kawelka, Mapkli, Palke, Klamakae and Kimbo. The first 
five are tribes, while the last, Kimbo, is a clan, which is structurally part o f the Minembi tribe, but closely 
associated with the Kawelka Kundmbo dan and the ‘Kopon’ Kopi tribe. The Raembka por (tail), he 
added, is made up o f Kentpi, Nelka, Gulke, Dapi, Prandike, Opei, Krange, Kumungaka, Purke, Mungapka, 
and Oklomoni. All o f these are tribes except Krange, which is commonly referred to as structurally part o f 
Kentpi. While the core groups remain constant, there is slight variation in the number o f groups which 
make up Raembka, depending on different informants. Groups such as Kimbo, Purke, Mungapka, 
Oklomoni, Mapkli, Palke, Opei, Gulke, and Punti have only recently been induded in Raembka mainly for 
political reasons. Waklupka, through their dose association with the Roklaka ‘Nu-por-pei’, are now 
considered as part o f the Pipilka, although they were previously included in Raembka (personal 
communication, January 1995).
20. While discussing Raembka it was easy to tell, from the unmistakable glow in his eyes, that Matrus, a 
UPNG commerce-economics graduate, is proud o f his tribal roots and apparently enjoys talking about 
local politics. Particularly impressive is his knowledge o f the Raembka alliance, within which he has 
considerable influence. Matrus Mel is m ost probably the only village councillor in the province with a 
university degree, and there is no question about his loyalty towards his Kelmbo dan (which he represents 
in Dei Local Government Council), or about his strong tribal roots with the Tepuka, o r about his role as a 
power-broker within Raembka and Dei politics. Nonetheless, and rather ironically, he has also been 
implicated in the processes that have destabilised group solidarity (as evident in Chapter Four on 
cooperative business ventures and in Chapter Seven on national dections).
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non-aligned (e,g. Mungapka, Gulke, Punti). By increasing membership in the various levels o f 
organisation, leaders like Matrus Mel thus become ‘engineers5 in the ‘construction5 and
m aintenance o f political blocs, a key point to which I shall return later in the concluding section 
o f  this chapter.
It is, in a way, fair to  say that Raembka clearly lacks cohesion, has never fought together in 
warfare21, and is highly fragmented because o f enduring and at times disruptive power struggles 
between leaders o f  factions and m inor coalitions. Matrus Mel, for m stanre, leads a faction that is 
opposed to  the one led by Parua Kuri and prom inent Dei businessman, Goim ba K o t Their 
struggle for pow er in Dei, as it will be made clear in Chapter Four; has resulted in bankrupting at 
least two once-prosperous business groups and arguably losing at least three national elections 
which Raembka could otherwise may have won.
Problem s o f  disruptive power struggles, however, are no t restricted to Raembka, as both Pipilka 
and Welyi-Kuta have faced similar problems o f their own. An overview o f the connection 
between warfare, elections, and businesses is presented in the next section (see Dei Council Field of 
Political Competition), and the various spheres o f political competition are being analysed more 
specifically (by way o f case studies) in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 4-8), so it will suffice 
here to schematically present the various factions and the key players involved (see Figure 3.4-6). 
Bear in mind that the num ber o f key players in each o f the factions given, however, is not 
exhaustive, as there are many outstanding leaders who have not been mentioned here (see 
Appendix III for a m ore comprehensive list o f Dei groups and their leaders). N ote also that not all 
o f the individuals mentioned as key players within the different coalitions, factions, and sub­
factions can be described as ‘big-men5. They are, in fact, different types o f  leaders, endowed with 
varied skills and knowledge. Some o f them, for example, are successful businessmen but 
generally poor orators, others are politicians (including a few with despotic tendencies), and a 
few are gifted orators (but lack knowledge o f m odem  business and politics).
Furtherm ore, the size o f their highly personalised following within factions is in fact much 
smaller —  at an average o f perhaps only fifty o r even fewer, core supporters —  than the 
population figures given in the following diagrams. To use Boissevain5s (1974) model o f
In pre-colonial warfare, some Raembka groups fought against each member o f the Welyi-Kuta alliance, 
but not in a concerted effort on a single front, nor in a single battle. When informants speak o f alliance 
warfare, one must take into account o f the fact that in these matters regarding warfare, Hageners tend to 
exaggerate. The nearest thing to alliance warfare between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta was said to have 
occurred sometime during the 1930s, when the Welyi group was almost decimated by the combined 
forces o f the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their, Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae allies (see Ketan 1996:264). 
O ther members o f the Raembka, however, ware not involved and the Kombukla-Minembi pair were said 
to  have assisted Welyi in a mainly non-fighting opacity.
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personal networks, these core supporters form a leader’s 'intimate’ and ‘effective’ 2ones, 
comprising friends and relatives in the former and the latter being made up o f a circle o f persons 
who are im portant to him in a m ore pragmatic sense for economic and political purposes. Some 
o f these people, as Boissevain says, are strategic persons who may be useful to a leader because 
o f their own networks, through which he can gain access to friends o f his friends (1974:47-8). It 
is thus possible to depend on a small circle o f relatives and friends to extend one’s networks, 
mainly by a systematic selection o f wives from a number o f strategic groups, careful cultivation 
o f exchange ties and by keeping relations warm through the investment o f material and 
emotional resources (see Chapter Six for a more detailed discussion o f personal networking as a 
political strategy). In this way, the various factions within Raembka, Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta can 
be seen as personal networks. In Raembka, for example, men such Parua Kuril, Goimba K ot and 
Matrus Mel are at the centre o f their personal networks through which they attempt to influence 
activities around them. Factions such as Tepuka (I)’, Tepuka IP, ‘Kawelka’ and ‘Kentpi-Nelka, 
etc.’ can therefore be viewed as personal networks o f these men inasmuch as their realm o f 
influence spreads unevenly throughout these groups. This interpretation is valid for both Pipilka 
and Welyi-Kuta.
F igure 3.4: R aem bka factions and  key players
N ote: All population figures are from the 1990 National Population Census (For a more detailed population data
on Dei tribes and the reliability o f National Statistical Office (NSO) data from the 1990 Census, see 
A ppendix IT, see also Table 3A  and explanatory notes).
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F igure 3.5: P ipilka factions and  key players
PIPILK A
K O PI NOKPA REM D I ROKLAKA KIMKA
The Kopi are The Nokpa are Remdi is yet another The Roklaka are The Kimka are
split across the also split across group that is split traditionally in close
Hagen-Dei an electoral across an electoral paired with the association with
electoral border. border between border, between Mul Kimka and are Remdi (with
Those in Hagen, Nebilyer and and Dei. But those in currently in a whom  they
also known as Anglimp. The Mul are not part o f military alliance share territory)
Kum Kopi, are Nokpa leaders, the Pipilka; only those with Remdi and and their pair-
paired with Michael Mel and in D ei are. And the Kimka- Their partner,
Nokpa, while his elder key players are key players are Roklaka. Their
those in D ei are brother, Peter Puklma Kopi and the current D ei key players are
closely Warna, are the Henry Tiki, w ho are MP, Puri Ruing Mount Hagen
associated with a key players in business rivals, his mentor, Pirn lawyer and
Raembka the Kopi- Councillor Koi Ranpi Koldopi, and businessman,
faction. There is Nokpa faction. and Willie Wundaki, Councillor D ot Simon Nurum,
a small faction, both unsuccessful Roltmga. and Councillor
led by Andrew candidates in national Kumi Krai.
Konts, which is 
opposed to that 
led by Michael 
Mel.
elections.
Note: Population data for Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes are given in Table 3.3 (see also Table 3.4), while
figures for Kopi-Nokpa pair o f  tribes were not readily available to me at the time o f  writing. Owing to 
multiple residency —  in Nebilyer, Hagen and Angjimp districts —  it was difficult to determine the Census 
Division in which file Kopi-Nokpa pair were enumerated during the 1990 census. However, an estimated 
combined population o f  2,500 persons for the Kopi-Nokpa in 1997 would not be unreasonable.
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3*6: W elyi-K uta factions and  key players
The registered business groups, which bear the same names, are discussed in the next chapter. 
But it should be noted here that the faction leaders mentioned above played dom inant roles in 
the creation o f these businesses, which they now control. Individuals such as Parua Kuri and 
Goim ba K ot (in Raembka), Michael Mel (in Pipilka), Melchior Pep, Pati Wamp and Sapom Kipa 
(in Welyi-Kuta) launched their business and political careers by manipulating these networks. 
The next generation o f leaders such as Matrus Mel (m Raembka), Simon Nurum and Henry Tiki 
(in Pipilka), and Pun Kaip and Wikai Membi (in Welyi-Kuta) are attempting to do the same, 
thereby resulting in rifts within the coalitions, a significant point to which I shall return in the 
next chapter, after first briefly discussing the military dimension o f political allegiances in the Dei 
Council political field.
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The Dei Council Field o f Political Com petition
The D ei Council field o f  com petition covers the entire national parliament electorate o f Dei 
O pen, which had a population o f  some 41,842 resident citizens in 1990 (NSO 1993:5). In the 
D ei Council area, as in other parts o f Hagen, there are clearly established alliance networks, 
through which military assistance is sought and given in warfare, and nowadays arrangements for 
support in elections and business developm ent corporations are organised along these same 
broad lines. This political field and the constituent alliances are schematised in Figure 3.7\ There 
are at least 28 tribes o r teklaep operating within the Dei Council field o f political competition, 
constantly com peting but sometimes cooperating with each other to form large blocs in arenas 
such as business, elections and warfare. Table 3.4 contains population data for 25 Dei tribes. The 
variation in size o f groups is again emphasised here by the population data, a major contributing 
factor in the degree o f  cohesion within groups. As evident in the case studies on warfare and 
elections (Chap.5-8), laige groups tend to split quite predictably along structural lines whilst 
smaller ones form  into alliances in order to match bigger rivals.
Some o f  these groups have organised themselves into large coalition-style alliances such as those 
m entioned in the previous section (Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta). W ithin these loosely 
organised coalitions are the core groups, whose membership is based on traditional military 
alliances, and which are currently in close association. In this section, I discuss these 
predominantly military blocs and the way they organise themselves in relation to other similar 
groups, thus emphasising the political cleavages within them, and make some general remarks 
about their proclaimed allegiances —  and opposition —  towards each other and the larger 
coalitions to which they belong.
However, it should be noted that my discussion is a simplified version o f what is otherwise a 
very complex situation. It is primarily based on informants’ perceptions o f contemporary 
relations between the various groups. It is possible that such perceptions may have been largely 
influenced by recent events rather than historical relations, although this means that what is 
given here is a fairly accurate assessment o f contemporary Dei politics (see Chapter Five and 
Chapter Seven for some historical discussions). Furthermore, the field o f military cooperation 
between the groups sketched below (see Figure 3.7) is taken from the context o f recent conflicts 
(see Chapter Five) and therefore should not be viewed as a permanent arrangement, as the 
patterns o f alliance and enmity are bound to  shift in future as the goals and interests o f the key 
players change.
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Figure 3.7: T he D ei Council field o f political com pétition and alliances
fi/paraka (major warfare) disjunction
Traditional Pairing
In current military alliance
Likely to support a candidate 
sponsored by an ally in 1997
>  May shift allegiance in 1997
In close association with each 
other
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T able 3.4: T ribes o f D ei: population  data
No. Tribe 1966' 1979* 19903 1997 est.
1 Minembi 2 8 1 3 ' 3596 4609 7000
2 Tepuka 2419 2575 3351 5000
3 Kombukla 1542 2262 2939 4000
4 Welyi 1224 1476 I 3109 3500
5 Kentpi 1196 2040* 5158* ' 5000*
6 Remdi 1196s 988 587* 20006
7 Kawelka 860 1631 41687a 4500^
8 Roklaka 744 781 N ot counted 1500
9 Kopi 711 514 964 1500
10 Kimka 388 600 936 1200
11 Kumungaka 368 514 374* 1000
12 Nelka 364 770 1116 1500 '
13 Waklupka 348 N ot counted 10158 1000
14 Prandike 252 with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi
15 Gulke with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi
16 Punti with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi
17 DaPf _________ with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi
18 Mungapka with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi with Kentpi
19 Klamakae 241 581 335* 1500
20 Kiklpukla 130 with Remdi with Remdi with Remdi
21 Mapkle with Tepuka with Tepuka with Tepuka with Tepuka
22 Palke with Tepuka with Tepuka with Tepuka with Tepuka
23 Epilkae N ot counted N ot counted N ot counted N ot counted
24 Dakapkae N ot counted N o t counted N ot counted N ot counted
25 Ndilika 68 with Remdi with Remdi with Remdi
Total 16,464 18,328 28,662 40,200
Notes and Sources:
1. Based on A.J. Strathem (1966b).
2 . Data from Western Highlands Provincial Data System (NSO 1982).
3 . Data from 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993).
4. Including Prandike, Gulke, Dapi, Mungapka and Punti tribes.
5. Including the Mul-based ‘Upper Remdi’ section.
6 . Including the small Kiklpukla and Ndilika groups.
7. Including som e Tepuka, Poiyaka-Aiyaka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk.
8. Including 401 Roklaka ‘Nu Por pei’ who are sometimes paired with the Waklupka.
•  * Suspected underenumeration during the 1990 Census. In the case o f  <Ix>wer Remdi’, for example, it is 
unlikely that the population had significantly decreased from 988 persons in 1979 to 587 in 1990. The opposite, 
however, is believed to have occurred, hence my conservative estimate o f  2,000 persons in 1997. The same 
would be true for both Kumungaka and Klamakae populations. In fact, underenumeration is suspected in all 
groups, a point which was raised by N SO  itself. Owing to operational difficulties involved in the 1990 census, it 
was suggested that “more case o f  omission and duplication is likely to have occurred during the 1990 Census 
than during the 1980 Census”, and “in the case o f  the Western Highlands Province, omission has almost 
certainly been far more extensive than duplication” (NSO 1994:9). It should also be noted that “the entire 
Rural Sector o f  Western Highlands Province was enumerated using the Tine-up’ system o f enumeration. In the 
absence o f  PDS data, coverage must have suffered” (NSO 1994:10). The extent o f  underenumeration, 
however, is not known mainly because o f  “unreliable results o f  the Post Enumeration Survey which was carried 
out in 1991”, thus, “comparison o f  1980 and 1990 data should be made with the utmost caution” (NSO  
1994:10).
•  Population figures for six small tribes have not been included here: (1) the small Rulna resident Mapkle-Palke 
tribe-pair, which may have been enumerated together with the Tepuka Jikimbo-Wanyembo clan-pair, (2) the 
Baiyer residents Epilkae-Dakapkae tnbe-pair, which had a combined population o f  only 138 persons in 1966
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(A.J. Strathem 1966b); (3) the small Dapi tribe which has almost been incorporated into the Kentpi; and the 
‘Kopon Mungapka tribe who reside in the Jimi valley. Also missing are the little-known Jimi Valley-based 
Oklmoni and the Kimil-based Opei who operate mainly within the Dei political field but are administratively 
part o f the N orth Wahgi electorate.
•  Rural Non-Village Census Units (such as plantations, small stations and schools) have not been included in the 
local population data because many o f these contain predominantly migrant populations (originally from other 
provinces). However, it is important to take note o f such populations, especially in instances where the migrant 
populations are in a patron-client relationship with their hosts. In such situations, migrant populations often 
vote with their hosts and may even support them in war, as in Remdi’s case with Simbu and Enga migrants at 
Gumanch Plantation (see Case 1 in Chapter Fivi).
Apart from their military functions, these blocs also operate in other arenas o f competition and 
cooperation, notably elections. Some questions worth considering here are; W hat is the 
historical basis for traditional pairing? Are they in a current military alliance? Are they in close 
association? Are they likely to support an election candidate sponsored by a military ally? A 
further question worth raising here would be whether o r not there was a shift in allegiances o f 
allied groups during the 1997 national elections. Some o f these questions will be considered in 
the context o f recent warfare between a confederacy o f two such blocs in a ‘fight-partnership’ 
against a common enemy bloc (1986-1990), and subsequent reparation payments during 1990­
1996 and the 1997 national election.
Figure 3.7 (above) is based on the traditional division between the Tepuka-Kawelka pair o f tribes 
and the Kombukla-M nembi. It was precisely along this major rift that serious fighting  broke out 
at the end o f 1986 (see A J. Strathem 1993:236; see also Chapter Five). The Dei Council area is 
divided into three provincial government constituencies —  Gumanch, Mala-Kinjibi and Kotna- 
Tiki. The later —  or more precisely, activities within it —  form the central focus o f analysis in 
Chapter Seven. The following are predominantly military alliances which operate within (and out 
of) these constituencies.
The Tepuka-K aw elka P a ir
The Tepuka-Kawelka see themselves as traditional rivals o f the Kombukla-Minembi in warfare, 
business and elections. Theirs is a traditional pairing, based on military alliance and exchange 
relations, dating back to pre-colonial times (see Chapter Five and Chapter Seven; see also A.J. 
Strathem 1971:64-6). In fact, it is evident in the Kawelka origin-myth that the alliance has its 
roots in a marriage between a Kawelka ancestor and a Tepuka woman. As indicated by A.J. 
Strathem (1972:40), it is a generalised alliance o f great importance in warfare, current marriage 
patterns, land use, and ceremonial exchange. This alliance was later extended into commercial 
enterprise and elections in the 1970s and early 1980s, largely through the initiatives o f the former 
D ei MP, Parua Kuril, him self the son o f a woman bom  into the m ost numerous Kawelka clan,
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Membo. The Tepuka-Kawelka, o r more precisely the Tepuka half o f the pair, have dominated 
D ei electoral politics since 1972 —  either as members o f parliament (MP) or the provincial 
assembly (MPA) —  through Parua Kuri, MP (1972-87) and his son, Reuben Parua (MP, 1993­
1997), in Dei O pen electorate, and Kuma Rokla (MPA, 1980-1984) and Kar Kil (MPA, 1984­
1994) in the Kotna-Tiki constituency o f Dei (see Chapter Fight for more information on these 
leaders).
Recently, however, the alliance has been considerably undermined by certain events and the 
conflicting roles and ambitions o f some leaders. The strength o f the alliance between the Tepuka 
and Kawelka tribes began to falter during the mid 1980s. A less than successful occasion in 1984 
when Parua Kuri’s clansmen repaid a ceremonial gift o f pigs and money (ntoka) to the Kawelka 
heralded this decline, which was hastened by a tragic event in 1988 when a young Membo man 
was killed in Port Moresby by a fellow clansman o f the politician (see A J. Strathem 1993:50; 
Ketan 1996:256; see also Chapter Seven for further discussion on Parua Kuri’s moka, and Chapter 
Fight for a more detailed discussion o f this incident and its political implications). O ne o f a new 
breed o f fearless leaders in gun warfare, his death was considered a major set-back to the 
Kawelka war effort against the Minembi. As A.J. Strathem says, this untoward event split the 
alliance, and even after a large compensation payment o f hundreds o f pigs and K12,000 cash 
had been made, relations were still shaky:
There was suspicion that the death was not an accident but might have been planned.
The Kawelka people at home in Mount Hagen had been involved for some years in 
bitter fighting with long-established enemies within Dei, and there was a feeling that the 
MP had not given them support but had rather attempted to gain favour with die more 
numerous enemies as a part of electoral manoeuvring. (All this was unsubstantiated 
rumour, but it affected people’s attitudes). Guns had been introduced in this war and 
the enemies held the better weapons. It happened that the Membo youth killed in 
Moresby was one of a new generation o f fighters with guns and his removal was 
regarded as giving an advantage to the Kawelka’s prime enemies. Previously, in 1987, 
the politician had lost the parliamentary election to a rival from the opposing bloc 
within Dei. Relationships that had held since the 1960s were now being shattered in all 
directions (1993:50).
For further discussion o f these matters, see also Chapter Six on electoral m anoeuvring Chapter - 
Seven for discussion on Tepuka-Kawelka relations in the context o f the 1992 and 1997 elections; 
and Chapter Fight for discussion on the circumstances surrounding the death o f the Membo 
youth in Port Moresby. Parua Kuri’s election defeat in 1987, which was replicated by his son 
Reuben Parua’s loss in 1992, are widely regarded as a direct consequence o f Kawelka’s 
withdrawal o f support This situation is further complicated by the political aspirations o f a 
form er deputy premier o f W estern Highlands Province, William Pik, himself a Kawelka 
Kundm bo clansman. Pik and Melchior Pep have been, and possibly still are, friends (though 
they both contested the Dei Open seat in 1997). Although Pik assisted Pep to secure some
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Kawelka votes (mainly from Pik’s Kundmbo clan) during both the 1987 and 1992 national 
elections, he him self entered the race in 1997, perhaps believing that he had become strong 
enough to defeat Pep and Parua (see Chapter Fight for a more detailed analysis o f Pik’s social 
networks vis-a-vis Pfep and other key players in the Dei political field).
W hilst personal networks between the Tepuka and Kawelka have not been severed by these 
events, corporate relations between the Tepuka and Kawelka appear, at best, shattered, if  not 
hostile. The traditional military alliance between the two group seems to have been temporarily 
suspended, as the Kawelka are now in a military alliance with a group described here as the 
T iki Alliance, comprising Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae groups. Furthermore, they are not likely 
to support each other in elections, as they both sponsored candidates in opposition to each 
other during the 1997 election and are understandably bitter not necessarily over their defeat by 
the Roklaka candidate, Pun Ruing but towards each other for jeopardising their chances. Thus, 
in post-polling violence, they both expressed their anger and frustration at each other rather than 
at Puri Ruing’s supporters.
The Kom bukla-M inem bi P air
The Kombukla-Minembi are a numerically powerful pairing based on traditional military 
alliance. They compete against the Tepuka-Kawelka pair in major warfare, business enterprise 
and national elections. Although potentially a very powerful political force, neither Minembi nor 
Kombukla leaders have been able to mobilise support for a combined effort in either warfare or 
elections. There is no doubt that if the pair o f tribes had fought wars or contested elections in a 
concerted manner, they would have won quite easily. But they have mostly assisted each other at 
the level o f their constituent clans rather than as a unified grouping during warfare, and have 
consistently endorsed candidates against each other in elections.
Part o f the problem is that Minembi, being a large tribe, is quite fragmented, with memories that 
m ost o f its constituent clans fought each other in pre-colonial warfare. As well, the Minembi are 
split across a provincial constituency boundary: one half o f Minembi belong to Gumanch 
constituency while the other are part o f the Kotna-TikL The division does not even follow 
structural lines. Instead, it is based on residential grounds. The Minembi clans who live within 
the Kotna-Tiki constituency are called Komonga Mandong Minembi (The Minembi who live down 
there on the other side o f the mountain5) whilst those in Gumanch call themselves Komonga 
Rondong Minembi (The Minembi who live up here on this side o f the mountain5).22 The mountain
Komonga Mandong Minembi comprises the Kimbo, Elyipi, some Papeke, Ruprupkae, Komonkae and 
Engambo clans who live in and around Tiki, whilst Komorga Rondong Minembi is largely made up o f the 
Nambkae, Ropke, Napakae and Mimfee clans who live in territories at Keraldung Moga, Kuta-Kori and 
Kumbunga (compare with segmentary structure given in Appendix 1).
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is in reference to the Miti range which divides the Gumanch valley from the Muka and Baiyer 
valleys.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that Minembi’s principal allies, the Kombukla 
and Welyi tribes, are also split across the same boundary, with Kombukla operating in Gumanch 
and Welyi in Kotna-TikL The Welyi have traditionally supported the Kombukla in pre-colonial 
warfare and later in elections against the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, but some o f them have recently 
shifted allegiances towards Reuben Parua in 1993. However, a large section o f the Welyi remain 
aligned with Melchior Pep and his Kombukla tribe, whilst a few (perhaps between 200-300) are 
believed to have voted for Reuben Parua in 1997. Relations between Minembi and Welyi are less 
certain. They may assist each other in warfare on an individual basis and largely in a non- fighting 
capacity, but it seems very unlikely that they would support candidates sponsored by either side 
in future elections. Even at the provincial level, they have opposed each other, as evident in 
ChapterEight. ^
The traditional military alliance between the Kombukla and Minembi is still valid at least at the 
dan  level, which means that a particular Kombukla dan may assist a neighbouring Minembi clan 
in warfare (and possibly elections), depending o f course on the degree o f warmth in the relations 
between them  and a factor described by Burton (1989a272) as ‘social propinquity’ (affinal and 
exchange system ties become im portant when lain fails to guide warriors and voters in their 
choice). Military cooperation at the tribal level, however, seems unlikely since they both have 
recently fought wars independently o f each other (though some assistance was given on an 
individual basis). Similarly, it seems unlikdy that they will support candidates sponsored by one 
o r the other pair-partner. A tradition (since 1972) o f opposing each other in elections was 
continued in 1997 when Kombukla and Minembi each sponsored candidates in opposition to 
each other. It is widely believed that a large number o f Minembi and possibly some Kombukla 
voters shifted allegiance to the Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruing, thus enabling his relatively small 
group to triumph over numerically stronger rivals.
The T iki Alliance (Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae)
The alliance being described here as the ‘Tiki Alliance’ is a fairly recent formation, based on their 
common military alliance with the Kawelka in a recent war fought against the Minembi during 
1986-1990 (see Chapter Five). They also share some territories at Tiki in the Baiyer Valley and 
operate mainly in the Kotna-Tiki constituency o f Dei. The Tiki Alliance, together with the 
Kawelka, were thus in a ‘fight-partnership’ with a similar bloc, described here as the ‘Gumanch 
Alliance’ (see below), in their war effort against the Kombukla-Minembi bloc. The dans in the 
Tiki Alliance, although currently in a military alliance with only the Kawelka half o f the Tepuka- 
Kawelka pair, are likely to  either individually (as individual men) or collectively (as members o f
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each dan) support candidates sponsored by either the Tepuka or the Kawelka. However, in 
1997 it is believed that a large majority o f the Kimbo and Klamakae vote went to the Kawelka 
candidate, William Pik, while some Kopi voted for the Tepuka candidate, Reuben Parua. An 
explanation for dais may be found in (1) Tepuka’s decision not to assist Kawelka and the Tiki 
Alliance in the late 1980s war against the Minembi; and (2) the subsequent reparation payments 
o f 300 pigs made by the Kawelka to the Tiki Alliance for men lost while assisting Kawelka 
during the war (see Chapter Five, see also discussion in the concluding chapter o f the thesis). Only
dose Kopi relatives within Reuben’s m other’s natal clan are believed to have remained loyal to 
him.
The Gumanch Alliance (Kimka-Roklaka-Remdi)
W hat I have labelled the ‘Gumanch Alliance’ is in fact the core o f the Pipilka Coalition which 
operates mainly within the Gumanch Constituency o f Dei Council. It is a traditional alliance, 
founded on historical military cooperation. The Kimka-Roklaka are paired and whilst historically 
have been dosely associated with the Remdi (with whom they share some territories near the 
Muglamp station), relations between them have not been particularly good in recent times. 
Despite their cooperation in warfare and a large reparation payment o f 1,000 roasted pigs made 
by the Remdi to their Kimka-Roklaka allies in 1994 for losses sustained in war, they compete 
against each other in elections. The Kimka-Roklaka sponsored their own candidate to oppose 
Remdi candidates in 1992 and 1997 elections as well as a by-election in 1993. The rdationship 
between the Kimka-Roklaka and Remdi is quite complex, the details o f which are given in 
Chapter Seven (see also Chapter Nine).
The North-Eastern Confederacy (Kumungaka-Kentpi-Nelka-Waklupka-Prandike)
W hat is described here as the ‘North-Eastern Confederacy’ is a constellation o f relatively small 
tribes in the Mala-Kinjibi Constituency o f Dei Council. It is not an alliance but a loose 
association o f groups who sometimes cooperate with each other and at other times oppose each 
other in arenas o f competition such as elections. While they have cooperated in major warfare 
against other similar confederates, they have also fought against each other in minor warfare. 
They are likely to support a candidate sponsored by Tepuka rather than Kawelka because o f 
Tepuka’s historical military alliance with the Kentpi. But with Parua Kuri out o f the picture, it is 
no t clear whether they would vote for Reuben Parua because o f their traditional ties with Kuri 
and his group. In 1997, as in 1992, the Waklupka are believed to have pledged allegiance to the 
Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruing, because o f their close association with the “Nu Por Pei” section 
o f the Roklaka who live with them at Penda. The Kumungaka-Kentpi pair o f tribes, with 
Prandike who are dosely associated with Kentpi, had a home candidate in 1997, while Nelka is 
believed to have split between the Kombukla candidate, Melchior Pep, and the Tepuka
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candidate, Reuben Parua. The Nelka have since the 1970s been closely associated with Reuben 
Parua s Tepuka Keitipi clan, both groups being core members o f the Raembka alliance. Yet in 
recent years Melchior Pep has developed strong ties with a section o f the Nelka through 
association with a former W estern Highlands provincial assembly member, John Moka, who 
him self contested the 1993 Dei Open By-Election when Pep was ineligible. John Moka, 1ik<* 
Matrus Mel and William Pik before 1997, is almost in a clientage relationship with Melchior Pep 
as patron and therefore could not contest against Pep in 1997.
A Comparable Bloc in the Hagen Central Area: A Confederacy o f Kinjika-Yam ka, Elti- 
Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka interests
By way o f comparison, the confederacy-type alliance system in Hagen Central area (also known 
as Hagen Open electorate), however, is slightly different As will be shown in Chapter Six, there 
are a num ber o f party-aligned interest groups at work, each led by prominent and powerful 
individuals. M ost o f these are loosely organised coalitions, with vague historical roots, suggesting 
that they are very recent formations serving the political aspirations o f certain individuals. The 
power-base o f the M ount Hagen Open MP since 1987, Paul Pora, is made up o f one such 
coalition. His relatively small Kinjika-Yamka group, having realised that it cannot compete 
effectively against either Jika o r Mokei groups, has made a pact with two other smaller tribe- 
pairs, the Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka to share out political offices and leadership roles. 
According to Yamka informants23, under the agreement reached between leaders o f these 
groups in the late 1980s, the Kinjika-Yamka pair, through Paul Pora, would hold onto the 
Hagen Open seat, the Elti-Penambi (through Kingal Kuikuri) would keep the Kwi Constituency 
seat in the provincial assembly, and the Kemi-Kukilka (through Bishop Sanangke) would retain 
the presidency o f the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG, Hagen District).
In light o f recent developments —  notably Kingal Kuikuri’s loss to Kinjika candidate, James 
Kond, in January 1995 and the abolition o f all provincial governments in July 1995 —  it is fair to 
say that leaders o f this coalition may encounter some difficulties in keeping it together as a 
cohesive unit. The Elti-Penambi pair are m ost likely to perceive Kuikuri’s election defeat in 1995 
as directly resulting from the Kinjika-Yamka pair’s failure in not keeping their end o f the bargain. 
Future elections can be viewed as an ideal test for its leaders and Paul Pora in particular. 
However, the 1997 election results confirmed a widely held view that Pora had done enough in 
Hagen to  retain his seat, despite a direct challenge from his former National Party colleague and 
Anglimp-South Wahgi MP (1987-1992), Michael Mel, who opted to contest the Hagen Open
The information on the agreement between the Kinjika-Yamka, Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka coalition 
was given to me in January 1995 by John Puk and members o f the Atenga family o f Tega village, Mount 
Hagen.
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seat Pora had previously retained his seat during a ‘supplementary* election in August 1987 (held 
some six weeks after die dose o f  polling in the main national dection period, 13 June to 4 July),
despite a challenge from a PDM -endorsed Kinjika candidate, Terema Rumints (see Burton 
1989a).
Conclusion
A major aim o f this chapter has been to establish the various levels in which local groups 
organise themselves for political purposes. The different types o f groups discussed here cover a 
wide range o f possibilities —  from the m ost minimal units such as families and lineages to 
progressively more indusive levels such as clans, sub-dans, tribes and coalitions —  all o f which 
are in competition with each other as well as with the PNG state for the allegiances o f individual 
citizens. The corporate nature o f political competition will become evident in the subsequent 
chapters o f this thesis.
This final section o f the chapter has a dual purpose: firstly to summaries the main points o f the 
chapter; and secondly to highlight some salient features o f social organisation in Hagen sodety 
in order to situate the discussions in the succeeding chapters. I now turn to some important 
points raised in this chapter.
Sliding Degree o f Identity and Loyalty
There are progressively more inclusive levels o f group membership, identity, and loyalty. In 
many cases, an individual has little choice: on the one hand is the group into which a person is 
bom  to , whilst on the other hand, there is a wide range o f administrative groups. It is, for 
example, nowadays not uncommon for a person to think o f himself as first a member o f a 
particular lineage or sub-clan, clan, tribe, then as belonging to a particular census division, 
constituency, electorate, and finally province, region and nation. It should be noted here that 
there is a tendency towards a progressively declining level o f loyalty as one moves away from the 
family, or what Boissevian calls “Ego’s personal cell”, which is “usually composed o f his dosest 
relatives and possibly a few o f his intimate friends” in whom “he invests a great deal o f his 
material and emotional resources” (1974:47). This sliding level o f loyalty is reflected in a 
statement made by a senior UPNG academic, Jo Mangi, which is worth quoting here in full:
W hen I am  in  the village I  am  know n as Tum be, the son o f M angi o f the K ondi 
W im ans E nduk K anem  lineage and I identify m yself as such. In  the rmd-W ahgi area I 
am  a  K ondika. In  the W estern H ighlands I  am  a Jiwaka (acronyms o f Jim i, W ahgi,
Kambia). In  o ther parts o f the H ighlands I am  a W estern Highlander. In  o ther parts o f 
d ie country I am  a H ighlander. W hen I  am  overseas I am  a Papua N ew  Guinean. This is 
my perception o f m y identity and I proudly adhere to  i t  I f  som eone was to  ask m e as to  
w here my loyally laid this is the answer they w ould get and it is in  the order presented 
above (M angi 1992:124).
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Personally revealing as it might be, this is an im portant statement about individual identity and 
loyalty in Papua New Guinea. As will be shown in the succeeding chapters, the PNG state, in 
comparison with the kin-group, comes a poor second when it comes to individual allegiances, 
thereby cleady emphasising the fundamental questions o f competing legitimacies between state 
and society; o f  parallel moral worlds, as expressed through the Hagen notion o f <us-versus- 
them ; and o f the familiar and, therefore reliable source o f physical and emotional security, 
versus the alien and sometimes unpredictable entity known as the state.
Nevertheless, what is also evident in the Hagen case studies is that group membership does not 
automatically translate into support for group events, either in the form o f military assistance in 
warfare, or by way o f votes in elections. It is often the case that there is greater internal cohesion 
within smaller tribes/clans than there is in large ones. The sub-units o f smaller groups tend to 
cooperate more frequently than those in large ones mainly for pragmatic reasons such as 
survival But what is common to all Hagen groups is that they all value the ‘name-must-not-go- 
down’ principle. It is this particular principle which has kept Hagen tribes together, despite 
major rifts within them. It has also kept the remnants o f groups decimated by pre-colonial 
warfare from losing their tribal identities completely through the process o f incorporation into 
more powerful groups.
Factors determining group composition, solidarity and continuity
The hame-must-not-go-down* principle is a major factor in the composition, recruitment, 
solidarity and continuity o f Hagen groups, a significant point which I think has been neglected 
by Highlands observers, particularly by those in search o f evidence to support the so-called 
African models and also by proponents o f the exchange model. While the principles o f descent, 
ascent, and exchange may be factors in group solidarity, they cannot adequately account for 
variations in group structure and recruitment patterns in Hagen and elsewhere in the PN G  
Highlands. But this Hagen notion o f the ‘name’ can help us to understand the reasons behind 
the actions o f leaders in building up their numbers through the recruitment o f non-agnates, in 
mobilising support for corporate activities such as business, elections and warfare.
The case studies on Hagen political competition highlight the m ost fundamental characteristics 
o f groups: that all groups are ultimately created to serve certain functions and in some instances 
to achieve specific goals; and that all groups are shifting in nature, in a constant state o f flux and 
wane, as old members are lost (via death, marriage and outward migration) and replaced by new 
ones (via births, marriage and inward migration). In light o f this evidence, one may ask whether 
there was any great value in the debate on descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory.
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Leaden as ‘engineers* in the ‘construction* and maintenance o f pow er blocs
An im portant point w orth emphasising here is that it is the political elites (men such as Michael 
Mel, Parua Kuri and Melchior Pep), not the mass o f the population, that initially define the 
political agenda. Such an argument is very similar to one made by Marina Ottaway, an observer 
o f African politics, who recently remarked:
As m any studies have show n, in A frica the em otional allegiance o f m ost people is no t 
directed originally to  the group th at politicians choose to  define as the nation, o r tribe.
T he O rom o L iberation F ron t in  E thiopia does n o t build on  a prim ordial sense o f 
affinity am ong all O rom os. I t is leaders, n o t prim ordial attachm ent, that define the 
boundaries o f  O rom ia. Popular sentim ent is usually created by the political agenda o f 
the leaders, n o t vice versa, bu t once it is unleased, it becom es very real (Ottaway 
1995:243).
The role o f leadership in the construction and maintenance o f local groups and coalitions have 
also been noted by other African observers. Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothchild, while 
commenting on the fluidity o f the ethnic group, its lack o f homogeneity and cohesiveness, 
concluded that “it is less than accurate to characterise the ethnic groups on the African continent 
as having a fixed, centuries-old, primordial consciousness” (1988:102). They further noted that:
A m ong such peoples as the Sukuma in  w hat is now  Tanzania, the Sara o f Chad, die 
Y oruba and Igbo o f  N igeria, the Kikuyu and Luhya o f  Kenya, the N goni and Plateau 
Tonga o f Zam bia, and the K aram ojong o f  Uganda, there were affinities based upon co­
residence in  a region and upon similarities o f culture, traditions, and legal and econom ic 
practices. H ow ever, an awareness o f  the group as a distinct entity in  relationship to  
o ther cultural groups rem ains a relatively recent phenom enon. In  fact, the process o f 
ethnic self-definition occurred in  the short tim e span that it did because o f the im pact 
o f  colonial interventions and the intense com petition over pow er, status, econom ic 
resources, and the social services happening during the late colonial and post-colonial 
periods (1988:103).
There are im portant distinctions between the Hagen coalitions described in this study and those 
African ethnic groups mentioned above. A major difference is in size: African ethnic groups 
num ber tens o f thousands while Hagen groups have an average population o f only a few 
thousand, with a range o f 200-20,000 persons. Yet, the prominent role o f leaders in the creation 
o f groups and the tendency to embrace as many groups as possible is a common trait in Hagen, 
in Africa, and indeed in many other human societies throughout the w orld In fact, it is fair to 
say that by increasing membership to the various levels o f social organisation, leaders such as 
Michael Mel, Paul Pota and Paias Wingti become political ‘engineers’ in the ‘construction’ and 
‘maintenance’ o f political blocs. Some salient features o f Hagen social organisation should 
illustrate some o f the points raised here.
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Salient Features of Hagen Social Organisation 
Nam ed groups as points o f reference
A salient feature o f Hagen society is that named groups are crucial for reference —  the tribe 
being the m ost inclusive category (see A.M. Strathem 1975). Others have made similar 
observations (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1971; 1972; Burton 1988; O ’Hanlon 1989; Medan 
and Rumsey 1991; Mangi 1992; Muke 1994). There are at least 85 tribes in the Hagen cultural- 
linguistic area (see Appendix IT ). Names o f individuals are often contextually prefixed with their 
tribe o r dan names. In inter-tribal activities, for instance, tribal names may be used. Personal 
names such as Raphael D oa (of the Mokei Nambka line), Parua Kuri (of the Tepuka Keitipi line) 
and Paias Wingri (of the Jika Mukaka line) thus become Mokei Doa, Tepuka Kuri and Jika 
Wingti. Likewise, in intra-tribal activities, clan names are appropriate: Nambka Doa, Keitipi 
Parua and Mukaka Paias, which indicate a sliding degree o f identity and loyalty.24
Tribe-pairs
A  second feature o f Hagen society is that m ost— but not all— Hagen tribes are paired, which, 
as noted by Burton (1989a:256), direcdy corresponds to the way the natural world is structured, 
with almost all plant and animal species being named in pairs. Greater solidarity supposedly 
exists between pair partners than between either o f them and other allies, and sometimes the 
linkage between a pair o f tribes is supported by an origin myth associating the first ancestors o f 
the two tribes (see A.J. Strathem 1971:19; A .M  Strathem 1975:432). But in practice, this is not 
always the case. For instance, when a group migrates to a new area, it is likely to lose its original 
pairing and develop another with one o f its new neighbours, which means that the new pairing 
may no t be supported by a myth (see A.J. Strathem 1971:19). The functions o f pairing at this 
level, as A.J. Strathem says, are also variable:
Some pairs are staunch allies, others have little to do with each other. Small tribes are 
likely to have strong pairings, if only because these were important for survival in the 
past (1971:19).
As m entioned above, size is an important factor in the degree o f cohesion or fragmentation 
within tribes and coalitions, and moreover in the degree o f ‘warmth’ between tribe-pair partners.
See Merlan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.5) for linguistic structures o f segmentary politics in the Nebilyer area; 
See also Mangi (1992:124) and Clark (1997:67) for a sliding degree o f identity and loyalty to clan, tribe and 
state. I provide a discussion on the question o f loyalty (and conflicting roles o f leaders) in Chapter Vive.
Tiagm Groupings,: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions 1 2 5
Preoccupation w ith ‘name’ and numbers
A third feature o f Hagen society is the perpetual preoccupation with ‘name’ and numbers o f a 
group. It is expressed in a myriad o f cultural expressions —  in the words o f folk songs, funeral 
laments, el ik (fight-talk’) speeches, dance formations, moka exchanges, group warfare, 
commercial enterprise and elections —  some o f which form the focus o f analysis in subsequent 
chapters. Hageners place great value on group identity, and while they realise that men make a 
group, they also know that a group makes a man. If, for instance, a girl must find a husband with 
a neighbouring tribe, her immediate kinsmen and clan brothers often make it their business to 
inquire about the potential groom. If  the future husband’s tribe is o f considerable renown, or 
has a nam e, then approval is granted. If, however, the group is o f no consequence, the girl’s 
people will register their disapproval by referring to its members as ‘men without name’ (wua mbi 
naparom), o r men o f no renown.
The preoccupation with numbers is reflected in the statements that Hagen men make in 
justification for practising polygyny. Men say that they marry more than one wife in order to 
have sons and ultimately to build up numbers for their groups. Using a plant metaphor, 
Hageners associate the birth o f sons in particular with the sprouting o f a wild banana species, 
mum, and the subsequent proliferation o f groups generally with the propagation o f a tropical 
palm called dakla (pronounced dalgd) in Melpa language.25 A group that is experiencing 
considerable growth in male population is often described metaphorically as sprouting shoots 
like round and flourishing like dakla plants.26 The preoccupation with numbers, particularly o f 
males, however, is no t unique to Hagen. In Wahgi society, for instance, O ’Hanlon (1989) 
reported that “men often express dismay at the birth o f daughters” and “make periodic demands 
that non-agnates residing elsewhere should return home to their natal clans” (1989:32).
Hagen tribes, accordingly, have grown bigger as a result o f population growth. This has led to 
problems associated with population pressure on agricultural land and marginally diminishing 
returns on investments in land-based resources (including poor yield in coffee and food-crops
25. These plants both thrive under humid tropical conditions and their proliferation rate is quite phenomenal: 
a single shoot o f either plant can multiply and colonise large tracts o f land over a relatively short period o f 
time. But the reasons why Hageners have selected these particular plants for comparison with their 
groups, I think, lies not only in the concept o f rapid proliferation, but perhaps more so in the naturally 
healthy and attractive manner in which shoots take off and proudly hold themselves up against the forces 
o f weather: solid, robust, vibrant; and above all, united —  almost like themselves, or perhaps more like 
what they would like to be!
26. Hagen courting songs provide an elegant channel through which concepts such as the roum-dakla effect 
are expressed, but they can be equally poetic, yet eloquent and forceful, in the hands o f skilful orators. In 
the words o f a particular courting song for instance, the prospective bride’s natal group is exhalted by her 
suitor: ‘T o u r people, like the round and dakla plants, have become more numerous {round melpokpa, dakla 
mel dakla neni), but I am only a small boy, with no one [behind me]. How can I deal with them [her 
people]?”
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due to impoverished, overused land). Nevertheless, Hageners, especially leaders, in attempting to 
build their support base for elections and other purposes, continue to recruit people from other 
parts o f the province and elsewhere in the Highlands. The Hagen case studies indicate that it is 
the smaller groups who actively participate in the recruitment o f non-agnates. For example, the 
Kawelka have sponsored a large number o f Poiyaka and Aiyaka migrants from Nebilyer to settle 
at Kuk. likew ise, the Remdi have taken in a large number o f Enga and Simbu migrants, who, as 
indicated in Chapter Five, have assisted the Remdi in warfare. This is quite consistent with 
observations made by other observers (Reay 1971; O ’Hanlon 1989). In N orth Wahgi, for 
example, O ’Hanlon (1989:32) noted that it was the smallest Komblo clan, Milyand, which most 
sharply augmented its size during the early 1980s by providing land for several immigrant Simbu 
families.
Alliance Systems: Some general points
A general point worth raising in any discussion on alliance systems and local group formation is 
the shifting nature o f alliances. The alliances are not fixed, though may have historical roots. As a 
direct consequence o f warfare and subsequent population movement, groups now allied to each 
other were previously involved in totally different arrangements with others geographically and 
historically removed from contemporary cases. According to historical accounts o f warfare given 
by Hagen informants, m ost groups involved in current military alliances have often fought each 
other in previous wars. Bearing in mind that Hageners make an important distinction between 
major, perpetual or traditional enemies {elparaka nmd) and m inor enemies {el namb nrna), groups 
opposed in m inor warfare may combine in major warfare (see A J. Strathem 1971:55-56; 
1972:74-75; A.M. Strathem 1975:168). This is made possible through reparation payments, 
following a general rule that one may compensate minor enemies but not major enemies for 
men killed in war (see Chapter Fiver, see also A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4; 1981:12). 
Similarly, groups opposed in provincial elections may combine in national elections and 
mobilising support from m inor enemies is much easier than from major enemies.
Secondly, despite this historical process o f shifting alliances, the present alliances o f Dei are 
relatively stable in the context o f the various arenas o f competition and cooperation analysed in 
this study. Their relative stability depends heavily on the historically military nature o f the 
alliances. But here one should be careful in dealing with historical accounts o f military alliance 
given by informants. As indicated by A.J. Strathem:
I t is possible th at the further away in  tim e the period o f endem ic w arfare becom es, the 
m ote the inform ants are likely to  simplify warfare patterns, o r to  make them  m ore rigid, 
o r to  attribute actions to  w hole groups w hich in  fact involved only certain individuals o f 
the g ro u p s... A  further danger is that inform ants may project back on to  the past 
features o f  their current political situation so that, while their ostensibly historical
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account is covertly valid for the present, it is invalid for the period which it overtly 
purports to describe (1971:54-55).
This is an important point, which requires us to ask why they make such statements. Part o f the 
answer, as indicated above, lies in individual motive and perception. Another reason for this is 
that in the absence o f reliable details o f past events, individuals are recasting history in the 
context o f contemporary relations, which does not necessarily mean that they are consciously 
manipulating information. Since each individual's perceptions are shaped by personal 
experiences and by oral accounts handed down through the generations, it is quite possible that 
the information they present is, in their view, accurate. In fact, there are only few older men, 
usually big-men and fight-leaders, who have some knowledge o f pre-colonial warfare and 
alliances, which means that for most people it is the present alliances that matter. The alliances 
described in this study are thus relatively stable insomuch as allowing us to predict where the 
rifts will occur and why some groups will cooperate in order to compete against others.
Finally, in matters regarding group affiliation and warfare vis-a-vis alliance systems, Hageners 
tend to exaggerate, at times deliberately inflating figures regarding the number o f men, groups, 
guns and so forth as part o f political strategy. In the Hagen world view, as would be the case 
elsewhere in the country and in other parts o f the world, it is always better to give others —  
including friends, enemies, potential rivals and supporters, or what ever they may be —  a clear 
impression that your group can more than hold its own against any force, militarily or otherwise. 
There are two sides to this strategy, which we may call constructive and obstructive. On the one 
hand, it is constructive in the sense that other non-aligned groups will find it attractive to 
associate with in terms o f intermarriage, moka exchange, and cooperation in business and 
elections. As for groups which belong to the same alliance as yours, the task o f securing 
assurances o f support for elections and contracting allies in warfare becomes much easier if they 
perceive strength and cohesion in your group. On the other hand, it is obstructive by way o f 
deterring potential enemy attacks. Exaggerating a group's strength is an effective way o f casting 
doubts in the minds o f enemy strategists about their own group's strength, which can protect 
the group from enemy aggression, or buy time in order to organise defences.
In this chapter I have described the major alliances in Dei, which, together with Chapter Two, 
provide important background information for Chapters 4-8, which contain case studies on the 
major arenas o f competition and cooperation in Hagen. As noted, some o f these alliances are 
nowadays mobilised in business competition and politics in state-sponsored arenas. The roles o f 
business groups will be discussed in the next chapter. Because the alliances described here are 
also registered business organisations, the division between this and the next chapter is therefore 
an artificial one forced on me to make it easier for the reader.
C h a p t e r  4
BUSINESS DEVELOPM ENT ASSOCIATIONS
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Introduction
The history o f capitalistic enterprise in this country is comparatively short Yet, it is quite 
complex and its political, economic and social implications are not yet fully understood. This 
study provides some useful insights into how people in a particular area o f Papua New Guinea 
have devised strategies to accommodate state-sponsored programmes o f commercialisation. In 
the PN G  Highlands, for instance, it has been said that people here were more ready for 
capitalism than their coastal counterparts (see Finney 1973). Although I do not subscribe to this 
theory, there is some truth in the notion that Highlanders are spirited competitors. One only 
needs to see the activities around us today to appreciate the fact that these enterprising people 
have taken over a substantial part o f the country^ economy. The coffee industry, for instance, is 
dominated by Western and Eastern Highlanders. Even the service industry in Port Moresby, 
including PMV buses, taxis, automobile service and fuel stations, real estate, and retail outlets are 
predominantly Highlands businesses. The roots o f this spirited enterprise lie in their 
sociocultural, demographic and environmental background (see Finney 1973). A glimpse o f that 
spirit will be revealed in this chapter.
The second and third chapters focused on leadership and social structure, highlighting some o f 
the major debates in the literature, to establish analytical parameters for later case studies. This 
and the next four chapters deal with major arenas o f competition and cooperation in which 
groups described in the previous chapter and their leaders operate. This chapter examines the 
major business groups in the Dei field o f political competition, and attempts to account for the 
relative successes (or lack o f it) in terms o f historical and current military and political alliances.
Also under scrutiny here are the new political actors —  superseding big-men —  who now 
appear more prominent than other types o f leaders. These new actors are the millionaire 
businessmen, their henchmen (who are themselves aspiring businessmen or politicians), and 
politicians at provincial and national levels. The chapter explores their links to local groups and 
their common appeal to local identities, highlighting the largely personalised nature o f these 
corporate business ventures and the problems that stem from this arrangement. It concludes 
with a brief critique o f Amarshi, Good and Mortimer (1979) and Donaldson and Good (1981), 
arguing that the power base o f wealthy capitalists in Hagen is the primordial community rather 
than class.
Problems of Terminology
Despite numerous studies o f ‘business development associations*, there is little agreement 
between observers on characteristics and definitions. W ithout getting involved in the debate on 
the application o f  terminology, it needs to be pointed out that ‘business development
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associations', interchangeably used as developm ent associations', equate to what R olf Gem tsen 
(1981) calls ‘dynamic community groups'. O ther descriptions are ‘community development 
associations' (Walter 1981), o r ‘self-help movements' (May 1981), o r ‘self-help development 
m ovem ents' (May 1982:21). These groups, also described as “spontaneous local movements, 
differing in their origins and specific objectives but sharing a broad concern with the 
achievement o f economic, social and political development through communal action”, were 
collectively dubbed as ‘micronationalist movements' (May 1982:1). The term ‘micronationalism' 
was introduced by May (1975) “to describe a varied collection o f movements which displayed a 
com m on tendency, at least at an ideological or psychological level, to disengage from the wider 
economic and political systems imposed by colonial rule, seeking in a sense a common identity 
and purpose, and through some combination o f traditional and modem values and 
organisational forms, an acceptable formula for their own development” (May 1982:1).
A major problem  with such a concept, as May himself may have been aware, is in its application 
—  or misapplication —  to embrace the vast differences between the various movements 
described in M icronationalist Movements in Papua New Guinea (May 1982), Inconsistencies 
and discrepancies are not confined to terminology, in that May’s description o f Pipilka as “an 
ethnic group, comprising a num ber o f clans which claim common ancestry” and numbering 
“about six thousand” (1982:21), is at odds with Standish's claim that “Michael Mel’s people at 
W urup near M ount Hagen joined with other traditional allies and formed a neo-tribe covering 
many fragmented groups in the Medlpa language area, which they called the Piblika Association” 
with “4,000 members” (1982:387, 391). The Piplka, as described in the preceding chapter, is a 
coalition-style alliance, with membership drawn from existing tribes in Dei, Anglimp, Hagen and 
Nebilyer areas. N either the registered business group, Pipilka Development Corporation, nor 
the Pipilka coalition are descent groups, nor do the principal factions —  the Kopi-Nokpa and 
the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka —  claim common ancestry. The Pipilka, as indicated in Chapter 3, 
compete with two other coalition-style alliances, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, and their principal 
field o f competition is Dei, not Hagen, Anglimp, or Nebilyer.
The registered business groups, which bear the same names, were formed by educated elites and 
local leaders from within these groups to facilitate participation in the national government's 
plantation acquisition scheme that began in the mid 1970s (A.J. Strathem 1984; Ketan 1996). 
The D ei Local Governm ent Council was instrumental in setting up these business groups. 
Councilors were encouraged by the government to mobilise resources to buy shares in 
plantations. The national government, eager to localise plantation economy, provided easy credit 
to enterprising local groups to buy these properties. Groups with traditional landownership 
rtflims over plantations were given preference, but where ownership was disputed, groups with 
adjoining territories were invited to  compete against each other. O f the individuals who played a
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prom inent role in this scheme, none was more influential than a young, energetic, forceful Parua 
Kuri, who was a m em ber o f the House o f Assembly and President o f the Local Governm ent 
Council during this time.
The business groups have also facilitated the political and economic ambitions o f certain 
individuals (Ketan 1996:249; comparable discussion in May 1981:75), a point that does no t sit 
too well w ith m ost members o f such groups. Dissension has crept in because o f the substantial 
disparities in income and living standards between the leaders who control the businesses and 
the members o f groups who are the supposed shareholders. Those who control the collective 
investments o f the associations have become extremely wealthy while those at the periphery 
have watched quietly in anger. All these groups have been plagued with problems, such as 
widespread dissension among shareholders and disruptive power struggles between leaders o f 
factions, which in one case resulted bankruptcy for the group. W hilst leaders, especially educated 
elites and politicians, have been jostling for power, the mass have been marginalised by a 
combination o f their own ignorance, feelings o f apathy and disdain, and by the dishonourable 
motives and actions o f their leaders.
The Pipilka factions, rifts and disruptive power struggles
Pipilka is probably the m ost successful business development association in Papua New Guinea. 
Michael Mel and Andrew Kei formed it in the early 1970s to take advantage o f the new 
opportunities created by the national government’s plantation acquisition scheme (see A.J. 
Strathem 1984:150). Among its first acquisitions were the W urup and Alimp South coffee 
plantations in May 1975. An expatriate planter, William M anton, built the plantations in 1958. 
W urup was established on land traditionally owned by the Kopi-Nokpa and Roni-Lati alliance, 
while Alimp South in the Nebilyer valley was built on land traditionally owned by the Kulga and 
Miliga groups. It took Michael Mel, then a student at the University o f Papua New Guinea, and 
Andrew Kei, a local magistrate, 18 months to negotiate the purchase o f the plantations, but in 
the end it was decided that the respective landowners o f Alimp and W urup take over the estates. 
As noted by Standish (1982:387), a combination o f sometimes crude, soemtimes subtle pressure 
on Highlands expatriates, as well as Michael Mel’s direct access to  the chief minister’s advisors 
through university contacts, helped overcome ministerial or bureaucratic blockages to the 
government’s acquisition o f these large coffee plantations.
The purchase o f Wurup and Alimp South were described by a PN G  Post-Courier reporter as 
“the first time in the Highlands that a plantation has been bought back by the original owners o f 
the land” (Stocker 1975:21). The government, as financier, paid K367,000 while Pipilka, as the 
purchaser, made a deposit o f  K 11,000. A t the handover ceremony in May 1975, which was 
attended by three government ministers (Thomas Kavali, Ebia Olewale and Peter Lus), the
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M inister for Lands, Thomas Kavali, gave die owner and builder o f Wurup plantation, William 
M anton, a cheque from the governm ent The Leader o f the Opposition, Tei Abel, hailed the sale 
o f the plantation as an act o f free enterprise, the sort o f thing that should continue in this 
country, while Justice Minister, Ebia Olewale, said the transaction was visible proof o f the Eight 
Point Plan in action (see Stocker 1975:21; see also Standish 1982).
Initially Pipilka had some stunning success, largely made possible by the 1975-1977 coffee 
boom. Bill Standish reported that 15 months o f extraordinarily high coffee prices enabled 
Pipilka to fully repay the government loan o f K212,000 by 31 December 1976 in addition to 
acquiring the M ount Hagen Park Motel for K225,000 (with K65,000 cash down payment with 
no need for government development bank assistance). A dividend o f 100% was paid to the 
association’s 4,000 members (Standish 1982:391, footnote).
Despite the initial success, there were problems in the direction o f the association and its 
registered company, the Pipilka Development Corporation. At the time Michael Mel told Bill 
Standish that Pipilka’s next step would be to buy urban real estate to utilise the group’s large cash 
surplus.
H ow ever, in ter d an  tensions involving Pflblika m em bers em broiling the W urup area had 
developed in  1976 and could disrupt the sm ooth operation o f the association’s 
businesses. A ttem pts were being m ade to  block the group’s expansion into M ount 
H agen tow n property ow nership and local jealousies seem to  have been aroused by the 
association’s w indfall success. By m id 1977 the W urup estates had been divided in to  
separate units com prising different clan groups (1982:391, footnote).
Initial problems arose because o f differences between Michael Mel’s Kopi-Nopka group and 
Andrew Kei’s Roni-Lati group. The Wurup plantation, as noted by Standish (quoted above), 
were split between these two groups. One observer, perhaps a little overwhelmed by the violent 
manner in which these groups sorted out their differences, conduded that Pipilka “after a 
spectacular early success appears to be in the process o f disintegration” (May 1981:73). Far from 
disintegrating, Pipilka consolidated through a common process called ‘shifting alliances’: 
dislodging from one alliance to enter into another. In this case, the Kopi-Nokpa group shifted 
away from their alliance with the Roni-Lati to form a coalition-style alliance with the Dei 
Council-based Pipilka alliance, which is a consortium o f Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka interests.
As well as the conflict with the Roni-Lati, the difficulties involved in securing real estate in 
M ount Hagen forced the Kopi-Nokpa group to look elsewhere for expansion. An explanation 
for Pipilka’s inability to enter into the Mount Hagen real estate business may be found in the 
traditional animosity with which Hagen Central groups, Jika, Mokei and Yamka, deal with 
groups from ‘peripheral’ areas. As traditional owners o f the land occupied by the township, 
Hagen Central groups feel that they have a right to deade who gets to own or control part o f
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tiie town. As evident in Chapter 6, these ‘super-tribes’ o f the Hagen Central area have been highly 
critical o f appointment o f people from other parts o f the province to key positions within the 
province and, on several occasions, have forced senior government officers to vacate their 
offices. These tribes control the real estate market in Mount Hagen. Groups from other parts o f 
the province have found it extremely difficult to buy into this lucrative business. The Kopi- 
Nokpa group, despite its prom inent role in Hagen politics1, does not have the numerical 
strength to muscle its way into the Mount Hagen real estate business.
This is where the Dei Council-based Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance comes into the equation. 
The Kopi-Nokpa thus entered into a larger alliance with the Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka groups. 
The combined forces o f Pipilka, led by Michael Mel and current company secretary Puklma 
Kopi (a Remdi Jikambo clansman), went into competition with Welyi-Kuta. As indicated in 
Chapter 5, the Pipilka ultimately acquired Gumanch coffee plantation, one o f the largest in the 
southern hemisphere, but lost out on Kugmi, an adjoining portion o f ‘undeveloped’ land, to 
prom inent Kombukla leaders, Pari Wamp and Melchior Pep, who acquired the land on behalf o f 
the Kombukla-Minembi pair. Although the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction claims traditional 
ownership over the land on which the Gumanch coffee plantation was established by an 
expatriate planter in the 1950s, their principal rivals, the Kombukla-Minembi, have always 
disputed this claim. This point was ultimately contested on the battlefield but not completely 
settled (see Chapter 5).
Pioneer coffee entrepreneur Dick Hagon first developed Gumanch, 25 kilometres northeast o f 
M ount Hagen. The 500-hectare coffee property stretches along and beyond the banks o f the 
Gumanch River. The Pipilka Development Corporation, now with more than 5,000 local 
shareholders, bought the plantation for K3 million from an exporting form, Coffee International 
Pty Ltd, in Mrach 1985. Gumanch was taken over by Coffee International Pty Ltd when then 
owners, die Collins (PNG) group went into receivership in Australia and were selling off their 
PN G  interests. Pipilka already had an interest in the property through its 18 per cent 
shareholding in Coffee International (see Times of Papua New Guinea 1985:29; Pascoe 1985:11; 
Sinclair 1995:433). The purchase, described by the media as the biggest payout by a wholly 
national company for the country’s largest plantation, marked the fruition o f a ten-year dream 
for Michael M el The Post-Courier journalist Noel Pascoe reported that Gumanch was the original *
Despite its small size, the Kopi-Nokpa pair o f tribes play a dominant role in Hagen politics mainly 
through the activities o f brothers, Peter Wama and Michael Mel —  and now Fr Robert Lak (gpvemor) 
and Thomas Webster (recently appointed administrator o f Western Highlands). Wama, a former 
administrator, Mel, a prominent businessman and former MP, and Lak, current MP, are all members of 
the Nokpa tribe while Webster, a former UPNG academic who recently completed his PhD studies at the 
University o f Bristol in England, is a ‘Kum’ Kopi tribesman.
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target for Michael Mel when he helped start Pipilka in 1975. He was still a final-year law student 
at the University o f Papua New Guinea when Pipilka began operations (Pascoe 1985ibid). At 
the time o f the takeover it was reported that Pipilka’s managing director Michael Mel was 
confident that Gumanch would start servicing its ten-year loan o f K2 million from the PNG 
Banking Corporation from the end o f that year. Moreover, at K l,900 per tonne o f coffee, 
Gumanch was expected to produce a total revenue o f K1.7 million by the end o f 1985 (Times of 
Papua New Guinea 1985:29).
By 1985 Pipilka also owned the W urup and Ulya plantations, in addition to the Hagen Park 
Motel. Gumanch was then managed by the National Plantation Management Agency (NPMA) 
for a fee o f K13,000 a m onth (Times of Papua New Guinea 1985:ibid). Michael Mel estimated that 
Pipilka, as NPMA’s biggest client, were paying NPMA K300,000 to K400,000 in fees annually. 
H e claimed that when Pipilka pulled out NPMA could not hold it together and it folded. Pipilka 
formed a grower company with other NPMA clients, called Natgrow, which is now owned 
100% by Pipilka (Michael Mel, June 1994; quoted in Sinclair 1995:432-433).
For the young elites, like Michael Mel and Puklma Kopi, the acquisition o f Wurup in 1975 and 
Gumanch in 1985 was an important step towards establishing patronage systems that would 
come to characterise interpersonal relations with clansmen later in life. They developed into 
major leaders later, but started their careers as brokers between the state and their groups. The 
same pattern is being continued by the next generation o f leaders such as Henry Tiki and Simon 
Nurum in attempting to challenge Michael Mel and Puklma Kopi’s dominance over Pipilka.
Initially diere were two major factions within Pipilka, divided according to geographical and 
political basis: the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer resident, Kopi-Nokpa faction, led by Michael 
Mel (Chairman); and die Dei Council-based Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction led by Puklma Kopi 
(Secretary). Recendy, however, the Dei Council faction divided into (1) the Remdi Jikambo clan; 
and (2) the Kimka-Roklaka pair o f tribes. The situation is further complicated by power struggles 
within die Remdi faction. It is fair to say that there is power struggle at two levels: between 
Remdi and Kimka-Roklaka (through the initiatives o f Kimka lawyer Simon Nurum and 
Councillor Kumi Krai); and within Remdi itself, between the faction led by Puklma Kopi and a 
faction led by an aspiring leader and coffee planter, Henry Tiki, and his lieutenant and adviser, 
Pora Kui, an accountant with the South Pacific Bank in Mount Hagen.
The differences between the Remdi and the Kimka-Roklaka factions has been taken on to the 
arena o f national elections, where the Kimka-Roklaka sponsored their own candidate, Puri 
Ruing, to oppose Remdi candidates, Koi Ranpi in 1992 and 1993 by-election, and Willie 
Wundaki in 1997. Whilst the underlying reasons for the rift between the Remdi and Kimka- 
Roklaka factions are detailed in the relevant parts o f the thesis (see, for example, Chapter 7), it
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should be pointed out here that Remdi political strategists gambled —  and lost —  by somewhat 
arrogantly assuming that the Kimka-Roklaka would back their candidate, Koi Ranpi, in 1992, 
despite outstanding reparation payments and alleged unpaid business dividends owed by the 
Remdi and the Pipilka Development Corporation.
The Raembka factions, rifts and disruptive power struggles
The Raembka Development Association, like Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta, was formed in the early 
1970s by then Dei MP Parua Kurt and businessman Goimba K ot who became its first nominal 
directors. By 1977 Raembka had acquired two coffee plantations, Nunga and Kinjibi 
(pronounced Kentpi), and a third, Tigi (pronounced Tiki), jointly with the Council.2 Both Kuri 
and K ot are influential leaders within the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance and they come from the same 
section o f the Tepuka tribe. Since none o f the plantations were located on land traditionally 
owned by the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, one cannot help wondering whether Kuri and K ot would 
have bothered putting together a group as large and fragmented as Raembka had they been able 
to rfairn traditional ownership at either the level o f the tribe-pair or at lower levels such as the 
tribe o r clan.
The Nunga and Kinjibi plantations, located in the upper N orth Wahgi, were established in the 
1950s by expatriate planters on land which was traditionally owned by the Nelka and Kentpi 
tribes, respectively. The traditional ownership o f the land which is now Tiki plantation in the 
Baiyer valley was never fully resolved, as the contest for territory and group prestige was frozen 
by coloniaHy-imposed pacification in the 1940s. This land was previously used as a major 
battlefield during pre-colonial warfare between the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae alliance 
versus an alliance o f mainly Minembi clans. Owing to this particularly ambiguous nature o f 
historical ownership and equally vague claims by the neighbouring groups, the land was virtually 
handed over to the expatriate planter, John Collins, by the colonial administration and later 
acquired by the Council in 1975.
Raembka Investments was incorporated as a business group in 1985. Its business activities were 
centred around Parua Kuri and Goimba Kot, both men having interests in coffee estates and 
retail shops. Raembka had some early successes, particularly through the efforts o f K ot in 
a tt^ ip tin g  to expand and diversify into areas such as automobile fuel sales and service stations, 
trade stores and supermarkets, plus coffee buying, processing and exporting. K ot built his 
business on small retail shops, beginning with the acquisition o f a Lutheran Mission-owned
2. The Tiki plantation was established in the mid-1950s by an enterprising Australian called John Collins.
According to A J. Strathem, ‘John Collins was o f a well-known business family in the Highlands and was 
sister’s son o f Danny Leahy, one o f the early Australian explorers and formers in die area. John Collins’ 
highly productive plantation in Dei Council was taken over in 1975 by the Council itself after his death” 
(explanatory footnote in A J. Strathem 1979.131).
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trade-store at K otna which he managed in the eady 1970s on behalf o f the Kotna (Lutheran 
Church) Circuit By the mid-1980s the business, exclusively under Goimba’s control, had 
developed from a small trade-store (no bigger than the size o f a street-comer ‘tuckerbox’ trailer) 
into a significant company with investments in supermarkets, coffee estates and a fleet o f Toyota 
pickups which were used mainly for roadside coffee buying.
In hindsight, it would seem that K ot probably took too much upon himself and at times juggling 
both personal and public businesses, considering his direct involvement in at least three areas, 
Raembka Investments, the Dei Development Corporation and his own coffee estates at Kotna 
and M ount Ambra. K ot ultimately lost control o f both Raembka Investments and Dei 
Development Corporation to his rivals. He lost the Chair o f the Dei Development Corporation 
in 1989 to  a younger rival, Matrus Mel, who comes from the same tribe as K ot and Kuri but 
leads a faction which acts in opposition to them in business and politics.
Despite its early successes, Raembka Investments collapsed in 1987, after much dissension and 
power struggles between the various factions. This was the year in which Parua Kuri lost the Dei 
O pen seat to Melchior Pep. As indicated above, before 1987 its business interests in addition to 
the three plantations mentioned above were: two supermarkets, one at Penga and the other in 
M ount Hagen town; the Kotna Coffee Plantation; and shares in various companies.3 Currently, 
Raembka is a dorm ant company and, as indicated in JFigure 4. /, individuals have taken control o f 
the business interests. The diagram represents the de facto, rather than de jure dismemberment o f 
Raembka, as in m ost cases the business interests were taken over by physical force.
W hilst the Nunga and Kinjibi plantations have been occupied by members o f the Nelka and 
Kentpi tribes, respectively, the future o f Tiki plantation is uncertain. As in pre-colonial times, the 
Tiki area once again became a battleground during 1986-1990 between the Minembi and an 
alliance o f Kawelka, Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae groups. Despite reports that a certain group, 
led by a Dakapkae tribesman and Holy Trinity Teachers College lecturer, Teng Wanenga, had 
shown interest in taking control o f the plantation, others claim that Tiki has almost been 
reclaimed by Muka Puklapukl, an exceptionally malevolent spirit, which is famous in the area 
and was claimed to have been responsible for the death o f the plantation’s previous owner and 
founder, John Collins.4
3. The information on Raembka Investments was given to me by Matrus Mel, the leader o f a faction 
opposed to the Kuri-Kot faction. A UPNG graduate with a combined major in Economics and 
Accounting Mel, after unsuccessfully contesting the Dei Open seat against Parua Kuri in 1982, became a 
Local Government Councillor in 1986 and subsequently in 1989 ousted Goimba K ot as Chairman o f Dei 
Development Corporation, a business arm o f the Council.
4 . According to local folktale, this particularly spiteful spirit Muka Puklapukl (named after a frog that lives in 
the Muka River) has deceived many men, including John Collins. Its modus operand involves enticing men 
to have sexual intercourse with it after transforming itself into a stunningly attractive maid. It kills men by
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Figure 4.1: T he Personalised B usiness In terests o f R aem bka
The Raimburger Supermarket in Mount Hagen town was taken over by Matrus Mel, who 
became owner-manager between March 1988 and December 1989. From January 1990, Matrus 
took control o f the Dei Development Corporation as its Chairman and left the retail shop to be 
taken over by a Kuli-based Jika Milakamb businessman. We can safely assume that Raimburger 
too has gone broke.
After the collapse o f Raembka and presumably Raimburger, our principal actors next turned 
their attention to the Dei Development Corporation. As in Raembka before its collapse in 1987, 
here too individuals contested the right to control Council-owned businesses, mostly coffee
impregnating them  with contaminated eggs, hence the swelling o f  the stomach several days before death. 
Before Collins’s arrival, Tiki and the surrounding swamps were considered by local folk to be the hom e o f  
malignant spirits like Puklapukl and were therefore avoided. Puklapukl in particular was said to have been 
angered by Collins’s clearing o f  the area and sought revenge by way o f enticem ent and impregnation with 
a dreadful disease after sexual intercourse with Puklapukl in the guise o f  a young girl. The statement that 
the Tiki plantation has alm ost been reclaimed by Muka Puklapukl’, however, can be inferred as an 
im plication o f  the plantation being in a run-down state, thus being reclaimed by the jungle and the swamp, 
conditions which suit Puklapukl (and perhaps mosquitoes?). The relationship between human settlem ents, 
malignant spirits, swamps and malaria has been m entioned elsewhere (see Ketan 1996:242; see also 
Górecki 1979; Muke 1994:56).
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estates. A bitter pow er struggle between factions saw Matrus Mel wrestle power from Goimba 
K ot in 1989. Mel was chairman o f the Corporation between January 1990 and July 1992. The 
company closed all its operations in July 1992. In a personal docum ent given to me by Matrus 
Mel in January 1995, he attributed the closure o f the company mainly to the national “economic 
crises, coupled with the depressed price o f coffee”.
A fter w hat may be described as particularly unsuccessful attempts in both business and politics 
—  having unsuccessfully contested the Dei Open seat in 1982,1987,1992 and a by-election in 
1993 —  Matrus Mel returned to his professional field o f accounting. Since May 1993, he has 
been employed by the Small Business Development Corporation’s Highlands Regional Office in 
M ount Hagen and did no t contest the 1997 elections. His former rival, Goimba K ot has now 
permanently migrated to M ount Ambra where he resides with his wife’s Yamka group, K ot has 
developed a num ber o f coffee blocks at Ambra and grows bananas on a relatively large-scale. In 
January 1995 K ot made a large presentation o f pigs to the Yamka as payment for the land which 
he occupies.
Meanwhile, R ot’s old business partner, Parua Kuri, has retired from national politics after some 
20 years. Kuri first contested the then combined Mul-Dei O pen seat in 1968 and lost to Mek 
N ugritz, but in the succeeding election he successfully contested the Dei O pen seat which he 
held for three consecutive five year terms (1972-1987). Kuri is still influential in Dei politics, at 
times perform ing a significant role in the political career o f his son, Reuben Parua. Kuri assumes 
many roles, as a father, confidant, adviser, for which he may be better qualified for than anyone 
else in D el His organisational abilities and extensive personal network would be o f huge value 
to  Reuben. The skilful manipulation o f such networks and Kuri’s personal involvement in 
mobilising support for Reuben during the 1993 Dei Open by-election directly influenced a shift 
in allegiances o f non-aligned voter blocks and ultimately resulted in a favourable outcome for his 
son. Significantly, his son lost the election in 1992 when Kuri’s involvement was minimal, 
almost reluctant5
The Welyi-Kuta factions, rifts and power struggles
The Welyi-Kuta development association was formed around the same time as Pipilka and 
Raembka. The Welyi, being the traditional owners o f the land occupied by the Tremeame 
(Penga) coffee plantation, were invited to contribute money towards the purchasing o f shares in 
the plantation.6 Their first acquisition was the Penga plantation in the late 1970s, followed by the
5 . See Chapter 7even for a more detailed account o f this election and Kuri’s involvement as a major 
contributing factor in Reuben’s change o f fortune in 1993.
6 . The Tremeame coffee plantation, at Penga, in Dei Council was built by an entrepreneur and pilot called 
Bob Gibbes, who earlier had run Gibbes-Sepik Airways and subsequently ran hotels in the Highlands 
before retiring to Australia (see explanatory footnote in A.J. Strathem 1979:131).
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creation o f others, including Mamgogl, in the 1980s. Similarly, a section o f the Kombukla tribe, 
as traditional landowners o f the Bitam coffee plantation, near Muka Kengnapana, were invited 
to pool their resources towards buying plantation shares and acquired Bitam. Together, the 
Welyi and Kombukla required a managing company, hence the formation o f the business group 
called Welyi-Kuta. The Welyi-Kuta group then went into competition with Pipilka for the right 
to gain control o f Gumanch coffee plantation, but was unsuccessful here. It was however 
successful in beating Pipilka for Moitemp plantation. After the acquisition o f the Moitemp 
plantation, near the Kugmi creek —  also known in Tok Pisin as deti-ivai% derived from the 
English dirty or muddy water —  by Pati Wamp, the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair broke away 
from the Welyi-Kuta business group.
The competition between Pipilka and the Kombukla-Minembi pair was especially intense, both 
parties claiming traditional ownership over Gumanch and Moitemp plantations. Their 
differences were ultimately sorted out on the battlefield: first by the Kimka-Roklaka pair against 
the Kombukla during 1980-1982; and later by the Remdi-KimkarRoklaka alliance against the 
Kombukla-Minembi pair during 1984-1989. In both wars, the Minembi suffered heavy losses, 
including nearly 20 deaths, whilst Kombukla managed to escape without substantial loss. This 
fact has not been lost on the Minembi, particularly the large group o f educated Minembi leaders. 
They resent the fact that Kombukla commands leadership status in both business and national 
politics while Minembi sacrificed warriors in defending Kombukla-Minembi honour and 
territory. If this resentment spreads among Minembi communities and clans, it could develop 
into a Minembi-for-Minembi group to compete against the Kombukla and their principal 
leaders, Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep. In fact, there are signs that such a group may have already 
emerged, as indicated by electoral challenges made by the Minembi Nambka clan in 1992, 
through the candidacy ofW ikai Membi, and again in 1997, through Maj, Pun Kaip’s candidacy.
Meanwhile at Kotna, the Welyi had consolidated their business investments, through the 
appointment o f Sapom Kipa, a high school headmaster, as managing director o f the Welyi-Kuta 
business group. Under his direction, the Wely-Kuta incorporated a coffee exporting company in 
1989 in an attempt to diversify its business. Further development in this area appears to have .  
been hampered by dissension and internal power struggles.
The Welyi-Kuta business group, like Raembka in 1987 (and Dei Development Corporation in 
1989), has been the focus o f power struggles between faction leaders, Sapom Kipa and Jimmy 
Wara. The faction led by Jimmy Wara was critical o f Sapom Kipa's management and wrestled 
power from Kipa in 1996. After ousting Kipa from die company's senior management, Jimmy 
Wara, according to one informant, paid K30,000 in dividends to Sapom’s clan in October 1996,
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ostensibly to show shareholders that he was a better manager than his predecessor. Such 
payments may well be motivated by a desire to gain support in upcoming elections.7
Discussion
The business development associations were founded on relatively weak historical alliance 
networks, but the core member groups have since strengthened their linkages through current 
military and political alliances. Despite bitter power struggles between faction leaders, the various 
companies owned by the Pipilka Development Corporation and the Welyi-Kuta Business 
Group have remained robust, whereas dominant individuals have grabbed Raembka assets.
For the core groups, with a recent history o f warfare, business enterprise and elections presented 
new and exciting arenas o f competition in which outstanding scores could be settled. Initially, 
personal interest was sacrificed in favour o f group prestige; a classic case o f group sentiments 
overriding individual goals. Amidst the excitement generated by the competitive manner in 
which the coalition-style alliances were registered as commercial businesses, coupled with the 
rapid acquisition o f large plantations, there is little chance that anyone would have foreseen a 
future in which only a few educated and dominant individuals would become increasingly 
wealthy and powerful at the expanse o f their tribesmen. In the heady days o f the late 1970s and 
eady 1980s —  a period characterised by intensive commercial activity and the competitive 
purchasing o f m otor vehicles as a direct result o f the coffee boom  —  the group ‘name’ mattered 
m ost
Dissension crept in only after the money disappeared, when inequalities between leaders and 
ordinary people became more marked, as reflected by status symbols such as Range Rovers and 
private education for children o f the wealthy compared with fellow tribesmen who travel by 
PMV and send their children to sub-standard, poorly equipped bush schools; when it dawned 
on fellow tribesmen that, apart from group pride and prestige, they had no personal stake in 
these businesses and were therefore unable to influence the direction o f these companies; and 
when it became obvious that some o f these companies were suffering from mismanagement and 
were thus unable to pay dividends because they were broke.
The information on Sapom Kipa’s removal from the senior management o f Welyi-Kuta and subsequently 
Jimmy Wara’s ascendancy was given to me by Ben Konts, a close relative o f Wara, who claims to have 
been present when the cash sum o f K30,000 was handed over to the Sapom-led faction. Although there 
has been some suggestion that Jimmy Wara supported his cross-cousin, Reuben Parua, rather than his 
own brother, Roman Rombokl Wara, during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election, it is not clear whether or 
not he was in this instance attempting to secure assurances o f support from his tribesman for his cousin 
for 1997. This type o f electoral manoeuvring is not uncommon in Hagen. For instance, a family who 
received a cash sum o f K3,000 from Reuben Parua to revitalise the Kul Coffee Plantation in the Baiyer 
Valley told me in November 1997 that they had to vote for him during the 1997 national elections, despite 
considerable pressure from their own group who had a home candidate. The man who received the grant 
was Parua’s second cousin.
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In Australia, Europe, N orth America and elsewhere in the industrialised world, these leaders 
would have been prosecuted and possibly jailed for bankrupting public companies. Either 
through pillage or negligence, factional leaders o f many o f these corporations have not 
registered profits, claiming that they are still repaying bank loans, while shareholders have not 
received any dividends since these companies began operations more than 20 years ago. The 
major reason shareholders have not revolted against their leaders is because (a) o f the influential 
roles these leaders played in setting up these businesses; and (b) the substantial contribution 
towards the purchase o f the plantations from the state in the form o f development grants which 
were brokered by some o f these factional leaders. Moreover, leaders such as Michael Mel and 
Puklma Kopi are protected by the Hagen concept o f pukl wua (‘root man5), which means that 
they are the ‘owners5 or custodians o f these businesses and, by implication, whether they make a 
profit o r not is their businesses, not everyone else5s.
In any case, the cleverest leaders are usually those who effectively utulise the specialist skills o f 
traditional big-men and orators to maintain peace and warmth in their relationship with member 
groups. In exchange for special favours and gifts o f mainly cash and beer, skilful orators can 
easily downplay the economic disparities, whilst emphasising the worthy efforts and enormous 
achievements o f the business leaders in lifting up the name o f the group. Special favours may 
include the sponsorship o f big-men to travel to Port Moresby or the northern Queensland city 
o f Cairns for a week o f fun and mischief. A commonly used strategy involves the appointment 
o f nominal company directors, representing various segments o f a group, who receive a small 
fee for protecting the interests o f the business leaders. These so-called directors have no direct 
influence over the operation o f their companies. But a guaranteed regular income, occasional 
gifts o f beer, and the prestige that goes with such a title may be sufficient inducement to secure 
their support. It is however important to note that most big-men are vein, self-centred and 
sometimes indomitable creatures, but definitely not fools. Always seeking new opportunities for 
mavimiring their wealth and influence, big-men will accommodate the interests o f businessmen 
and politicians for as long as they feel that such a relationship enhances their own reputation. 
Prestige is the driving force behind the activities o f such men.
Is this really capitalism? Leaders are still mobilising group sentiment (in elections, business and 
warfare), even if  they act as dominant individual capitalists. This is a major weakness (or gap) in 
the work o f Amarshi, Good, and Mortimer (1979) and Donaldson and Good (1981). The 
Hagen case studies presented here suggest that Marxist models o f economic relations and social 
class systems are inadequate when it comes to analysing business development associations and 
the behaviour o f millionaire businessmen. The common assumption that a small class o f owners 
o f capital who control the means o f production would dominate the majority o f people who 
have nothing but their labour to sell is hard to justify in light o f the evidence presented here.
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Neatly all Papua New Guineans ate landowners and do not need to sell their labour in order to 
make a living.
Despite the presence o f wealthy capitalists who may associate with other people o f similar 
socioeconomic brackets, all o f them  are tribesmen and depend on their primary kin-groups for 
security, emotional well-being and votes; and their political power-base is still the primordial 
community, not class.
A  final point is that there is more cooperation in warfare than in elections or in business, which 
means that the military alliances are more stable than political and economic alliances. Military 
alliances generally follow moka networks and are therefore dominated by traditional leaders such 
as big-men. Political and economic alliances, though founded on military alliances, are more 
commonly dominated by politicians and businessmen. Conflicts, however, arise when modem 
and traditional leaders compete for dominance. In the next chapter I discuss a particular type o f 
conflict, group warfare, which was organised along these same coalition-style alliance lines 
described here and in the previous chapter.
C h a p t e r  5
TH E DYNAMICS OF HAGEN WARFARE
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Introduction
This chapter deals with warfare as an im portant arena o f political competition and cooperation, 
previously linked to  ceremonial exchange through reparation payments, and nowadays to state- 
sponsored arenas such as elections and business. Elections, as will become evident in the 
following chapters, are generally organised along the lines o f military alliances discussed here and 
in the previous chapters. But, as indicated in the previous chapter, there is more reliable 
cooperation in warfare than in other arenas o f  competition and cooperation. Evidence 
presented in this chapter will show that dans o f the same tribe may oppose each other in 
business, elections, and even in m inor warfare, but are highly likely to cooperate in major 
warfare against traditional or perpetual enemies. The high degree o f cohesion in warfare can be 
viewed as a basic survival strategy —  with a political dimension. Cooperation between the 
constituent clans o f a tribe was especially vital in pre-colonial times because annihilation was an 
ever present danger. By no means o f lesser significance, was the group ‘name’ factor, a 
significant them e which runs throughout this thesis.
Previous studies on PN G  Highlands warfare have been approached from various perspectives: 
functionalist and cultural ecological (Vayda 1967; Rappaport 1984[1968]); and demographic —  
involving focus on pressure on land and social and social relations (Meggitt 1977); other writers 
have stressed social and ritual aspects o f warfare (Muke 1994); and shifting alliances (A.J. 
Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1977; 1992). The wide range o f social-structural, ecological, political and 
psychological theories applied to Melanesian warfare has been critically reviewed by Knauft 
(1990; see also Muke 1994 and O ’Hanlon 1995). The value and validity o f the various 
explanations o f  Melanesian warfare and the historical influences that shaped anthropological 
perspectives have been assessed by Knauft (1990). By providing insights into the dynamics o f 
Hagen warfare, my study attempts to correct some fallacious assumptions inherent in W estern 
theoretical perspectives on PN G  Highlands warfare, and moreover argues that Hageners engage 
in warfare to ensure that their respective group ‘names must not go down’.
Furtherm ore, this study provides explanations for the persistence o f warfare in the Highlands o f 
Papua New Guinea, with a special emphasis on cultural and societal ‘strength’ and institutional 
‘weakness’ in state structures. In a recent paper on social disorder, A.J. Strathem (1993b) 
discusses state-society interaction and competing legitimacies. Although my overall aim in this 
thesis is similar to Strathem ’s —  to map competing legitimacies —  the main purpose o f the 
present chapter is to provide a m ore detailed and refined discussion o f contemporary Hagen 
warfare than hitherto available. Accordingly, I present a micro-analysis o f warfare, stressing the 
dynamics o f  political com petition between groups, factions and coalitions and, more specifically,
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on the role o f leaders in warfare, particularly in the context o f W estern influence in terms o f new 
ideas and beliefs such as Christianity and technological innovations such as guns.
The chapter is organised into four parts. The first contains a brief background discussion on 
Hagen warfare, with a particular emphasis on im portant distinctions made by Hageners when 
discussing warfare. The second part contains two case studies o f Hagen warfare during the late 
1980s, w ith a view to dem onstrating the corporate nature o f warfare, the difficulties involved in 
organising m odem  warfare, and the conspicuous lack o f state intervention. The third part o f the 
chapter looks at the im pact o f technological innovations, especially the devastating effects o f gun 
warfare and its economic dimensions. The final part o f the chapter looks at the contexts o f 
leadership in warfare. In particular, it examines change and continuity in leadership roles in the 
context o f gun warfare and wider social change. A model o f Hagen warfare is used to  explain 
some o f  die complex processes involved. The model encapsulates a general pattern o f escalation 
in disputes and conflict m anagem ent The chapter concludes by arguing that Hagen warfare, 
despite com m on belief, does no t represent societal collapse o r disintegration. Rather, it can be 
fruitfully viewed as a way o f asserting authority and restoring order within a weak state.
The Hagen Concept o f Warfare
It m ust be stated at the outset that the term  ‘tribal warfare’ can be misleading when loosely used, 
especially as in media reports. It is misleading because warfare does no t involve tribes alone but 
other levels o f  group as w ell For example, warfare can be a clan m atter in some instances1, 
while, in others, it can be at a level higher than the tribe, such as tribe-pairs, coalitions, or other 
forms o f alliance. Tribal warfare, then, involves physical violence between groups. Since 
definitions, contexts and patterns o f Hagen warfare have been adequately treated by others (see 
A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; Muke 1994), I shall only briefly deal with them , in order to allow 
for fuller discussion o f the role o f alliance networks as a basis for competition and the role o f 
leaders in warfare, the effects o f guns in Hagen warfare, and the political (including electoral) 
dimensions o f that warfare.
W ithout duplicating the work o f others, like Rappoport (1984[1968]) and Meggitt (1977), it is, 
nevertheless, necessary to m ention the major contributing factors behind group warfare. There 
are many reasons why groups engage in warfare, but it is im portant to point out that in m ost 
cases groups resort to  armed conflict either because peaceful avenues o f  resolving conflicts have
\  The Jika Maipngel intra-section warfare o f 1986-87 is a good example. During this war MaipngePs two
subsections, Rukumb and Andakelkam, fought each other and, consequently, Rukumb, comprising 
Komapei, Oprom b, Milakamb and Muklmana dans, routed the Komb-Akdemb dan-pair, who have since 
taken up residence with a Mokei section. The adoption o f guns, as a technological innovation in Hagen 
warfare, was first noted in this war.
The Dynamics o/Hcgen Warfare 1 4 6
been totally exhausted, o r because circumstances dictate such action. The latter occurs when 
existing relations between the antagonists have deteriorated to  such an extent that peaceful 
avenues o f settling disputes will be deliberately ignored and war will no t only be considered 
inevitable but ideal and noble —  very much to do with questions o f honour, group ‘name’ or 
renown, pride and dignity.
Resolving conflicts through violence becomes a m ore realistic option when a person or group 
considers an insult caused by some wrongdoing—  such as homicide, assault o r theft— to be so 
grave that even the offer o f wealth items as compensation payment in generous amounts would 
no t make adequate incentive for appeasem ent The reason for this may be found in the Hagen 
concept which I have identified earlier as mbi mam nepanha (‘the name m ust not go down'). The 
other is the Hagen concept called popokl (‘anger7), which influences the choice to be made. The 
offer o f  compensation may be accepted if  a person’s popokl is no t so intense; o r conversely, 
revenge will be chosen if  the popokl is very intense. A.J. Strathem (1981) makes this point clearly 
in discussing
...H ageners’ ways o f  describing their feelings after a killing o r death for w hich 
responsibility is im puted: they are angry (popokl), and they w ant to  take revenge, to  
retaliate. N o t to  do  so is to  behave like w om en rather than m en. Only the sight o f  
w ealth, they say, can soothe their feelings and m ake them  am enable to  peaceful 
settlem ent (1981:7).
W hat Strathem does no t mention is that Hageners also say that only revenge or pay-back killing 
can settle outstanding debts in reciprocal killing. It is often the case that people have long 
collective memories regarding killings, and when a son fails to avenge his father’s death, the 
grandson takes over the responsibility, and so on until outstanding debts in reciprocal killings, in 
the clan or family view, are balanced.
In  spite o f Christian mission influence, the pay-back mentality (good-for-good and bad-for-bad) 
still prevails. The key is people’s perceptions regarding positive and negative reciprocity and their 
notions o f a balanced system. Functionalists (for example, Rappaport 1984 [1968]; and Meggitt 
1977), however, argue otherwise, but my empirical data, such as Case 2  (Kawelka-Minembi W ar, 
described below) suggest that sometimes groups fight for almost purely psychological reasons 
(see, for example, Standish 1973; Knauft 1990), in which case, o f course, functional reasons are 
secondary considerations.
Hagen warfare typically involves armed conflict between groups with strong military traditions 
stretching back to  pre-colonial times. The rules governing war preparation, battle sequences, and 
indemnity payment are clearly defined. M oreover, war alliances follow a pattern quite similar to 
those involving ceremonial exchange networks. Any serious scholarly inquiry into warfare must 
cover all its dimensions. It cannot be analysed adequately w ithout a historical perspective o f
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social relations between local groups. Otherwise a great injustice will be done to the subject at 
hand. M ost reasons for fighting mentioned in the media, for instance, are no t major contributing 
factors, but are, in fact, trigger mechanisms. For example, the particular cases o f warfare 
described in the next section o f this chapter were both triggered by alcohol-related incidents, yet 
there were underlying factors which prevented the eventual antagonists from seeking peaceful 
avenues o f conflict resolution —  hence, alcohol was blamed for both wars. Groups fight for 
various reasons, which are quite complex and multifaceted, but informants tend to agree that 
groups fight mainly over land, suspected and actual killings (including m otor vehicle accidents), 
assault causing serious injury, rape, theft o f property (especially pigs), arson, non-payment o f 
compensation, and (nowadays) over election results (see Iamo and Ketan 1992:102-103; see also 
Standish 1992 for comparable discussion in Simbu).
It is w orth m entioning here that any serious attem pt to understand the complexities o f warfare 
m ust allow for the distinctions made by the participants themselves. Hageners, as pointed out by 
A.J. Strathem (1966b;49), make three basic distinctions in their own accounts o f warfare: (1) 
between the ‘root man o f war’ and the ‘a ll/ (glpukl wua and kui wud); (2) between major or 
traditional enemies and m inor enemies (elparaha wua and el uninga wud)\ and (3) between clans 
which are paired and those which are n o t I shall explore these dichotomies o f Hagen warfare 
rather briefly here, but later provide a discussion on how key warfare relationships are 
maintained (see section on Reparation Paymentfater in this chapter).
The Hagen term , el pukl wua (lit: ‘fight root man7), is used when referring to the principal 
instigators o f war, as opposed to kui wua (lit: ‘dead man7; or those who died while supporting the 
‘fight root man7). In Hagen there is a clear distinction between the pukl wua, as ‘owners7 o f the 
war and the kui wua> who, as allies, m ust be compensated for assistance rendered and losses 
sustained. This idea o f identifying a person or group as the ‘owner7 o f a dispute, wrongdoing or 
fighting, which is expressed by the term  pukl (‘root7; ‘base’) (A.J. Strathem 1981:12), not only 
facilitates compensation payments but also serves other functions such as retribution. The 
principal combatants in Case /, the Remdi Jikambo and the Minembi Nambka clans, for 
example, were the el pukl wua> whilst the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair were the kui wua to  the Remdi 
(and el uninga wua, m inor enemies, to the Minembi).
The second dichotomy o f Hagen warfare distinguishes major o r traditional enemies from m inor 
enemies. The words, elparaka wua (tit: ‘fight-bird o f paradise plumes-man7) translate as ‘the man 
who fights you wearing his feather head-dress7 (often made o f bird o f paradise plumes), which 
means in his full war apparel (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:49). It is a term used when referring to 
m ajor o r traditional enemies who maintain hostile relations in both times o f  peace and war, A 
timp o f peace, in other words, is a truce period, mutually reached for various reasons (for
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example, when both sides have had enough o f fighting, o r when both sides are threatened by 
famine owing to  neglect o f food-crop gardens). By contrast, el uninga wua (also called el namb wua) 
simply m eans there is a lesser degree o f enmity and centrality in the conflict It can be used when 
referring to those assisting a major enemy in war; your major enemy’s allies are the el uninga wua. 
In  Case 2, die K opi (as well as Minembi Kimbo and Klamakae) were seen by the Minembi as el 
uninga wua because o f their supporting role to die Kawelka. As pointed out by A.J. Strathem, “in 
Hagen the rule was that one paid compensation to m inor enemies, with whom there was regular 
intermarriage and exchange. W ith major enemies matters were much more uncertain” (1981:12). 
The fact that one paid compensation to m inor enemies m eant that previously hostile relations 
could be converted into exchange networks and sometimes into alliance systems. In this way, 
groups which had in some instances fought against each other as m inor enemies were in other 
instances allied against a major enemy. H ie  phenom enon o f group relations alternating between 
alliance and enmity is quite consistent with an observed pattern o f shifting alliances (see A.J. 
Strathem  1966b.*Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4; see also Kawelka example in Case T).
A  third dichotomy deals with the difference between clans which are paired and those which are 
n o t The difference lies in their approach to  negotiating each other’s assistance in war. Paired 
clans, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent moha exchanges, are ideally automatic 
allies in warfare, unlike non-paired clans which may not be automatic allies. They may share 
territory, have usufructuary tights in commonly held gardening land, and in the past they may 
have given refuge to each other. It is evident from A.J. Strathem’s examination o f dan pairs 
within the Tepuka tribe that paired clans: (1) do speak o f themselves as intermarrying closely; (2) 
do share territory and have given refuge to each other; and that (3) their military situation is such 
that (a) whilst there may be stick fights between them , which are conflicts o f a lesser order o f 
seriousness, they are automatic allies o f each other when one is involved with an outside enemy; 
and (b) whilst there may be some unpleasantness between them over kui wua payments, they are 
never arrayed on opposite sides in a fight; (4) ideally there is no poisoning between them  (and 
A.J.S. found no cases where accusations o f such were made); (5) they are linked by the marker 
w ord ntkl (‘pair’), suffixed to their names spoken together, and (6) internal compensations 
between such groups are continued in the form o f moka (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; 
1971:Chap.4).
W hile this is a fair assessment o f the situation in the Dei Council area, which is characterised by 
numerous and relatively small tribes, the situation in other parts o f Hagen may be slightly 
different The military situation in the Hagen Central area, for instance, significantly differs from 
that o f  D e l Hagen Central area, as indicated in Chapter Three, is hom e to the ‘super-tribes’ o f Jika, 
Mokei and Yamka: all o f which are quite powerful in terms o f numerical strength as well as 
political influence (often backed up by superior firepower). This means that, on the one hand,
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groups below the dan  level can hold their own and match others at both the clan and tribal 
levels in warfare, while on the other hand, they may not become automatic allies when one 
m em ber o f a  clan-pair is involved in a fight Owing to factors o f size, strength and C hristian  
mission influence, some paired clans in Hagen Central are no t automatic allies. For example, 
during the Jika Maipngel-Kukilka war, fought in the late 1980s, a section o f the Jika O prom b 
clan allegedly gave safe passage to  fleeing Kukilka tribesmen instead o f assisting their Jika 
Kom api dan-pair partners in attacking them.
Christian church membership may have been a factor here. A common response from both Jika 
and other Hagen inform ants, when asked why this was allowed to  happen, was that the Kukilka 
were protected by God. Attacking them  would have evoked the wrath o f G od  Their escape 
from  die Jika Komapi troops after leaving their Tipukla and Kukulinga territories, west o f 
O gdbeng, was directly likened to that o f the Israelites o f the Old Testament who, under Moses’s 
leadership, fled from  slavery in Egypt and made a dramatic escape from the pursuing Egyptian 
army by crossing the Red Sea, after “the LORD drove the sea back with a strong east wind 
[which] blew all night and turned the sea into dry land, [hence] die water was divided, and the 
Israelites w ent through die sea on dry ground, with walls o f  water on both sides” (Exodus 14:21­
22). It is said that before the Kukilka left for Kelua and Bag}, they gathered at their Tipukla 
Church for prayers and collected an offering o f cash which they deliberately left behind, 
knowing full well that their enemies would steal it and therefore be punished by G od2. 
Incidentally, the head o f the Lutheran Church, Bishop Sanengke, is a Kukilka tribesman, and he 
has strong ties with the O prom b clan through church work. The O prom b live in and around 
the O gdbeng (also called Uklpeng) Lutheran mission station, which was founded in the early 
1930s by the German missionary, Georg Vicedom. In this context, it is dear that the O prom b 
dan-section’s decision no t to attack the Kukilka is quite understandable: how could they possibly 
justify attar-king fellow Lutherans and Christian brothers with whom  they have shared fellowship 
for m ore than fifty years?
However, what is no t so dear is the relevance o f group size and strength in decisions to do with 
military alliance. Komapi can hold its own against any similar size group, as it did against the 
Kukilka tribe. And so would O prom b in a similar situation. Komapi and O prom b are in an 
unusual situation in the sense that they bdong to a single large tribe section, Maipngel, whose 
Hang act independently in m ost events, have endorsed candidates against one another in national 
elections, experienced internal fighting in 1986-87, yet still remain an exogamous un it Another
Indeed, many Hagen informants, including some Komapi leaders, have pointed out to me that foe 
Komapi have consistently been embroiled in conflict after conflict and will continue to do so simply 
because they committed foe ultimate crime by attacking foe house o f God.
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reason why the dan-pair ‘rule* regarding warfare was ‘broken’ here lies in the Hagen concept 
described earlier aspopokl (‘anger1). An offence such as assault evokespopoklwhich makes people 
w ant to take revenge, unless compensation is offered. It is even more pronounced in murders, 
where popokl drives people to seek revenge (although in some cases compensation may prevent 
this). In  the Kukilka case, it was the Jika Komapi’s popokl over an alleged poisoning o f  a young 
Kom api man by a Kukilka man’s wife which gave the Komapi a valid reason to fight The 
O prom b, however, had no popokl with the Kukilka and so did not join their paired dan  in 
attacking them. It is this notion o f Hagen reasoning, taking into account the nature o f previous 
relations and the severity o f an offence, which determines the outcome o f disputes.
Beyond that lies the analytical realm where structural explanations have been offered by 
anthropologists and other observers. The resurgence o f warfare in the 1970s, after colonial 
administration imposed pacification in the 1940s, has been largely attributed to demographic 
pressure (see Meggitt 1971,1977). For example, in the case o f the Central Enga, Meggitt (1977) 
argued that Enga population build-up has m eant the inevitable return to warfare, as alternative 
means o f coping with the problem o f land shortage have been exhausted. For Hagen, however, 
this argument does not hold because o f factors dealing with recruitment for warfare, business 
enterprise and election campaigns. In spite o f a high population density, which approaches 300 
persons per square kilometre in some areas, leaders actively recruit new members, comprising 
mainly Simbu and Enga immigrants, for both political and economic purposes. Such migrants 
receive access to garden land, but are dependent on their hosts and patrons. Migrants have at 
times played vital roles in warfare. In the Remdi-Minembi war, for instance, both Simbu and 
Enga migrants residing with the Remdi in and around Gumanch coffee plantation fought 
against the Minembi (see Case 1). Such support can also be extended to election campaigns (see 
Chapter Si£) and to business activities in terms o f labour. Thus, the demographic argument 
cannot be extended to Hagen because land acquired through violent eviction is seldom occupied 
by the victors for fear o f both enemy attack and enemy spirits seeking revenge. Both the Jika 
Maipngel and the Kawelka-Minembi cases reinforce this p o in t After the Komb-Akelemb dan- 
pair were routed during the 1986-87 Maipngel war the Milakamb clan and its allies —  Komapi, 
O prom b and Muklmana —  deliberately avoided the vacant Puklgjmp settlem ent Similarly, 
neither the Kawelka, nor its allies— K opi, Kimbo and Klamakae —  showed interest in claiming 
the form er M inembi territory in Tiki for resettlem ent In both instances, die m ost attractive 
option appeared to be business developm ent (of mainly coffee plantations) on these properties. 
Labour, however, will remain a major problem  because traditional sources o f plantation labour 
recruitm ent such as the Southern Highlands and Enga currently offer more attractive monetary 
rewards as a direct consequence o f mining and petroleum exploitation in those areas. This is 
further complicated by the fact that Hageners, for reasons to do with status, do not like working 
for other Hageners, and recruitm ent from within the tribe for expanded plantation holding? is
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limited by reasons m entioned previously (fear o f attack). Recruitment o f group ‘members’ from 
other provinces as well as encouraging migrant settlements in W estern Highlands, therefore, 
remains a viable option, which is mutually beneficial to  the provinces concerned because it eases 
demographic pressure in some areas (Enga and Simbu) and increases manpower in others 
(W estern Highlands) where plantation labour is scarce. Recruits from other parts o f the province 
and the Highlands region, as indicated in Chapter Three; are sponsored by leaders as part o f 
political strategies, and while their continued ‘membership’ to Hagen tribes and clans is 
constantly renewed through participation in corporate activities such as warfare and elections, 
they never fully relinquish their membership to natal groups in their hom e provinces. This 
statem ent is also applicable to descendants o f migrants. I shall now turn to the case studies on 
Hagen warfare in order to assess the corporate nature o f warfare.
Case 1: The Remdi-Minembi War (1984-1989)
The Remdi-Minembi conflict lasted nearly five years. Although the groups were no t traditionally 
m ajor enemies, relations between them  had deteriorated to such an extent that armed conflict 
was inevitable. As indicated in die second and third chapters o f this thesis, the plantation 
acquisition scheme, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, played a vital role in this 
conflict To facilitate participation in the government's plantation acquisition scheme, Remdi and 
other Pipilka groups (Kimka, Roklaka, and the Nebilyer, Hagen Central and Anglimp residents, 
K opi-N okpa tribe-pair) in 1975 formed into a development association called Pipilka 
Developm ent Corporation. Pipilka w ent into competition with a similar group called Welyi- 
Kuta, comprising mainly the Kombukla-Mtnembi tribe-pair and their allies in Welyi tribe (see 
A J. Strathem  1984; see also Ketan 1996). Pipilka ultimately gained the giant Gumanch Coffee 
plantation3, but lost out on Kugmi, an adjoining portion o f land, to prom inent Kombulda 
leaders Pati Wamp and M elchior Pep, who acquired the land on behalf o f the Kombukla- 
Minembi. Pipilka’s Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, who share a common territorial boundary with 
Kombukla, disputed the PN G  Land Board decision and consequently war eventuated. While 
Kimka-Roklaka and Kombukla were the principal combatants, both Minembi and Remdi 
inform ants agree that their groups provided assistance to their respective allies. After almost a 
year o f  fighting, using mainly traditional weapons such as bows and arrows, a period o f mutual 
truce prevailed in the early 1980s.
Although the Remdi and M inembi groups were not principal combatants during the Kimka- 
Roklaka versus Kombukla war, their relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that
The plantation, according to one Remdi informant, was formally taken over by the locals in 1985 with a 
2.7 million kina bank loan, which was folly repaid in 1993. Such complexities o f modem commerce are not 
folly grasped by Hageners and consequently resulted in a dispute over non-payment o f dividends (see 
Chapters 3A \ see also ChapterSetm).
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peaceful avenues o f resolving conflicts were ignored when a m inor incident involving a 
disagreement over a snooker game developed into full-scale warfare. The Remdi-Minembi war 
was triggered o ff by an incident at a village tavern owned and managed by a Remdi tribesman, a 
senior governm ent employee in M ount Hagen. Following a disagreement over a snooker table, a 
now  prom inent Minembi leader, then a governm ent employee in M ount Hagen, was alleged to 
have ‘confiscated’ the snooker balls, which angered the Remdi caretaker o f the premises. A 
tussle ensued and during the confusion, someone damaged the caretaker’s testicles. 
Com pensation was demanded, which the Minembi claimed was to excessive, and Remdi 
declared war on Minembi.
D uring the initial encounters warriors on both sides used traditional weapons —  bows and 
arrows, shields and spears —- and the battle sequences followed shield formation and 
manoeuvres which characterise traditional Hagen warfare (see discussion below on The Adoption 
of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare; see also Muke 1994 and Burton 1990 for 
comparison). The turning point o f this war was marked by a particular incident now vividly 
remembered by warriors on either side and was simply referred to by one Minembi inform ant as 
* e  ‘T enga incident”. While engaged in a batde at the Tenga creek, with opposing troops on 
either side o f the water, a shotgun went o ff “accidentally” on the Minembi side4. Although no- 
one was hurt and no further shots were fired, which suggests that it may in fact have been an 
accident, the Remdi were quite convinced that the gun shot was m eant to kill someone but the 
cartridge failed to find its target
In  hindsight, I am convinced that the shot was neither an accident nor m eant to kill someone, 
but was an expression o f strength, or a flexing o f military muscle. I f  this is correct, then, Remdi 
read it well by responding with guns. The fact that it did no t take both sides long to come up 
with several guns for battle a few days later suggests that this was a war which had deeper (much 
deeper) roots and both sides were well-prepared for i t  It is believed that some gun-men had 
served their apprenticeship in other conflicts prior to  this war, whilst a few had technical 
knowledge o f guns through participation in criminal gang activities (chiefly robbing and 
terrorising coffee buyers and expatriate plantation owners an d /o r managers). M ost others had to 
learn, which they did very quickly. By the second week, open battlefield tactics were abandoned, 
for reasons discussed later in this chapter, and gun-men formed gangs to attack and counter­
attack using raiding and ambush tactics.
Principal Combatants and Allies
The information on the ‘Tenga incident” was given to me by M r Bu Phill o f the Minembi Napakae clan, 
which, together with its dan-pair partner, Nambka, were the ‘fight root man’, or ‘owners’ o f this war.
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The principal combatants, elpukl mta (‘fight root man5) or ^owners’ o f the fight were the Remdi 
Jikambo and Minembi Nambka clans. The Remdi Jikambo were assisted by a number o f groups: 
some in fighting capacity, such as major allies; and others, especially the minor allies in non­
fighting, yet materially supportive roles. Likewise, the Minembi Nambka were assisted by a 
number o f groups. A full list o f allies on both sides is given below (see Table 5. /).
T able 5.1: A lliance System s: Rem di-M inem bi W ar (1984-1989)
Major allies of the Remdi 
Jikambo clan
Minor allies of the 
Remdi Jikambo clan
Major allies of the 
Minembi Nambka
Minor allies of the 
Minembi Nambka
Remdi Elpuklmbo Nengka Minembi
Ropkembo
Kombukla
Remdi Penambembo Jika Maipngel Minimbi Papeke Kumdi
Remdi Ropmbo Yamka Minimbi Kutmbo Jika Andapunts
Remdi Kundumbo Minimibi
Engambo
Welyi
Remdi Ukunimbo Minimbi Napakae
Kimka Minimbi Mimkae
Roklaka
Kiklpukla
Enga Migrants
Simbu Migrants
Source: Based on information supplied by Remdi informants: Ivan Tau, Maip Kei, Puklma Kopi and jerry Yar
Rombina o f  Muglamp, and Minembi informants: Bu Phill, Moga village, and Peter Watinga, Keraldung 
village, Mount Hagen.
Remdi Jikambo fought according to its structural divisions: Pilembo, Roklomb and Kulembo- 
Paklembo subclan-pairs. Remdi as a tribe is split across both a Local Government Council and 
an Open Electorate border. One half comprising predominantly Jikambo and some
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Penambem bo live in Dei Council (also Dei O pen electorate) and are also known as “Lower 
Remdi”, while the other half comprising the rest o f the Remdi clans live in Mul Council (which 
is part o f the Mul-Baiyer O pen electorate) and are also known as “Upper Remdi”. In this 
particular war, U pper Remdi clans, like the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair and Kiklpukla, actively 
participated as major allies. The Engan and Simbu migrants, who live with the Remdi Jikambo 
dan  and are employed by the Gumanch Coffee Plantation (which is owned mostly by the 
Jikam bo), also participated in fighting as major allies.
Remdi Jikam bo’s m inor allies —  Nengka, Jika Maipngel5 and some sections o f the Yamka —  
assisted in a largely non-fighting capacity. They provided the links through which resources, 
induding guns and cartridges, were channelled towards the Remdi war effo rt As is customary 
in Hagen, one or two warriors from these groups may have acted independently and strictly on 
an individual basis to  take up arms and fought on the Remdi side. Such men are called el kentep 
mta (‘steal fight man’) and when one o f them  is killed, the responsibility lies with the ‘owner’ o f 
the fight, no t the killer, which means that his group will not normally take upon themselves to 
avenge his death. The ‘owner’ o f the fight will pay compensation, in the same way as allies are 
compensated for their support and losses sustained. This rule o f placing responsibility on the 
‘owner’ o f the fight acts as a constraint for full-scale confederation-type alliance warfare.
The Remdi also had an active fighting partnership, el kompani (‘fight company’, o r ‘joint venture- 
ship5) with the Kawelka (who were involved with the Minembi Andakelkam section), and by 
extension o f its allies, were also in partnership with the Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae (Kawelka’s 
allies) who were involved with the Nguni and Minembi Andakelkam section with whom they 
share a common border.
T .ik<* their Remdi Jikambo opponents, Minembi Nambka also coopted the assistance o f fellow 
M inembi dans: Ropkembo, Napakae, Mimkae, Papeke, Kutmbo and Engambo. They also had a 
major ally in the Kombukla but here the support was not given in a concerted effort, rather it 
was mostly on an individual basis, thus we may call Kombukla a m inor ally.
Remdi, through its Jikambo clan, has strong connections with the Maipngel section o f the Jika, which is 
Hagen’s biggest tribe. Both Remdi and Jika Maipngel had fought in separate wars, at different times, 
against another Jika section, Andapunts. That explains why Maipngel supported Remdi while Andapunts 
threw its weight behind Minembi.
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the Remdi
F igure 5.1: S tructural O rganisation o f M inem bi Forces against the Rem di- 
K awelka F igh t P artnersh ip  (El Kompani).
Andaoukam
Elyipi Fought 
against die 
Kawelka and 
dieir allies, 
Kopi, Kimbo 
and
Klamakae.
MINEMBI
Komonkae
Ruprupkae
Andakelkam
TRIBE MAJOR SECTION CLAN (EXOGAMOUS)
Source: Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Jerry Yar Rombina, Maip Kei, Puklma Kopi and Pen
‘Seholda’ Kei o f  Remdi Jikambo dan; Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky o f  Kawelka Elpuklmbo sub­
subclan; and Bu Phill and Peter Watinga o f  Minembi Napakae and Nambka dans, respectively.
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Figure 5.2: T he H agen  El Kompani (‘F igh t P artnersh ip’) System .
M ul Uppex-Rerndi El-Paraka D isjunction
Nengka
H agen jika- El-Paraka D isjunction
Central M aipngel
Key:
Assisted in fighting on an individual basis
Assisted in a mainly non-fighting capacity
Currently in confederated-style alliance, providing links through 
which firearms and sensitive information are passed from one 
conflict to another.
The el paraka disjunction indicates either historically established 
major enemy lines or that these groups have recently fought each 
other in major warfare.
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Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Jerry Yar Robina, Puklma Kopi and Pen ‘Seholda’ Kei o f 
Remdi Jikambo dan; Yap Goimba, Goimba Onombe and Komorui Onky of Kawelka Elpuklmbo sub­
subclan, and Bu Phil and Peter Watinga o f Minembi Napakae and Nambka dans, respectively. Ivan and 
Kopi in particular were responsible for my education on el kompam systems and how information and 
resources (including guns) are channelled through alliance networks. Kopi was particularly patient in 
explaining political strategies, such as the conversion o f previously hostile relations into one o f moka 
relations, especially when engaging war with a major enemy. A t the inception o f the Remdi-Minembi 
conflict in 1984, for instance, Kopi led a group o f Remdi Jikambo leaders into presenting a sum o f K500 
as moka gifts to their minor enemies, the Jika Kilampi clan (of the Jika Andapunts section), thus converting 
previously hostile relations into one o f friendship. This effectively prevented the Andapunts, as a group, 
from supporting Minembi (although it is widely beilieved that some members o f the Andapunts section 
assisted Minembi on an individual basis, mainly in a non-fighting capadty).
Although the Kopi-Nokpa are Hagen Central residents, they are part o f the Dei Council-based Pipilka 
alliance, mainly through business activities.
The Ngum are not part o f the Welyi-Kuta alliance but are listed here because o f their role in the Kawelka- 
Minembi war, as an active fighting partner o f the Minembi,
M inembi had an active fighting partnership with the Baiyer resident, Nguni, who were in alliance 
with the Minembi Andakelkam against the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae alliance.
Minembi’s m inor allies were: Kumdi, Jika Andapunts and Welyi. Both Kumdi and Jika 
Andapunts had scores to settle and may have joined in on individual basis, but Welyi mostly 
acted as a non-fighting partner by allowing Minembi to use its territories to set up road-blocks 
against Remdi and Kawelka. Both Kumdi and Kombukla have historical ties with the Minembi. 
The Kombukla are currently paired with the Minembi and have previously fought together in 
major wars against other groups such as the Tepuka-Kawelka pair. The Jika Andapunts- 
Minembi association, however, is a more recent formation, founded on common military 
grounds —  they both had an enemy in Remdi. The Jika Andapunts section, comprising mainly 
Kilampi, Jilimb, Kundka and Pangaka dans, fought the Remdi in a bow and arrow fight during 
the 1980s.
It is significant to note here that the Remdi-Jika Andapunts conflict was quickly resolved as a 
direct consequence o f some smart thinking on the part o f Remdi military strategists. As the 
Remdi-Minembi war intensified, Remdi strategists offered a gift in cash (K500) as a token o f 
peace and goodwill to the Jika Kilampi elan o f die Andapunts section, thereby effectively 
preventing Kilampi from  mobilising significant fighting blocks as well as preventing Minembi 
from  contracting the Andapunts as a major ally6. Following this, moka relations were created,
6 There is no doubt that Remdi leaders would have taken this opportunity to remind Kilampi leaders that 
this particular war was a Dei Council m atter and Hagen Central groups should keep out o f it
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which culminated in presentation o f 15 pigs to Remdi by the Kilampi in early 1995.? Remdi used 
the pigs in their miapeng compensation to their Kimka-Roklaka allies in January 1995.
The Remdi and Minembi maintained hostile relations for nearly six years, from the inception o f 
war in 1984 until it was concluded in 1989. During this period, nearly forty warriors were killed, 
almost all in raids and ambushes as battlefields were abandoned (for reasons discussed later in 
this section), large human populations were displaced (many have yet to reclaim previous 
settlements, especially those around the Tenga battle-grounds), and no accurate figure can be 
placed on damage to property which is believed to be in tens o f thousands o f kina.
Unlike previous inter-group conflicts in which the state played an active role in at least 
attempting to prevent them from escalating, this particular war was typical o f conflicts in the 
eighties where there was virtually no state intervention. In the 1970s, for instance, police mobile 
squads, assisted by helicopters, were sent into ‘tribal fighting zones’ to apprehend warriors and 
restore order, but in the 1980s there were so many fights, at least 22 separate cases in Western 
Highlands (see Appendix DTI; see also Iamo and Ketan 1992:104), that police were unable to 
cope with the situation.
T ab le 5.2: W ar D eaths: R em di-M inem bi W ar (1984-1989)
The Dynamics of Hagen Warfare
Remdi <& Allies No. of Death Minembi No. of Death
Lower Remdi 6 Papeke 3
Upper Remdi 2 Nambka 6
Roklaka 3 Engambo 3
Kimka 3 Ropkae 3
Kiklpukla 1 Napakae 1
Enga migrants 1 Rapake 1
Simbu migrants 1 Mimkae 1
Total 17 18
Source: Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Muglamp, and Peter Watinga, Keraldung village, Mount
Hagen.
The Remdi-Minembi war, like numerous others, ended in 1989 not because o f state intervention 
but mainly because the combatants themselves felt that they had had enough o f fighting. That
The information on the conversion o f  enmity into moka relations between the Remdi Jikambo and the 
Jika Kilampi was given to me by prominent Mount Hagen businessman and Remdi big-man, Puklma 
Kopi, w ho himself played a significant role here and now enjoys warm relations with the Kilampi. Kopi 
told me that this was a com m on ploy put to use successfully by imaginative leaders in the past, but current 
leaders are sometimes slow to realise the importance o f  making friendly gestures towards minor enemies 
when confronted with the prospect o f  full-scale war against major or traditional enemies (Puklma 1994: 
personal communication).
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there were nearly equal num ber o f deaths on both sides (see Table 5.2) suggests that debts in 
reciprocal killings were settled. A church-sponsored peace settlement was endorsed by leaders 
on both sides and the war was ended in 1989.
However, the process towards accepting the eventual peace settlement was initiated well before 
the missions stepped in. Prom inent individuals, mostly businessmen and senior government 
employees, related by cross-cutting kin-networks, m et on a regular basis in Port Moresby. One 
o f  the M inembi leaders who was principally held responsible for the pub incident, which initially 
triggered the war, has strong personal connections with im portant Remdi Jikambo leaders 
through marriage. Also, his Nambka clan has marriage and moka ties with the Jikambo clan. In 
this regard, the war was viewed by many people as an unfortunate, if  not shameful, event which 
threatened to destroy these special ties. In fact, when an attempt was made on his life at M ount 
Ambra, whilst travelling to M ount Hagen town for work, many Jikambo leaders realised that 
they would have caused the death o f the husband o f their sister and father o f her young 
children. A fter the attem pt he transferred to Port Moresby, where he was allowed to attend 
those meetings between Remdi and Minembi leaders. The key individuals here were two PN G  
Defence Force employees, both commissioned officers: one with the rank o f Captain, a 
Nambka clansman who recently resigned with the rank o f a Major in 1996 to contest the 1997 
national elections; and the other a Jikambo clansman who is currently a Captain in the army. The 
officers were linked by both work and cross-cutting kinship ties. O n this basis, they were able to 
attract prom inent individuals from both Remdi and Minembi to attend informal weekend 
gatherings at their army barracks residential premises. The gatherings were in the form o f 
barbeques and mumus and were mostly family events, but would invariably coincide with the visit 
o f one o r more leaders from home. The fact that these meetings were conducted inside military 
establishments with visible security precautions such as entry check-points meant that visitors, 
despite their backgrounds, felt quite comfortable8.1 personally know both officers quite well and 
was invited to  several o f those gatherings in which the conversation, despite the absence o f any 
set-agenda, always revolved around the war: dealing with questions such as why they fought, and 
how to stop i t  It was clear to me that these two officers, for different reasons, were rebuilding I
I certainly had confidence in both their intentions and in the security offered by the military establishment; 
although in one instance I may have been saved by the Nambka army captain from possible harm. I was 
in his house one evening when some o f his clansmen who were visiting from Hagen inquired about me 
and he told them  to leave me alone. Whilst my own group, the Kawelka, were never directly involved with 
the Nambka, they were nonetheless enemies by virtue o f the ‘fight partnership’ system, which made me 
an enemy by extension. The danger was more real than apparent because I later learnt to my horror that 
some Kawelka had assisted the Remdi in at least one battle against the Nambka and they were more 
fearful than I, even in 1992, long before the war was over. On this occasion, I was doing some research 
for the PNG Electoral Commission and visited Minembi territory for the first time in over ten years. 
Although I was accompanied by the same PN G D F officer, my tribesmen (about five men) whom I took 
with me were so petrified that they almost wet themselves. It was their first time, too, in ova- a decade 
since they last entered Minembi territory and came face to face with the enemy.
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bridges between themselves and their groups, the Jikambo and Nambka, both elpukl rma, or 
owners o f  the war. W ithout doubt, the heavy burden o f responsibility for losses sustained by 
respective allies was a factor in their calculation, but they were also worried about re-establishing 
ties. Indeed, an im portant point frequently raised in these meetings and later taken up by leaders 
in Hagen was that although gun warfare had caused far too much damage and cut o ff relatives 
on both sides, efforts towards restoring ties should be made so that people could “see each 
other’s free” again, especially those o f daughters and sisters and their children (and they in turn 
would see their fathers, brothers and uncles). I now turn to  the second case on warfare, before 
making some general statements about Hagen warfare.
Case 2: T he Kawelka-M inembi War (1986-1990)
The Kawelka and Minembi are traditionally major enemies. Kawelka sections have either 
individually or collectively fought against Minembi clans in pre-colonial times. The 1986-1990 
conflict was triggered o ff by an incident involving a Kawelka Kundmbo man who died inside 
M inembi Elyipi territory under dubious circumstances. Although apparently intoxicated with 
alcohol at the time o f his death, and the cause o f death was never established, Kawelka 
suspected foul play and demanded compensation. Denying responsibility, Minembi refused to 
pay what they considered was a hefty compensation claim, and Kawelka, obviously angered by 
this treatment, declared war on the Elyipi clan. In the ensuing war, involving nearly five years o f 
brutal deaths and massive destruction o f property, a section o f Minembi was routed, but not 
w ithout substantial loss o f life and property to  Kawelka and its allies. Compared with previous 
wars, informants claimed that the loss o f  life and property in this particular war was unusually 
high, something which has been directly attributed to the adoption o f western technological 
innovations in the form o f guns and m otor vehicles used mainly for the movement o f troops 
and equipm ent
The el pukl wua (‘fight root man5), or ‘owners’ o f the fight, were the Kawelka Kundmbo and 
M inembi Elyipi clans. The Kundmbo were supported by other Kawelka dans, chiefly Membo 
and, to  a lesser extent, Mandembo. They also coopted the services o f Kopi, Kimbo and 
Klamakae. All o f these groups fought as major allies o f Kundmbo.
The historical military situation is that M embo and Mandembo have paired against the 
Kundm bo-Kim bo pair in m inor warfare but combined against Minembi in major warfare during 
pre-colonial times. The Kimbo are structurally part o f the Minembi but have in the past fought 
against other M inembi dans and are currently in close association with both Kundmbo and 
K opi, with whom  they are paired together and linked idiomatically as Kopi-Kimbo rakl ( a 
‘pairi), in the same way that dan-pairs are described. The Klamakae have in the past fought 
against the M embo in m inor warfare but are now closely associated through intermarriage and
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moka exchanges. All o f these groups, including Kimbo (which is a more recent inclusion), are 
part o f a larger but rather loosely organised group called Raembka (see Chapter Three, see also A.J. 
Strathem  1984; Ketan 1996).
Some assistance was received from the Raembka confederacy, but not in a concerted effort 
And, those w ho came forward to provide assistance did so on individual basis and mostly in a 
non-fighting capacity, because m ost Raembka groups remained neutral in principle. However, 
Kawelka had a solid fighting partnership with the Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes who were 
engaged in active warfare with a section o f the Minembi during the same period (see Case 1 in 
this chapter).
lik e  K undm bo, the Minembi Elyipi clan was assisted by other Minembi clans, mainly Papeke, 
Engam bo, Kom onka and Ruprupkae. They were also supported by die Nguni tribe. The 
historical military situation is that the Papeke-Elyipi are paired, having descended from a pair o f 
brothers, Romnggukl and Waep, and whilst the two have not fought between themselves, there 
were causes o f enmity between them which prevented them from being close allies during the 
sequences o f warfare within living memory (A.J. Strathem 1966b:60-61). The Elyipi are currently 
in close association with the Tepuka Kengeke, with which they have intense intermarriage and 
frequent moka exchanges. An explanation for this may be found in that in pre-colonial warfare 
the Elyipi were attacked by the Numereng section o f the Engambo dan  and driven out from  
their old territory at Krapana where the Engambo now are. The Elyipi, as a result were scattered 
and later reform ed in a new territory granted them by the Tepuka Kengeke, hence the Elyipi- 
Kengeke alliance which subsequendy developed across the supposed el paruka disjunction 
between Tepuka and Minembi (A.J. Strathem 1966b:60). The Komonka-Ruprupkae pair have 
fought against the Kawelka Membo with the small Klamakae tribe hdping them  as their 
neighbours (A.J. Strathem 1966b:63). The Minembi-Nguni association appears to be a more 
recent formation, founded largely on common military grounds.
Both the Kombukla and Welyi were m inor allies o f the Minembi and assisted in a largely non­
fighting capacity. In addition to supplying resources towards the Minembi war effort, these 
tribes also allowed Minembi to set up road-blocks within their territories, which resulted in at 
least two Kawelka deaths. Road-blocks were a key tactic, considering the fact that Kawelka 
warriors residing at Kuk had to travel all the way to Mbukl and into the Baiyer Valley to fight 
Along the way, they had to somehow pass Kombukla and Welyi territories w ithout encountering 
road-blocks. The journeys were always made at night, leaving Kuk after 10.00 p.m. and reaching 
K otna before dawn. H alf the journey would be covered by vehicles in less than two hours but 
after Penga it became difficult for vehicles because o f road-blocks at the Kuiya bridge and other 
similarly strategic locations within Welyi territory. A common route taken was to  follow the
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Highlands Highway down to K indeng and across to Kondapena, or alternatively to cross over 
the suspension bridge near Rukmump and into Roklaka~Waklupka territory, and from there 
follow the old highway back to  Penga and try to sneak past Welyi territory in the early hours o f 
the morning. O nce past Kotna, they were into Tepuka territory (although they were often wary 
o f possible danger in Kengeke territory because o f the Elyipi-Kengeke alliance). The M ount 
Am bra-Kotna road, although it is more direct and takes considerably less time to reach Penga, 
was deliberately avoided because more than two-thirds o f the distance is within Kombukla 
territory. The Kombukla were viewed by the Kawelka as an active ally o f the Minembi whilst the 
Welyi were considered as, at the m ost, sympathetic towards die Minembi.
Overall, it was an extremely difficult war, especially for the Kawelka, in the sense that these long 
journeys, coupled with shortage o f food supply and cartridges, put enormous pressure on the 
warriors whose task was to drive out the Minembi from Tiki while at the same time protecting 
their own territories, m ost o f which lie in difficult terrain on the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer divide. 
Initially, many people from within the Raembka alliance provided food and cash but as the war 
progressed further it became especially difficult to maintain such support. As a result, many 
warriors who returned to Kuk showed signs o f malnutrition, having suffered from lack o f food 
and fatigue. Many o f them  were reluctant to go back to Mbukl, often openly expressing anger at 
other members o f the community, blaming them for lack o f  support A few even demanded that 
fellow clansmen and their families contribute towards trips taken to Port Moresby, ostensibly to 
purchase m ore powerful guns and cartridges. Those who did make it to Port Moresby often 
boasted o f almost single-handedly driving out the enemy and demanded that Port Moresby- 
based clansmen supply food and beer for themselves (so that they could regain weight and 
strength) and cash for guns and cartridges. A t first the Port Moresby-based clansmen felt 
obligated towards these warriors, whom they considered as protectors o f their territorial rights 
back hom e, and tolerated their excesses and outrageous demands, but as time went on, they 
came to  realise that some o f these ‘great warriors’ were selfishly exploiting the kinship system for 
personal gain9. Although a few o f the visitors were in fact warriors with genuine intentions, the 
others were ‘businessmen’ looking to make a quick profit from re-selling communally purchased 
cartridges (see discussion on Economics of Gun Warfare). Once this im portant source o f resources 
was cut o ff as a direct consequence o f human greed it became extremely difficult to maintain the
It is significant to note that the exploitation o f the kinship system for personal gain follows a common 
trend in which urbanites feel that their rural counterparts make far too many demands on them without 
reciprocal action. The system is supposed to be mutually beneficial in the sense that clansmen who come 
on visits to urban centres like Port Moresby are given shelter, food and cash by their urban-dwelling 
kinsmen and when the urbanites return home for visits they are supposed to be taken care o f by their 
rural kinsmen. However, this does not seem to be the case any more. It has become a largely one-way 
process, where many urbanites have complained o f clansmen who have foiled to reciprocate and, 
moreover, are resentful o f people who not only foil to reciprocate but also expect and often ask for cash 
when they visit home.
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war effort back hom e and it was only a m atter o f time before other options, too, became 
exhausted, thus bringing the war to conclusion in 1990.
As previously m entioned in the Remdi-Minembi case, here too was a notable absence o f state 
involvem ent A part from  instances where state agencies’ involvement was specifically requested 
by the com batants, the state generally failed to  take control o f the situation in an authoritative 
m anner, even where opportunity presented itself. The state’s incapacity was emphasised by its 
apparent failures in at least two accessions when police action was requested.
The first occurred in January 1987 when the Kawelka and their allies invited the then Provincial 
Police Commander, Robert K oras, and his deputy, Jeffeny Kera, to attend a wrn paka funeral 
ceremony at M bukl It was a public ceremony attended by several hundred people, including 
leaders from  neutral groups, who came especially to see if  the police would take some kind o f 
action against those responsible for the killing o f a Kawelka Kundmbo man (which triggered the 
war). W hilst both K oras and Kera were personally in favour o f a peaceful settlement and 
prom ised that some sort o f action would be taken, they were unable to back their words because 
o f  lack o f resources and eventually the rugged nature o f the terrain and Minembi’s unwillingness 
to hand over the alleged killer conspired against the officers.
The second incident occurred in July 1989 when a Church-sponsored trace was violated by the 
Minembi through the killing o f a Kawelka Kundmbo man, K upakl Prior to and possibly 
because o f the higher priority o f the W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent elections in 
June 1988, leaders from both sides agreed to a peace proposal jointly submitted by the Lutheran 
and Catholic churches (in consultation with the Provincial Peace and G ood O rder Committee). 
The trace ceremony was witnessed by representatives from missions, the Provincial 
G overnm ent and members o f the Police D epartm ent W hilst the details o f the agreement were 
no t available, it was, nonetheless, evident from the speeches made at Kupakl’s funeral ceremony 
that representatives from both Kawelka and Minembi had signed the agreement pledging that 
they would take responsibility for any violation o f the trace. Precisely what course o f action 
would be taken in the instance o f trace violation, it seems, was not stated in the agreement, 
because that proved to be a point o f contention in the debates that followed. Since the final 
peace settlement, which signals the conclusion o f war, was never held, the Minembi, who 
obviously felt that the debts in reciprocal killings had not been balanced, set up the road-block at 
Kenimba (inside Kombukla territory) in which the Kundmbo man was killed (see Election Case II: 
1995 Western Highlands Provincial Election!). Consequently, the Kawelka invited provincial 
governm ent officials and the Provincial Police Commander to attend the funeral ceremony at 
Knk-Rimgamiiridi village in an attem pt to  press home the point that Minembi had violated a 
state-sanctioned truce.
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The significance o f die truce agreement, or lack o f it, was questioned by many speakers who 
wanted to know what course o f action the state was going to take. This point was clearly 
expressed by die Jika Kilampi councillor, David Maip, who said:
This agreement that you [state representatives] made them [Kawdka and Minembi 
leaders] sign, what kind of agreement is it? Does it empower you to take [punitive] 
action against those who have violated it? If it does, then you should send the police in 
to take appropriate action [raid villages, apprehend the killers, and take the leaders into 
custody]. When you made that agreement, what kind of power did you have? You 
should now use that power against the violators [Minembi] (Ketan 1989b).
Although the then Acting Provincial Secretary, Oseah John10 *, and the Provincial Police 
Commander, Samson Mapi, were quite sympathetic and promised to look into the matter, it was 
obvious that their investigations were hampered by lack o f resources. In the end no action was 
taken and the groups returned to take up where they left off. Hostile relations were maintained 
until 1990 when a peace settlement was finally reached Between 1986 and 1990, a total o f about 
forty wamors were killed, twenty from Kawelka and its allies and about the same number from 
Minembi11. M ost o f these deaths resulted from raids and ambushes. Batdefields, as mentioned 
earlier, were abandoned soon after guns were introduced into this war during the eady part o f 
1987. The reasons for the change o f tactics, from batdefields to raids and ambushes, are 
discussed later in this chapter (see The Adoption of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen 
Warfare). The unusually high number o f deaths on both sides has been attributed to the change 
in tactics and the use o f guns. A laige majority o f deaths on the Kawelka side, for example, 
resulted from cartridge wounds and nearly all, except Kupakl and a young Membo man, were 
victims o f enemy raids and ambushes.
Oseah John, a devout Christian with exceptionally high work ethics, often went beyond the call o f duty to 
assist in restoring order in conflict situations throughout Western Highlands, but without the support o f 
local public servants and the police force, his efforts almost inevitably foiled to bear much success.
The number o f women and children killed during this war is unknown. Considering that the war had been 
fought outside o f the batdefields, casualties o f war, especially in raids, did include non-combatants, which 
means that the total number o f deaths on both sides is much higher than the figures given here.
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T able 5.3: W ar D eaths: K aw elka-M inem bi W ar (1986-1990)
Kawelka &  Allies No. of Deaths Minembi No. of Deaths
Kawelka Membo 5 all clans c.20
Kawelka Kundmbo 5 Nguni c.5
Others 1
Kopon Kopi 4
Minembi Kimbo 3
Klamakae 2
Kurupmbo-Klambo 0
Total '2 0 c.25
Source: Based on information supplied by Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla Village, Mount Hagen.
Noie: Informants maintain that the Kawelka Kurupmbo-Klambo clan-pair did not lose any men because only a
handful took part in the war. Membo and Kundmbo were the major participants. A  Kumdi Oynamb 
man, listed above as ‘other’, married into the Membo clan and residing at Kuk, was killed while fighting on 
the Kawelka side.
I have excluded actual names o f individuals elsewhere but, here, owing to its relevance to the
discussion on compensation, the names of war dead are listed.
T ab le 5.4: A breakdow n o f Kawelka and  allies deaths, by group (clan and  tribe).
Kawelka Membo Kawelka Kundmbo Kopi Minembi Kimbo Klamakae
Pengk Kakl Palim Kuri Mok Tu Ken Kewa
Kumi Karl Kel Raem Pot Kuri Kerow Kupri
Ketipa Raklpa John Pangk Koim Mok Ketipa
Wump Pengk^ Umdi Romba Wanga’s bro
Ruk Tiki Kupakl^
Nopa^
6 5 4 3 2
Source: Based on information supplied by Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla Village, Mount Hagen.
1. Originally o f  the Kumdi Oynamb clan but residing with his Kawelka Membo wife inside Kawelka territory 
at the time o f  his death. H e fought as a Kawelka against Minembi and may have faced fellow Kumdi 
tribesmen at som e stage o f  the war. His clan received mostly pigs as compensation from the Kawelka.
2. All o f  these, except Kupakl and Wump, were warriors killed in action or 'line o f  duty'. Kupakl was killed in 
an enemy road-block whilst travelling from Kuk to Mbukl on the Kotna-Tiki road, whilst Wump (who 
lost his father, Pengk, in an enemy raid only weeks earlier) was killed in an enemy road-block on the 
Hagen-Baiyer-Tiki road.
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The Adoption of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare
An overwhelming majority o f deaths on both sides resulted not from pitched batdes, as we 
would expect from  normal Hagen warfare, where opposing troops are arranged in prepared 
positions on pre-arranged set battlefields, but from pre-dawn raids and ambushes. W hat made 
this an unusual war was the role played by politicians and the way in which new resources, or 
W estern technological innovations, dramatically altered the pattern o f warfare, specifically in 
term s o f com bat strategies and their effect on both combatants and non-combatants. As will 
becom e dear in the next chapter, politicians and their henchmen, as part o f electoral 
manoeuvring, are some o f the major suppliers o f guns and cartridges used in warfare (see Chapter 
Six; see also A J. Strathem 1993). They are also known to have supplied vehicles used in raids 
and the general movement o f troops, as well as giving financial and other aid to victims o f war.
The use o f guns in particular has added an extremely dangerous dimension to Hagen warfare, 
resulting in m ore fatalities because o f a general shift in emphasis from one largely based on 
display and adornm ent to that o f ambush and slaughter. The adoption o f guns in warfare has 
m eant that batdes fought with bow and arrows on designated fields, watched by neutral 
spectators, is now a thing o f the past W hilst pre-gun batdes were serious confrontations and 
should no t be compared to football matches, it is im portant to  realise that firstly warriors in war 
dress were on display, both as a group exhibiting tribal might as well as individual fighting 
prowess, and secondly, the chances o f dying from  arrow wounds were quite minimal In fact, 
many have survived from injuries inflicted by arrows. And, furthermore, as noted by Muke, “in 
traditional [pre-gun, o r bow and arrow] fights, only a few men were killed in a single encounter 
and in some instances, the war lasted for several m onths or even years without war deaths” 
(1994:112). Hagen battle scenes are characterised by weaving and dodging combatants so it is 
almost impossible to target the heart o f someone in perpetual m otion, even by com petent 
marksmen.
However, it is also im portant to m ention that combatants can die from such battles. According 
to  accounts o f warfare given to me by Hagen informants, deaths on a battlefield occur when one 
group is forced by the other to withdraw. If  the weaker group withdraws in a structured manner, 
where die front-line shield-men and their archers’ withdrawal is covered by the flank archers, 
deaths can be avoided, and they can regroup to fight again or call it o ff till another day. If, 
however, they receive no such cover and flee, deaths cannot be avoided because they will be 
easy targets fo r enemy archers and spearmen (who are also shield carriers). In such situations, the 
seriously injured can be left behind with no protection. Here shield-men are very im portant 
because they can save their stricken comrades from being hacked to death. By planting a shield 
firmly on the ground in front o f the stricken man and at the same time holding o ff the pursuing
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enemy with an axe o r spear can buy precious minutes in which the wounded can be rescued by 
fellow kinsmen. But if  no such rescue team o r backup is forthcoming, the shield-man m ust 
abandon the rescue attem pt and try to save himself, o r he, too, will be hacked to death. It is 
because o f this possibility that brothers, fathers and sons, and cousins fight side by side in battle. 
It is said that only an immediate relative, or in special cases, a good friend, will come back to 
rescue you when you’re facing die axe. Even if  one is already dead from an arrow or spear 
wound, relatives will still try and save the body from being hacked12. This is because a mutilated 
o r disfigured body has a particularly demoralising effect on warriors. Younger and inexperienced 
warriors, therefore, are never allowed near a hacked body. Likewise, immediate relatives, 
especially women and children o f the deceased, will be prevented from seeing the body, in the 
hope that it will no t add to their anguish and he will be remembered as he was before the battle.
O n the other hand, men who have used an axe to kill in battle are described as those V ithout 
spirits/souls* (min pi-napetim), or with 'dead blood’ in their veins (mema kurum). It is a highly 
specialised task, handled by a very few and only by those who have the stomach for the job, or 
the killer instinct It is said that they have permanent bloodshot eyes, from having seen too 
much blood, and generally avoid pork because a butchered pig reminds them o f exposed human 
flesh. Their axes are jealously guarded and women and children are forbidden from touching 
them  for fear o f retaliation from the spirits o f the victims. Such men are generally despotic in 
nature and are both feared and admired by other members o f their groups13. While the power 
relations between warriors such as those mentioned above and other members o f society are 
discussed in the section on the Context of headers in Warfare, here I turn to the history o f guns and 
the effects o f gun warfare.
Guns were first introduced into Hagen warfare in 1986 during intra-sectional fighting within the 
Jika in Hagen Central, but soon spread to other areas in inter-group conflicts, such as Dei 
(Remdi-Minembi; Kawelka-Minembi); Nebilyer (Kuklga-Uklga); and South Wahgi (Konumbka- 
Kondika). Guns are passed from one conflict to another through social networks, just the same 
way in which dance costumes and head-dress do in times o f moka and other festivities. Both 
guns and dance costumes, especially the kei wal head-dress (which are largely made o f Raggiana 
and King of Saxony sprays), are valued scarce resources. Ownership o f the kei wal, for example, is 
limited to enterprising individuals who loan them out to members o f a group staging a dance. 
A fter the dance, pigs will be killed and choice pork bits and, in many instances, cash will be 
presented to  owners o f the kei wal Similarly, owners o f guns will be rewarded with pigs and
«  Reciprocal hacking exists where fighting is especially brutal and only between major enemies. In less brutal
encounters, the bodies o f warriors killed with arrows or spears are left behind on the battlefield for neutral 
groups to collect and return to respective groups for funeral ceremonies.
13. Georg F. Vicedom mentioned such a man called FCo o f the Yamka tribe (1983[1943-48], Vol.l:78-82).
The Dynamics of Hagen Warfare 1 6 8
cash, o r votes in some instances, for guns used in warfare. Initially, when guns were in short 
supply, owners regularly loaned them  out for cash payments. The same guns used in warfare 
were also used in armed robberies, thus making it difficult for law enforcem ent agencies to 
apprehend criminals because o f their value as warriors to their groups. In a few cases, owners o f 
powerful guns were allegedly hired as mercenaries to fight in other people's wars. In the Wahgi 
‘border war*, for instance, I was told by South Wahgi informants that mercenaries fought for 
wom en in addition to cash and other economic resources. In the Kondika-Konumbka war, 
Muke (1994) m entioned the involvement o f mercenaries from Hagen. And, during the Remdi- 
M inembi war, it was reported that a D aru man fought on the Minembi side while some Engans 
and Simbus fought on the Remdi side. The hiring o f warriors, or mercenary killers, does not 
seem to be a new phenom ena, as it is evident from G eorg Vicedom's description o f a man 
called K o o f the Yamka tribe who claimed that:
W hen the K uth jK ulij fought* their brothers said to  me: K ill K etla [Kelij Pora, this rich 
m an, fo r us. Y ou are the m an w ho kills people. W e do  n o t ask m ore o f  you. O nly kill 
this one fo r us. I  joined up w ith tw o m en o f  the Kerne. W e w ent and killed the m an.
T h e K etla [Kelij, how ever, cam e and asked [for] com pensation. I paid them  a string o f 
cow rie shells and  m y Jam ka (Yamka] added som ething else. T he K uth (KuliJ, how ever, 
killed pigs [and] gave us the m eat and paid also w ith valuables. This I took  and 
distributed am ongst m y people. I  kept only one cow rie string and som e m eat for m yself 
(V icedom and T ischner 1983 [1943-48], VoLl.81).
The life history o f Yamka Ko suggests that he was o f a despotic nature and was both feared and 
admired by the people. I take up his story latter in this chapter (see Context of Leadership in 
Warfare).
Presently every clan has its own collection o f guns, which means that any group in conflict with 
another o f comparable size can hold its own in war. But the battles, such as the one described 
earlier, are no longer possible. Battles have been replaced by raids and ambushes.
Traditional battle formation, involving shield-men in the front-line with archers fighting out o f 
the wings and returning for cover behind the shield formation, was no longer possible because 
shield-men could no t defend against guns which can easily penetrate the wooden shields. In 
both the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi wars the principal battlefields o f Tenga and 
Golke, respectively, were abandoned after the first shots were fired. Some tried corrugated 
roofing metal sheets for shields but these, too, proved ineffective against guns. In South Wahgi, 
John Muke, who observed the Konumbka-Kondika war in which guns were introduced in 
September 1989, reported that:
...shield carriers are sitting ducks during gun warfare: the K ondika lost seven m en in 
tw o set piece m oves w ithin a  single week. T hree w ere sho t in  one set piece m ove and 
four w ere sho t in  another form al co m b at A ll o f  them  w ere shield earners (Muke 
1994:254).
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The devastating im pact o f guns on shields and men resulted in the transition from battlefields to 
raids and ambushes. A typical raid would involve five to ten young warriors sneaking into enemy 
territory, under the cover o f darkness during the early hours o f die morning» and killing anyone 
found before returning home. In the Kawelka-Minembi case, for instance, I was told that young 
w am ors from  Kawelka and its Kopi-Kimbo allied groups would travel from Tiki, cross over the 
Miti K u m ountains, through Minembi territories, and follow the ridge into Remdi territories at 
Muglamp. Similarly, M inembi and Nguni warriors would sneak into Kawelka, K opi and Kimbo 
territories in their search-and-destroy missions, and in one particular instance, killed three 
Kawelka at their M ope territories. A similar pattern o f warfare was observed in South Wahgi, 
during the Konumbka-Kondika war, where Muke (1994) reported that:
After the loss of seven men within a single week die Kondika abandoned the idea of 
carrying wooden shields. A similar shock-wave was generated throughout the 
Konumbka fighting forces. The ‘fight husbands’ and the bone shield men’ felt reluctant 
to go in the front-line. From mid December 1989 to January 1990, the Kondika used 
ambush tactics instead. The traditional battlefields were abandoned and some of the 
Kondika young warriors formed gangs and made a number of raids into Konumbka 
territory around Minj town from strategically convenient places. The war was now in 
the hands of the young men and they conducted a kind of war without any rules at all 
(Muke 1994:255).
Muke’s point on rules o f warfare is a significant one because in these seek-and-destroy missions 
young men are known to have been involved in indiscriminate killing —  o f both combatants 
and non-com batants, including women and children —  which is not a feature o f traditional 
Hagen warfare. In a particular raid, for instance, I was told that a woman was killed and a couple 
o f  young boys, both under ten years, were almost killed, but were saved by an older member o f 
the raiding party. H e pleaded with the younger members o f his team not to kill the boys and was 
allowed to bring them back with him14. This is perhaps the only instance in which a traditional 
rule on prohibition against the killing o f women and children was observed, mainly because o f 
die presence o f an older man who still believed in the rules o f warfare. Otherwise, both the 
Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi wars indicate characteristics o f unrestricted warfare, 
such as those o f traditional Eastern Highlands warfare (see Feil 1987: Chap.4). Following 
Langness (1972), D .K. Feil makes a useful distinction between types o f warfare in the Highlands: 
die practice o f unrestricted warfare in eastern highlands and restricted warfare in western 
highlands societies. Unrestricted warfare, according to Feil (1987:68), “is waged in the total 
absence o f  ‘rules’ and no t invariably linked to specific incidents o r motives. It is general, 
pervasive and perpetual warfare between groups more corporate than those that wage restricted 
warfare.” H e further suggested that “this ‘absence o f rules’ involves, among other things, a less
One o f die boys was given to a man as a replacement for his own son who was killed by the enemy, while 
the other was raised by the man who saved their lives. They lived amongst the enemy for die duration o f 
the war and were only recently returned after negotiations initiated by the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG).
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complex and interlocking set o f constraints on individual choice determining participation in a 
given war, such that m ore united and corporate fighting units can wage war” (ibid). For 
ethnographical accounts o f unrestricted warfare in Eastern Highlands societies, see J. W atson 
(1983) on Tairora; see also Langness (1964) on Bena Bena; Read (1955) on Gahuku-Gama; and 
Robbins (1982) on Auyana. For accounts o f restricted warfare in the W estern Highlands, see 
Brandewie (1981) on the Kumdi o f W estern Melpa; see also Reay (1959) and especially Muke 
(1994) on the Kuma o f South Wahgi; and A.J. Strathem (1971) on the N orthern Melpa.
In  gun warfare, it is mostly young men with knowledge o f guns who organise raids and set 14) 
ambushes for counter-raids. The ‘traditional’ big-men who played a general’s role in pre-gun 
warfare have little o r no say at all in these matters, which indicates that guns have also affected 
the balance o f power, a significant point to which I shall return to later. But, here, I discuss the 
economics o f gun warfare.
The Economics of Gun Warfare
Some o f the costs o f warfare, such as loss o f human lives and destruction o f property, are more 
obvious than others as a result o f mass-media coverage and people can more easily relate to 
them  because o f physical o r tangible evidence. O ther costs, by contrast, are not so obvious 
principally because o f problems in quantifying and sometimes it is difficult to put a price on 
things like psychological effects o f warfare. However, by establishing the cost o f guns and 
cartridges used in warfare during specified periods in relation to major source o f income, it is 
possible to  get some impression o f the economics o f gun warfare.
In 1987, when guns were introduced into a number o f conflicts in Hagen, a colleague and I were 
told that an average clan o f 100-200 fighting men out o f a total population o f 2,000-5,000 
persons would have 20-50 guns (both factory-made and home-made). A particular dan, which 
has an exceptionally laige num ber o f its members in the disciplined forces (military and police) 
as well as other key positions in government (both politicians and public servants) as well as the 
private sector, was claimed to have more than 50 guns, including a num ber o f high-powered 
semi-automatic weapons. Many others with smaller populations were said to have fewer than ten 
guns each. We were also told that during heavy fighting periods, o f up to a week or more in 
certain cases, a gun-man can fire as many as twenty cartridges in a single day. Since cartridges are 
scarce and costly, at a retail price o f K2.50 per cartridge and at a black-market price o f K5.00 per 
cartridge, we estimated that one gun-man could fire an average o f twenty cartridges in one week. 
If, however, in the unlikely event that he did fire up to 20 cartridges per day for seven days o r 
m ore, he would m ost likely end up firing blank shots, getting himself killed, or bankrupting his 
group. I shall return to this point later but first a word on the num ber o f guns.
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As it is customary for Hageners to deliberately inflate figures as part o f war propaganda, we 
reached a conclusion that a more accurate figure would be ten guns per clan. That would have 
been a more likely figure in 1987. But soon after that, many clans sent out representatives, with 
thousands o f  kina, to purchase guns mainly from criminal gangs in Port Moresby and Lae. Some 
buyers came as far as Australia and, according to Hagen informants, several returned to Hagen 
(via Torres Strait) with guns. A more likely figure, thus, would be 50 guns per clan (c.5,000 
persons). At K250 black-market price, 50 single-shot guns work out to K12,500 per clan. High- 
powered self-loading rifles and semi-automatic weapons would, o f course, cost a lot more than 
that.
Despite restrictions on cartridge sales in 1986 and 1987, cartridges were easily available from 
Chinese shops at Boroko, National Capital District, for K2.50 per shot-gun cartridge, and could 
be transported to Mount Hagen without much trouble at all. At more than K5.00 per cartridge 
on the black-market, businessmen and others saw this as an opportunity and freighted in 
thousands o f kina worth o f cartridges. One particular 'businessman*, a Kawelka Membo 
clansman, who profited from the Kawelka-Minembi war by selling cartridges to his own 
clansmen at a high price, was caught at Jacksons Airport in 1989 and jailed, but later escaped 
from police custody while being transported to the Boroko District Court house.
Based on an estimate o f 50 guns per clan and cartridges at K5.00 black-market price, held 
constant, and the number o f shots and the number o f days, treated as variables, the cost o f 
cartridges, in PN G  Kina, can be worked out in the following manner (see Table 5.5).
T able 5.5: T he cost o f cartridges
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Variables 1 shot 5 shots 10 shots 20 shots
1 day 250 1,250 2,500 5,000
1 week (7 days) 1,750 8,750 35,000
1 month (30 days) 7,500 37,500 75,000 150,000
1 year (365 days) 91,250 456,250 912,000 1,825,000
A single shot per day is tactically impossible because the initial confrontations before the 
abandonment o f battlefields most certainly would have required more than one shot fired from 
each gun. Even in raids gun-men would rarely be restricted to a single cartridge each. 
Conversely, each gun-man could fire 20 shots in a single battle, but a raid would not require that 
many shots, except in the instance o f being ambushed while out on a raid. In such a scenario —  
where each gun-man fired 20 rounds —  a single day's fighting would cost K5,000, and K35,000 
if the trend continued for a week, while one month's cost would be K150,000. If the intensity 
was continued for a year, it would cost a staggering 1.8 million kina, but that is practically
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impossible, even if  guns were rotated amongst any combination o f men. However, 10-20 shots 
fired by each gun-man, each day for a m onth o r m ore, is possible but would still cost between 
K75,000 and K150,000, which is a lot o f money and almost impossible to raise during a war. If  
cartridges for just a single m onth cost that much money, imagine how much it would cost in five 
years, in addition to food, transport, and the cost to property. Apart from the cost o f property 
damaged by the war, the war effort alone would have cost at least one million kina each year. 
H ow  was the money raised?
A t first regular collections were made, but once the coffee trees, due to years o f neglect, stopped 
beating cherries, people were forced into alternative crops. Food crops are an alternative to 
coffee but marketing was a problem. People travelling to and returning from markets can be 
easy targets for enemy patrols. Eventually, many people resorted to the cultivation and sale o f 
marijuana crops. Large gardens o f the drug were cultivated, usually under coffee trees or 
amongst other crops such as bananas, and the product was flown into Port Moresby where it 
was sold to mostly expatriate dealers but also to middlemen (mostly educated nationals with 
overseas connections). Highlands-grown marijuana is reputed to be o f a distinctively high quality 
and is in great demand on overseas black-markets.15 Compared with coffee, marijuana fetches 
good money (according to one police source, between K300 to K500 per kilogram)16 but 
because o f harsh penalties, many people were scared and it is mostly young men who were —  
and still are —  actually involved in the trade. W hilst individual cultivators claimed that income 
derived from die sale o f the drug is solely for the war effort and are therefore protected from the 
police, some young men (like our cartridges-smuggling ‘businessman’ mentioned earlier) were 
greedy and often kept the money for themselves, telling their clansmen that they were unable to 
sell the product in Port Moresby. In this regard, marijuana as a source o f income for the war 
effort was not very reliable.
In contrast, a m ore reliable source o f income was provided by clansmen residing in Port 
M oresby and other parts o f the country. Boxes o f cartridges were regularly sent home and, in 
some instances, guns and cash were also sen t Among the Wahgi a similar pattern was 
continued: in one case, a clansman living overseas at the time told me that he had sent half o f his
15. According to Bruce Hams, formerly o f the Department o f Finance and Planning, PNG Hollands-grown 
marijuana, called New Guinea Gold, is in great demand on the streets o f Los Angeles (Public Lecture on 
raovka/gangs at Bomana CIS Officers’ Mess in September 1990).
16. However, as pointed out to me by Sinclair Dinnen, it is extremely difficult to generalise about the price o f 
marijuana. It is mainly dependent on a number o f factors, including geographical location, social relations, 
type o f market (such as local vis-a-vis international), and seasonal availability o f cash (for example, during 
coffee seasons and elections). The big trade in marijuana, Dinnen says, is between the Highlands growers 
and expatriate buyers in the northern parts o f Australia, but the Americans have intercepted some o f the 
trade via Hawaii. The flow o f marijuana from PNG to Australia basically follows the same route in which 
guns and bullets travel in the opposite direction, via the Torres Strait (personal communication, August 
1996).
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annual salary towards the war effo rt But the major contributors here were politicians and 
aspiring politicians —  a m ore detailed examination o f their role is attempted in the next chapter 
(see also section on Contexts of Leadership in Warfare in this chapter).
An im portant point w orth mentioning here is in the role played by PN G  national middlemen in 
both shot-gun cartridges and marijuana businesses. The marijuana cultivator, just as the gun­
man, is an ordinary villager with no knowledge o f the international firearms and drugs trade, nor 
does his personal network extend to overseas connections. It is precisely those with overseas 
connections that profit m ost from guns and drugs. Whilst my data on the middleman is 
inconclusive, I can only speculate that those who reap considerable profits are some o f the 
country’s m ost wealthy and powerful individuals who are well-connected to take advantage o f 
such opportunities. People like our friend the village cartridge ‘businessman’ makes peanuts 
compared with w hat our elite make through illegal sale o f firearms and drugs. I now turn to the 
role o f leaders in warfare and discuss the implications o f gun warfare on Hagen leadership.
Context of Leadership in Warfare
There are a num ber o f leadership roles in Hagen warfare, just as in other aspects o f society, but a 
m ajor difference lies in the emphasis by observers. A.J. Strathem (1966b:362-365) mentioned 
two aspects o f leadership in warfare: (1) the leader’s own ability in fighting; and (2) his 
judgement on when to make war and peace. J.D . Muke (1994:Chap.3) presents a cycle o f Wahgi 
warfare comprising five stages, ranging from war preparations to peace settlement and festivities, 
in which any one o f the stages would require leadership roles (although Muke was not quite 
explicit here). I have presented a similar cycle elsewhere (Ketan 1989a). I explore some o f these 
aspects o f  leadership in the context o f gun warfare and extend the discussion to leadership roles 
in rituals on war deaths. A major aim here is to assess the level o f change and /or continuity in 
aspects o f leadership in Hagen warfare. It basically follows the model o f Hagen warfare I have 
sketched below:
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Figure 5.3: A G eneral M odel o f H agen  W arfare
Source: Based on Ketan (1989a) and Muke (1994).
P hase I: D ispute
This is the first phase o f  a cycle in which human behaviour is governed by definite rules, and 
leadership roles are clearly marked by culture. Disputes in general arise from both perceptions of 
insult and actual assault on person. Acts o f violence resulting in loss o f blood, limb or organ, are 
serious matters which can be resolved through compensation or reciprocal acts o f violence. 
Homicide, either by design or accident, is an ultimate act o f violence which can be reciprocated 
by way o f  pay-back killing or alternatively resolved peacefully through compensation payment. 
Disputes may also arise from theft and damage o f property, sexual offences such as rape and 
adultery, and use o f someone else’s land without prior permission. In all o f these the use of 
wealth items o f  pigs and cash play an important part in determining the final outcome of
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disputes in the sense that in principle they ‘replace’ stolen or damaged property, blood spilt, and 
life taken. Compensation for property is called kumop, which Marilyn Strathem (1972) calls 
restitution17, for assault resulting in injury is called memapentetemen (‘putting back blood5), and for 
homicide is called nnta metemen (‘carrying or bearing a man5)18. However, as pointed out by A.J. 
Strathem  (1981:8), it may happen, o f course, that people choose revenge rather than 
compensation. This is particularly true in homicide cases involving groups which presently 
maintain hostile relations or have a recent history o f warfare. A.J. Strathem stated that “revenge 
is likely to be chosen only between major political enemies who also have other scores to pay 
off. T hat is, a group dimension is involved, and groups have a history o f disputes which may 
include a num ber o f loose ends waiting to be sorted out” (1981:8). The decision to choose 
revenge, o r no t to , is weighted by factors o f social propinquity (the offender’s relative position 
within the victim’s personal social network), the nature o f group relations (alliance or enmity), 
and severity o f offence19.
I f  fighting between brothers o r lineage members (‘father-and-sons5), for instance, resulted in 
severe injuries, it would not lead to armed conflict because it is within the family, and other 
members will try to prevent such fights from escalating rather than taking sides. W hen asked 
why revenge is not an option a common reply from informants is that these are family fights, 
which side shall we fight on? Homicide resulting from lineage fights are very rare and are treated 
as a major disaster.20 If, however, fighting between members o f two different tribes resulted in 
serious injuries or homicide, armed conflict was more likely than if the antagonists belonged to 
the same tribe. Armed conflict was even less likely if  the antagonists were members o f the same 
dan  o r subclan. The doser the relationship the less likely the chance o f armed conflict Bdow
17. Property compensation payments, according to AM . Strathem, fell into two main categories: (1) 
restitution, where amounts equivalent to the value o f the stolen item, damage to property or previous 
debt; were returned; and (2) reconciliation payments, which were paid when the injury had no cost in 
material terms but where a breach o f norms had to be recognised or relations brought back to some 
equilibrium (1972a;25).
18. The phrase, am  metemen, as noted by A J. Strathem (1981:7), tells us that die wealth stands in direct 
replacement o f the man who has been lost, and can be used to obtain a new group member, for example, 
by payments for a new bride who will bear children for the kin group which has received the 
compensation.
19. In his discussion o f hostile relations between the Maring groups (neighbours o f the Hagen), R A  
Rappaport reached a similar conclusion. “A violent episode between single or a few members o f a pair o f 
groups did not in all cases lead to inter-group armed conflict W hether or not it did seems to have been 
mainly dependent upon (1) the results o f the violence; and (2) the previous relations o f the two groups” 
(1984:110).
2°. Paul Sillitoe makes a similar observation among the Wola o f Mendi. During fights between relatives, 
witnesses would intervene and part them for fear o f serious injury. It is unlikely that other men will join 
in the fight, and if a dispute does escalate into a fight between the disputants’ relatives, they will tty not to 
injure seriously o r kill one another because to do so would be an unthinkable and tragic thing (Sillitoe 
1981:72).
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the clan level armed conflict is no t allowed —  and compensation is encouraged as a way o f 
resolving disputes.
However, there are instances where less-than-fatal o r minor injuries which have led to armed 
conflict between dans o f the same tribe. In the early 1980s fighting within the Kumdi tribe o f 
Mul Council was triggered by what seemed to be a minor incident, during a ceremonial dance, 
involving young boys shooting at each other with coffee beans projected from bamboo blow­
pipes. O ne o f the projectiles missed its intended target and found its mark amongst the dancers. 
A  male dancer sustained an eye injury and the alleged culprit was attacked by the victim’s 
kinsmen. The boy’s kinsmen retaliated and what seemed to be a m inor intident led to armed 
conflict, now known as the Kumdi kopi mong el (‘Kumdi coffee bean fight7). Although the 
circumstances surrounding this conflict are less understood, it is, nonetheless, clear to me that 
one o f the antagonists, the Kumdi Oynamb dan, shares with other Kumdi clans less than warm 
relations. It has, for example, a history o f warfare in which individuals have gone against tribal 
policy and fought for groups which are opposed to those in alliance with Kumdi21.
Having sketched the likely scenarios, I now turn to the question o f leadership role in disputes. 
W ho decides w hether o r not to choose revenge? How do individuals reach a decision on the 
outcome o f a decision? It is mostly big-men with knowledge o f past relations and current 
connections, through moha and marriage ties, with big-men o f other groups who influence 
decisions regarding revenge or compensation. Big-men are forceful public speakers and can 
easily persuade others to take up arms or to ask for compensation. But the decision to seek 
revenge usually takes more than sheer power o f a big-man’s words. And a decision to take up 
arms does no t instantaneously result from a single incident It is, in fact, based on a number o f 
events o r offences, to which a big-man makes reference in his elik (‘fight talk7) speeches. It is his 
ability to sum up a situation, in this case, one o f a deteriorating relations between his own and 
the offending group, that makes a big-man a powerful instigator o f war (or o f peace). In cases 
where previous transgressions have not been adequately addressed through compensation, and 
moka and marriage ties between the two groups are minimal or virtually non-existent, m ost 
people would agree that revenge should be sought for a killing. A big-man would weigh up the 
situation carefully and if  he stands to lose nothing personally and the tribe can hold its own in 
terms o f strength in numbers and nowadays firepower, or is able to draw support from its allies, 
he then proceeds to advocate armed confrontation. Since the relations between the groups, due 
to recurring negative reciprocity (reciprocal theft, assault, rape and such), has reached a point 
beyond which it can no longer be salvaged, a big-man’s suggestion to seek revenge through *
a > see, for example, Kawelka-Minembi War in which a Kumdi Oynamb clansman was killed while fighting
* on the Kawelka side. In a system o f fight partnerships {el kompam), Minembi received assistance on an 
individual basis from Kumdi, just as Kawelka did from Remdi, so a Oynamb man fighting against 
Minembi was certainly not in line with corporate or tribal interests.
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armed com bat is merely restating a view that is already collectively held. Once a decision is 
consensually reached, after each spokesman o f the different sub-groups has had his say on the 
m atter at hand, the segmentary units will be told to prepare for war.
O f course, it may be the case that they had already prepared for war and were waiting for 
som ething to trigger it off, in which case, this latest incident will be the perfect opportunity to 
engage war. Traditional war preparation is similar to that o f the South Wahgi (see Muke 1994). It 
involved wealth reduction ceremonies in which outstanding debts were repaid to potential allies, 
pig? were sacrificed to ancestors, weapons were produced, and orators released war statements at 
public gatherings (see Muke 1994:Chap.3). In each o f these exercises big-men were prominent: 
as major sponsors o f the ceremonies and as major donors in prestations; as ritual leaders in 
sacrifices to  ancestors (asking spirits o f victims to assist in avenging their deaths); as supervisors 
and advisers in the production o f weapons and keeping mental tally o f shields; and as orators in 
releasing o f war statements at public gatherings.
The influence o f Christian missions, which began operations in the eady 1930s, and the recent 
introduction o f guns have, somewhat altered this situation. Pig sacrifices to ancestors, for 
example, were stopped by the Lutheran Church. The introduction o f guns in particular has 
limited the role o f die big-men in war preparation quite considerably. Elaborate ceremonies such 
as those m entioned by Muke (1994) are no longer necessary because those who possess such 
powerful weapons believe they can do the job without the assistance o f the ancestors. A big- 
man’s role is, thus, limited to releasing war statements. Furthermore, gun-men often play a 
dom inant role in decisions regarding warfare, arguing that it is they, not the big-men, who will 
do the fighting. Also, die supervision o f weapon production (home-made guns) and purchase o f 
factory-made guns and cartridges is now handled by younger men with knowledge o f guns. In 
my view, it is only a m atter o f time before they, too, will decide when to and when not to go to 
war, thus effectively reducing the power o f big-men in war preparations.
Phase II: Compensation or Escalation?
If  we were to stricdy follow a cycle o f warfare, phase II would involve escalation o f a conflict. 
But it is im portant to recognise that compensation may positively short-circuit the process back 
to peaceful relations, thereby restoring some sort o f equilibrium. Since the various types o f 
com pensation payments are discussed separately in another section (see Compensation Payments), I 
shall only briefly present a general outline here in order to allow for a fuller treatment o f 
escalation as a sub-phase o f warfare.
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2.1: Compensation
Compensation is a powerful means through which disputes are resolved. The anger, expressed 
through the concept, popokb can only be appeased by wealth items o f pigs and cash offered as 
com pensation (see A.J. Strathem 1981; see also A M . Strathem 1972b). By paying compensation 
the pukl M ia’s (‘root man5) group accepts responsibility for the offence (theft, assault, or killing) 
and attem pts to prevent retaliation. Big-men on either side would speak for the groups: those 
representing the aggrieved party would demand compensation and speakers representing the 
pukl M ia’s group would try to shift the blame away from the group, thepukl nmds family, and try 
to  blame it on immaturity or a particular nature o f the offender such as nomanpi-napetim (lias no 
sense o f reasoning5), ndoimb ri-neri ('inadequate mental capacity5), rakra fwild5), or raskol ('rascal 
gangster5). This does not mean that they are denying responsibility, nor is it intended to infer 
insignificance o f the m atter at hand. Instead, it is a way o f telling the aggrieved party that group 
relations are far m ore im portant than the cowardly acts o f some individuals and efforts will be 
made to restore some equilibrium. A t the same time, the speakers on the pukl m ta’s side will try 
to persuade the pukl M ia’s family to come up with a reasonable size compensation payment, one 
that would no t only 'fit the crime5 but also take care o f the popokl factor, thus removing the need 
for retaliation. It may follow Marilyn Strathem’s scheme: "where restitution was demanded 
reconciliation items might be added to the original am ount Thus after the theft o f a pig, the 
th ief would return a similar pig (kumop, restitution) and then add a further article 'to  shake hands5 
(ki tiUmbil) with the owner55 (1972a:25). It is this reconciliation aspect o f compensation which 
may remove the popokl factor and lead to restoration o f relations. This best sums up disputes 
involving theft and damage to property, sexual offences, assault and other such relatively m inor 
offences. But severe injuries and homicide compensation are certainly more serious matters in 
which the behaviour o f big-men and their approach to settling disputes differs markedly from 
that involving m inor disputes. In such cases big-men from neutral groups would be invited to 
act as arbitrators. Their task was to negotiate a settlement that would satisfy both parties in the 
case o f injury compensation and especially the victim group in homicide cases. Some aspects o f 
Hagen dispute settlement procedures are similar to those o f the Wahgj. John Muke5s description 
o f  South Wahgi conflict solving procedures can easily be applied to Hagen:
The victim group and the offender5s group assembled at their own central activity place 
and invited a third party group to act as arbitrators. This group consulted the principal 
protagonists and then carried back and forth the confrontational debates between the 
two groups. Depending on the proximity between the disputants, such negotiations 
lasted a day or for several days (Muke 1994:99).
H e goes on to note that “if  the peace mediators were successful, a compromise was reached and 
some form  o f damages payments were exchanged55 (ibid). It needs to be added here that big-men 
from  neutral groups acting as arbitrators were quite forceful in directing the owners o f a dispute
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involving homicide compensation. They would generally set the target (as near as possible but 
n o t necessarily as high 38 the one demanded by the victim group) and worked away at the 
offending party until the required amount in wealth items was raised. Elsewhere I explore the 
strategies involved in the raising o f homicide compensation (see Compensation Paymenty), but here 
I should m ention that the use o f third-party arbitrators in resolving such disputes has worked 
well in the past and the m odem  state, having the foresight to recognise its value, has validated 
their role by creating local peace and good order committees. These committees, comprising 
prom inent individuals (such as local government councillors, village court magistrates, as well as 
big-men) representing the various local groups (tribes and clans), arbitrate in major disputes 
between high-level groups (mostly at above the subclan level). All the members are men and are 
typically skilful orators. They are paid a basic allowance o f K25 per m onth and act mainly upon 
request and are usually rewarded with a small potion o f the compensation. Their role in society 
is nonetheless an im portant one which is recognised by both state and society, and the 
members, therefore, are held in high regard in their Local Governm ent Council areas. Their 
renown, o f course, goes beyond local governm ent council boundaries but their power and 
influence is limited to groups within their respective council areas.
The D ei Council Peace and G ood O rder Committee, for example, has eight members (see Table 
5,5) and handles mostly homicide and serious injury cases. According to committee member and 
Roklaka councillor, D ot Roltinga, and Mugjamp Village Court Chairman, Pirn Koldpi, the 
committee’s power to enforce compensation claims falls within a ceiling figure o f K6,000 and 40 
pigs for homicide cases, including fatal m otor vehicle accidents. D ot Roltinga, who has been a 
local governm ent councillor for over twenty-three years, pointed out that this ceiling price is 
much lower than the current rate o f  over K10,000 and at least 50 pigs, which makes their job 
m ore difficult, and exposes its apparent lack o f power.
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T able  5.6: T he D ei C ouncil Peace and  G ood O rder C om m ittee
Committee
Member
Tribe Position Type of Leader Approximate
Ape
D ot Roltinga Roklaka Councillor Big-man 50+
Kumi Krai Kimka Councillor Big-man 50+
Nuggints Waembe Councillor Big-man 50+
RinS , Nelka Councillor Big-man 50+
Romba Unknown Unknown Big-man 50+
Pini Mapkli Unknown Big-man 50+
Kingal Unknown Unknown Big-man 50+
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
Source: D o t Roltinga and Pim Koldpi, Gumanch Village, Mount Hagen.
Both Roltinga and Koldpi claimed that the lack o f resources as a limiting factor in their work. 
This was supported by Jika Komapi councillor, Tepra, who said that the state itself has “no 
strength” (rondokl ti mod) and must therefore recognise the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG) and 
other churches, together with the Peace and Good Order Committees, as leading peace-makers, 
by allocating more resources such as vehicles and funds to continue their good work. Tepra 
blamed politicians for lack o f action in conflict areas and his own Hagen MP, Paul Pora, for not 
responding to conflicts in the Hagen Central area. Meanwhile, D ot Roltinga blamed politicians 
as being responsible for contributing towards inter-group conflicts by supplying guns as well as 
paying compensation, both o f which can enhance their status in society.
2.2. Escalation
Escalation, depending on the type o f relations maintained, may take two basic forms. Where 
hostile relations are maintained, one offence will be reciprocated with another, in a fashion that 
can be described as mutually destructive negative reciprocity. For example, if one man was 
assaulted, his kinsmen would not hesitate to retaliate by assaulting either the assailant or a 
member o f his kin-group, or if this is not possible, they would grab and/or kill pigs, or even 
rape women in serious injury and homicide cases. However, in the event o f seemingly normal 
relations —  neither friendly nor hostile —  a single offence may not require direct retaliation and 
in fact the offended group may setde for compensation, but all such incidents will not be 
forgotten. They will be kept as unsettled scores, together with outstanding war deaths during 
previous fights in their history. In the meantime, big-men will begin to release war statements 
during public ceremonies. Also certain incidents involving big-men, such as peculiar behaviour, 
will be interpreted by other big-men as signalling war messages. Prior to the Kawelka-Minembi 
War, for example, a certain Minembi big-man’s behaviour during a Kawelka Kundmbo pig­
killing ceremony at Golke was interpreted as intending to kill someone. This man, according to
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K undm bo inform ants, paraded around the ceremonial ground with a woman's net-bag (n>al met) 
containing some unripe bananas, stones and some other fruits and nuts. A t a funeral speech, 
after a K undm bo man was killed by the Minembi in a road-block in 1989, the Kundm bo big- 
man, Rai, made reference to  this by saying that:
This man, a big-man, did a strange thing by carrying those objects around in a public 
place. There were many people from different groups who came for the feast saw this 
strange behaviour and were baffled by it Some said: "This man is going to kill 
someone, but who is he going to kill?" I thought he was hungry for pork so I asked my 
brothers to add some to my own and gave it to him. But did he want pork? No, he 
wanted something else. Instead, he took and ate polled} my man [referring to Kundmbo 
Palim]. That is how he waged war against me. I did not want to fight- He started it all 
(based on Melpa transcripts of tape recordings made by Andrew Strathem in July 1989).
As happened here, relations, whilst appearing to be quite normal may hide tensions which at any 
time can flare up in full-scale war. Revenge for the death o f Palim, who died under dubious 
circumstances inside Minembi Elyipi territory (lamo and Ketan 1992:103), appears to have been 
chosen instead o f compensation (see Case 2).
Escalation also involves the contracting o f allies as well as reaching temporary truce and 
establishing moka ties with m inor enemies. This is where the persuasive skills o f orators (ik ivud) 
and the entrepreneurial skills o f wealth transactors —  both qualities that successful big-men 
possess —  are required Big-men will call upon their allies to repay debts for assistance 
previously given to them  during their fights. A t the same time, they will make sure that the fight 
is only on a single front and discourage m inor enemies from attacking by making small 
prestations o f gifts to them. In the Rem di-M bembi War, for example, Remdi leaders, led by 
Remdi Jikambo big-man and M ount Hagen businessman, Puklma Kopi, gave a gift o f K500 to 
the Jika Kilampi, thus converting a previously hostile relations into one o f exchange network 
(see Case /).
W hen making peace with m inor enemies, no matter how temporary it might be, whilst at the 
same time initiating war with a major enemy, big-men will almost apologetically (but never 
explicitly) point out to their former enemies that fighting should never have occurred between 
them  (and perhaps never should again), arguing that the positive aspects o f their relations, such 
as moka exchanges and intermarriage, far outweigh those o f negative reciprocity. A m ajor aim 
here is to explicitly state the current nature o f their relations between the ex-minor enemies 
whilst emphasising the point that current enmities are strictly between the major enemies. Thus, 
in this way, the battle lines are clearly drawn at the outset so that third-parties (except for major 
allies o f principal combatants) are discouraged from entering into the conflict In Hagen, alliance 
systems are clearly established (although shifting in nature) and, therefore, act as a preventive 
mechanism in negptiations between m inor enemies, where one o r both parties are also major
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allies o f tiie principal combatants. In other words, one principal com batant will no t initiate 
exchange relations w ith a major ally o f its principal opponent It may happen some time in the 
future but no t at the time when the major combatants are preparing for war. In the same way, 
alliance systems may act as a major constraining factor in all-out warfare between confederacy- 
type conglomerates w ith members who are parts o f more than one alliance network. It is big- 
men with knowledge o f such networks who can successfully exploit them  to their own and their 
group’s advantage. But even for the m ost successful o f big-men there are constraints such as 
individual cross-cutting kinship ties, marriage and moka exchanges, and nowadays business and 
w ork ties. These can prevent the big-men from contracting individuals from allied groups to 
assist in fighting, in the same way that it is difficult to prevent one or two individuals from m inor 
enemy groups from  supporting the principal opponent The point to remember here is that a 
group may pledge allegiance one way, or declare neutrality in a particular conflict, yet individuals, 
for reasons m entioned above, may not necessarily act accordingly. Significantly, this trend is 
continued in other spheres o f competition and cooperation (see, for example, elections in 
Chapters 6-8).
Phase III: War
This corresponds to John Muke’s “actual engagement” phase (1994:107), o r combat, in which 
battle sequences were fought between the combatants. Since I have already mentioned 
traditional battle formations, albeit briefly, and they are described more extensively by Muke 
(1994), I deal with only leadership aspects o f com bat here.
3.1. Fight-Leaders and Despots
The first aspect is the leader’s own ability in fighting (A.J. Strathem 1966b:362). Strathem goes 
on to note that “fighting ability is always listed as one o f the ideal capacities o f big-men 
(although they were matched in this by fighters who were not big-men)” (ibid). Drawing from 
early accounts o f warfare (Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, V o ll and 2; A J. Strathem 1966b), 
one gets the impression that excellence in moka,, not fighting skills, was required in achieving and 
maintaining big-man status. This is probably an accurate assessment in so far as the big-man 
m odel goes, with strong emphasis on pre-eminence in moka exchanges, but does that mean that 
there were no other types o f leaders? If  big-men, as Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8, VoL2) and 
A.J. Strathem (1966b) say, did “incite their clansmen to war, in order to humble neighbouring 
rlans and prevent them  from holding successful moka occasions”, yet “im portant big-men might 
keep away from  fighting” (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:363), it makes one wonder just who might 
have led Hangmen to  war. I f  someone did lead them to  war, then shall we call such persons 
fight-leaders? Vicedom would have said no: he claimed that “there were no real fight-leaders, 
although an orator might marshal the men initially for a pitched battle” (voL2:147; cited in A.J.
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Strathem  1966b:363), and Strathem  him self offers litde in the way o f either rebutting or 
supporting Vicedom, apart from  this general com m ent on big-men:
On the whole, then, it seems that personal prowess in warfare was neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient criterion for becoming a big-man. Yet it enters as a component in the 
ideal picture of the big-man, in his guise as the triumphant victor over other clans and 
rival big-men (1966b:363).
There are two points w orth raising here. Firstly, it is possible that Vicedom in particular and also 
Strathem  (perhaps to a lesser extent) down-played the role o f leaders in battle. Secondly, the 
pow er and influence o f ‘fight-leaders’ (those who led others in battle) appears to  be lesser sixty 
years ago than it is today. I f  the situation had changed over time, then it m ust have been very 
dramatic because my own observations o f warfare over the last ten years indicate that there are 
in fact fight-leaders. These are men who formulate strategies, organise battle formation and led 
others in attack and defence. Some are skilful fighters themselves, excelling in several aspects o f 
fighting such as shield formation, archery, o r counter-attack. O thers are fearless men who 
organise raids and ambushes. A few are violent men who terrorise others in times o f both war 
and peace. These m en are especially despotic in nature and feared by enemies but are valued by 
their own groups for their licensed violence in warfare. I have heard stories o f such men but 
personally know o f only one. He is o f the Kawelka Membo clan, aged between 35 and 40, his 
nickname, M bakiaAmP!, is well-known amongst many groups in the whole o f the Dei Council 
area and some parts o f the Hagen Central area. Among the Kawelka his prowess in fighting is 
matched by none and he was a major driving force behind the brutal eviction o f a Minembi 
section from  their Tiki territories in the Baiyer Valley. H e is said to have fought a num ber o f 
battles almost single-handedly and in one instance fought on despite a spear lodged into his 
thigh. W ith the sharp end o f the spear firmly buried into the ground and the other end sticking 
out o f his thigh, he was pinned to the ground, but as the enemy closed in for the kill, he used the 
back o f  his palm and karate-chopped the spear at both points o f entry and exit, thus freeing 
him self to face the enemy. Spurred on by his courageous act, his clansmen engaged the enemy in 
a pitched battle and finally chased the enemy off. Mbakla Ami is one o f the few ‘older’ fighters 
w ho have made the transition from bow and arrow fights to gun warfare. He is now skilled in 
both weapons and, during the Kawelka-Minembi War, led numerous raids into Minembi 
territory. H e is well respected by warriors and all o f them  feel comfortable being led by him in 
raids.
Mbakla A m  (lit ‘Mbakla a rm /, or ‘a one-man army from Mbakla1). Mbakla (as in Mbakla Imp manga, 
‘origri place9) is h e  Kawelka sacred site near Mbukl on the Sepik-Wahgi Divide, and one o f the villages at 
Kuk has been christained Kuk-Mbakla. It is a term that is also used as a prefix when formally referring to 
the group or an individual member o f the Kawelka, thus Mbakla Kawelka or Mbakla Ami. Incidentally, 
Ami is also the name o f an important ancestor but I see no direct linkage here —  the word derives from 
the English, (and Pidgin) army.
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Ami is also a leader in other aspects o f society. H e is a renowned orator, possesses skills in 
com pensation negotiation, is prom inent in clan and subclan matters regarding bridewealth 
payment and has been involved in some m inor moka exchanges. And, he is referred to  as a rwa 
nuim (big-man), precisely the same word used when referring to  those who are pre-em inent in 
moka exchanges. Ami is admired for all these <positive> aspects o f his character and is considered 
an hero by many o f  his tribesmen. Yet he is feared by many people from both within his own 
tribe and outside. There are two cases which illustrate this po in t
The first involved the renowned social anthropologist, Andrew Strathem, in late 1994. D uring a 
brief visit from  Pittsburgh, USA, Andrew killed a pig for his old friends at Kuk to settle some 
outstanding matters. The meeting went well and as he was coming out o f a friend’s settlement he 
encountered a road-block. A young man o f the Kawelka Kurupmbo dan, apparently unhappy 
with Andrew over some land matter, had felled a gum tree across the road. As the young man 
(who was in fact the nephew o f the Kawelka big-man, Ru, a dose friend o f Andrew) was about 
to confront Andrew, Mbakla Ami appeared with a chain-saw and deared the road. There was no 
objection to  his intervention and the m atter was dropped w ithout further problems.
The second involved a young councillor from a Hagen Central group. In 1992 three young men 
from  the Kawelka Klambo clan were involved in a fight with the councillor’s brother, in which 
the Hagen Central man sustained a broken arm. After the fight the councillor took it upon 
him self to hand out punishm ent He first assaulted one o f the assailants, then followed another 
into M ount Hagen town and after having spotted him sitting inside a vehide confronted him. 
H e tried dragging him  out o f the front-seat, threatening to cripple h im  Ami who had been 
sitting next to him  got out o f die vehide and challenged him: ‘Y ou promise to cripple him but 
first tell me how many men have you personally killed?” It was Ami’s way o f telling the 
councillor that ‘do no t start what you cannot finish’, o r ‘do no t get involve in matters which you 
cannot handle’. The councillor, in spite o f his reputation as a tough character himself, did not 
pursue the matter, at least not along this line o f strategy, and the conflict was later resolved 
peacefully through an exchange o f compensation.
These two cases, whilst illustrating fear, also suggest the use o f fearless reputation as a tool in the 
prevention o f disputes from further escalation. This makes men like Ami become unlikely 
peace-makers, despite their use o f heavy-handed tactics. All o f these may be good for the 
community in terms o f maintaining some form o f order, but there are bad or disruptive aspects 
to the behaviour o f  such men as well.
Ami in particular is known to have taken goods from local markets w ithout paying, demanded 
wom en from the Kundm bo elpuklwua (although this is normal in elpukl wtuhkui wua relations) 
and was prom pdy given one (for which he has yet to pay bridewealth), and in the past stolen
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pigs and attempted rape on at least one woman, and defaulted one moka. This behaviour is 
consistent with that o f similar men in the past In Georg Vicedom’s account o f Yamka Ko, we 
leam that Ko began his life-time career as a tough character early in his youth. He claimed to 
have ‘never listened to talk’, stole pigs, struck-down men with sticks and wounded them, raped 
women, broke into houses and stole valuables, killed a number o f men and women, and people 
generally fled at the sight o f him. He described himself as ‘shameless’ and ‘non-hearing', a 
‘napitla’ [one who would not mend his bad ways, nor take advise regarding such behaviour]. His 
own people were said to have been proud o f him and often praised him but many feared him 
(1943-8, VoLl:80). Further, he goes on to claim that:
I killed Kutli {Kuli] Kiti. His relations came and asked for compensation, so I gave 
them shells. I killed a Ndika (JikaJ, the Kuntaka [Kundtka] Ketla [Ketikla], during a 
fight; also the Kutli [Kuli] Ropokla. From the Mokae [Mokei] I killed the Komonka 
Korama and from the Namboka JMokei Nambka] a young man on the dancing ground.
During a fight I killed the Ndika [Jika] Nditing and the Mokae Koepaka (Mokei 
Koipka], as well as the Koka Medimbo [Mokei Melirnb]. W hen I killed Mokae [Mokei] 
Oklambo, I left his body on the dancing ground (VoLl:81).
Such outrageous claims, if made today, would get someone killed. In fact, the real and ever 
present fear o f pay-back killing would prevent most men from making such bold claims. 
Moreover, considering the size o f Yamka which is rather small compared with Jika or Mokei 
(see Table 5.6), it is incredible that Yamka was not routed as a result o f this man’s actions.
T ab le  5.7: H agen  C entral’s ‘super-tribes’, by population.
Year/ Period Jika Mokei Yamka
1960s 6,749a 6,199b 2,281
1980 residents counts ̂ 8,943 7,809 3,653c
1987 est pops.2 10,508 9,241 4,642
Sources'. A.J. Strathem (l% 6b:19); Burton (1989:257).
a: Including groups given refuge: Kungunaka (755), Penambi (678), Elti (445) and Palka (314).
b: Including som e Epilkae (153) w ho are semi-incorporated,
c: With Kinjika
1: T hese figures are for people deemed to be ‘residents’, which suggests that the total figures (including
non-residents) would be much higher.
2: O n the basis o f  population growth at 2.0 per cent a year.
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G eorg Vicedom who m ust have been shocked by this man’s self-account tried to place K o’s 
behaviour in the context o f tribal strength and the man has a certain kind o f hero from whom 
people around him  could draw strength from. His comments are given below:
When reading this life history, one shudders and could think that the man has 
exaggerated. But this is not the case by any means. There are a few men of this kind in 
every tribe. They are always celebrated as heroes by their relations, for it is this kind of 
man who makes a tribe strong, protects his clan, and enriches it by his actions. When 
one gets the impression that Ko tells o f his deeds with a certain satisfaction, one has to 
keep in mind that the Mbowamb [Hageners] do not detest such men but have a certain 
fear of them and even magical shyness. If other men are not like this it is only because 
they have not such strength The Mbowamb’s [Hageners] attitude towards criminals is 
different from ours (Westerners]. Crime is only what harms the clan, everything else is 
welcome (Voll:82).
It is clear from  the Mbakla Ami and Yamka Ko cases that such men have a place in society, their 
pow er and influence derived from  reputations and in war they led by example. Hagen society, in 
contrast with W estern society, has no regimented military structure and ranking in which orders 
are followed strictly to the letter. But that does no t necessarily mean the absence o f leadership in 
warfare. There were —  and still are —  fight-leaders who may not be big-men (and why should 
they be?) bu t are still leaders.
3.2. Initiators of War and Peace
I t has been suggested in the literature that big-men often play a major role in initiating war as 
well as in peace-making (see Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, VoL2; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b; 
1971). Big-men have been depicted as calculative individuals who influence others to fight so 
that they may personally benefit at the expense o f rival big-men (see Vicedom and Tischner 
1943-8, Vol.2; de Lepervanche 1968:176; Sillitoe 1978:252, cited from Muke 1994).23 There may 
be some truth in this in the sense that the accounts o f warfare given by Hagen informants often 
indicate that particular wars were started or ended by certain individuals who are usually big- 
men, o r nowadays, politicians and educated elites. Testing this, however, is difficult because 
firstly, it is almost impossible to document cases in which big-men did win or lose from wars 
initiated by them  or by their rivals; and secondly, no big-man or politician would admit to either 
starting, or profiting from, a particular war, w ithout serious repercussions. It is mainly for these 
reasons that there is no substantial evidence.
23. In a subsequent paper, Sillitoe (1981), however, states that “in the acephalous society o f Wola, rival big- 
men do not lead factions nor do they try to extend political control over one another through war (which 
is the argument put foward in Sillitoe 1978). The Wola think that war is a bad, but sadly an unavoidable, 
part o f life, and big-men stand to gain nothing from it. The only time they stand out above average is 
following the end o f a war when men make reparation payments to relatives o f dead allies. This is because 
o f their superior ability in handling wealth in ceremonial exchanges, upon which their and positions as big- 
men depend” (Sillitoe 1981:75).
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Nevertheless, in recent times, politicians have been blamed for encouraging others to fight, as 
part o f electoral manoeuvring, or as part o f punitive action against supporters o f rival candidates. 
Again, there is no conclusive evidence, apart from rumours and allegations. The closest I came 
to  docum enting the involvement o f  big-men and politicians as initiators o f  war (and peace) was 
in 1992. A fter the 1992 National Parliament elections, war broke out between the Welyi and 
K entpi tribes o f D ei Council over election results (see Chapter Seven, see also Ketan 1996:263-4). 
A  prom inent big-man and form er provincial government member outlined a strategy to me, 
which he argued would win the support o f both Welyi and Kentpi voters for the Tepuka 
candidate, Reuben Parua. H e argued quite convincingly that it was in Tepuka’s interest to 
encourage the antagonists to fight for a while and then step in with gifts o f pigs and cash to 
settle the dispute, thus putting them  into positions o f obligation towards Tepuka as the peace­
maker. As it transpired, the conflict was resolved and the Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby, was 
persuaded to step aside in favour o f his fellow Raembka candidate, Parua, and some Welyi 
voters shifted allegiance to  Parua during the 1993 Dei O pen By-Election. W hilst this case 
suggests that there is a possibility o f big-men and politicians exploiting conflict situations for 
personal and group interests, the evidence, is still insufficient to make any firm statements about 
the role o f leaders in initiating war as a strategy designed to achieve personal goals.
Contrarily, die data on leadership role in peace-making is quite sufficient A.J. Strathem (1966b; 
1971) has already reported on big-men as peace-makers. I extend the discussion to cover the 
role o f politicians and other leaders such as church leaders, businessmen and educated elites (see 
discussion on Peace Settlement, see also the discussion on die role played by leaders in ending the 
Remdi-Minembi W ar in 1989).
Phase IV: War Deaths
In  traditional Hagen warfare, there was a definite leadership role here. After Muke (1994), I 
break the discussion into two sub-phases, reflecting the two opposing sides to war death 
ceremonies: the victim’s funeral ceremony; and the killer’s victory ceremony.
4A:Funeral Ceremony (Victim 'sgroup)
There were two parts to this ceremony. The first involved funeral rites and this is where the 
ritual leader comes in. I f  a warrior was killed instandy on a batdefield it is believed that the 
victim’s min ('spirit’, o r 'shadow image’) escapes suddenly and stays where the incident occurred 
(Muke 1994:112). The objective o f the victim’s group, as pointed out by Muke, 'Is  to form an 
enclosure at the scene o f the death and invite the shadow image to  come with them  back to the 
proper burial place” {ibid). A ritual expert {man mai), armed with a bam boo tube and a piece o f 
clothing taken from  the victim, would roast pork-fat over a fire, whilst at the same time summon
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the min by calling the name o f the victim, often explaining to the victim’s min that he is in foreign 
territory and therefore m ust come hom e with them. The min, supposedly operating on the basis 
o f smell (of som ething familiar such as clothing) would be lured into the bamboo tube by the 
axoma o f  the burning fa t It responds by chirping like a quail as it approaches the ritual expert 
who m ust catch and trap it inside the bam boo tube by closing it with leaves or a piece o f  do th  
once he and his clansmen are convinced that it had entered the tube. I f  successfully captured it 
will be taken back to  the tribal burial grounds where it will be released soon after die corpse is 
buried. O n the other hand, if  unsuccessful, the victim’s min is said to be unhappy with somebody 
which calls for public confession in order to eliminate clansmen who may have wronged the 
victim so that only those considered to be on good terms and preferably his best friends may 
participate in the rituals. The ritual expert, if  it is believed that he is no t doing a good job, may be 
substituted w ith another. And, the ritual will be repeatedly perform ed until die min is captured 
and delivered to  the clan cemetery. The ritual min calling also extends to deaths resulting from 
m otor vehicle o r other similar accidents in which the victim dies instandy.
The influence o f missions, however, has meant that such rituals are becoming very rare and face 
die real possibility o f being phased out with church rituals. There are very few ritual experts 
around; many have died out, while others have now been baptised, which prevents them  from 
practising. This has forced people to go outside their tribal groups to hire ritual experts. For 
example, in 1988, when a Kawelka man was killed in Port Moresby, a Koiari ritual expert was 
hired to summon the min so that it would be taken back to Hagen with the body. Although my 
tribesmen were convinced that the min had been captured, I was not so convinced. There are 
two ways o f testing the procedure. Firsdy, it is claimed that you can hear the min chirping away 
like an excited quail, both from inside the tube after it is captured and from outside as it 
responds to the ritual expert’s calL Secondly, it is said that there is a big difference in the weight 
o f the bam boo tube before and after it is captured I heard no such chirping noises, nor felt any 
difference in w eight W hen I pointed out this to the ritual expert, he responded that he was not 
too sure. W hen I asked why then did he claim to have captured the min, his response was simple 
and quite logical: “it is w hat your tribesmen believe that is im portant, whether or not the spirit is 
in the bam boo is no t im portant” I saw no reason to withhold payment so I advised my 
tribesm en to pay him for his specialist services.
The second part o f a traditional funeral ceremony involves the wuapaka (rip-lifting man’), o r the 
public display o f the corpse, o r alternatively his clothing such as front-apron (hai), bark-belt (kak) 
and 3fc-tanget o r cordyline leaves (keiya pukia). This would occur at a ceremonial ground (moka 
pend) in which m ourning women and close male relatives o f the victim would assemble around 
the corpse (or his clothes) suspended on a platform or cross-bar and would rise to join grieving 
neighbours as they marched into the grounds in clan and subclan groups. Each group would
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sing a funeral song considered appropriate for the occasion, whilst the victim’s group would sing 
two o r m ore newly com posed funeral songs together with old ones. After circling around the 
grounds for some time and once all the neighbouring groups (both allies and neutral groups) 
have joined in, everyone will be told to assemble for el ik  (‘fight talk*) speeches. This is where 
big-men and nowadays politicians come in. An exceptionally high level o f oratorical skills is 
required here in order to persuade allies to continue with the war effort and urge warriors to 
avenge the death.
The nmapaka ceremonies for im portant leaders were similar to those o f war deaths, except for a 
major difference in being that the objective o f the orators here is to emphasis the group’s loss 
rather than to marshal support for revenge.
The Christian missions, however, have banned this ceremony, so now it is reserved for 
im portant leaders who have no t yet been baptised. Even those who have died whilst being 
prepared for baptism have been denied a traditional funeral ceremony. This has led to some 
tension between those who have been converted to Christianity and a small but powerful 
minority (including m ost politicians) who still d ing to some aspects o f the past, especially in 
matters o f  personal interest (such as funeral ceremonies in which their participation can gain 
them  political support, “polygyny, which secures for a big-man wives as a labour force and 
affines as exchange partners” [A.J. Strathem 1969a:44] and potential voters in elections, and 
other aspects o f traditional society which contribute towards the overall success o f individuals 
and groups). The tension between Christians and ‘traditionalists’ over funeral ceremonies was 
highlighted by a South Wahgi case in early 1987. I was part o f a UPNG research team which 
visited the W estern Highlands in January 1987. We flew to Goroka by plane and from there 
travelled by road to Minj where we had an invitation from UPNG academic and Kondika 
Jo  Mangi, to overnight at his house. Mangi and a colleague, Linus Digin’rina, had 
arrived in Minj two weeks earlier. There were four o f us in the second team, comprising two 
expatriates and two nationals, and as we arrived at the rendezvous point (Minj High School), 
neither the U PN G  pair, nor Mangi’s brother, Andrew (the school’s headmaster) were present 
As we started walking towards a small Kondika hamlet on the hills behind die Minj township, a 
messenger told us that Mangi was not able to m eet us because o f a family tragedy but he 
(messenger) would lead us to Mangi’s home. The others, being outsiders (the other national was 
from the coast), may not have noticed but the first thing that struck me upon arrival at the 
Kondika hamlet was the conspicuous absence o f mourning. I found that disturbingly unusual 
because people throughout the Highlands always cry when someone dies. An explanation for 
this was given to  us later. The deceased, who was Mangi’s paternal uncle, was studying for 
baptism  when he died, which, according to the Catholic church, made him a Christian and 
therefore required a non-traditional funeral. This ‘non-traditional’ or Christian funeral consisted
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o f prayers, a sermon and singing o f  Christian songs accompanied by guitar music. The denial o f 
a full traditional funeral ceremony to the deceased angered his relatives, especially Mangi and his 
younger brother, who considered this as an infringement o f  individual rights as well as a 
violation o f traditional custom. The dispute resulted in Mangi pulling a stunt on his clansmen, 
which eventually cost him  a pig. The details o f this incident are given in Appendix XI.
42: Victory Ceremony (K iller’s group)
This particular ceremony also involved ritual leadership, especially in the purification rites 
perform ed immediately after the killing. Muke’s description o f South Wahgi purification rites are 
applicable to Hagen:
Meanwhile, the killer’s group showed their jubilant mood and humiliated the opponents 
by singing abusive war songs, chants and dancing... After their victory ceremony in the 
battlefield, they also returned to their sacred site to perform a series o f rituals known as 
‘they killed the person and are eating them’ [which, in Hagen is symbolised by the eating 
of pig Ever]. The main objective was to purify the killer from the minmaan [die Hagen 
min\ of the deceased enemy from haunting him and to honour the gods for assistance.
A huge pig was killed during this ceremony. The Ever and heart of the pig was removed 
and cooked on a specially prepared platform. The fresh meat was steamed and was 
given to the warrior who struck the first blow. The rest was oven cooked [and] 
distributed among the crowd, but portions of the meat were not given the test of the 
population. After the ceremony they displayed their shields to an audience and then 
waited fort the victim’s group to conduct all the funeral rituals and then stage the next 
battle known as the ‘paint wax’ (Muke 1994:113).
The Hagen purification rites are similar to those o f the Wahgi as described by Muke. The victory 
celebration is called guide roromen (roughly equates with jubilation), which involves taunting the 
victim 's group with words, song? and actions. N o definite leadership role is required here and 
the participants are mostly younger warriors. It is in the next part o f the ceremony which 
requires ritual leadership. The symboEc ‘eating o f the man’ through the consumption o f pig Ever 
is called wua mk hcnmh halg noromen (‘killing man and eating his Ever5) are activities which are 
supervised by a ritual expert, o r alternatively by clan leaders with knowledge o f ritual procedures.
Nowadays, victory celebrations, as a direct result o f gun warfare, are no longer possible because 
successful raiding parties cannot express their jubilation nor taunt the enemy without drawing 
unnecessary attention to themselves and face the real possibiHty o f being killed. Furthermore, 
mission influence has meant that m ost men cannot participate in these ‘pagan’ ceremonies.
Phase V: Peace Ceremony
This is the ceremony which formally marks the end o f a single bout o f warfare and the 
beginning o f peaceful relations. As pointed out by Muke (1994:113), it is difficult to define the 
duration o f  wars between groups. He goes on to note that:
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....in some cases (like ‘the brother’ groups) there exists a permanent hostility that lasts 
for several hundred years. In other cases (as the wars against the ‘brother-in-law’ 
groups) wars were fought for a short duration: each brief bout of war was brought to an 
end, followed by a period of mss> and back again. In both cases, however, it was 
intervention of a third party group that brought a formal war to an end (Muke 
1994:113).
The South Wahgi groups’ maintenance o f perm anent hostility between ’the brother’ groups can 
be compared to  m ajor o r traditional enemy relations in Hagen where one compensates m inor 
enemies but no t m ajor enemies and the relationship between major enemies is characterised by 
mutual distrust, fear and accusations o f poisoning.
W ithout compensation (which would otherwise terminate hostilities and convert relations o f 
enmity into exchange partnership), hostilities are never truly terminated. And the virtual absence 
o f  intermarriage and moka ties means that friendly relations are never achieved. In this regard, 
Muke’s characterisation o f the South Wahgi ‘brother’ group warfare as “permanent hostility that 
lasts for several hundred years” (1994:113) may hold for Hagen.
likew ise, the Wahgi ‘brother-in-law’ groups can be compared with the Hagen m inor enemies 
who share intermarriage and moka ties and whilst having fought one another in m inor warfare, 
have also combined against a major enemy.
In both cases, a single bout o f warfare may last several years, as indicated by the Remdi-Minembi 
and Kawelka-Minembi cases, which ended when the combatants got tired o f fighting.24 This 
would invariably coincide with diminishing food supplies and difficulties in maintaining the 
support o f allies. M oreover, it seems that wars were always brought to an end as a result o f third 
party intervention (see Muke 1994:113; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b:364-5). Indeed, third party 
groups and im portant leaders played a significant role in initiating peace. But it was a 
com bination o f factors, in addition to third party intervention, that brought a war to  an end. 
Firstly, it is the combatants who themselves must decide that they have settled outstanding debts 
in reciprocal killings (as seems to  have occurred in the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi 
cases), o r when one group is routed (as in the Jika Maipngel case). Secondly, when it becomes 
difficult to maintain support for the war effort in terms o f manpower and resources, especially 
cartridges in contemporary gun warfare (as in the case o f the Kawelka). A third factor was that 
o f cross-cutting kinship ties, especially in the contemporary context where relatives from warring 
groups can m eet at work places, in hotels and homes in urban centres, away from the battlefields 
(as in the Remdi case). Finally, after all these factors have been brought to bear on the outcome 
o f the war, the third party intervention becomes a reality. Any premature intervention,
24. An im portant point worth mentioning here is that there is no clear winner in this confrontation, although 
one group may route another (as occurred during the Jika Maipngel war).
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particularly when uninvited, may result in further problems, such as truce violation (see 
Kawelka-Minembi case). It is partly because o f die difficulties involved in reporting that these 
factors I have m entioned are rarely brought to the attention o f authorities in Waigani. In 
newspapers, for instance, we only read o f peace settlements and the involvement o f church and 
governm ent agencies, but rarely o r none at all on ‘human interest* stories about the role o f 
individuals in peace settlements (like die two PN G D F soldiers that I have m entioned in the 
Remdi-Minembi case).
The role o f  the churches, nonetheless, is an im portant one. The Evangelical Lutheran Church o f 
Papua New Guinea (ELC-PNG), for example, has an on-going program on inter-group 
conflicts. It began with church leaders, comprising pastors, circuit councillors and headmen {miti 
rup mua, ‘man who has custodian o f the gospel*) from neutral groups contacting their 
counterparts in warring groups to see if  they would be receptive to a peace proposal Meanwhile, 
the congregations within the various circuits were formed into prayer groups, each responsible 
for a particular conflict The prayer groups, mostiy headed by women, m et every night praying 
for peace, and their fellowships often ended in the early hours o f the morning. The church 
leaders, on die other hand, maintained frequent contact until they were convinced that the 
combatants were ready for peace, hence their congregations’ prayers were answered. Their 
warring counterparts’ task was to convince their fellow clansmen to end the war. Once this 
process, which may take m onths or even years, was completed, they would report back to their 
peace-making counterparts that they were ready for peace. The church leaders would then 
proceed by inviting government agencies to witness a peace settlement on a date convenient to 
all parties.
A mission-sponsored, state-sanctioned, peace settlement was symbolically marked by a 
ceremony in  which leaders o f rival groups would pledge to G od (by taking an oath on the Bible) 
and State (by signing an agreement) to end hostilities and seal the agreement by shaking hands. It 
is a public ceremony in which the combatants are said to ‘shake hands’ (k i titimbil). It is also 
rtnring this ceremony that the church will erect a wooden cross on the border o f the combatants’ 
territories, as a  symbol o f peace (but it may decide to do so earlier in an effort to  stop them  from 
fighting). Muke reported a particularly interesting example o f church intervention by way o f a 
placard ‘planted’ in the battlefield, which read in Tok Pisirr.
Pimsim pail biiong Kondtka na Konumbka Olsem na ol man i sakim tok biiong Gavaman, ol i
sakim tok biiong Godtu. Olsem na bat olikisim pe nogut biiong olyet (Rom 13:2) [italics mine].
T he K ondika and K onum bka fight m ust stop. T hose m en w ho disobey die
governm ent, also disobey G od. T herefore they will receive their bad rew ards (Rom ans
13:2) (Muke 1994:113-114).
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Although it is no t dear from  his discussion about the origins o f the placard, we can assume on 
the basis o f its message that it was put there by members o f  one o f the churches. Muke’s 
com m ents, however, are useful for our purpose:
This placard is interesting because of the unique combination of authorities and belief 
systems it refers to. Most obvious is the presence of the Christian G od Warfare is 
disapproved of by God and its missionary envoys, and it is God's divine justice that will 
punish the wrongdoer. Unequal relationship between God and man is inherent to 
Christianity because it is believed that God created man and that man must worship the 
divine creator... At the same time, the authority of God extends (or is extended) to the 
government, which has its own system of laws and sanctions. Lastly, the placard 
displays also an indigenous symbol of peace. This is the taboo substance known as milt 
bol {fern), often erected by a neutral group at the boundary of the battle-ground This 
taboo substance, o f die highest order of moral and religious sanction symbolises the 
willingness of the third party group to bring the opponents together by conducting a 
peace ceremony which would bring the war to an end (Muke 1994:114).
Muke’s final point regarding taboo substance is worth commenting on. Hageners, too, have 
taboo or divination substance called mi (see A.J. Strathem 1981:15), upon which oaths are taken 
when cla im in g  innocence in any wrongdoing and certain taboos, or “don’ts” (which carries with 
them  supernatural sanctions), are observed. As others have previously noted (Strauss and 
Tischner 1962; A.J. Strathem 1972:40), the origin myth o f each Hagen tribe contains a reference 
to its mi, explaining how this was revealed to a tribal ancestor either by Sky Spirits or by a ghost, 
as in the case o f the Kawelka. The Kawelka mi o r mystical divination-substance (cf. A.J. 
Strathem 1972:34), for example, is the cordyline plant {keiya koema), which, according to one 
older inform ant (the Kawelka Membo big-man, Goimba Onombe), was used by third parties in 
an attem pt to stop m inor warfare between the Kawelka Kundmbo and Membo clans. N o 
recollection, however, was made o f the mi being used in major warfare, nor is there any mention 
o f  it by A.J. Strathem (1966b) who conducted his fieldwork in the sixties.25 If, however, it was 
used to stop warfare in the past, then the situation has changed considerably over time, as 
evident in both the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi cases in which the influence o f 
Christianity was m ost apparent The comparison between South Wahgi and Hagen use o f taboo 
substance may not o f course be valid on the basis o f cultural differences, but this, I think, is not 
die case, as there are far too many similarities (almost to the point o f exact likeness). It may well 
be the case o f the ‘ethnographic past* versus that o f the ‘ethnographic present. I now return to 
the Lutheran (ELC-PNG) program mentioned earlier.
A fter a peace settlement was reached, the next step for Church leaders was to re-educate the ex­
combatants about Christianity and its virtues o f forgiving and peaceful co-existence. Members o f 
the Wahgi congregation, headed by Pastor Petro Timbi, for instance, were assigned the task o f
25 In a footnote, A.J. Strathem (1966b:365), however, did admit that “a close account o f the strategy o f 
peace-making was not obtained by me.’
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mili omkl (‘gospel revision*) work amongst the Minembi congregations o f  Keraldong and Mokla 
(also spelt Moga). This is the long-term aspect o f  group relations in which church leaders can 
play a crucial role in the maintenance o f peace and order. The state, however, as pointed out by 
Jika Komapi Councillor Tepra (and also by the Roklaka Councillor, D ot Roltinga, and Muglamp 
Village Court Chairm an , Pirn Koldpi), does not always recognise this. In stead, its over­
enthusiastic and rather clumsy efforts in attempting to stop tribal warfare has almost inevitably 
failed, Police riot squads have been largely responsible for damaging the image o f the police and 
the ultimate decline o f die state. O ne local observer, appalled by the destructive m anner o f riot 
squad operations, has described them  as “the rape and pillage squad o f the Highlands” (Mangi 
1992:118). H e goes on to argue that:
The Mobile Riot Squad of the Police Force based in the Highlands is as much a 
criminal element as any petty criminal; only they are in uniform and under the 
protection of the Law of the land... They know no bounds and go in to rape and pillage.
As their superiors often put i t  ‘This is Operation Mekim Save” (Operation: Teach a 
Lesson). There are many cases pending before the courts throughout the Highlands 
whereby the people are claiming compensation for damages done by the police when 
raiding villages. These range from assault charges to ones where whole villages and 
settlements have been razed to the ground (Mangi 1992:118).
I can only add here that such claims are not unfounded because I too have heard o f and 
witnessed police brutality. Elsewhere, I have reported on one case o f destruction in which the 
R iot Squad destroyed an entire Konumbka village near Minj “with the sensitivity o f a Nazi 
blitzkrieg” (Ketan 1989c). As asked by Mangi, one wonders “how the hell does the Police Force 
expect to win the cooperation o f the people if  terrorism is the only m ethod they apply when 
dealing with the people?” (Mangi 1992:118).
Phase VI: Reparation Payment
This refers to compensation for killings o r reparations for losses sustained by one’s allies (A.J. 
Strathem  1981:12). In tribal warfare, principal combatants are called elpukl wua (‘fight root man*) 
and allies who have sustained losses as km wua (‘dead man5). It is the elpukl wua, on both sides, as 
‘owners’ o f the fight, who pay compensation o f wealth items (mainly pigs, pork and cash) to 
respective allies. Referred to as wuapeng (‘man’s head5) in Hagen, and using moka principles, this 
is usually reciprocal payment for solidtory gifts, wua omhil (‘man’s bone’), previously received 
from  the km wua Such compensations, according to A.J Strathem (1981:12), are largely aimed at 
pnsnring an ally’s goodwill in future fights, but also to maintain one’s prestige (see also A J. 
Strathem  1966b; 1971; 1981).
The compensation o f  allies for war deaths is called wuapeng (‘man’s head5) paym ent It is made 
after a war to  compensate for losses, especially o f warriors, incurred by allies while providing 
military assistance. There are two strategies involved in allies compensation: (1) direct payment;
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and (2) a series o f payments involving solicitory gifts, and counter-gifts, which may develop into 
moha. The two cases given below illustrate these strategies. In the latter case, a nma peng 
compensation usually follows a nma ombil (‘man’s bones’) solicitor}7 gift In this case, moha may or 
may not eventuate, depending on the individuals involved.
Kawelka w ua peng  payment to allies
Following the second approach, Kawelka received solicitor}7 gifts before reciprocating in a large 
presentation o f pigs to its allies. The allies may or may not return the gifts as moha in future, 
although it is generally accepted that some form of reciprocal payment will be made in future to 
compensate for Kawelka men who died whilst fighting on the Kopi-Kimbo and Klamakae 
fronts. As indicated in Table 5.7, Kawelka received 30 pigs as nma ombil gifts from its allies. In 
return, Kawelka gave 300 pigs to Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae.
T ab le  5.8: K awelka wua peng paym ent to allies
Allies Items (pigs) received from allies as 
wua ombil gifts
Items (pigs) given to allies as wua 
peng compensation
Kopi 10 100
Kimbo 10 100
Klamakae 10 100
Total 30 300
Source: Based on information supplied by Yap Gotmba, Tangka Timbi and K om on Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla village,
M ount Hagen.
Note: The 300 pigs given as nma peng com pensation were contributed by all Kawelka clans: M embo (100);
Kundm bo (100); and Kurupmbo-Klambo (100).
Apart from the nma peng compensation, the Membo clan of Kawelka also made a nma ombil moka 
to Kundmbo, soliciting compensation or nma peng payment for the loss o f three men (Kumi, 
Pengk and Keripa) who died on the Kundmbo front against the Minembi.26 A total o f 20 pigs 
and three cows were given to the Kundmbo, who were planning to use these to celebrate a 
successful election win. Much of which will, o f course, go to voters and supporters. Further, 
Kawelka as a group gave a nma ombil moha to its Kimbo and Kopi allies, soliciting compensation 
for the loss o f four men (Wump, Ruk, John and Kel) who died while fighting on the Kopi- 
Kimbo front against the Minembi. Membo, Kundmbo and Kurupmbo-Klambo contributed 10
26 In late 1996 the Kawelka Kundmbo clan reciprocated M em bo’s solicitory gifts by making a large nmapeng 
payment. For details, see Chapter Six.
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pigs each towards the wua ombil gifts. O f all deaths, only the allies (Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae) 
deaths were com pensated by Kawelka through wua peng payments after receiving wua ombil 
soRdtory gifts. The others were delayed for mainly two reasons: (1) owing to Kawelka’s status as 
elpukl wua (‘fight root m an5), both Kim bo and K opi cannot be pressured into rushing payment; 
and (2) the K undm bo wua peng payment to  M embo has been tied up with the W estern Highlands 
Provincial G overnm ent election campaign, in which Membo sponsored a Kundmbo candidate 
(as part o f soliciting for payment). See the concluding chapter o f this thesis for an update o f this 
situation. M embo also contributed towards his campaign by provision o f funds and other 
economic resources (see Chapters 7-8).
Rem di wua peng paym ent to allies
Unlike Kawelka, who tied up allies5 compensation in moka and election campaigns, Remdi took a 
simpler approach by opting for direct payment in roasted pigs, which means that these payments 
will no t be reciprocated in future. As indicated in Table 5.7, the Remdi Jikambo dan, as ‘owners 
o f die fight5, gave away a total o f 1,750 pigs (all roasted) in reparation payments. The major 
recipients were the Mul Council-based Tipper Remdi5 section, with 500 pigs in 1990 for the loss 
o f two men, and die Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, with 1,000 pigs in December 1994 for die loss o f 
six men in battle. Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla were paid 200 pigs in 1992 for the loss o f 
three men, while Enga and Simbu migrants received only 50 pigs for die loss o f two men in 
batde.
The highly disproportionate nature and possibly the sequencing o f the payment partly reflects 
the nature o f relationship between these groups, whilst at the same time emphasising the 
potential fear o f retribution— or lack o f i t—  from kid  wua groups. The Tipper Remdi5 section, 
for instance, belongs to a separate political field, the Mul-Baiyer electorate, and is an im portant 
political and military force in the Mul Council area. The social, administrative and geographical 
distance between die two Remdi sections, Tipper5 and Tow er5, meant that the compensation 
am ount, talcing into account the num ber o f deaths, had to be o f a reasonable size and TJpper 
Remdi5 given priority over other allies.
Conversely, the Enga and Simbu migrants, because o f their clientage relationship with the 
Remdi Jikam bo as patrons, were perhaps inadequately compensated for two deaths. The Simbu 
and Enga migrants, despite losing as many men as TJpper Remdi5, were paid only 10 per cent o f 
w hat the Mul Council group g p t Apparently, Remdi Jikambo leaders saw no danger in down­
playing the contributions from their Enga and Simbu clients. These migrant groups live and 
work at the Gumanch coffee plantation, and whilst they were definitely not used as mercenaries 
here, one cannot help feeling that they may have been used as a new form o f labour in warfare. 
Furtherm ore, the feet that these migrant groups do no t have the numerical strength with which
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to  dem and reparation payments was no t lost on Remdi political strategists. Although it is a 
norm al practice in Hagen for hut wua groups to demand compensation and even threaten to  kill 
pigs and rape women o f the elpukJ wua group, it is dear that Remdi leaders took advantage o f 
the ‘foreignness’ o f  their clients. It is typical o f Hagen groups to treat diente —  such as refugees 
('womb età), migrants {tepa-pd womb), and ‘servants’ (klntmant wamB) —  with indifference, almost 
contem ptuously, and certainly w ithout the kind o f respect and esteem which they themselves 
expect and sometimes demand from others.
Similady, the Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla, though losing three men, were given only 200 
pigs because o f  their dose association with the Remdi Jikambo dan. The Kiklpukla are almost 
incorporated into the Remdi Jikambo dan, while some Remdi Penambimbo share territories 
with Jikam bo clansmen near the Muglamp station. It seems that both these groups were treated 
as part o f  the Jikam bo clan and therefore shared responsibilities o f ‘fight ownership’.
Meanwhile, the Kimka-Roklaka, who lost six men, were paid 1,000 pigs, which works out to 
166.66 pigs for each death. The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance, as evident in Chapter Three and 
involves a high degree o f complexity, which will be examined later in the thesis (see Chapters 7-8), 
but it is perhaps w orth m entioning here that the Remdi Jikambo made two vital mistakes. In 
light o f recent developments, especially the 1992 and 1997 national elections, Remdi Jikambo 
strategists firstly erred in their judgment that the Kimka-Roklaka pair o f tribes were not 
im portant enough to warrant priority over others in reparation payments, and secondly, their 
blunder in assuming that the Kimka-Roklaka would ‘commoditise’ their votes as solidtory gifts 
for reparation payments was not corrected earlier. In retrospect, it would seem that by 1992, it 
was far too late, as the Kimka-Roklaka had already sponsored their own candidate, Puri Ruing, 
to  oppose the Remdi Jikambo candidate, Koi Ranpi.
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T ab le  5.9: R em di wua peng paym ent: allies deaths & com pensation
Year Group {Allies of Rem di Jikambo) Number of 
Deaths
Items
(Roasted Pigs)
Pigs Per Death
1990 ‘Upper Remdi’ 2 500 250
1992 R. Penambimbo & Kiklpukla 3 200 66.66
1992 Enga & Simbu migrants 2 50 25
1994 Kimka-Roklaka 6 1,000 166.66
Total 17 1,750 102.94
Source: Based on inform ation supplied by Ivan Tau and Maip Kei, Muglamp, M ount Hagen.
The different approaches in reparation payment selected by the Remdi and the Kawelka groups 
reflects, among other things, the varying degree o f corporate emphasis placed on arenas o f 
competition and cooperation. The Kawelka, for instance, have been successful in moka, setting 
trends in incorporating new ideas and resources (see discussion on Moka), whilst Remdi has had 
major successes in business. Significantly, prominent individuals such as Ongka and Kont who 
acquired their big-men status through moka, are still active and very much influential amongst the 
Kawelka, whilst those among the Remdi, men such as Maip Kei, have been either converted to 
business or replaced by younger and Western educated leaders, such as Puklma Kopi, Stanley Pil 
and Ivan Tau, who made their name through business and government positions. Pig-rearing is 
a full-time occupation, requiring considerable investment o f time, labour and energy. Men such 
as Puklma, Stanley and Ivan are already committed to full-time occupations and, though they 
may find the energy, do not have the time nor the labour required in pig management. 
Consequently, most men in this category do not have pigs o f their own —  as aptly described by 
Chris Owen’s (1990) documentary film on PN G ’s first professor, John Waiko —  they are ‘men 
without pigs’. When they do need pigs, they just simply buy them or acquire them on credit basis 
through social networks. For example, during the 1994 Remdi reparation payment to its Kimka- 
Roklaka allies, Madang Open MP Stanley Pil brought two truckloads o f pigs from the coast 
while others went shopping for pigs in nearby villages and hamlets. The point is that these men 
cannot engage in moka for sustained periods without seriously jeopardising their business and 
career prospects in government. On the other hand, men like Ongka can and do take every 
opportunity to do so because that is what they do best and their position in society depends on
it
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Phase VII: M oka
There are three types o f exchanges: (1) enemy compensation; (2) ally reparation payment; and (3) 
pure moka (see A.J. Sfcrathem 1971). Enemy compensation involves gift exchanges with m inor 
enemies, thereby creating relationships o f  enmity into exchange networks for political purposes 
(as in the Remdi-Jika Kilampi case m entioned above). Ally reparation involves the payment o f 
com pensation to ones allies for assistance rendered and losses sustained in war (see above 
examples). Pure moka, whilst initially may have developed from warfare exchanges, take the form 
o f gift exchanges between established partners. The link between war payments and pure moka 
has been noted by Andrew and Marilyn Strathem:
In practice pure moka and warfare exchanges become intertwined. An important feature 
of all ceremonial exchange relations in Hagen is that they are expected to continue over 
a number o f years. If one group compensates, reparates, or gives moka to another it 
expects that the recipients will reciprocate after a few years. Moka relations are explicitly 
based on this norm of reciprocity; war payments come to follow the same pattern since 
it is often the case that there have been reciprocal killings or ally-losses between dans.
Thus A pays B for losses and later B pays A, much as done in moka itself (1971:48).
I have recorded no examples o f enemy compensation except the Minembi Engambo clan’s 
approach to the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, with m inor gifts and promise o f votes during 
the 1995 provincial assembly elections (see Chapter Eight). This may lead to compensation, but 
they are major enemies. I f  it does eventuate, then it will be a result o f elections as an all- 
encompassing event Examples o f ally reparation payments, as mentioned above, ate (1) the 
Remdi payment to die Kimka-Roklaka and other allies; and (2) the Kawelka payments to their 
allies.
Phase VIII: Peaceful Relations
A fter bouts o f warfare, reparation payments and moka exchanges are necessary to bring about 
peaceful relations between local groups. However, it is worth mentioning here that neither peace 
nor war are natural states o f  human societies. Moreover, peaceful relations may even be only 
truce periods, that is, a temporary political arrangement, just as warfare is temporary. A true 
picture o f society, thus can be interpreted as one o f alternating peace and war. In fact, the Hagen 
case studies presented in this study suggest that the dynamics o f Hagen society can be best 
described in terms o f cycles within a megacycle (see Chapter Nine for further exposition o f this 
point).
The cydes and sub-cydes o f Hagen sodety are the key features o f Hagen sodety, a sodety 
which is still going through the motions o f change. In the second chapter o f the thesis I 
presented an erratic cycle o f Hagen history, characterised by alternating periods o f peace and
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war, where the exchange o f blows and gifts was prom inent In each case, we have seen the rise 
to  prom inence o f  certain leadership types, each with special skills. In this chapter I have shown 
that despotic leaders, although no t necessarily o f the ruthless type described by Salisbury (1964) 
and W atson (1971), have a place in society, and moreover, that their value to their groups 
becomes m ore significant when their societies are caught in the grips o f warfare.
The recent resurgence in warfare in the Highlands can be understood in the context o f social 
and political change, coupled with a remarkable resilience o f  traditional customs and values o f 
Highlands societies and a corresponding weak institutional capacity o f the post-colonial state, a 
significant point to which I shall return in the next chapter o f this thesis.
Conclusion
The key issues raised in this chapter need further elaboration here. Traditionally, warfare has 
always been an im portant arena o f competition and cooperation for Hagen groups and their 
leaders. Prowess in fighting skills was an im portant criterion for acquiring leadership status. Also 
im portant were skills in management o f large-scale events such as warfare and specialist 
knowledge o f esoteric activities, especially in the conduct o f rituals regarding war deaths. 
Traditional Hagen warfare, like contemporary Wahgi warfare, was ritually regulated.27 This and 
other studies (see, for example, Meggitt 1977; A.J. Strathem 1977 and 1992; G ordon and Meggitt 
1985; Burton 1990; Muke 1994) show that group warfare was never an uncontrolled descent into 
Hobbesian chaos. Evidence presented in this study and in Muke’s (1994) study provide support 
for a corrective to W estern assumptions (about Melanesian warfare) that conflict escalation 
corresponds to  a progressive breakdown or abandonment o f social controls (cf. O ’Hanlon 
1995:472).
Contemporary Hagen warfare is less ritually regulated than Wahgi warfare, mainly because o f its 
political and economic dimensions. The influence o f Christian missions, new economic 
resources and technological innovations such as the gun have significantly altered the pattern o f 
Hagen warfare. In particular, gun warfare, with rising cost o f guns and cartridges, can become 
expensive exercise. The economic costs can be measured in millions o f kina, but what is really 
shocking for observers and participants is the high num ber o f deaths involved in gun warfare.
The way in which Hagen warfare has been systematically linked to other arenas o f competition, 
especially reparation payments, moka exchange and elections —  to form a megacycle —  may be 
unique to  Hagen. However, the inherent intergenerational power struggles between older style
27 gee Muke (1994) and O 'Hanlon (1995) for accounts o f Southern and Northern Wahgi warfare, respectively, See also
Rappaport 1984[1968] for a sophisticated discussion on ritually regulated warfare among the Mating people o f the Jimi 
and Simbai valleys.
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leaders such as big-men and new style leaders has wider implications for Bougainville, Melanesia 
and elsewhere in the world, an im portant point to which I shall return in the concluding chapter 
o f  this thesis.
Secondly, the case studies on Hagen warfare suggest that the persistence o f organised violence in 
the H ighlands and in other parts o f the country represents the m ost powerful and consistent 
challenge to state authority, thereby exposing the weakness o f the post-colonial state. The PN G  
state s lack o f administrative capacity in policy implementation and its inability to penetrate, 
dominate and regulate society has substantially diminished its legitimacy in die eyes o f its 
citizens. M oreover, the challenge to public order and particularly to the state’s cla im  o f 
m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force raises wider questions about the definition and 
function o f the m odem  state. For instance, what exacdy is a ‘state? According to one textbook 
definition:
The state refers to the authoritative decision-making institutions for an entire society, to 
which all other groups, institutions and persons are legally subject In other words, die 
state is legaly supreme: in the last resort, its authority is compulsory. The state is the 
ultimate regulator of the legitimate use of force within its territory (Hague, Harrop and 
BresKn (1992:6).
In  fact, as pointed out by Dahl, in practice "the Government o f a State does not necessarily 
monopolise the use o f force, but it has the exclusive authority to set the limits within which force 
may legitimately be used” (1976:10).28 In Papua New Guinea it is this particular claim o f 
authority and indeed the state’s legitimacy which has come under fire from local groups in recent 
times.
Finally, it is precisely in those areas that he state has failed to assert authority where PN G  
Highlands societies such as Hagen were effective, as indicated by die relative ease with which 
conflicts are resolved especially after government efforts in peace negotiations fail Actions by 
local groups which may at times appear to be in defiance o f state authority, upon closer scrutiny, 
may in feet prove to be not only necessary but perhaps the only course o f action open to 
participants. A  series o f unsuccessful attempts at peace settlements initiated by the state in 
conflict areas demonstrate this p o in t The Hagen case studies on warfare presented in this thesis 
show that the state’s peace attempts were premature and government officials lacked local 
knowledge o f conflict resolution skills. A bit o f local research would have indicated to state 
agencies that group warfare comes to a formal conclusion only after outstanding debts in 
reciprocal killings between the warring factions are balanced It is therefore partly due to lack o f
28. After Weber, Dahl (1976:10) says that “The Government is art]/government that succestftdly upholds a claim to the 
exclusive regulation o f the legitimate use o f physical force in enforcing its rules within a gven territorial area. ” (italics in 
original). Furthermore, he says that “the political system made up o f the residents o f that territorial area 
and the Government o f the area is a State”’ {ibid).
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understanding o f historically proven methods o f local conflict resolution, and also because o f 
inadequate and at times, inappropriate, police action in dealing with local conflicts, that there has 
been an escalation o f violence in Hagen, the PN G  H ollands, and odier parts o f  the country. 
The other reason o f course lies with people’s reactions to structural changes and the state’s 
incapacity to deal with such problems, a trend which is evident in other arenas o f competition 
such as elections, which form  the focus o f analysis in the next three chapters.
C h a p t e r  6
ELECTIONS AND TH E HAGEN MEGACYCLE
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Introduction
In this chapter I present an overview o f elections in the Highlands o f Papua New Guinea, in 
order to situate the case studies discussed in the next two chapters. Basically, it deals with two 
m ajor issues: elections and violence. A particularly worrying feature o f elections in recent times is 
the escalating cost o f election campaigns and correspondingly high rate o f election-related 
violence in Papua New Guinea (see, for example, Iamo ed. 1992 and Saffu ed. 1996; see also A.J. 
Strathem  1993b; Standish 1994; and Dinnen 1996b). While these and other observers have 
reported instances o f election-related violence in varying degrees o f severity, none has attempted 
to provide detailed analysis o f  the underlying reasons for such violence. And whilst some 
observers have commented on election campaign expenditure and associated problems (see, for 
example, Standish 1989), perhaps none may have pointed out the economic irrationality o f 
elections. This chapter, largely based on observations in Hagen, attempts to help rectify that 
situation.
Accordingly, the escalating levels o f violence, in addition to the deliberate infringement o f PN G  
electoral regulations, and the use o f large sums o f cash to buy votes, are discussed in the context 
o f electoral manoeuvring by powerful individuals, as an innovative extension o f the rivalry 
between equally powerful and, in some instances, party-aligned 'interest' groups operating within 
well established arenas o f competition and cooperation. These election case studies o f local-level 
politics again raise wider issues o f competing legitimacies and state-society interactions.
The chapter starts by providing some essential background information on elections in the 
Highlands, highlighting some im portant symbolic and functional parallels between traditional 
Hagen and PN G  state political systems. It then looks at the specifics and elementary aspects o f 
elections, commenting on behavioural patterns o f participants and the general characteristics o f 
contem porary Hagen political culture. More specifically, it examines factors such as the 
respective power-bases o f nationally prom inent Hagen leaders, disruptive power struggles 
between national and provincial politicians, and the rivalry between party-aligned 'interest5 
groups. A relatively prolonged history o f confrontation between the National Government and 
the W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent highlights this perpetual power struggle between 
national and provincial politicians. Such a situation ultimately led to the abolition o f the 
provincial governm ent system in Papua New Guinea, the implications o f which include a 
possible increase in the intensity o f competition as people realise that the stakes are now higher 
since the sphere o f com petition has been considerably narrowed.
It is essentially an analysis o f political strategies o f local groups and their leaders in competition 
for state-derived resources, prestige and power. O ne o f the m ost sophisticated and effective
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strategies analysed here is the skilful use o f the Hagen megacycle and its sub-cycles o f warfare 
and reparation payments as political resources by candidates and their supporters in their 
attempts to mobilise support for elections. Also examined in this chapter are some salient 
features o f Hagen elections, such as ‘cash-for-votes’ and ‘name-list’ groups, Vote-banks’ and 
‘base-vote’, the pervasive practice o f voter coercion, and the problems created by the rising cost 
o f  elections and unrealistic expectations o f elective office.
The final part o f the chapter attempts to place the empirical evidence in wider theoretical 
perspectives. In  particular, it argues that some o f the current problems faced by PN G  are the 
cumulative effects o f a new political culture, which can be examined in the context o f (1) 
com peting legitimacies and the re-invention o f legitimisation processes by local groups to 
facilitate their aims and goals; and (2) the weak state/ strong society dichotomy. By drawing from 
the experiences o f  other Third W orld countries, especially in tropical Africa, this chapter 
concludes by pointing out that, despite being blessed with a wide range o f natural resources in 
generous proportions, the PN G  nation-state’s current economic, social and political problems 
are almost like a m irror image o f the kind o f problems faced by some African regimes before 
crumbling.
Background
O ne o f the m ost striking aspects o f Papua New Guinea Highlands societies generally and, 
Hagen in particular, is the spirit o f competition. Both ethnographers and casual observers tend 
to agree that it is here in these densely populated high valleys that one finds extraordinarily 
competitive societies in which groups and individuals constantly compete for temporary 
advantages over one another. The traditional spheres o f competition are warfare, ceremonial 
exchange, bridewealth and various types o f compensation payments —  all o f which are status- 
oriented and can be described as monumental prestige institutions. These institutions o f both 
positive and negative reciprocity have shown great resilience in the face o f rapid social change 
and now exist side by side with, and in some ways are incorporated, into modem spheres o f 
com petition such as commercial business enterprise and elections, one o f which forms the 
subject under scrutiny here.1 This competitive character o f Highlanders is partly based on an 
ideology o f equality, although in practice big-men have more influence and prestige than others. 
Ordinary men, however, believe that they too can become big-men (cf. Feil 1987:116). Few in
The way in which traditional Highlands ideologies and practices have been incorporated into elections can 
almost be equated to the processes o f socio-religious syncretism which occurred in the Caribbean; 
voodooism (or what Haitians respectfully label vodou, vodun, or tmdou), for example, arose from contact 
between Aftican ‘paganism’ and European Catholicism, but whether the current trends in politics will 
develop into something uniquely Highlands only time can tell.
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fact actually do, but that is not the point; what needs to be stated is that there is a system o f 
ideological equality, o r w hat others may call ‘egaktarianisiri, which fuels such competition.2
However, it is crucial that competition also involves some form o f cooperation. For it is true 
that members o f society, either as individuals or as a group, m ust cooperate in order to compete 
effectively against those perceived as common opponents. Certainly, large-scale socio-political 
events like tribal warfare require cooperation between most, if  not all, segmentary components 
(clans and subclans) o f a politically and militarily autonomous group (tribe) to avoid routing and 
possible decimation. Tribal strength and individual status, for instance, depends on successes 
and failures in group activities so it is not surprising that we find well-developed arenas o f 
com petition and cooperation in m ost parts o f the Highlands. Although Highlands societies all 
exhibit forms o f competition for status, and the competition is often expressed through a 
struggle for control over valued scarce goods and their disbursement through reciprocal 
exchanges (A.J. Strathem 1982:138), it is here in Hagen (and Enga) where more advanced 
reciprocal exchange systems requiring astute entrepreneurship are found (see Feil 1987; see also 
A.J. Strathem  1971; and Meggitt 1977). While traditional spheres o f competition and 
cooperation, especially warfare and ceremonial exchange systems, have warranted much 
attention (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1977; 1992; Meggitt 1977; and Muke 
1994), a more m odem  form  o f competition (and cooperation), perhaps o f similar magnitude, is 
the focus o f this chapter.
In  spite o f the fact that European contact with the PN G  Highlands was made only recendy —  
beginning in the Eastern Highlands in 1929 and the W estern Highlands in 1933 —  and formal 
elections for Local Governm ent Councils and the colonial House o f Assembly were introduced 
in the early 1960s, elections in general and especially provincial and national government 
elections have become an im portant sphere o f competition and cooperation for Highlanders.3 
The level o f political integration and cohesion between Highlands groups is far more advanced 
than coastal and lowland groups could ever achieve because o f the inherent structural and 
institutional differences between them. This is evident in the mobilisation and management o f 
massive economic resources required in elections. W e may add here that candidates in coastal 
areas, by contrast, generally spend less money on election campaigns and that participation levels 
are much lower.
In his criticism o f those in search o f an ‘egalitarian’ Highlands and a timeless ahistoric big-man model, Feil 
(1987:116-118) has pointed out that while structural, enduring inequalities may be absent, they can be 
subtie and marked by an ideology o f equality. Even today the Highlands has that character.
See Chapter T m  for more information on the background o f Hagen politics as they have developed 
historically during colonial and post-colonial periods. See also A J. Strathem (1977,1984,1992,1993b) for 
similar discussion. For a comparable discussion o f historical events in Simbu, see Standish (1992,1994; see 
also Warry 1987).
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This conform s to  a generally observed pattern in electoral behaviour. In a comparative analysis 
o f  electoral behaviour, a colleague and I noted that:
In some societies, elections are serious events which can draw a high level of interest 
and participation. Elections in the Highlands, for example, are marked by aggressive 
campaigns and a very active and responsive public. Election campaigns are usually 
characterised by placard-carrying convoys of supporters in traditional finery, political 
rallies, mob oratory, emergency party conventions, traditional dances, massive pig 
ceremonials, and seemingly endless beer parties. This active interest and participation 
often leads to exceptionally high, or even inflated, voter turnout at polling places. 
Conversely, in other societies, elections are not such serious events and the level of 
interest and participation can be very low (Ketan and Eyre 1991:18).
Indeed, in three PN G  government-supported election monitoring and assessment studies4 (in 
which I was involved) covering by-elections in the coastal provinces o f East New Britain and 
Central, one could no t fail to note the general lack o f fanfare that so typically depicts elections in 
other parts o f  the country, especially in the PN G  Highlands (Ketan and Mangi 1991; Ketan 
1991; Ketan and Eyre 1991). During the Gazelle O pen By-Election, in May 1991, it was found 
that:
Voter turnout was poor. Not many people turned up for voting. They were not very 
enthusiastic about it as if they would, say in die Highlands of Papua New Guinea. For 
example, when we visited the polling booth in some of the areas around 11:00 a.m. 
there was hardly anyone who had turned up to cast their votes. When this was 
rechecked in the afternoon the turnout had not really improved at all (Ketan and Mangi 
1991:10).
Similarly, in two Central Provincial Governm ent by-elections voter turnout was especially low: 
as poor as ten or less votes in at least two polling stations during the June 1991 Kuni By­
Election in Kairuku District (Ketan 1991); and members o f at least one village in Cloudy had to 
be notified on polling day in August 1991 because they had no idea that there was a by-election 
underway (Ketan and Eyre 1991). As in Gazelle, voters here in Central showed a general lack o f 
interest in both by-elections. In Cloudy Bay, for instance, we noted th a t
There ware no convoys or rallies, and no feasting or dancing. Such fanfare and gaiety 
which depict elections in other parts of the country were lacking here. Except for 
posters, there was hardly any campaigning. Some prospective voters were not even 
aware o f the feet that there was a by-election being held at Cloudy Bay. If this is any 
indication, the level of political awareness is believed to be exceptionally low in Cloudy 
Bay (Ketan and Eyre 1991:18).
With a view to improving elections in Papua New Guinea, the PNG Electoral Commission assigned the 
PNG National Research Institute the task o f election monitoring and assessment. I was involved here as 
principal researcher in three by-election studies in 1991: (1) Gazelle Open (with Jo Mangi, Anthropology 
D ep t, UPNG); (2) Kuni; and (3) Cloudy Bay (with Henry Eyre, formerly o f UPNG). Based on these and 
one other study (by Wari Iamo and others), the Electoral Commission made significant changes to the 
electoral system, including the introduction o f one-day polling in PNG elections. However, other 
recommendations, such as the re-introduction o f preferential voting, interagency cooperation in a single 
and unified dvil registration system, etc, were sadly ignored.
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In  the absence o f any systematic nation-wide study, it is difficult to say whether these differences 
in electoral behavioural outcomes are largely dependent on the level o f sociopolitical, economic, 
and infrastructural developm ent
However, it is fair to say that significant differences in electoral behaviour, including high levels 
o f violence in some areas and relatively peaceful conduct in other parts o f the country, can be 
explained in the context o f markedly contrasting cultural backgrounds. Highlanders, for 
instance, were perhaps m ore ‘qualified’ than their coastal counterparts in entering this new arena 
o f  com petition and cooperation because o f their cultural background which is characterised by 
impressive prestige institutions such as the M ount Hagen moka and other ceremonial exchange 
systems. Moka is the term  in Melpa language for reciprocal exchanges o f wealth between 
partners, in which the rule is that a main gift should exceed an initial o r initiatory one (A.J. 
Strathem  1981:10; 1971). The main items o f exchange used in moka are pigs, pork, previously 
peadshells and nowadays cash. In a return moka, which may take place several years later, one 
m ust give m ore than he had received. The increment is referred to as ‘making mokd. G roup 
prestige and individual status is derived from ‘making mokd. Similar systems existing in other 
parts o f the Highlands are: the tee in Enga and mok ink in Mendi. The Wahgi konggar and Simbu 
huglagende are slightly different in the sense that their emphasis is predominantly on the exchange 
o f roasted pork. All, however, operate on the principle o f delayed exchange, where goods 
received in one ceremony will be reciprocated with similar kind in another at a later date.
Furtherm ore, there are symbolic and functional parallels in the m odem state and traditional 
Highlands politics. Im portant clan issues are discussed by clan members in the men’s house 
where it is usually the big-men who dominate such meetings. The Hagen men’s house, for 
example, is called manga rapa. In front o f the manga rapa stands the pukla mho m onum ent which 
commemorates the first moka. Hageners, as indicated in Table 6. /, easily associate the National 
Parliament House with manga rapa, the national flag with pukh mho, the Prime Minister and his 
cabinet ministers with wua nuim mumuk (major big-men), budget speeches with el-ik (‘fight talk’), 
which is the m ost formal kind o f public oratory.5 It is, therefore, easy to understand why 
elections are im portant to Highlanders because they fit in well with existing institutions and 
cultural practices. Some symbolic and functional parallels are given in Table 6.1 (below).
O ne Hagen informant, Jerry Yar Rombina, himself a skilful orator and a big-man of the Remdi Jikambo 
clan, gave me a more specific picture: that o f Paias Wingti as major big-man, his handling o f the national 
budget as a major pig ceremonial, and Wingti’s speeches in parliament as el-ik that goes with ceremonial 
prestations involving the distribution o f roasted pork. See A J. Strathem (1975) for the delineation o f 
Hagen speech form and its functions; veiled speech (ik-ek) and el-ik (‘fight talk5) as the most formal kind o f 
oratory.
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T ab le  6.1: Sym bolic and  functional parallels in  political system s
Point Traditional Mount Hagm j Modem PNG State
1 (a) The manga rapa as a sym bol o f  clan 
solidarity, its internal structure o f  converging 
rafters held together by a central post is 
associated w ith a big-man surrounded by his 
followers; (b) as central m eeting place where 
im portant issues and disputes are resolved 
collectively through consensus; (c) the pukla 
mbo com m em orating the first moka, and (d) 
the moka pern as the ceremonial ground for 
display o f  m en (during singsings) and wealth 
(during moka prestations).
(a) The N ational Parliament as a sym bol o f  
democracy; (b) as central m eeting place where 
legislation (regarding im portant issues and disputes) 
is passed collectively through debate; and (c) the 
PN G  national flag as a sym bol o f  national solidarity, 
a statem ent o f  unity in the face o f  diversity.
2 B oth the major and m inor big-m en are 
prom inent in clan m eetings just as they are 
pre-em inent in moka.
The prime minister as ch ief executive and his 
cabinet ministers have m ore say in matters 
regarding respective portfolios.
3 T he big-m en, through control o f moka 
exchange networks, have m ore access to 
valued scarce resources than ordinary men.
The prime minister and his cabinet ministers, as 
political heads o f  governm ent departments, have 
m ore access to econom ic resources than ordinary 
MPs.
4 The m anagement and distribution o f  valued 
scarce resources is controlled by big-m en 
through selective moka exchanges.
The management o f  national resources and 
distribution o f wealth is controlled by the PM  and 
his cabinet ministers through budget allocations.
5 Individual status and group prestige is derived 
from  success in moka exchanges.
Individual status and ‘good’ governm ent is based on  
sound econom ic management and delivery o f  
goods and services.
6 Major big-m en are skilled orators w ho make 
extravagant claims o f  group achievem ents 
during el-ik speech-making.
A  prime minister and his ministers are constantly 
defending their actions (or inactions) during crises, 
often claiming success (even where there is 
apparent failure) and take credit for positive 
outcom es.
7 T he achievem ent and maintenance o f  big- 
man status is dependent on individual ability 
to  attract followers and wealth through 
reciprocal exchanges.
The basis o f  a continued role in Parliament 
ultimately lies with the voters but is dependent on 
personal ability to m obilise and maintain a solid 
support-base in respective electorates.
8 Big-m en are generally good leaders w ho lead 
by example, but there are som e ‘good’ big- 
m en and others are had’ big-m en w ho 
default creditors and are despotic in nature. 
Such had’ big-m en often lose followers to  
rival big-m en, ultimately resulting in a loss o f  
status.
Politicians are often their own w orst enem ies, 
creating problem s (such as misappropriation o f  
public funds) which ultimately bring their dow nfall 
There are ‘good’ politicians just as there are ‘bad’ 
ones w ho make mockery out o f  the word 
‘representative’. Such ‘bad’ politicians are 
consistently punished by seemingly unforgiving 
constituents.
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Elections involve a significant change in the level o f participation —  a marked shift away from 
com petition between a select band o f individuals to one o f active participation on a m nrh wider 
scale. Unlike warfare and ceremonial exchange, where competition for status and struggle for 
control over valued scarce resources was restricted to warriors and big-men, elections are more 
encompassing, involving far more ordinary people. Although it is difficult to establish precisely 
how powerful big-men were in control over valued scarce resources before European contact in 
the 1930s, the early accounts o f German Lutheran missionary-anthropologist, Georg Vicedom 
who worked in M ount Hagen between 1934 and 1939, suggests that the power o f big-men sixty- 
five years ago was then greater. Big-men were described as chiefs, belonging to rich lineages and 
ruling over clans. The chiefly lineages monopolised the peadshell valuables and circulated these 
in moka transactions only among themselves. Pigs could be reared by all but only the pearlshells 
carried prestige (A.J. Strathem 1966a:362; see also Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8: VoL2, cited 
from Strathem 1966a and Feil 1987). The work o f other eady observers, such as Ross (1936) and 
Gitlow (1947), which is largely based on Ross, confirms this picture o f the M ount Hagen 
political order as one o f a high degree o f local class stratification. A large middle class, a class o f 
‘rubbishm en’ and one o f ‘serfs’, called ‘slaves’ by Vicedom, lived as dependants and at the behest 
o f  the m ore rich and powerful class (see Feil 1982; 1987).
A word o f caution here: too much weight placed on the accounts o f missionaries and others 
could lead to unnecessary complications, and even portraying a somewhat misleading picture o f 
the M ount Hagen political order. While accepting that there was some degree o f inequality, the 
descriptions o f Hagen social classes by these early observers, as pointed out by A.J. Strathem 
(1987) is far too rigid —  not too different to that o f feudal Europe. Although Vicedom’s work 
in particular provides useful insights into M ount Hagen society before contact, it is influenced 
by his own background and the times in which he was writing —  European feudalism, 
colonialism, and especially A dolf Hitler’s fascism. It is extraordinary that he was able to publish 
three large volumes at the time o f the Second W orld War in a country ravaged by disease and 
chronic shortage o f basic needs.6
European colonialism, however, drastically altered the M ount Hagen political order, first by the 
inflation o f the local exchange economy with plane-loads o f peadshells in the millions (see 
Hughes 1978; see also Connolly and Anderson 1987; and Chapter Two in this thesis), and then
As indicated in Chapter One, Vicedom’s work, as evident in his ‘master race’ theory, was apparently 
influenced by German fascism. His belief that the original inhabitants o f Hagen were dark-skinned dwarfs 
which were colonised and subsequently displaced by a fight-skinned tall race from the west reflects Nazi 
Germany’s Aryan race policy. See A.J. Strathem (1971 and 1987) for a mote critical review of Vicedom and other 
earlier interpretations of Hagen as a highly stratified society.
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through the processes o f ‘development* in general, and more specifically by the creation o f 
m odem  political structures.7
In a drastically altered economy, through the introduction o f cash, cash-crops and education, 
elections offer ordinary men and, perhaps more significantly, women the chance to compete for 
pow er and influence. In other words, it opens doors for people who otherwise would have been 
shut out by traditional big-men who had a monopoly over exchange networks in pre-colonial 
times. This partly explains aggressive electoral behaviour. As evident in recent elections, 
Hageners approach the campaign nail with the same passion and vigour which they take onto 
the battlefield: to win at all cost! Like warfare and ceremonial exchange, which produce leaders 
such as fight-leaders and big-men,, so too do elections which generate a special brand o f leaders. 
W hilst all o f them  are referred to as wua nuim (leader*), politicians are commonly known in 
Hagen as ktkptih wua> a pejorative term which roughly translates to the English ‘rogue*. 
Retrospectively, a person with no principles or scruples is often called politik wua (‘political 
man*), which, in reality, can be far less flattering than is initially apparent.
PNG Highlands-style Electioneering: A Unique Experience
PN G  Highlands-style electioneering is a culture in itself, with election fanfare unmatched 
anywhere else in the country. W ith floats o f awe-inspiring warriors and full-bodied women in 
magnificent plumes o f birds o f paradise8, simultaneous orchestration o f exchange sequences, 
and mobilisation o f supporters, Highlands election campaigns have few parallels in size o r scale, 
and in sophistication o f strategies and ploys involved. It is no t uncommon to find candidates 
and supporters in varying states o f intoxication, not from alcohol consumption but simply 
because o f the frenetic pace o f events and the way in which the various events o f social, 
economic, political and religious significance are all brought together to coincide with elections. 
Relations o f enmity, for instance, can be transformed into ones o f alliance, o r temporary truce 
can be mutually reached by warring factions to cater for the higher priority o f elections (see 
Ketan 1996). Similarly, those who hold the ‘ropes* o f moka will simultaneously release them, thus 
resulting in a series o f return payments.9 Furthermore, reparation payments to allies for losses
7. D. K. Feil describes colonialism as die second great revolution, after die introduction o f sweet potato 
(ipomoean revolution) which altered the status quo o f the then political order through an intensification o f 
pig production and the exchange o f surplus products (1987:115-120).
8. The men wear km head-dress which are largely made o f Puqygam and King o f Saxons sprays while women
wear m k  and rumba tails o f Princess Stephanie and Skkkbill (an influence o f Wahgi styles). For decoration sets 
and the way in which particular types o f feathers distinguish between different festivals, see A.J. and AM . 
Strathem (1971). The King of Saxony feathers, for example, were reserved for the more important occasions 
such as moka. When men are ready to make a big moka, they say, ‘the bird is on its way", meaning, ‘now the 
Saxony plumes will appear5 {ibid. 63).
9. See, for example, Parua Kuri’s return moka to the Kawelka in 1984 (Ketan 1996). For a discussion on moka 
sequences and those who hold the ‘ropes’ o f moka {moka kan ambromiri), refer to A J. Strathem (1971).
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sustained in war, com pensation o f m inor enemies for killings, and even peaceful negotiations 
between m ajor enemies will be made in deliberately ordered sequences prior to and culminating 
in elections, thus creating what I call the Hagen megacycle.
Conversely, rifts can occur within alliances and groups once allied to each other may find 
themselves on opposite sides. Electoral manoeuvring, for instance, may involve negotiations 
with m ajor enemies, abandoning existing military allies in the face o f war, and the use o f criminal 
gangs and guns by politicians and their henchmen to manipulate voters. In a recent study on 
violence and political change in M ount Hagen, A.J. Strathem reported th a t
• • - the recurrent suspicion on the part o f ordinary people (and some electoral officials 
also) that certain politicians are among the most important suppliers of guns to their 
constituents, largely because guns buy votes. Politicians’ henchmen distribute guns to 
their networks and build their own influence on the putative possession of powerful 
weapons (1993b:47).
H ere I can only add that such suspicions are no t uncommon, nor unfounded, because I too 
have heard and seen instances o f guns and ammunition being distributed by aspiring politicians. 
In  my discussion on the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance in the context o f the 1992 Dei O pen election 
and o f the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990), I have explored the way in which electoral 
behaviour is dictated by the type o f relations maintained by individuals and groups, and how this 
is translated into election results (Ketan 1996).
Electioneering is also an extremely serious business involving millions o f kina and vast amounts 
o f other economic resources ch a n g in g  hands between thousands o f individuals and hundreds o f 
groups. In  many ways it involves the redistribution o f wealth in varying amounts and ways, from 
simple cash handouts inside a haus-man (men’s house) to ceremonial prestations on a grand scale 
involving thousands o f people. Iambakey Okuk’s distribution o f 4,000 cartons o f beer at 
Kundiawa airport during the 1982 National Election ranks as one o f the m ost spectacular o f all 
♦imp. Bill Standish, a keen observer o f Simbu politics since 1972, reported th a t
Okuk’s most spectacular innovation was on the eve of the [1982] election liquor ban to 
give out 4,000 cartons of beer, each with twenty-four bottles, at Kundiawa airstrip on 
the 29 May, following an all night string band competition. In ten years I had not seen 
him wear traditional dress, but on this occasion Okuk did wear the traditional apron 
and breach clout The story of the hare-bottomed M F and the deputy prime minister’s 
wife ‘dancing bare breasted’ at the beer barrel election’ was duly reported internationally 
along with front-page photographs (Sydney Morning Herald 5 June 1982; ABC Background 
Briefing 6 June 1982; The Age 2 June 1982), but this was not an occasion for mockery. 
Witnesses said that Okuk— who as at Maki spoke in Tokpisin— again said that he was 
the son of a traditional Chimbu leader and asserted a tight to political power under the 
Simbu ideology of hereditary leadership. At least 10,000 people came to collect the beer, 
with Okuk as master of ceremonies distributing huge piles for supporters in each open 
electorate and fifty cartons each for the police, Pangu supporters [his principal 
opponents] and the mostly expatriate Hash House Hamers (Standish 1989:194; see also 
Domey 1990; and Standish 1992).
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Such flagrant flaunting o f personal wealth, whilst usually justified through the use o f the 
traditionar ideology o f big-men as magnets for attracting wealth, can sometimes have an adverse 
effect, as in Okuk s case. Although Okuk was quite clever in dressing traditionally so that he 
could cite custom  as a defence against possible bribery charges10, he obviously foigot that gifts 
given through inter-personal networks create obligations while those given at a public level are 
merely dismissed as pabhk semiring hilong kisim tasol (‘public things to be taken only’, not m eant to 
be reciprocated).
Subsequent events in Hagen and other parts o f  the Highlands suggests that modified versions o f 
O kuks innovation have been adopted by other politicians throughout the Highlands and in 
some parts o f the country, especially in the capital, Port Moresby, where many Highlanders live 
in a num ber o f relatively large settlements and until 1997 a Simbu, David Unagi, was a MP for 
the Port Moresby N orth-East O pen electorate.
That Okuk admitted having spent between K240-250,000 in Chimbu, compared with the 
eventual winner, John Nilkare’s admitted K45,000 (Standish 1989:195) and still lost the election 
suggests, among other things, that factors other than mega resources are also im portant in 
elections. I now  turn to the key players who interact between the local Hagen political field and 
the PN G  national scene.
Powerful Individuals and Political Parties
A t the centre o f the expanded Hagen-PNG political field are some o f the country’s m ost 
wealthy and powerful men competing for super-big-man status. For instance, the leaders o f the 
country’s major political parties are based in M ount Hagen, where party-aligned business and 
tribal groups are clearly at work, perhaps reaching a higher level o f political integration than in 
other parts o f the country. Names such as Paias Wingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel are known 
way beyond local boundaries. A history o f competition between ‘party-aligned groups’ is 
analysed here in the context o f the W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent and the rivalry 
between the People’s Democratic M ovement (PDM) Party and the National Party. Both PDM , 
headed by Paias Wingti, and the two factions o f the National Party, headed separately by Paul 
Pora and Michael Mel, have strong following in the M ount Hagen Central area, but are not as
As pointed out by Bill Standish, “Okuk dressed traditionally in order to be able to cite his use o f custom, 
which is supported in the National Constitution, should he later need to defend himself against any 
possible charges under the Criminal Code o f treating (corruptly providing food, meat, drink or 
entertainment in order to influence votes). Bribery and the exercise o f undue influence (threats or use o f 
force obstructing the free exercise o f voting rigjhts by an elector) are grounds for rendering a poll null and 
void’ (Standish 1989:194; 1992:237-238). In this regard, Okuk’s grand performance seems to have been 
based on a conscious and calculated decision. He further goes on to say that “Okuk had read reports in 
which (Standish] had argued that gift-exchange for prestige purposes could be defended as customary, 
with generosity and display intrinsic to Melanesian leadership” (Standish 1992:238; 1978b).
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strong in other parts o f the province. The other major PNG parties with Hageners as leaders 
are: Pangu Pad (Kombukla tribesman, Pati Wamp, as the national president); and the People’s 
Progress Party (PPP), with Jika Milakamb clansman, Glen Komomga, as its national president 
However, both Pangu and PPP are relatively weak in terms of party7 following in Hagen because 
most people view them as namhis or coastal parties and their nominal Hagen leaders as mere 
window dressing (bilas tasol). Table 6.2 shows the local groups, power bases and government 
positions o f six prominent Hagen leaders in the last 20 years.
T ab le 6.2: P rom inent H agen  leaders and  their pow er-bases
Hader Healgroup Power-base and Party-aligned Interest* 
groups
Position
Paias Wingti Jika Mukaka Wingti and PDM  have a strong 
following in one half Maipngel, 
Andapunts & Mukaka sections o f  
Jika, Kungunka-Palka pair, & 
Kukilka Kluika section.
Leader o f  PDM , MP (1977-97), 
Deputy PM (1982-85), Prime 
Minister (1985-87; 1987-88; 
1992-94), Governor o f  WHP 
(1995-1997).
Paul Pora Yamka Pepka Pora and his faction o f  the 
National Party have a strong 
following among the Kinjika- 
Yamka, som e Mokei sections and 
Elti-Penambi tribe-pair.
Leads one half o f  National Party, 
MP for Hagen Open (1987- 
present), former Finance 
Minister (1988-92).
Michael Mel Nokpa Mel and his faction o f  the 
National Party have a strong 
following among the Kopi- 
Nokpa, Roni-Lati, and the Pipilka 
Coalition-style Alliance.
Leads one half o f  National Party, 
Pipilka Chairman, former 
national government Treasurer 
& MP for Anglimp-South Wahgi 
(1987-92).
Pati Wamp Kombukla Kombukla-Minembi, Welyi-Kuta 
Coalition-style Alliance.
President o f  Pangu Party
Glen Komonga Jika Milakamb Jika Maipngel section President o f  Peoples Progress 
Party
Lucas Roika Mokei Anda- 
Akelemb
Mokei Nambka and Andakelkam 
subsections.
Last Premier o f  Western 
Highlands (1995) and National 
Party strongman.
All, except Michael Mel (Anglimp) and Pati Wamp (Dei), are from Hagen Central tribes. 
Significandy, all o f the Western Highlands Provincial MPs have been Hagen Central men: 
Raphael Doa (Mokei Nambka); Kindi Lawi (Jika Opromb); and Paias Wingti (Jika Mukaka), 
emphasising my point that here in Hagen Central super-big-men, backed by sections o f large tribes, 
are able to compete for positions o f great power and influence. However, it must also be noted 
that whilst Wingti, Pora and Mel could definitely be described as super-big-men, the same could 
not be said o f Doa and Lawi.
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Political parties have virtually failed to reach the grass-roots level, where voting is principally 
based on  die kinship system and personal networks, and while it is not my intention to pretend 
otherwise, it needs to be pointed out that: (1) parties are a good source o f economic resources 
for use in election campaigns; (2) party membership may have advantages in securing 
employment for the party elite, thus, conforming to the true spirit o f “jobs-for-the-boys” mode 
o f patronage and spoils system; (3) party alignment is often a major factor in securing 
governm ent-funded projects and development funds; and (4) it is widely believed that party- 
aligned interest* groups and prom inent individuals often receive preferential treatment in 
business deals and governm ent contracts. It is chiefly for these reasons that individuals compete 
for party leadership, and Hageners have been particularly successful in this regard. In each o f the 
cases m entioned above the party followings (or followers) are o f course supporters o f influential 
leaders and their numbers, depending on the fortune o f the leaders, flux and wane, just as the 
relations between individuals are constantly shifting.11 Paul Pora, for example, led his supporters 
out o f Pangu and into National when he switched parties before the 1987 National Elections, 
but defected back to the Pangu-led Opposition when the other National Party faction, led by 
Michael Mel, entered into an alliance with PDM  to form the government after the 1987 
elections. H e was then Finance Minister in a Pangu led government from 1988 to 1992.
Nonetheless, as noted by Burton (1989a:271), party is im portant in Hagen in the sense that sets 
o f party-aligned groups are at work. This is perhaps more so in Hagen Central than elsewhere 
because my own investigations revealed no evidence o f party-based political organisation in 
peripheral areas such as Dei, Mul and Anglimp. If  there is any party confrontation which comes 
to the fore o f political discussions by Hagpners, then it is the rivalry between PDM  and National 
in the context o f the W estern Highlands Provincial Government versus the PDM -dominated 
national gpvem m ent in early 1987.
The background to this rivalry is given below, based in part on Burton (1989a:270-271) and 
Burton and Keher (1997). The National Party, led by Philip Kapal, came to power in the 
W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent through a no-confidence m otion in April 1985. 
Kapal’s governm ent was suspended by the Wingti-led national government in eady 1987 and 
no t reinstated until after the 1987 elections.1 2 As was widely tipped at the time, this cost PDM  a
11. While the party following in Hagen is generally along the lines indicated above, it needs to be pointed out 
that the actual situation can be far more complex. Despite party-aligned groups at work here, there is far 
more fluidity in individual choice, as in instances where families are split between candidates. Cash 
inducement is also a major factor in the final analysis o f a voter’s choice o f candidate, but there are other 
factors (such as kinship ties, intermarriage, and moka exchange relations).
12. The suspension was based on an Auditor-General’s report in February 1987 which alleged “gross 
mismanagement o f finances in the years 1982, 83, 85 and 86”. Premier Kapal, however, appealed against 
the decision, claiming that it was politically motivated and his administration unfairly penalised for the 
wrongdoings by the two preceding governments, those o f Nambuka Mara and Kagul Koroka. In 
September 1987 a National Court judge, Justice HinchKffe, ruled that “the Auditor-General’s report o f
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great deal o f support in Hagen Central and W ingti, who had held the Hagen O pen seat since 
1977, was forced by Paul Pora’s candidacy in Hagen O pen into nominating for the W estern 
Highlands Provincial seat. Paias Wingti and Paul Pora won the Provincial and Hagen O pen seats 
w ith big majorities o f over 40 and 30 per cent o f the total vote, respectively. After the elections 
and in the subsequent governm ent formation, the principal combatants then faced each other 
on the front benches o f the National Parliam ent— W ingti as Prime Minister and Pora as senior 
O pposition spokesman.
The W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent remained in suspension until fresh elections 
were called in June 1988. This time the National Party, again led by Philip Kapal and his deputy, 
Lucas Roika, was returned to power for a second term in office with a two-thirds majority in the 
provincial assembly. It was reported that:
Western Highlands Premier Philip Kapal and his deputy Lucas Roika unanimously 
retained their respective positions yesterday [5 July 1988] following the swearing in of 
the new government Mr Kapal collected 19 votes defeating his PDM party challenger,
Kagul Koroka who only collected five votes. Mr Roika also collected 19 defeating the 
opposition sponsored member Mr Er Tal who only got five votes (Post-Courier, 6 July 
1988).
For Philip Kapal and the National Party, it was a m ajor victory against PDM  and Paias Wingti in 
particular because it was W ingti whom many people in Hagen —  rightly o r wrongly —  saw as 
being responsible for the suspension o f the provincial governm ent The People’s Democratic 
M ovement Party’s comprehensive defeat in W estern Highlands in 1988 led many people to 
suggest the end o f PDM  in provincial politics.13 This trend was continual at the national level 
when Paul Pora, who had earlier defected to the Opposition with five National Party members, 
was rewarded with the powerful Finance and Planning Ministry after Paias Wingti was defeated 
—  58 votes to 50 —  by Rabbie Namaliu in a no-confidence m otion on Monday 4 July 1988 
(Ntugim Nius, Editorial 5 July 1988).
February 1987, which the then Provincial Affairs Minister, Mr Warena, tabled in Cabinet was incomplete”, 
which meant that the suspension was invalid. The report referred to “major unsatisfactory matters”, much 
o f it during die years prior to Mr Kapal’s time, but some matters did refer to his government Justice 
Hinchliffe said he was satisfied that Cabinet was wrong in law when it said that the matter “can only be 
put right by suspension”. He added that there was a lot o f work to be done because it appeared the 
financial mismanagement prior to Kapal’s government was “quite staggering” (Buruka, Post-Courier, 
September 1987; cited in PN G  Electoral Commission, Press Covenge of 1987 Elections). The National 
Government, however, appealed against the decision and in November 1987 a full-bench Supreme Court 
quashed the order o f the National Court and declared that the provisional suspension o f the Western 
Highlands Provincial Government by the NEC was valid (PNG Electoral Commission, ibid).
The People’s Democratic Movement Party and die National Party had each endorsed candidates in all 26 
constituencies. PDM  pledged to upgrade the M ount Hagen hospital to a base hospital whilst National 
promised a scholarship scheme for grade 7, 8, and 9, and to build enough dormitories in High schools to 
enable all students to be boarders (Bengi, Post-Courier.; 6 May 1988).
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The W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent was again suspended soon after W ingd won 
back the reins o f pow er following the 1992 National Elections. This time it was no t reinstated 
even though W ingti was replaced by his deputy Sir Julius Chan as Prime M inister in August 
1994. D espite court challenges brought against the National Governm ent by suspended Premier 
Lucas Roika w ho had replaced Kapal in an internal power struggle— die W estern Highlands
Provincial G overnm ent remained suspended until Novem ber 1994 when fresh elections were 
called to  be held in January 1995.
The Provincial Government Factor
The W estern Highlands Provincial Governm ent came into existence in 1977 as part o f the 
decentralisation process throughout Papua New Guinea. The history o f post-independence 
decentralisation in Papua New Guinea has been adequately covered by others (see, for example, 
Conyers 1976; Standish 1979; Axbne 1986; Ghai and Regan 1992; Regan 1997a and 1997b; and 
May and Regan ed. 1997), so it is not necessary to go over the same ground here. It is, however, 
necessary to  m ention that after considerable pressure from some parte o f the country —  
including Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula, and the Papuan region —  action was somewhat 
reluctandy taken in 1977 to establish nineteen provincial governments based on the existing 
nineteen administrative districts o f  the country, apart from the National Capital D istrict (see 
Peasah 1990; Ghai and Regan 1992; and Regan 1997a). As Peasah says:
T his dem and fo r substantial devolution o f  governm ental pow ers and functions to  the 
d istrict/p rov incial level reflected a dram atic em ergence o f  intense m icro-nationalist 
sentim ents and interests in  m any parts o f  the country in  the decade im m ediately 
preceding independence in  1975. I t w as m ost strongly expressed by such m ovem ents as 
th e  M atau n ^ n  A ssociation o f  the G azelle Peninsula, the N apidakoe N avitu o f 
Bougainville D istrict, and the Papua Besena in  the Papuan Region. Bougainville D istrict 
and , to  a  lesser degree, the Papua Besena (on behalf o f  the Papuan Region) w ent to  the 
ex ten t o f even threatening secession o f their respective areas from  the state o f  Papua 
N ew  G uinea. In  the process, a three-tier system  o f governm ent com prising the national, 
provincial, and  local levels has replaced the previous tw o-tier system  o f  the national and 
local levels (Peasah 1990:2).
W hile establishing the provincial governm ent system the national parliament retained the power 
to suspend those considered by the national governm ent as being incapable o f looking after 
their own affairs. The grounds for suspension, as outlined in the Papua New Guinea National 
Constitution, are if:
(a) there is w idespread corruption in  the adm inistration o f  the province; o r (b) there has 
been  gross mismanagement o f  the financial affairs o f  the province; o r (c) them  has been 
a  breakdow n in  the administration o f  the province; o r (d) there has been a deliberate 
and persisten t frustration  o f, o r failure to  com ply w ith, lawful directions o f  the N ational 
G overnm ent (C onstitution ss .l8 7 E (l) and 187E(4), cited in  Peasah 1990:12).
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Peasah goes on  to  say that “the actual procedures for suspending a provincial governm ent have 
been simplified since 1983 to  the point o f perm itting the National Executive Council to 
provisionally suspend that governm ent, subject to later confirmation by the Parliament” (ibid). 
A nthony Regan, a keen observer and consultant to the PN G  governm ent on provincial 
governm ent, makes this point clearly:
In addition to the provisions on disallowance of provincial laws by the National 
Parliament, it is the provisions for suspension of provincial governments contained in 
the Constitution and OLPG [Organic Law on Provincial Government] which most 
emphatically assert the unitary nature of the provincial government system In their 
original form, the suspension provisions contained various procedural safeguards 
designed to protect provincial governments from precipitate or politically-motivated 
action by the national executive. The two laws were amended in 1983, removing or 
modifying almost all the safeguards, a step which shifted the balance in the
It was under this pow er that the Kapal governm ent in W estern Highlands was suspended in 
1987, and in many instances it seems that the national government, when confronted with 
problem s o f unaccountability at the provincial level, has dealt with them  in rather ruthless 
fashion. Accordingly, and since 1983, numerous provincial governments have been suspended 
chiefly for ‘gross mismanagement o f financial affairs’. The then Prime Minister, Paias Wingti, 
while addressing the Port Moresby Chamber o f Commerce in O ctober 1992, estimated that 
“over half o f the provincial governments in die country have been suspended for gross 
mismanagement and corruption at one time or another” (Wingti 1992:8). In fact, Regan says that 
“as o f early 1994, fourteen provincial governments have been suspended, the first (Enga) in 
1984 and the latest (Madang and Enga again) in eady 1993” (1997b:49).
W hilst the problem s o f ‘mismanagement o f public funds’, o r ‘corruption in administration’, o r 
any other matters o f incompetence and personal enrichment are not restricted to provincial 
governm ents, it would seem that the national governm ent has acted on the somewhat misguided 
principle that such problems could be resolved through suspension. Since the problems o f 
corruption and financial mismanagement are widespread throughout national as well as 
provincial departm ents, provincial politicians, whose governments can be suspended by national 
politicians (who themselves, however, appear immune to suspension under similar grounds), 
often view their national counterparts as rivals rather than partners. This situation is further 
complicated by patronage relations between some national politicians and their provincial 
counterparts. But, generally, the relationship between national and provincial politicians is one 
based on mutual distrust, characterised by confrontational debates on the level o f autonomy in 
regard to mineral resource developm ent rights and similar issues o f  both national and provincial 
interests. A t the core is the persistent and sometimes disruptive power struggle between national 
and provincial politicians.
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The struggle for control over state resources is a key element in any political confrontation, but 
even m ore so in a system o f patronage where the ‘rules o f the game>14 are bent towards 
maximising profit for key players and their followers. This is particularly true in Papua New 
Guinea where elective office-holders have converted their representative role into one o f 
patronage towards their electorates (see A.J. Strathem 1993b:49) and the spoils o f office are 
flagrantly displayed during elections and at other times. Dictated by the harsh realities o f PN G  
elective office in which politicians are judged no t by their stand on policy issues but by how 
m uch they can personally deliver to their voters, politicians at all levels have quite consciously 
concentrated on extending their personal networks. This, amongst other things, has resulted in a 
direct confrontation between national and provincial politicians. National politicians, as 
indicated by form er Prime Minister Paias Wingti, argue that ‘‘this costly second tier o f 
governm ent [arose] as a result o f blackmail from one provincial grouping [Bougainville]” (Wingti 
1992:4).15
Furtherm ore, provincial governments are seen by national politicians as “an unnecessary 
intermediate layer between them  and their electorates, and thereby obfuscating the usefulness o f 
national politicians in the eyes o f the voters” (Peasah 1990:15). In a country where there is a lack 
o f distinctive ideologies and political party platforms, complicated by the highly  localised nature 
o f party-aligned interest groups, the anxieties o f politicians to prove themselves as the link 
between their people and government resources has generated suspicion and antagonism 
between national and provincial politicians.
The evidence for mutual antagonism and suspicion (subsumed in a generalised power struggle), 
as indicated by Peasah (1990) is demonstrated in the following.
•  the scant regard normally given by the national government to recommendations 
of the Premiers> Council conferences;
Using F.G. Bailey’s (1969) game analogy o f political competition, where competitiors agree that the prize is 
worth having and they accept some basic rules o f conduct; ‘rules’, as used here, refers chiefly to what 
Bailey calk normative rules. “Rules which express such ultimate and publicly acceptable values are called 
normative rules” (1969:4). Normative rules, he goes ont to say, “are very general glides to conduct; they are 
used to judge particular actions ethically right or wrong” (ibickS). The word ‘game’, however, should not be 
taken literally, as PNG politics is fir more serious than th at
According to Wingti (1992), a total o f K329 million goes into delegated functions o f the provincial 
government system every year. “Five hundred and fifty provincial politicians and their provincial 
government staff took up just over K10 million in 1991 in wages bill alone, [which] excludes perks and 
privileges for 240 provincial ministers” (1992:4). Wingti makes an interesting comparison between PNG 
and New Zealand, a country “with a similar population as PNG [but] a fir more advanced economy 
which supports only 97 politicians [compared to] PNG taxpayers supporting 659 politicians” (1992:5). The 
97 politicians, he says, “costs the New Zealand taxpayers $7 million per annum [in] salaries and allowances. 
That works out to about K3.5 million [in 1992; before the devaluation o f the PNG Kina]” (ibid). If 550 
provincial politicians cost K10 million, then surely 109 national politicians would cost a lot more, and a 
total o f 659 politicians would definitely be much higher, perhaps five times that o f New Zealand.
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•  the emasculation of the National Fiscal Commission, one of the most important 
aspects o f the constitutional machinery for overseeing national-provincial 
relations;
•  the extra-legal accretions and even sometimes arbitrariness on the part of the 
national government in the fiscal relations between the national government and 
provincial governments;
•  the lack of adequate consultation and notification (contrary to constitutional 
recommendations) in passing national or provincial laws;
•  the unconstitutional establishment and retention of provincial administrative 
departments despite a court decision on the unconstitutionality of these 
departments;
•  the foisting of national parliamentarians on provincial assemblies; and
•  the increasingly free hand assumed by the national government and the Parliament 
in suspending provincial governments (Peasah 1990:14).
Given these unfortunate and rather sad circumstances, it came as no big surprise when the 
N ational Parliament finally decided to abolish the provincial governm ent system in June 1995. 
According to the PN G  Foreign Affairs Departm ent News Summary.
Papua New Guinea’s 20-year-old provincial government system was yesterday [28 June 
1995] abolished in an historical passage of reform bill The controversial bill was passed 
86-15 following the third reading which was introduced by Prime Minister Sir Julius 
Chan. However, five prominent Government Ministers did not vote for the Bill 
[together with] prominent senior Opposition MPs Sir John Kaputin (Rabaul) and 
Masket Iangalio (Wapenamanda). The obstinate Ministers were John Momis 
(Communications), Bernard Narakobi (Agriculture and Livestock), Bart Philemon 
(Public Service), Jerry Nalau (Labour and Employment) and Paul Pota (Civil Aviation 
and Tourism). Mr Momis and Mr Narakobi are the parliamentary bosses of coalition 
partner Melanesian Alliance [Party]. Mr Philemon and Mr Nalau are from Pangu Pati 
and Mr Pora heads National Party. The MA pair and Mr Pora abstained from voting. .
Mr Philemon and Mr Nalau voted against the Bill. They had all declined a request to 
resign and are likely to be sacked by Sir Julius (News Summary, 29 June 1995, p.2).
As it transpired, all five governm ent ministers were later replaced, but it is significant to note that 
Paul Pora had quite sensibly abstained from voting. There is no doubt that if  Pora had voted for 
the bill, he would have antagonised his henchm an, Lucas Roika, who had only five m onths 
earlier been voted in as Prem ier o f W estern Highlands Province. Roika has considerable 
influence in Hagen Central, which is the heart o f M ount Hagen O pen politics, and Pora needs a 
man like Roika to mobilise support during national parliament elections. W hilst Pora’s decision 
may have been weighted by m ore parochial struggles in Hagen, Momis and Narakobi’s had 
m ore to do with matters o f principle —  these two Melanesian Alliance leaders are generally 
credited for being the founding fathers o f the provincial governm ent system in Papua New
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Guinea. Despite their noble stand, they were overwhelmingly outnum bered by those favouring 
abolition. Hence:
In place [of provincial governments] is now a system which abolishes provincial 
politicians and enables [national politicians] to become members of provincial 
assemblies. Local Government [Council! presidents will now form the new provincial 
assemblies together with their MPs. Regional MPs will automatically become 
Governors, except for a Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister, plus funds for 
development purposes will be channelled directly to local-level governments. Financial 
powers will be centralised and provincial development programs or similar (projects] 
will now have to get the blessings of Waigani (PNG Foreign Affairs Department News 
Summary, June 29, p.2).
Back in Hagen, the termination o f the last elected W estern Highlands Provincial Government, 
headed by Lucas Roika o f the National Party, which ceased operations in July 1995, is another 
factor which will come into the equation when the heavy-weights clash in future elections. In  yet 
another interesting twist to this rivalry between PDM  and National Party, the abolition o f 
provincial governm ents, saw Paias Wingti resign from his position as Leader o f O pposition and 
take charge o f W estern Highlands as the first G overnor o f die province* thereby, in effect, 
displacing Roika.
M ost people in W estern Highlands would see this as yet another defeat o f National by PDM , 
but those familiar with Hagpn history will know the traditional rivalry between Hagen’s two 
largest groups, Jika and Mokei. It goes back to the colonial period, when Jika leaders were said to 
have laughed at Mokei leaders who were told to wear red laptops supplied by the Australian 
administrators. Mokei leaders, angered by w hat they considered to be deliberate ridicule, 
challenged Jika to a contest in log-dragging whilst working on road constructions. This rivalry 
was later transferred into sports, business and politics.16
The Mokei, as traditional owners o f land now occupied by the M ount Hagen township, feel that 
they should have m ore say in the management o f the town. The Jika, on the other hand, feel that 
they have die tight, by virtue o f size and strength, to control town affairs. This has in the past 
resulted in some conflict between these two large tribes, and will continue because the Mokei 
will view the replacement o f the Roika governm ent by the W ingti governorship as an extension 
o f  that rivalry. As Hageners say, when giants lock horns in the sky there is bound to be thunder 
and lightning. Similarly, the clash between political and economic heavy-weights will surely 
produce turbulence o f massive proportions.
Elections in M ount Hagen, at best, are times o f uncertainty and, at worst, o f widespread fear and 
anxiety. These are natural psychological phenom ena in times o f conflict, but the 1997 National
16. The historical background to the Mokei-Jika rivalry was given to me by Mathew Nokkie o f M ount Hagen. 
Nokkie’s tribe, (Kum) Kopi, has strong ties with the Mokei.
Elections and the Hagen Megacycle 222
Election17, following recent structural changes, o r m ore specifically the abolition o f provincial 
governm ents, caused the jitters in certain circles, notably among the churches. Amidst 
widespread violence during the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial elections, entire 
congregations within the W ahgi Parish (Melpa Circuit) o f  the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG) 
were n o t only vigilant in prayer but held their considerable numbers away from trouble through 
some powerful preaching and community work. Anticipating trouble in 1997, many church 
leaders had expressed the need for an end to inter-church rivalry and greater cooperation 
between the various Christian denominations towards achieving more peaceful and fair elections 
in future. I now  turn to  strategies o f candidates in elections.
Cash-for-Yotes
The strategies adopted by candidates in soliciting for votes vary, ranging from more subtle forms 
such as m ini moka to  use o f threat o r force. But the use o f cash has become a common 
denom inator in the mad scramble for votes. Cash-for-votes, o r open bribery, is a common 
practice and accepted as an integral part o f electioneering in M ount Hagen society, but 
candidates express disgust at clan leaders who openly solicit for money in return for promise o f 
votes on polling days. O f the candidates interviewed, m ost o f them admitted that cash-for-votes 
is indeed a bad practice, which not only goes against the spirit o f democracy but also contributes 
to election-related violence, yet it is practically impossible for a candidate to avoid such a 
situation w ithout seriously jeopardising his chances o f  winning.
As previously indicated, there are parallels in traditional spheres o f competition and cooperation 
such as the M ount Hagen moka ceremonial exchange system and a m odem  election campaign. 
Both involve some form  o f cooperation between mutual interest groups, such as clans o f a 
particular tribe, in order to compete effectively against other similar groups. As in moka, where 
big-men try to outdo each other with the size o f their gifts o f pigs, pork and cash, in election 
campaigns candidates try to outdo each other with ‘gifts* mainly o f cash. In both instances, clan 
support is considered vital, where both the big-men and candidates depend on fellow clansmen 
and relatives for resources to launch their careers as well as consolidating their positions.
The difference, however, lies in the m anner o f approach and type o f return payments. In  moka 
the original gift is given in good faith to exchange partners who are usually kinsmen or affines 
and will be repaid with an increm ent o f similar kind at a later date. O n the other hand, elections 
involve transactions between relatives as well as total strangers, and economic resources —
This would be PN G ’s eight national election and the fifth since political independence in 1975. After four 
different Prime Ministers and nine governments, PN G , while I was writing this chapter, was preparing for 
1997 which is possibly the nation’s m ost im portant election in history. See Appendix V I for a full list o f 
PN G  national governments, 1972-1992.
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mostly cash, but other valued scarce items such as pigs, cattle, cars, guns, and beer, too —  are 
often directly exchanged for votes, or in the hope o f receiving votes.
Moreover, the economic irrationality o f Western Highlands elections in particular raises 
considerable concern. It is shocking to find so much resources committed to an office which 
carries a basic salary o f less than K500 per fortnight for ordinary members o f provincial 
assemblies. However, what appears irrational to outsiders makes perfect sense to Hageners 
whose behaviour is governed by clearly defined rules and their efforts driven primarily by 
prestige rather than profit motive. A major aim o f individuals is simply to become the biggest 
big-man in the area. In other words, it is mostly big-men competing for super-big-men status. 
Monetary considerations become secondary issues here.
Two candidates from Dei Council, during an interview conducted in Mount Hagen in early 1995 
less than 48 hours before polling for the provincial assembly, revealed that they had spent 
K10,000 and K12,000 respectively, while another’s costs were approaching K15,000. It was 
estimated that about eighty per cent o f that money was used in buying o f votes. Although this is 
an accurate representation o f campaign expenditure in peripheral areas such as Dei, it does not, 
however, reflect actual election expenditure in Mount Hagen generally because it is in the Hagen 
Central area where the super-big-men operate. It is believed that here in Hagen Central, candidates 
spend well over K20,000 in provincial elections alone. The figure for National Elections, in view 
o f  major political party confrontations and personality clashes, is much higher. Equivalent 
figures for Dei Open in 1992 went beyond K250,000. That should give us a picture o f how 
much a candidate spends in Hagen Central during both provincial and national elections. As 
shown in Table 6.3, projected expenditure for Hagen Central (Open) in 1997 was K100,000 to 
one million kina, which means that each candidate’s expenditure will fall roughly between these 
figures.18
T ab le 6.3: E stim ated  E lection  E xpenditure in  M ount H agen: A rea by A m ount (kina)
Area 1992 National 1995 Provincial 1997 National
Dei Council 20-250,000 10-15,000 50-500,000
Hagen Central 50-500,000 20-50,000 100-1,000,000
Bill Standish provides comparable figures for campaign expenditure in Simbu during the 1982 elections 
when Okuk said that the National Party had spent K1 million in total, o f which K547,000 was his own. 
Okuk himself spent close to a quarter o f a million in Simbu (Standish 1989:195; see also Standish 1992).
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It should be pointed out that these are conservative estimates o f expenditure in cash alone; add 
other wealth items such as pigs, pork and beer, and it presents a more accurate picture o f pure 
economic irrationality. D uring the 1992 Elections one candidate in an open electorate was said 
to  have spent more than K200,000 in less than a week. In one village this same candidate came 
across an aging big-man who was ill. A fter learning that the old man was suffering from a bad 
cold, the candidate reached into his breast pocket and said: “You seem to be suffering from the 
same cough as I. Here are some cough medicine that I have been taking.” The medicine was a 
K50 note! Such generosity however did not win votes for the candidate because he gave out 
cash outside o f the context o f social relations, which means that his kind gesture may have been 
interpreted as gris mom (‘grease money*) intended to influence voters rather than meeting social 
obligations.
In  this somewhat strange game o f massive spending and correspondingly high levels o f violence, 
various breeds o f leaders, representing different interest groups, have emerged. Amongst these 
are some who represent what is commonly known as ‘name-list* groups, some fictitious but 
others real, comprising an average o f fifteen voters. Their names are listed roughly on a piece o f 
paper and delivered to a candidate by their leader who negotiates for cash in return for promise 
o f  votes which may or may not be actually delivered on polling day. The same list may be 
delivered to one or more candidates and cash collected. And the candidates know o f such 
practice, yet they persevere in their quest for support19 Thus, it becomes a game o f deception 
which can be mutual. This supports a particular theory which holds that theirs is a relationship 
o f mutual deception, gullibility and ridiculous naivety (see Iamo and Ketan 1992:2-3; see also 
Ketan 1995). The ‘name-list* group is one with perhaps the m ost sinister o f motives. Candidates 
will tolerate them only to a certain extent, by dealing with them for as long as they believe that 
the group genuinely exists in neutral locality or not being part o f a larger base-vote belonging to 
a rival candidate.
In die event o f an imbalance in reciprocity, when cash is not reciprocated with votes, retribution 
will surely follow in varying forms. Post-polling violence in W estern Highlands during the 1992 
National Elections included murders, rape, injury to person, destruction o f property, and even 
banishm ent o f fellow clansmen from tribal territorial boundaries. Banishment is perhaps the 
harshest o f penalties for members who do not conform to clan policies regarding elections, but 
there are o f course more hideous forms o f punishment (such as death) which can be handed out
Although candidates are not easily fooled by self-styled leaders such as those claiming to represent name­
list-groups, they persevere in their quest for electorate-wide support because o f the common belief that he 
who consistently picks up marginal votes, in addition to a solid base-vote comprising his local group, win 
eventually win (see Ketan and Eyre 1991). In spite o f conclusions reached by a previous study (Burton 
1989a), primordial factors can alter the course o f an election quite significantly in Hagen politics, as 
occurred during the 1995 Western Highlands provincial assembly elections (see Chapter Eight).
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to ‘nonconform ists’ from outside the clan.20 In the instance o f a clan having endorsed its own 
candidate, clan members automatically become members o f what is commonly known in Hagen 
as a ‘base-vote’, something that has led some people to believe in the existence o f Vote-banks’. 
Both concepts are the focus o f discussion in the next two sections.
‘Vote-banks’
It can be argued that issues, policies and political parties are not significant factors in Papua New 
Guinea elections. My own experience with election m onitoring studies is that election campaigns 
are no t based on comprehensive policy issues, nor on party ideologies, but are rather based on 
kinship systems and personal networks. Kin-groups are undoubtedly im portant factors in 
elections. In fact, clan and tribal loyalty, as noted by Standish (1978a), are o f prime importance in 
directing voters during elections and remain the principal resource available to skilled 
manipulators. In any election it is quite normal for candidates to claim dan-wide support as well 
as significant proportions o f other dans and sections from both within and outside o f their own 
tribe. Such claims, coupled with the actual practice o f ‘block-voting’ in a candidate’s home-base 
area, has led many people to believe in the existence o f Vote-banks’. The composition o f a 
‘base-vote’ and how it is nurtured and protected from rival candidates will be the subject o f the 
next section, but the following discussion will show that Vote-banks’ are merely based on claims 
made by candidates, while a *base-vote’ actually represents mobilised support
Despite claims o f clan-wide support, there is no such thing as a ready-made group which 
automatically forms into a Vote-bank’ that a candidate can call upon when required. While there 
is a a id e  o f relatives and intimate friends in whom he invests considerable material and 
em otional resources, an aspiring leader still has to mould that group and those beyond what 
Boissevain (1974) calls the intimate circles into a ‘base-vote’. And that requires skill as well as 
knowledge o f  social networks. In other words, anyone can claim support o f primary kin-group, 
bu t it requires superior capacity to mobilise support required in elections, which means that 
leaders need to invest a great deal o f resources in each individual within his personal network. 
This essentially means that there are no absolute units, or parameters within which a candidate 
can safely Haim automatic support w ithout keeping his relations warm with others around him. 
Some groups, therefore, are easier to manipulate than others. The Hagen sodal networks are 
schematised below (see Figures 6.1-6.2).
20. Retribution, as a political option in asserting tribal authority, is more commonly sought in patron-client 
relations, where the client population offend the patron-group by voting for a candidate other than the 
patron-group’s choice. During the 1992 national elections, for instance, a Simbu migrant was killed 
because it was believed that he and his fellow Simbu migrants, whilst residing on one Hagen group’s land 
(and therefore being clients o f the landowners in a patron-client relationship), had voted for another 
candidate instead o f the local candidate (see Ketan 1996; see also Chtyter Seven in this thesis).
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Both diagrams are based on Bossevain’s representation of network structures, specifically the 
centrality o f an individual in personal networks (1974:47-48). Figure 6.1 is a simple concentric 
model o f Hagen social relations. It represents the various levels o f organisation, sometimes 
arranged as segmentary structures (see examples given in Appendix 1). Figure 6.2 is a model o f a 
person’s first order zone in a concentric form. In his model o f personal networks, as told to him
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by Maltese informants, Boissevain (1974) identified five analytically distinct, though sometimes 
overlapping, zones:
A t the centre is Ego. A round him  are clustered (I) Personal Cell, usually com posed o f his 
closest relatives and possibly, a few o f his m ost intim ate friends. H e invests a great deal 
o f  his m aterial and em otional resources in  these persons. Beyond his personal cell there 
is a range o f  people w ho are also em otionally im portant to  him , his intim ates. [His 
intim ates are divided into tw o categories based on  the nature o f relations: active and 
passive]. (11) Intimate Zone is com posed o f very close friends and relatives w ith w hom  
E gp m aintains active, intim ate relations. (JUI) Intimate Zone B consists o f bo th  friends and 
relatives, w ith w hom  he m aintains m ore passive relations bu t w ho nonetheless are 
em otionally im portant to  h im  (TV) Effective Zone is a circle o f persons w ho are im portant 
to  him  in  a m ore pragm atic sense fo r econom ic and political purposes and the logistics 
o f  daily life. A  num ber o f people in  this zone are there, rather than in  Z one V  because 
o f  their ow n netw orks. As these contain strategic persons w ho may be useful to  E go, he 
keeps his relations w ith them  warm  so he can gain access to  friends o f his friends. Thus 
m any in  Z one IV  are instrum ental friends rather than em otional friends, Still farther 
from  E go in  subjective term s is w hat could be called his (V) Nominal Zlone, persons he 
know s b u t w ho m ean little to  him  pragmatically and em otionally.. .These persons, and 
those beyond his first order zone, form  the (VI) Extended Zone o f his netw ork 
(Boissevain 1974:47-48).
This model can be modified to suit particular purposes. In the case o f Hagen, for instance, we 
may use this model to explain the behaviour o f individuals, specifically big-men and other types 
o f leaders, in their attempts to mobilise support for elections and other corporate activities.
In the context o f a concentric form, those closer to him emotionally would be ideally easier to 
mobilise and as one moves outward and away from his personal cell it would become 
progressively more difficult to do so, thus requiring more skilful use o f economic resources to 
manipulate them. But there are exceptions. First, interest groups, such as ‘name-list’ groups can 
be quite unpredictable and even deceptive in their behaviour. Since profit— in the form o f cash 
handouts— is their primary motive, they are loyal to none and the word ‘honour’ is not part o f 
their vocabulary.
A second factor which complicates this process is the fact that those from within a candidate’s 
primary kin-group are, as individuals, primarily free agents who may choose to support an 
opposing candidate simply because o f relations which they consider more pragmatic in their 
own personal networks. And if they stand to gain more from supporting someone outside their 
own kin-group, as opposed to their own candidate, then they will vote that way.
In whichever the case it may be, it certainly requires a more skilful candidate to manipulate 
networks —  his own as well as those o f others to reach friends o f friends —  to mobilise enough 
support to form a comfortable ‘base-vote’ upon which to launch his campaign. Needless to say 
that it is the more skilful candidates who can convert that support into votes, and go even a step 
further by competing effectively in areas peripheral to respective ‘base-vote’ areas, who will
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ultimately win elections. Therefore* one may conclude that there are no such th in gs as Vote- 
banks , some groups are easier to mobilise than others, and it requires superior capacity and 
skilful use o f resources to manipulate individuals within the various circles. A primary kin-group, 
however, remains an im portant resource to skilful candidates in mobilising support for 
respective ‘base-votes’, which forms the basis o f my discussion in the next section.
'Base-Vote’
‘Base-vote is a term used by Hageners when referring to a candidate’s power-base, or 
stronghold, which is basically composed o f secured votes. It may be, depending on the level o f 
elective office, composed o f a subclan, clan, an alliance o f clans, o r in some cases, an entire tribe 
o r tribe-pair. As previously mentioned (fCetan 1995), in the instance o f a clan having endorsed 
its own candidate, clan members automatically become members o f the ‘base-vote’. This base- 
vote, which may num ber up to several thousand eligible voters, is protected jealously by 
supporters. Anyone believed to be courting with rival candidates is deemed to have betrayed 
tribal or loyalty and punished accordingly. The punishment, which is normally delivered during 
o r after polling, may range from a severe beating to banishm ent Voters are told to call the name 
o f the local candidate loudly when voting, or face the consequences.
An effective way in which Hageners try to convert a base-vote into actual votes on polling day is 
to conduct open voting either by calling the name o f the local candidate loudly or alternatively 
by asking the presiding officer to mark each registered voter’s ballot-paper in favour o f the local 
candidate for every person who passes through the polling booth. To deviate from this can 
mean trouble for m ost people. For example, during the 1988 Western Highlands provincial 
elections, supporters o f a losing candidate organised a punitive raid in which they beat a fellow 
clansman and his family, a woman was allegedly raped, and a man’s house burnt down because 
they believed that he had voted for the wrong man (see A.J. Strathem 1993b:49-51, Case /, for a 
discussion o f events leading up to this case). This illustrates the potential for supposed members 
o f a base-vote to defect to the opposition side, which means that group membership is not an 
absolute indicator o f commitment from its members. The conversion o f an assumed base-vote, 
thus, rarely meets with a hundred per cent success rate, as indicated in William Pik’s case during 
the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial elections (see Chapter Eight).
Nevertheless, there are ways in which a base-vote can be protected from rival candidates. Since 
the base-vote is a predominantly localised group, territorial boundaries which run mostly along 
rivers and mountains act as natural barriers to vote-poachers. Anyone who belongs to a rival 
candidate’s Han or in any way connected to him will be told to leave if found within the base- 
vote area. Candidates regularly warn each other against poaching but encourage their supporters 
to do so and they themselves are active in soliciting defectors. Consequently many o f them have
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ended up with injuries and loss o f vehicles at road-blocks set up by enraged supporters o f rival 
candidates. The road-blocks, usually set up at entrances into respective base-vote areas, are 
mainly designed to  catch rival candidates and their supporters who visit villages and hamlets in 
the dark o f  the night with bags o f cash for the purpose o f buying votes. For instance, in a single 
week o f pre-polling violence during the 1992 Dei O pen election, four vehicles were damaged, 
two others were impounded, and one candidate was abducted at such road-blocks. I have 
reported cases o f election-related violence elsewhere (Ketan 1996; see also Chapter Seven). 
Vehicles are a primary target because large amounts o f cash, meant for vote-buying, are usually 
transported by road, but individuals with smaller amounts are known to have been dropped o ff 
at the entrances into base-vote areas during the day.
In instances where a neutral group —  one not having sponsored its own candidate -—  is split 
between two o r more candidates, voter blocks aligned to the various candidates are physically 
transferred across into the base-vote areas o f their preferred candidate, where surveillance is 
m ore effective and they are treated almost like royalty. As I have previously mentioned (Ketan 
1995), they are kept busy with entertainments o f the Hagen mortya dance, local version o f disco 
called six-to-six  ̂and some feasting. Both the ntorlya and six-to-six provide avenues for courting in 
which young people actively participate, eventuating in marriage for some, but have m et with 
disastrous consequences for others. In one N orth Wahgi area, Warakar, near Banz, for example, 
a man was killed and others sustained injuries following an argument over a girl at a six-to-six 
associated with the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial assembly elections.
A nother way in which Hageners try to ensure hill cooperation horn members o f a base-vote is 
through the use o f threat, force, and violence to prevent them from voting for the wrong 
candidate. By forcing voters to call the name o f the local candidate at home polling booths, 
husbands can m onitor their demand that their wives (and children in some instances) vote the 
same way as they do. Hageners have deliberately turned the democratic feature o f secret ballot 
into an open event, thereby drastically curtailing an individual’s right to freedom o f selection. 
This apparently gross infringement o f an individual’s right to vote freely has been continuously 
ignored by authorities over the decades and has now become an accepted evil in Hagen politics 
(Ketan 1995). It is fair to say that this happens only at polling stations within a candidate’s base- 
vote area. Conversely, in neutral areas, polling is a less painful exercise in which polling officials 
are less intimidated and voters enjoy m ore freedom in their choice o f candidates. Polling 
officials, w ithout police support, are often at the mercy o f the local candidates’ supporters who 
virtually dictate policy. I have witnessed polling stations in which polling officials were told to 
place an *X’ beside the name o f the local candidate as voters passed through the polling booth. It 
was understood that everyone was voting for the local candidate In this way one can expect the 
conversion o f a base-vote into actual votes as near as possible to achieving a hundred per cent
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success rate. Yet, as the results indicate, one can never be sure, because some will always get 
away through abstention or defection (see Chester Eight).
Based on previous experiences and current assessment o f the situation in M ount Hagen, I am o f 
the opinion that it will be difficult to prevent these instances o f violence from occurring again, 
both in 1997 and in future elections. Therefore, it is hardly unreasonable to suggest that we will 
continue to see: (1) leaders o f various groups submitting lists o f names o f voters to more than 
one candidate for cash payments; (2) candidates visiting villages and hamlets with bags o f cash 
(usually at night); (3) the practice o f ‘open ballot9 voting at candidates9 home booths; (4) women 
being forced to vote the same way as their husbands; and (5) violence resulting from candidates 
and supporters seeking retribution for non-deliverance o f votes. These are the features o f an 
emerging political subculture in contemporary Hagen politics. I now turn to some problems 
associated with the high cost o f election campaigns.
Campaign Expenditure and Associated Problems
Despite the underlying ideologies and principles governing competition and political action, 
much o f election-related violence, especially post-polling violence, stems from this practice o f 
massive spending in election campaigns. Furthermore, it leaves winning candidates in the 
unenviable positions o f immense pressure to reward voters for their votes, repay supporters for 
their campaign contributions, and to settle debts with creditors. There are a number o f ways to 
fund election campaigns, including private donations o f cash and other resources (mostly 
vehicles) from  local businessmen and educated elites, political party sponsorship and 
contributions (of cash and pigs) from kinsmen. However, ‘serious’ candidates, according to the 
Hagen world view, m ust demonstrate no t only leadership qualities but also the ability to attract 
wealth. Those considered as ‘serious’ candidates m ust have sufficient personal funds, at least 
K10,000 for provincial and K20,000 or more for national elections, before announcing their 
candidacy. In other words, as Hageners say, you need to have ‘big’ money to contest elections 
these days. This mentality has forced many intending candidates into seeking commercial bank 
loans o r overdrafts against business and personal assets (see, for example, Standish 1989), others 
into withdrawing their life-savings or retrenchment benefits and superannuation (m die case o f 
ex-govemment employees), and even a few into crime (ranging from illicit sale o f drugs such as 
alcohol and marijuana to ‘white-collar’ crime such as stealing money by fraud). As a result, many 
have ended up bankrupt, and a few in jail In the case o f the recendy suspended Western 
Highlands Provincial Government, nearly all o f them are faced with the difficult task o f 
balancing the system as they have now caused a situation o f disequilibrium in their relations with 
others. The following case, that o f Kawelka candidate William Pik should illustrate this final 
p o in t
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Pik s campaign effort, like that o f his rivals and many others, was considered as a collective 
investm ent Accordingly, all the Kawelka clans were involved in one way or another. The 
campaign cost nearly K20,000 in cash, 25 pigs, numerous roasted hindquarters o f pigs, tonnes o f 
vegetable food (for visitors), and thousands o f man- and woman-hours. Nearly half o f  the cash 
and about three-quarters o f the pigs were contributions from kinsmen. In addition to that, Pik 
received donations o f several 44-gallon drums o f fuel from a provincial politician from the Mul 
Council area, some electrical equipment (including an overhead loudspeaker system) from a 
form er national politician from the Dei Council area, and his election posters were arranged by 
an aspiring national politician, also from the Dei Council area. Finally, his campaign vehicles 
were donated by individuals: a Toyota Tand-Cndser from a fellow Kundmbo clansman; a Toyota 
Dyna truck from  a D ei Council man; and a Ma^da utility from an Engan businessman.
Consistent with Hagen ideology o f group solidarity, die tribe-wide support for William Pik was 
expressed through bloc votes, thereby enabling him to score almost a hundred per cent o f total 
votes cast at his hom e-booths (98.1%): Kuk I (99.51%); Kuk II (99.47%); and Mope (93.53%). 
Amazingly, he lost a total o f just 35 votes at home-booths, 28 at Mope and 7 at Kuk. The 
slightly higher num ber o f votes lost to other candidates at Mope was put down to poor 
*8603131/, which dearly implies that his scrutineers were not totally effective in directing all voters 
along tribal lines.
Despite winning the election and becoming a deputy premier o f the province, the abolition o f 
the provincial government system caused him considerable problems, a significant point to 
which I shall return in Chapter Eight. A t this stage, it is worth mentioning here that, although the 
group ‘name’ factor is im portant in mobilising support and resources for elections, obligations 
are continually created through such actions. For instance, individuals who contribute large sums 
o f cash, pigs and other economic resources expect a return on their investm ent One cannot 
overestimate the kind o f pressure to which candidates subject themselves.
Implications: Competing Legitimacies and Violence
O ne condusion derived from this rather complex matrix o f M ount Hagen sodo-political 
relationships is one o f competing legitimades and the re-invention o f democracy to suit M ount 
Hagen needs and life-styles. It is nd ther rejection nor acceptance o f democracy as a political 
process, but rather an innovative use o f democracy, by adopting new resources but using Mount 
Hagen rules and ideologies. In his study on Simbu paths to  power, Standish (1992) comes to 
similar condusions.21 As new resources became available, both Simbu and Hagen leaders readily
21 In another study, based on Chuave politics, Warry (1987) pointed out the persistence o f traditional beliefs 
and behaviour that continues to affect political action in the H ollands.
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incorporate them  into both traditional and more modem spheres o f competition and 
cooperation such as the use o f cash, cattle and beer in Simbu bugla gende pig ceremonial, the 
Hagen tnoka system, and in election campaigns. The use o f beer in election campaigns, creating 
obligations and in entertaining constituents, is not restricted to Hagen, since it as been reported 
elsewhere (see Standish 1978b, 1989 and 1992; Reay 1982; W arty 1987; see also Marshall 1982). 
Similarly, in warfare, the adoption o f W estern technological innovations such as guns —  many 
o f which are believed to have been supplied by politicians and their henchmen —  have added 
yet another dimension to this sphere o f competition and cooperation, resulting in more fatalities 
because o f a general shift in emphasis from one based on display and adornment to that o f 
ambush and slaughter, an im portant point already discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 
Fire).
In  terms o f coping w ith introduced state structures, Hageners have been quick to recognise that 
local methods can be quite effective in pursuit o f political office. In a system where tribal loyalty 
overrides that o f national sentiments, local group objectives appear far more practical than 
national goals. And local groups will go to great lengths to achieve desired results. Traditional 
m ethods o f coercion, through use o f shame, threat and violence, have worked well in many 
cases.
It has also become painfully clear that not having someone from your own local group in key 
political and administrative office means no access to goods and services. Politicians, owing to 
the nature o f the electoral system, tend to favour a particular group and neglect others 
considered peripheral to respective power bases. Because o f the first-past-the-post system, in which 
the candidate with the largest vote wins even if  it is only a small minority o f the total, 
representatives at both provincial and national levels need not command electorate-wide support 
and consequently may seek to represent only those considered as part o f their base-vote group, 
which may turn out to be a single tribe or an alliance o f clans.22 It is only natural that MPs and 
MPAs concentrate their efforts on base-vote areas, for instance, by allocating resources such as 
the Electoral Development Fund to a single area rather than the whole electorate as intended. A 
tribe's access to power, therefore, becomes increasingly important; and elections provide a good 
opportunity for a group to have their own man placed firmly there. Empirical evidence suggests 
that local groups will do everything within their power, including deliberate infringement o f 
national laws, and the ever increasing use o f force, to achieve that gpaL In many ways, elections
One way o f overcoming such problems would be to introduce preferential voting which ensures wider 
representation. Reilly (1996) has discussed the voting systems in some detail. Elsewhere, I have discussed 
the problems associated with the current electoral system and made necessary recommendations so it is 
now up to the PN G  Electoral Commission and the National Parliament to consider changes along those 
lines (see Ketan 1991; Ketan and Eyre 1991).
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in Hagen and the Highlands, as suggested by Standish (1996), now represent a bizarre form o f 
democracy at gunpoint
The strategies and ploys used in getting a tribesman elected to political office may vary 
depending on the specific nature o f each case but the m ost commonly recurring ones are:
•  the intimidation o f polling officials;
•  die infringement o f constitutional rights (via absence o f secret-ballot);
•  the violation o f electoral regulations (via double or multiple voting, impersonating or 
representing deceased and absentees);
•  the use o f threat, force, and violence to prevent members o f a base-vote group from 
voting for the wrong man;
•  the reactivating o f traditional alliance networks and old exchange partners (via ‘gifts’ o f 
cash and other economic resources);
•  the courting o f ‘name-list’ groups from neutral areas (mainly through use o f cash); and
•  the prevention o f rival candidates suspected o f poaching votes from entering the base- 
vote area, which involves guarding territorial boundaries o f the local group as well as 
those o f traditional allies who have pledged support
Much more sophisticated strategies are used where confederacy-type alliance networks exist 
This is particularly true for the Dei Council area in which alliance systems are characterised by 
complex networks centred around three large coalitions —  Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta —  
which compete in business, warfare and elections (see Chapters 3-4). These networks have 
facilitated a process described in this study as the Hagen megacycle, the details o f which are 
outlined below.
The Hagen Megacycle
Recent developments in Hagen suggest that there has been a definite merging o f spheres o f 
political competition, between ‘traditional’ Hagen and modem PNG arenas o f competition and 
cooperation. It is not only a fusion o f ideas and practices, borrowed from one field to use in 
another, but also involves die deliberate and systematic ordering o f major events to form a 
megacycle. In one way, as A.J. Strathem (1992) says, it represents an actual widening o f spheres 
o f political action, while at the same time, it emphasises the major political lines o f cleavage 
between local groups, factions, and coalitions.
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The megacycle involves a high degree o f complexity which cannot be adequately analysed 
without understanding the social relations involved. It is therefore necessary to go into some 
detail, before returning to an analysis in the next section, in order to explain some o f the more 
complex processes at work in this turbulent society. A particular megacycle described in this 
study is given in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Political com petition as a m egacycle: the D ei C ouncil case
As indicated above (in Figure 6.3), the expanded field o f competition covers a number of 
important political events occurring over a period o f around fourteen years, beginning with a 
seven-year period o f hostilities (1984-1990), punctuated by a combined church and state-
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sponsored one-year truce period (1989-1990) during which two separate peace settlements were 
negotiated, first between the Remdi and Minembi in 1989 and later between the Kawelka and 
Minembi in 1990. This was followed by a six-year period o f intensive reparation payments and 
gift exchanges (1990-1996). The seven-year period o f hostilities was twice broken by short 
intervals o f mutual truce, first in 1987 for a short while during the national election, and ag^in 
briefly in 1988 during the provincial government elections. The one-year truce period also 
coincided with preparations for the national government election in June 1992. The last six-year 
period o f peace, between 1990 and 1996, was apparently building towards the 1997 national 
elections.
D uring a large-scale alliance warfare involving over ten tribes during 1984-1990, a total o f nearly 
100 men were killed, large populations were brutally evicted from their homes, and property 
valued in tens o f thousands o f kina was destroyed, and there was perhaps millions o f kina in lost 
income (see Case 1 and 2 in Chapter Fit#). Whilst the war was predictably fought along lines o f 
historically established military alliances, the introduction o f guns in late 1986 changed the 
pattern o f Hagen warfare, involving a major transition from massed confrontations between 
bowmen and shield carriers on battlefields to raids and ambushes, which resulted in an 
alarmingly high number o f deaths on both sides. It also necessitated the contracting o f allies 
from neighbouring alliance networks to form super-networks or fight joint-ventureships called el 
hompani (‘fight-company5) systems, thus resulting in a physical widening or expansion o f the 
political field. The expanded field o f warfare and alliance between Mul and Dei Councils, as 
pointed out by A J. Strathem (1992:236-237), is associated with the use o f firearms. As indicated 
in Chapter Five, the political field has also expanded into the Hagen Central area. There are cross­
cutting ties through which guns, military intelligence and other types o f sensitive and secret 
information travel from one conflict to another.
The war was formally concluded in 1990 after protracted peace negotiations were initiated by the 
Christian missions. In more than seven separate compensation ceremonies, between 1990 and 
1996, over 2650 pigs were given by the ‘owners5 o f the fight, or the elpukl nma (‘fight-root-men5) 
groups, in reparation payments to allies for losses sustained while assisting them in war. Most o f 
these payments were built around election times, in an obvious attempt to secure assurances o f 
support for candidates put up by the respective ‘owners5 o f the fight The following examples o f 
m ore recent reparation payment should clarify this po in t
•  O n the 12* o f O ctober 1996, the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, as ‘owners5 o f the Kawelka- 
Minembi W ar (1986-1990), made reparation payments o f 400 pigs to the neighbouring 
Kawelka Membo clan for three Membo men who died fighting alongside the Kundmbo 
against an alliance o f Minembi dans (see Case 2 in Chapter Five, see also The National, October
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16,1996, p .l and 2). The timing o f the payment is a significant factor here, considering the 
fact that Kundmbo clansman and former Western Highlands Deputy Premier, William Pik, 
was contesting the Dei O pen seat in 1997. William Pik wanted to ensure as much support 
and as many votes as possible from allied groups.
•  In December 1996, the Minembi Nambka, as ‘owners’ o f the Remdi-Minembi War (1984­
1989), made reparation payment o f nearly 200 pigs, plus some cattle and horses, to another 
Minembi clan for losses sustained while assisting the Nambka in their fight against the 
Remdi (see Chapter Four, Case 1). Again, the timing o f this payment is a significant factor, in 
light o f Minembi Nambka’s decision to endorse one o f their clansman and former PNGDF 
officer, Major Pun Kaip, as a candidate for the Dei Open in 1997, and o f course to 
maximise his vote.23
Previous cases o f reparation payment were also centred around elections. In four separate 
ceremonies, the Remdi Jikambo clan, as the el pukl nma, or ‘owner o f the fight’, during the 
Remdi-Minembi war (1984-1989), gave away a total o f 1,750 pigs (all roasted) in reparation 
payment to their allies for losses sustained (13 deaths) while assisting Remdi in fighting an 
alliance o f Minembi clans: the first in 1990 when they gave 500 pigs to the Mul Council-based 
TJpper Remdi’ section o f the tribe for loss o f two men in battle; the second, in 1992, when they 
gave 200 pigs to Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla for the loss o f three men; the third 
ceremony was also in 1992 during which a total o f 50 pigs were given to Engan and Simbu 
migrants residing at Gumanch Plantation for the loss o f two men; and the final one was in 
December 1994 when a massive presentation o f 1,000 pigs was made to the Kimka-Roklaka pair 
for loss o f six men.
The first three compensations were built around the 1992 elections, attempting to secure 
assurances o f support for the Remdi Jikambo candidate, Koi Ranpi. Remdi’s gamble in not 
compensating Kimka-Roklaka before the 1992 elections was based on the assumption that 
because the Kimka-Roklaka were owed reparation payment, they would not complicate matters 
by endorsing their own candidate. Furthermore, it was assumed that the Kimka-Roklaka pair 
would support the Remdi candidate, thereby ‘commoditising’ votes as valuables used as 
solidtory gifts, a form o f request for reparation payments. As indicated in Chapter Seven, 
misjudging the Kimka-Roklaka was a major blunder on the part o f Remdi strategists, which may 
have cost Koi Ranpi an election victory. The Kimka-Roklaka, who had lost six men while
Both Major Pun Kaip and William Pik, however, were unsuccessful. Both were closely associated with Pep 
before die 1997 election. It is however difficult to determine whether or not the voters saw them as Pep’s 
political stooges. According to the victor, Puri Ruing, there have been reports that Pep and Pik were seen 
together on friendly terms after the elections (personal communication, January 1998). This I cannot 
confirm or reject here.
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supporting Remdi during the Remdi-Minembi war, were obviously upset over not receiving 
either set o f reparation payments as well as the non-payment o f dividends from the giant 
Gumanch Coffee Plantation. Gumanch is jointly owned by the Pipilka alliance, comprising 
Remdi Jikambo, Kimka and Roklaka, but controlled by a predominantly Remdi Jikambo 
m anagement As a result, the Kimka-Roklaka pair went ahead and endorsed their own candidate, 
Pun Ruing, for the Dei O pen seat during the 1992 elections, thereby splitting the relatively small 
Pipilka alliance base-vote between two candidates (see Chapter Severn, see also Ketan 1996).
The fourth and final ceremony in December 1994 was designed partly to correct their blunder in 
1992 and also to make way for another Remdi Jikambo candidate, Willie Wundaki, a senior 
officer with the PN G  Electricity Commission, to contest the Dei Open seat in 1997. Wundaki 
and his supporters, however, failed to convince Puri Ruing to step aside in Wundaki’s favour, 
and Ruing ultimately proved that he alone was the strongest Pipilka candidate by winning the 
election.
Likewise, the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, as the el pukl wua, o r ‘owner o f the fight", during the 
Kawelka-Minembi war (1986-1990), gave away 700 live pigs24, in two separate ceremonies, to 
allies for losses sustained (15 deaths) while assisting Kundmbo in fighting an alliance o f 
Minembi clans: the first in 1993 when they gave 300 pigs to Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae for loss 
o f nine men; and the other a presentation o f 400 pigs to the Kawelka Membo clan in October 
1996 for loss o f three men.25 The first payment was an attempt to mobilise support for the 
Kundm bo candidate, William Pik, for the 1995 provincial elections (see Chapter Eight), while the 
second was designed to mobilise support for William Pik for the 1997 national elections.
The evidence presented here suggests that elections are highly coordinated events involving 
meticulous planning and deliberate exploitation o f underlying social and political relations 
between local groups. Existing relations such as the confederacy-type alliances, strengthened by 
intense intermarriage and frequent moka exchanges, are important resources utilised by skilful 
leaders. This is because election campaigns are essentially tied in with moka sequences, ally 
reparation payments, and military alliances.
In fact, Kundmbo gave only 500 pigs because in the first ceremony, 200 o f the 300 pigs were contributed 
by the other Kawelka clans, Membo (100), Kurupmbo (50) and Klambo (50). The Membo contribution 
o f 100 pigs, followed by a further gift o f 20 pig?, three cows and nearly K1,000 cash, together with the 
sponsorship o f William Pik’s candidacy during the 1995 provincial election, was made in die form o f a nm  
omtil moka, soliciting compensation, or nm  peng payment for three men who died while fighting alongside 
die Kundmbo.
Although the Kawelka Membo clan lost five men while assisting Kundmbo during the war against the 
Minembi, only three (Kumi, Pengk and Ketipa) died fighting on the Kundmbo front, while the other two 
(Wump and Ruk) died on the Kopi-Kimbo front
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In addition to  these ‘positive’ political strategies, politicians and other types o f leaders have also 
been implicated in processes that exacerbate violence in Hagen society. In recent times, 
politicians have been blamed for encouraging others to fight, as part o f electoral manoeuvring, 
o r as part o f punitive action against supporters o f rival candidates. Such blame on politicians, 
although based in part on rumours and allegations, is not entirely misplaced, as there are cases in 
which politicians and oilier leaders are said to have been the principal instigators. As pointed out 
to me by Bill Standish, conflicts can boost a leader7s role —  he may put him self in a dispute as 
stirrer, mediator, com pensator, o r whatever fits at the time —  to increase his influence (personal 
communication, August 19%; see Standish 1992:113 for Siwi Kurondo’s role in a Simbu dispute 
which resurrected his political career after his 1972 election loss).
In the D ei Council area, for instance, at least two recent wars were triggered by incidents 
involving national election candidates and a third case involved a certain MP who was alleged to 
have supplied guns to traditional enemies o f a group which is allied to his own by a traditional 
pairing (see A.J. Strathem 1993b). Instead o f assisting the group that was allied to his own, the 
MP “attempted to gain favour with their more numerous enemies as a part o f  electoral 
manoeuvring” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:50). The MP’s alleged role here, as pointed out by A.J. 
Strathem , “was unsubstantiated rumour, but it affected people’s attitudes” (ibid). Stories about 
the involvement o f politicians in warfare may be partly based on unsubstantiated rumours and 
allegations, but if believed by the people to be true, then they will be true for them in their 
consequences, thereby conforming to what is known in sociology as Thom as’s theorem (see 
Standish 1992). In this regard, reputation is what matters here; if  a particular politician is believed 
to  have initiated a conflict, then he will be principally held responsible for its consequences.
The closest I came to documenting the involvement o f big-men and politicians as initiators o f 
war (and peace) was in 1992. After the 1992 National Parliament elections, war broke out 
between the Welyi and Kentpi tribes o f Dei Council over election results (Ketan 1996:263-4). A 
prom inent big-man and former provincial government member outlined a strategy to me, which 
he argued would win the support o f both Welyi and Kentpi voters for the Tepuka candidate, 
Reuben Parua. H e argued quite convincingly that it was in Tepuka’s interest to encourage the 
antagonists to fight for a while and then step in with gifts o f pigs and cash to settle the dispute, 
thus putting them  into positions o f obligation towards Tepuka as the peace-maker. As it 
transpired, the conflict was resolved and the Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby, was persuaded to 
step aside in favour o f his fellow Raembka candidate, Parua, and some Welyi voters shifted 
allegiance to  Parua during the 1993 Dei O pen By-Election. This case suggests that there is a 
strong possibility o f big-men and politicians exploiting conflict situations for personal and group 
interests.
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While the kind o f evidence presented here may not be accepted as proof o f guilt in a court o f 
law, it does not, however, suggest that we cannot make any firm statements about the role o f 
leaders in initiating war as a strategy to achieve personal goals. Perhaps the most important point 
to make here is that there is always a elpukl mia (‘fight root man5), or ‘owner o f a fight5, on both 
sides o f a conflict And regardless o f whether real or perceived, an individual (usually a leader) is 
always identified as principal instigator and his group held responsible for losses sustained by 
supporters on both sides. This is to facilitate compensation o f allies, and whilst establishing the 
‘owner5 o f a fight or dispute over an accidental killing is a straightforward matter, leaders who are 
perceived as being perpetrators o f trouble are less likely to admit responsibility — precisely 
because o f the devious nature o f their political strategies. A point worth emphasising here is that 
the inability to dearly identify leaders as culprits in conflict situations presents a problem only 
for law enforcement agencies and researchers. The people who are involved in these conflicts, 
by contrast, are aware o f such schemes designed by conniving politicians and have often repaid 
them in kind at election time — simply by accepting gifts o f cash in return for promise o f votes 
on polling day (while, o f course, knowing full well that they would do no such thing). In other 
words, the megacycle, despite the planning, may not always work.
One may ask that if politicians are such cunning, deviously scheming characters whose actions 
have generated more pain than pleasure, why accommodate them at all? Firstly because they are 
seen as local creatures, and as prominent members o f local groups, factions and coalitions, they 
are important links through which government funds and resources can be channelled towards 
local events. Even after wars have been triggered by the words and actions o f politicians, they 
are still useful to the combatants in various capacities. One such capacity in which politicians 
have excelled is the somewhat dubious role o f the firearms supplier. Ultimately, too, they are 
needed to make peace.
Discussion
There are many issues involved here —  and I may have raised more issues than I have answers 
for —  but the general point is the acceptance o f certain practices as ‘necessary evils5 o f 
electioneering in Mount Hagen. Firstly, violence in terms o f its increasing frequency and its 
apparent inevitability has added a dangerous dimension to elections. Physical attacks on persons 
and destruction o f property are almost natural consequences o f election losses. Secondly, cash- 
for-votes or bribery is now an integral part o f election campaigns. Various categpries o f voters, 
such as ‘name-list5 groups, are constantly on the market in search o f the best possible deals with 
candidates. Politicians, therefore, in their search for power, no longer depend on platforms or 
policies but rather on the contexts o f violence and cash payments (A.J. Strathem 1993b;56). The 
extent to which people will go in order to get one o f their own group members elected includes
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physical coercion, infringement o f electoral laws, and the disbursement o f vast economic 
resources-
In all o f these, the state has been unable to intervene, or to take control o f the situation in an 
authoritative way. This, coupled with an escalation o f criminal gang violence in urban centres 
and a resurgence o f tribal warfare in many parts o f the Highlands, has led to a general decline in 
the legitimacy o f the state. The politicians whom people could look up to for guidance are 
themselves entangled in intricate webs o f social relations in ‘V hich they on the one hand make 
laws to control crime and violence and on the other hand are implicated in the processes that 
escalate the overall level o f violence in their areas” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:57). In M ount Hagen, 
as in other parts o f  the Highlands, it is difficult for politicians to perform their electoral duties 
w ithout being influenced by their personal social networks. They, o f course, are members o f 
local groups and, in the Hagen world view, it is their primary kin-group to which they owe their 
first loyalty, no t the state.
In advanced liberal democracies like Britain and Australia, where there are well-organised parties, 
elections do determine change in government and policy. Contrarily, in Papua New Guinea, 
elections do no t necessarily determine change in gpvemment or change in policy. Instead, PN G  
elections are im portant for the way in which they affect groups and individuals in terms o f the 
allocation o f the spoils o f office and renown. This is mainly because o f the fact that state 
resources are regularly used in local arenas o f competition.
In  any case, such a scenario represents the more complex aspects o f electioneering in M ount 
Hagen society, whilst the strategies mentioned earlier indicate a lack o f respect for election 
procedures and, ultimately, raises the question o f competing legitimacies. Although the 
legitimacy o f the state may not be questioned directly, it is, however, implicit in many cases that 
people are aware o f the state’s inability to assert authority. It also shows that people are more 
interested in achieving what they consider to be more practical goals rather than adhering to 
rules and regulations set up by a largely faceless system which has little bearing on their lifestyles. 
Here lies the danger that what appears to be harmless disdain may actually lead to minimally 
organised chaos in future elections.
In a country where corruption in government offices is rampant, local or tribal loyalty overrides 
that o f national sentiments, and a checks-and-baJance system is seriously flawed by the selfish 
manipulation and chronic shortage o f funds, future elections in PN G  could be a nightmare for 
law enforcem ent agencies. Already there are insufficient police to even attempt to control all 
polling booths in a one day po ll Events such as elections must be approached cautiously with 
meticulous planning and inter-agency cooperation to ensure maximum use o f scarce resources 
required for m onitoring and policing procedural aspects o f elections. Knowing full well that
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inter-agency cooperation between government departments rarely meets with a hundred per 
cent success rate, it is perhaps time to approach the churches to assist in some capacity, 
preferably in logistics and identifying personnel for recruitment as polling officials.
Turbulence o f some sort is expected and, in Hagen, considered an inevitable consequence o f 
rapid political and social change. The W estern Highlands provincial government story illustrates 
this. It was voted into office in January 1995 after a lengthy suspension, but abolished together 
with others throughout PN G  in July 1995, thereby further complicating an already complex 
situation. For many assembly members, the 1995 provincial election was a wasted effort 
especially after what they consider to be a full five year-term investment, instead o f  less than a 
year.26 Undoubtedly, many o f them feel cheated and decided to enter the race for national seats 
in 1997 and future elections. That alone can be enough to raise the intensity o f competition. 
Election-related violence, given these unfortunate circumstances, cannot be avoided, yet 
concerted efforts towards minimising this particularly disruptive process must be attem pted But 
w hether the intensity o f this competition will reach new and possibly dangerous heights, and 
precisely how the nature o f democracy in PN G  will be shaped by mostly isolated local events, 
even in an area o f national importance such as Hagen needs further academic debate and 
speculation (as started in Standish 1996). Having summarised the main points o f this chapter, I 
now attem pt to place the evidence in the context o f wider theoretical perspectives.
‘Weak5 state versus ‘strong5 societies
A major theme identifiable throughout this thesis, and one that can be supported by available 
data, is the tension between a ‘weak* state and ‘strong" societies (Migdal 1988). Arguing from a 
state-society interaction perspective, Standish (1994), using Migdal’s terminology, suggested that 
Papua New Guinea has ‘strong" societies, autonomous but divided. Migdal’s (1988) main 
concern is states, and the degree o f control —  compliance, participation and legitimation —  
they have. It seems the ‘strength" o f a society is basically to do with the degree o f autonomy o f 
the many and varied groups, quite apart from what is done by the state. The state, by contrast, is 
«weak" (Migdal 1988; Standish 1994). In a more recent paper, Standish (1996) added that:
It [the PNG state) lacks administrative and service capacity, without political strength to 
difficult policy decisions and implement programmes; it does not politically 
penetrate and dominate the society. Sometimes state resources can be used for local 
benefit, but politicians lack authority outside their own communities, and the state as a 
whole lacks popular legitimacy, worsened by its own excesses in the attempt to gam
Only months after the election provincial assembly-men were given notice by Paias Wingti, as incoming 
Governor o f the province, to vacate their offices. Surely, someone must have known that provincial 
governments would be abolished in 1995, so why conduct an election in January o f the same year? It has 
been a wasteful exercise for both candidates and the Electoral Commission. Needless to say, winning 
candidates who have committed massive amounts o f resources to a seat in the assembly have been 
unfairly victimised.
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control The societies are increasingly isolated from the state, which is irrelevant to their 
needs, and withdraw from engagement with the state (Standish 1996:319-20).
Many o f the problems which characterise the weak nature o f the state are common to many 
developing countries, especially the recently decolonised states o f Africa and the small Pacific 
island states. In many ways the problems such as lack o f resources, inadequate manpower 
training facilities and underdeveloped economies are a distinct legacy o f the colonial past. If  the 
colonial state was relatively strong, then it is because it was highly centralised in Port Moresby 
and had strong control over fairly efficient operatives in districts (see Standish 1996:320). But it 
clearly did n o t wholly dominate, nor completely penetrate into the societies it claimed control 
over. A t the periphery (in this case, the entire country outside the national capital and the much 
smaller dots symbolising the provincial metropolitan centres), the Melanesian societies 
functioned much in the same way as they did for thousands o f years, although changing and 
incorporating new ideas and innovations when it suited them.
The im position o f  rigid hierarchical state structures onto fragmented but autonomous and in 
many ways ‘sovereign’ groups o f the Papua New Guinea Highlands inevitably resulted in 
com peting legitimacies, o f state versus society, and conflicting roles for politicians, policemen 
and other governm ent officials, between their roles as state employees and members o f local 
groups. By contrast with many African societies, A.J. Strathem (1993b:42) noted that the small- 
scale societies o f Papua New Guinea tended to be politically acephalous, and in the Highlands 
there were no established centralised chiefdoms that could have been used to graft indigenous 
politics onto the introduced colonial state. H e goes on to say that:
Big-men were leaders of groups, coalitions, and fictions in pursuit of competitive ends.
When populations of this kind are introduced at first to colonial and then to post­
colonial power, we should not expect diem to invent overnight a respect for the 
hierarchical authority. They obeyed die colonial power out of a combination of fear and 
self-interest When fear is no longer there, they will continue to pursue the self-interest 
part of the equation unless curbed. In short, the national government, inheriting die 
colonial state apparatus in 1975, was not initially equipped with any automatic 
legitimacy in the people’s eyes (AJ. Strathem 1993b:42).
Indeed, the state system was flawed from die beginning and the people in the Highlands, as in 
other parts o f the country and elsewhere, recognising its lack o f capacity to assert its authority, 
have deliberately manipulated various aspects o f the state for self gain.27 As indicated by the 
evidence presented here and that o f others (Reay 1987; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; A J. 
Strathem 1993b; and D innen 1996), the people engage with the state on occasions, such as 
elections, when the opportunity for economic gain is m ost clearly present Otherwise, they have 
become increasingly isolated, and withdraw from engagement with the state (see Standish 1996).
27 That elections are a farce, with inflated voter turnout, intimidation o f polling officials and gross 
infringement o f electoral regulations, is indicative o f this sad state o f affairs.
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In this regard, die data presented in this paper and elsewhere (Ketan 1995 and 1996) supports 
Standish’s assessment o f the state as being weak and now lacking administrative capacity and 
coordination, both at the centre and at the periphery (1996:320).
If, in fact, the PN G  state is weak, we then can ask whether Hagen and other PN G  Highlands 
societies m ust be strong. Apart from the autonomy o f society and its high level o f social control 
as characteristics o f a strong society (Migdal 1988:34-35), there is not much else that Migdal says 
about strong societies. The strength o f Melanesian societies is in their kastoms> values, autonomy 
and effective maintenance o f public order. If  strength is to be defined in terms o f kastom, 
ideology and cultural practices influencing the behaviour o f people in their engagement with the 
state, then, Hagen society is indeed strong.28 In this regard, we may consider Hagen political 
strategies —  including violent means o f asserting authority and compliance, use o f state 
resources in local com petition, and defiance o f state authority —  as manifestations o f a strong 
society. Clearly, the state, by contrast, does not function in a coherent manner, which indicates 
the absence o f what Migdal calls integrated domination, in which die state as a whole establishes 
broad power and in which it acts in a coherent fashion (Migdal 1994:9). But this in no way 
suggests that the reverse is true, such that the society has been dom inant in changing parts o f the 
state. W hilst accepting that the PN G  state has been relatively ineffective, it is equally im portant 
to realise that, generally, the state and society are mutually transforming, which means that 
Hageners, as citizens o f the PN G  state, are affected by political decisions made in Port Moresby, 
but as members o f local groups, coalitions, and factions, they also subvert the state when it suits 
them. This ‘mutuality o f state-society interactions’ conforms to Migdal et ah  generalisation that 
“states may help mould, but they are also continually moulded by the societies within which they 
are imbedded” (1994:2), a significant point which leads us to our next theoretical perspective.
Beyond the rather statist state-versus-society perspective is the state-in-society perspective 
proposed by Migdal etal (1994) for the comparative study o f the state and politics in developing 
countries. The form er perspective, they argue, “is misleading in so far as it renders the state in an 
adversarial position vis-a-vis the society, and instead favour viewing the state as part o f society” 
(ibid4). The state-in-society perspective is largely based on the ‘mutually transforming’ aspect o f 
the interactions between components o f the state and society. Nevertheless, Migdal et al (1994) 
do focus on degrees o f state domination o f society. The Papua New Guinea situation, as evident 
here and in the writing o f other observers (see, for example, Reay 1987; A.J. Strathem 1993b; 
Standish 1994 and 1996), fits into a category conceptually labelled by Migdal et al (1994) as 
dispersed domination. According to Migdal, it is a form o f domination “in which neither the state
28. Noting the ‘strength’ o f Melanesian political cultures in adapting to and surviving ‘revolutions’ such as 
colonialism, Standish concluded that “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies have colonised the 
state” (Standish 1994:60; see also Standish 1992).
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(nor any other social force) manages to achieve country-wide domination and in which parts o f 
the state may be pulled in very different directions” (Migdal 1994:9), H e gpes on to note th a t
C onflicts flare up  over specific thrusts and parries: attem pts by the state to  increase tax 
collection, efforts by local figures to  gain control over particular state offices and 
resources, initiatives by state agencies to  regulate certain behaviour, attem pts by local 
strongm en to  extend the area o f  their ow n dom inance, and m ore. T he struggles in  these 
m ultiple settings end up  reshaping b o th  the state and society (M igdal 1994:9-10).
All o f these points are applicable to the PN G  situation, especially in the context o f elections in 
which local groups and their leaders compete for political office and power to control state 
resources, and in the PN G  Highlands where the state has unsuccessfully tried to stop tribal 
warfare, and attempts by politicians to build their networks and consolidating existing power 
bases by converting their representative role into one o f patronage towards their constituents 
(A.J. Strathem 1993b; see also Boone 1994 for comparable discussion o f a patronage system in 
post-colonial Africa). Papua New Guinea is like the African state o f Senegal where the political 
practices, based on a system o f patronage, seem to undermine the administrative capacities and 
resource base o f the Senegalese state (Boone 1994). Such evidence, as pointed out by Migdal 
(1994), present great difficulties for state-centred theories which are based on the assumption 
that state organisation is powerful and cohesive enough to drive society. Such a perspective, as 
noted by Migdal (ibid), leaves us at a loss to explain such instances as Senegal and Papua New 
Guinea.29 Boone’s (1994) study o f the Senegalese state presents a strong warning for Papua New 
Guinea, and in many ways portrays an image that m ost PN G  people (including some foreign 
observers) in Papua New Guinea will be familiar with. Commenting on Boone’s study, Migdal 
(1994) reported th a t
T he {Senegalese] state itself came to  be based o n  a system  o f  patronage in  w hich chiefs 
and o ther local-level authorities exercised a trem endous degree o f  discretion in  local 
areas. T hese local patterns o f dom ination came to  be rooted in  the state organisation, 
crippling it and rendering it unable to  deal w ith  the pressing problem  o f eroding 
national production  th at left the state w ith  a drastically declining tax base. A uthoritative 
and  autonom ous forces in  society shaped the state as m uch o r m ore than  they w ere 
shaped by it (M igdal 1994:20).
Amazingly, this could have been written for Papua New Guinea. A definite parallel between the 
Senegalese case and Papua New Guinea would become even more apparent if we were to
O w ing to the difficulties involved in attem pting to use a state-centric view o f  security as som ething created 
or im posed from  above, Standish (1994), explicitly follow ing Clifford e t a l (1984), urged the need to  
recognise that law  and order* can only emerge bottom -up' from  within the society and m ust com e from  
w ithin the com m unity as well as foe state (Standish 1994:61). Similarly, w e need to shift away from  a state­
centric perspective and view  Third W orld states as interacting with societies and at the sam e time 
recognising that there are significant differences between them  as w ell as w ith those in developed  
countries, gaining insights from  com parison w hile treating each case strictly on the basis o f  empirical 
evidence.
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formulate further questions. In the context o f patron-client relationships and lack o f public 
accountability, have our national leaders become too powerful, and in Hagen have big-men like 
W ingti, Pora and Mel, in pursuit o f super-big-men status, become too big for their small local 
groups? Will die abolition o f  the provincial government system create even more disparities in 
wealth and pow er between this type o f super-big-men leaders and their people, and therefore, 
extend their dom ination beyond local boundaries? Is the patronage system o f domination an 
hindrance to effective government? Are the current economic, social and political problems in 
Papua New Guinea rooted in this system? The answers, though contestable, are implicit in the 
questions, a significant point to which I shall return in the concluding chapter o f this thesis. It 
suffices here to say that the people and state o f Papua New Guinea face great problems, which 
are the cumulative result o f their colonial history, the political practices o f leaders and followers, 
and the wider processes o f social and political change. Many o f these problems stem from 
ineffective state penetration, and the distinct lack o f administrative capacity to formulate and 
implem ent appropriate policies, and moreover, are a direct result o f a political culture based on 
parochialism and the pillage o f national resources. That is, the state is in a different moral sphere 
from  the local groups.
Finally, if  the African experience has any implications for PN G , then a key issue is the manner in 
which the emerging political culture is taking shape: that elections are viewed as the fastest road 
to  wealth, power, and influence; that state resources are constantly used for personal enrichment 
and nepotistic patronage; that local cultural values and political practices have dominated state 
politics; that they have thereby rendered the state ineffective in dealing with problems o f public 
accountability, security, and policy implementation. M oreover, as Zartman (1995:6) says, “the 
norm al politics o f demands and responses atrophies; the political processes for popular 
legitimisation are discarded or prostituted; politics and economics are localised; and the centre 
becomes peripheral to the workings o f society” at the local level. The fact that some African 
states, which had experienced problems similar to those currently faced by Papua New Guinea, 
have collapsed (see, for example, Ng’ethe 1995; Ottaway 1995; and Zartman 1995) ought to be a 
strong warning for PN G  leaders, observers and others. I shall return to discuss this point on 
state collapse in the concluding chapter o f this thesis. As preparation for this argument I now 
present a couple o f  election case studies in the next two chapters, so as to provide further 
o f and insights into the dynamics o f Hagen society and the way it interrelates with state
politics.
C h a p t e r  7
ELECTION CASE I: GROUP-BASED CAMPAIGNING AND VIOLENCE IN  
TH E DEI OPEN ELECTORATE: TH E 1992 ELECTION
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Introduction
The 1992 Dei O pen election was won by Pangu Party candidate, Melchior Pep, with 5,435 votes 
or 27 per cent o f the popular vote and 1,998 more than his nearest rival, an independent 
candidate, K oi Ranpi, who polled 3,437. A nother independent, Reuben Namba Parua, came 
dose behind in third place with 3,036. Melchior Pep beat seven other candidates to retain his 
seat, which he had w on in 1987 by beating Reuben’s father, Parua Kuri, a long-time MP since 
the colonial H ouse o f Assembly days.
This chapter is pardy based on an earlier version published in Saffu (ed. 1996), in which I 
examined structural group-based campaigning in Western Highlands and the supposed law and 
order problems stemming from such behaviour. The chapter starts by providing some basic 
background inform ation about the electorate o f Dei Open. It then moves onto a discussion o f 
the candidates and their local group affiliations, with particular reference to the large coalitions 
which were outlined in Chapter Three, in an attempt to highlight the dynamics o f local Hagen 
politics and the way in which local groups compete for elective office.
The second part o f the chapter deals with election-related violence. Purported ‘electoral 
violence’, for instance, is analysed in the context o f the underlying relationship between groups 
and individuals. The concept o f electoral violence can be rather misleading when analysed on its 
own. Thus, one can argue that forms o f violence during elections can be explained in terms o f 
historical and structural organisation o f local groups in the Papua New Guinea Highlands. 
Similarly, it can also be said that the various types o f violence can be identified and categorised 
for possible analysis. The final part o f the chapter argues that local group-based campaigning 
and election-violence is a way o f asserting group solidarity, strength and cohesion within a weak 
state. It also shows local methods o f coercion and maintaining social control are more effective 
than state agencies. Like warfare, election-related violence poses a serious threat to the state’s 
rUim over the legitimate use o f force. In effect, these are challenges to the state’s authority, 
thereby exposing the weakness o f a state with flawed policy-making and implementation and 
limited capabilities.
Background to the Dei Open Electorate
The Dei O pen electorate is part o f the Hagen N orth District o f W estern Highlands province. 
W ith a population o f 41,849 persons (1990 Census), Dei is the largest Local Government 
Council area-cum-Open electorate in the area. It comprises almost half o f the Hagen N orth 
population, which makes it the only local government council area considered big enough to be 
defined as an open electorate. The population figures for the Local Government Council areas 
in Hagen N orth district are given in Table 7.1.
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T able 7.1: Local G overnm ent C ouncils in  H agen  N orth  D istrict
Vocal Government Council Populatio n (1990) %
Mul 18,813 21.84
Dei 41,849 48.58
Baiyer1 18,692 21.70
Lumusa1 6,796 7.90
Total: 86,150 100.00
1. Although separate census divisions, Baiyer and Lumusa are far too small for separate local government
councils.
Source: Based on final population figures for 1990 Census (National Statistical Office 1993; 1994).
The electorate o f Dei is strategically placed in a geographically unique position. Contrasting 
features within its boundaries are: (1) the North Wahgi swamplands which are currently the 
centre o f intense commercial activities, including one of the largest coffee plantations in the 
Southern Hemisphere; (2) the rolling plains of Hagen North, covered by thick layers o f volcanic 
ash and debris, which are home to some of the world's oldest agricultural systems (cf. Loffler 
1977; Steensberg 1980; Golson 1981; 1982; Górecki 1982); and (3) the rugged terrain o f the 
southern slopes o f the Sepik-Wahgi Divide which are densely covered with rainforest
The Dei electorate shares administrative boundaries with five other open electorates: Hagen; 
Mul-Baiyer; Jimi; North Wahgi; and Anglimp-South Wahgi. In the east it shares a common 
border with North Wahgi at Kimil. Westwards it runs parallel with the Wahgi River and the 
Jimi-Wahgi Divide till it reaches the Gugla creek, a tributary of the Gumanch River which 
empties into the Wahgi at Rukmump. In the northwest, it drops over the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer 
Divide at Mbukl, then crosses the plains o f Baiyer and onto the slopes o f the Miti Range where 
it separates Dei from MuL In the southwest Dei shares a common border with Hagen Central at 
Kuk (see Burton 1987a; 1987b; 1988). In the south the Wahgi River separates Dei from 
Anglimp-South Wahgi.
The bulk o f the population occupy the fertile valleys, where the population density is about 200 
persons per square kilometre and, in parts o f the valley where portions o f land had been 
allocated for resetdement, the figure is even higher. Swamplands which were once considered as 
the domain o f bad spirits (kor rakm in Melpa language) are now filled with human setdements. 
This is a by-product o f a shift in perception o f the socio-religious system, largely influenced by 
the Health Department’s malaria eradication programme which began soon after European 
contact, and also by improved methods o f swamp drainage introduced by the Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock (DAL). Being ideal breeding grounds for mosquitoes, the Wahgi
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Valley floor was avoided and the high fever which resulted from malaria was generally regarded 
as the work o f malevolent spirits (Melpa: korrakm, Wahgi: kangi, see Muke 1994:55-56; see also 
Górecki 1979). But in recent times, after both the mosquitoes and the evil spirits were driven 
away from the valley by draining the swamps into the Wahgi River, human populations have 
returned in greater numbers. A J. Strathem (1984:87-88) provides a discussion on relocation o f 
settlements. Examples o f such movements are: (1) the Kawelka’s return to their lower-altitude 
Kuk territory from  Mbukl (A.J. Strathem 1984:88; Górecki 1982); Tepuka kinsfolk who have 
joined the Kawelka there and also at the ancient Raemb settlement not far from Kuk (A.J. 
Strathem  1984:88); (3) the movement o f various groups, including many Minembi clansmen, 
w ho have migrated down to the Baiyer valley around Tiki plantation, where coffee grows fast at 
an altitude o f less than 2,000 metres (A.J. Strathem 1984:88); and (4) Minembi and Kombukla 
tribesmen who have moved down to the Kugmi and N orth Wahgi swamplands. This 
considerable relocation o f settlement, both towards roads when they are newly built and, more 
strikingly, from high to low-altitude terrain (A.J. Strathem 1984:87), is a widespread 
phenom enon. Muke (1994) presents an excellent discussion on both historical and prehistórica! 
population movement in South Wahgi. As inward migration continues to accelerate towards the 
twenty-first century, these fertile valleys will face major population pressure. In fact, it has already 
resulted in conflicts between the occupants, with several clans brutally evicted from the Tiki area 
following the Kawelka-M bembi war (1986-1990) and another war fought over the Kugmi 
swampland between the Kombukla and Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair during the early 1980s (see 
Chapter Five). Furtherm ore, the Remdi-Minembi war (1984-1989), although triggered by an 
incident at a local tavern, had its roots in conflicts over land That the Tenga valley was used as a 
battlefield was no t incidental; antagonists on both rides had their eyes on such prime land
Above the tribal level is a loosely organised level which I have described as coalition-style 
alliance. The major coalitions in Dei are the Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta. As indicated in 
Chapter Three, these groups were formed to serve two basic functions: (1) to facilitate the 
plantation acquisition scheme which began in the mid-seventies; (2) to facilitate the political 
ambitions o f groups and individuals in both warfare and elections. The former Dei MP Parua 
Kuri, for example, had successfully utilised both Raembka and the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance as 
his political foundation for three successive parliamentary terms (1972-1987), until Kawelka 
pulled out o f  flie alliance in 1987. Likewise, Kuri’s successor, Melchior Pep, appeared to have 
consolidated his position within his Welyi-Kuta group since taking office in 1987. He was 
returned to Parliament during the June 1992 elections but was thrown out o f office by the PN G  
Leadership Tribunal after found guilty o f 17 breaches o f the Leadership Code (Ombudsman
Commission 1993:66).
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Between the tribe and coalition-style alliance levels can be found another level o f  organisation 
called the tribe-pair. These are mainly political units whose membership is drawn from 
traditional ties based originally on military alliances between tribal groups. Although Hageners 
have no definite term for this, it is, however, a widespread phenomenon, in which moka 
exchange is usually intense and many wives are taken from each other. Within the Tepuka- 
Kawelka pair, for example, members o f each partner refer to those o f the other as ang wua 
(‘brother-man’). The intriguing phenomena o f tribe pairing and neo-traditional coalition-style 
alliance have already been discussed in Chapter Three. In any case, it must be emphasised that in 
Hagen, politics at both local and national levels are generally organised along these broad lines.
There is evidence suggesting that candidates have been sponsored by all levels o f group. Former 
Dei MP Parua Kuri, for example, had largely been a (Raembka) coalition-based candidate during 
his eady days in the House o f Assembly and later a (Tepuka-Kawelka) tribal pair-based candidate 
when tribes from within Raembka began sponsoring their own candidates. In contrast, his son, 
Reuben Parua, was a (Tepuka Kiteipi) clan-based candidate during the 1992 elections. Paias 
Wingti was another clan-based candidate when he first contested the Hagen Open seat in 1977. 
Melchior Pep is a good example o f a tribal-based candidate. While he may have consolidated his 
position amongst the Welyi-Kuta coalition-style alliance during this election, his Kombukla tribe 
provided the necessary foundation for his win during the last election. The candidates and their 
groups are given below (Table 7.2).
T ab le  7.2: C andidates, tribes, tribe-pairs and  coalition-style alliances o f D ei
Candidate Tribe Tribe-pair Coalition-style
alliance
Koi Ranpi Remdi Kumdi-Remdi1 Pipilka
Puri Ruing Roklaka Roklaka-Waklupka2 * Pipilka
Wikai Membi Minembi Kombukla- Minembi Welyi-Kuta
Michael Yona Minembi Kombukla-Minembi Welyi-Kuta
Melchior Mack Pep Kombukla Kombukla-Minembi Welyi-Kuta
Philip Bobby Kentpi Kumungaka-Kentpi Raembka
Reuben Namba Parua Tepuka Tepuka-Kawelka Raembka
Matrus Dokta Mel Tepuka Tepuka-Kawelka Raembka
1 . Although the Kumdi-Remdi is a more traditional alliance, and the relationship is continued in Mul Council
area (where “Upper Remdi” is paired with Kumdi), the Remdi in D ei (a.ka. “Lower Remdi”) are now  
closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka pair.
2 . Like Remdi, Roklaka is also geographically divided. The Roklaka nu-porpd (‘those who live downstream5)
are com m only paired with the Waklupka while those residing at Gumanch are paired with Kimka.
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Candidates and Group Affiliations
D uring die National Elections in June 1992, eight candidates contested the Dei O pen Electorate 
seat held by M elchior Pep, a Pangu party member. As indicated in Table 7.2, the major coalition- 
style alliances Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta —  were all represented by candidates. Both 
Kaembka and W elyi-Kuta had three each while Pipilka had two candidates. The candidates’ bio­
data is given bellow:
•  Matrus (Dokta) Mel, aged 35 (9/7/62), was bom  into the Kelmbo Kopim bo clan o f the 
Tepuka tribe. H e spent his eady school years with his Kentpi maternal uncles while 
attending Nunga Community School (1969-1974). H e completed his secondary education at 
the Fatima Catholic Mission High School near Banz (1975-1978), before entering the 
University o f Papua New Guinea where he graduated with a combined Bachelors Degree in 
Econom ics and Commerce (1979-1985). His first employment after completing university 
studies in February 1985 was with Coopers and Lybrand Accountants in M ount Hagen as a 
trainee accountant. After having progressed full accountants status in the Tax and 
Accounting Division o f the fitm , Matrus resigned for personal reasons. From 16 February 
1987 to  16 March 1988, he was employed by Touche Ross and Company (Chartered 
Accountants) in the Tax and Accounting Division o f that firm before being transferred to its 
auditing division. In  March 1988, Matrus resigned because o f a job offer from the Highlands 
Regional Secretariat, but did not take up the offer because o f infighting amongst member 
governments o f the Secretariat In stead, he w ent into private business as owner-manager o f 
a retail shop in M ount Hagen. In 1989, Matrus was elected a Local Governm ent Councillor 
and, in January 1990, he ousted fellow Tepuka tribesman and prom inent Dei businessman, 
Goim ba K ot, as C h airm an o f the D ei Development Corporation, the business arm o f the 
D ei Local Governm ent Council, with interests in coffee plantations and investments in 
Niugini Loydds Bank, Farm set (a farm supply store) and plantation managem ent After the 
company closed down all its operations in 1992, due to what Matrus described as “economic 
crises coupled with the depressed price o f coffee” (personal communication, January 1995), 
he left the now  defunct company to contest the 1992 PN G  National Elections. Matrus first 
contested the Dei O pen seat, then held by fellow Tepuka tribesman, Parua Kuri, during the 
1982 PN G  National Elections, whilst still a student at UPNG. After losing to Parua Kuri, 
who successfully retained the seat he had held since the House o f Assembly days in 1972, 
M atrus returned to U PN G  to finish his studies. Again, during the 1987 PN G  National 
Elections, Matrus contested the Dei O pen seat, but both he and Parua lost to Kombukla 
trihpsmarv M elchior Pep. The rift between Matrus Mel’s Kelmbo clan and Parua Kuri’s
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K dtipi dan  widened, just as Mel and Parua’s rivalry intensified, and culminated in Mel’s 
wrenching o f power from Parua Kuri and Goimba K ot in Dei Development Corporation. 
By the 1992 PN G  National Elections, as will be seen, Matrus appears to have resigned to 
the fact that his Kelmbo base-vote is for too small compared with Parua’s to launch a serious 
campaign. Since the rift between his group and Parua’s had deteriorated to a level where 
differences could not be resolved, Matrus struck a deal with Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp, 
Pangu Party president, rather than throwing his support behind Parua’s son, Reuben, during 
the 1992 elections.
•  Reuben Namba Parua, aged between 35 and 40, was bom  into the Keitipi clan o f the 
Tepuka tribe. Reuben is the eldest son o f the former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, who is 
undoubtedly one o f the major ‘traditional’ big-men in the whole o f the Hagen area. Despite 
the lack o f  tertiary educational qualifications, Reuben is an astute businessmen, can be quite 
articulate at times, sophisticated, and forthright in manner. He can be m ost eloquent when 
he wants to be, but can sometimes be quite unpredictable. He has considerable experience 
in the hotel industry. Reuben served his political apprenticeship with a number o f 
prom inent politicians, including Ted Diro, Paias Wingti, and o f course his father Parua Kuri. 
Having been away from his home electorate for most o f his adult life, Reuben relied heavily 
on his father’s extensive social networks, especially among the core Raembka groups such as 
the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and Nelka, to launch his election campaign. He lives in Port 
Moresby and this was his first attempt in elective office,
• Melchior Mack Pep, aged between 40 and 45, belongs to Rondong clan o f the Kombukla 
tribe. H e worked with the Health Department as a Health Inspector before entering 
parliament in 1987. During the 1987 National Elections, he contested the Dei Open as a 
Pangu candidate and ousted sitting member, Parua Kuri, a long-serving MP since 1972. He 
briefly served in the Opposition backbenches, but after the Wingti government was ousted 
in July 1988 through a successful no-confidence motion, Melchior was appointed Minister 
for Correctional Services in the Namaliu governm ent Before the 1992 elections, Melchior 
and two other government ministers were forced to resign in order to avoid facing charges 
brought against them under the PN G  Leadership Code. In a deal reached between the 
ministers and die Prime Minister, they were paid K100,000 each as compensation for being 
replaced in a ministerial reshuffle. The other ex-ministers charged together with Melchior 
were Timothy Bonga (Nawae Open) and Peter Garong (Tewai-Siassi Open). All o f them 
knew that the chaiges would be brought against them in the event that any, or all o f them, 
were to retain their seats, but that did not stop them from contesting the 1992 elections.1
1. As it did transpired, Melclior Mack Pep did in feet win the 1992 Dei Open election, but was thrown out o f
office after being found guilty o f breaching the Leadership Code.
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Puri Ruing, aged between 35 and 40, is a member o f the Roklaka tribe. Puri is a Port 
Moresby-based policeman but has remarkably strong ties with his kinsmen at home. A 
devout Christian and a somewhat reluctant politician, Puri entered the campaign way behind 
his rivals. It is widely believed that he was pressured by certain individuals, including a 
prominent Roklaka big-man, into contesting the elections. His candidacy was also viewed as 
a protest against the Remdi candidate, Koi Ranpi, for reasons to do with corporative 
business deals. There was an obvious rift between the Remdi and the Kimka-Roklaka pair 
over non-payment o f dividends from the giant Gumanch Coffee Plantation which they 
jointly own but which was controlled by a predominantly Remdi Jikambo management In 
addition, the Kimka-Roklaka, who lost men while supporting Remdi in their fight against 
the Minembi and therefore were owed reparation payments, may not have been impressed 
by the Remdi election fanaticism. It seems highly conceivable that Puri may have been used 
by Kimka-Roklaka leaders to get back at Remdi. Despite such rumours and allegations, there 
is no conclusive evidence to prove this point, nor is there any substance in a claim that Puri 
may have been endorsed by Melchior Pep to split Koi Ranpi’s vote. As will be seen, Puri 
appears to be a serious candidate, with a genuine interest in the people, and as voters come 
to understand him better, he will become an important candidate in Dei Open elections.
Koi Ranpi, aged between 45 and 50, is a member o f the Remdi Jikambo clan and has been 
a local government councillor for many years. He took over the coundllorship from Maip 
Kei, an important Remdi Jikambo leader and a former provincial government minister, 
thereby symbolically inheriting the Remdi leadership and the right to contest government 
office through elections. Accordingly, he has dutifully contested every national election since 
1977. The 1992 election was his fourth attem pt In both the 1977 and 1982 national 
elections, Koi was runner-up to Parua Kim, and in 1987 he was again runner-up to Melchior 
Pep. Iitde did he know that history was about to repeat itself, yet again in 1992. Unlike his 
rivals, Koi is a ‘traditional’ big-man, with skills in oratory and knowledge o f local alliance 
systems, but has limited knowledge o f the wheeling and dealing nature o f modem PNG 
politics (including its evils).
Wikai Weeks’ Membi, ag^d between 35 and 40, is a member o f the Minembi Nambka 
dan. Wikai was employed by the Justice Department as a Court Clerk before going into 
private business with interests in real estate. Wikai is distantly related to both Koi Ranpi and 
Melchior Pep through marriage ties. Both Kai’s Nambka dan and Koi’s Jikambo dan were 
the ‘fight-root-man’ (elpukhmd), or ‘owners’ o f the Remdi-Minembi War, fought between 
1984 and 1989. Because o f the Minembi Nambka clan’s elpukl wua status and outstanding 
debts in reparation payment owed to groups in alliance with them, Wikai’s candidacy came 
as a surprise to Melchior Pep, who did not take this too kindly, taking into account o f the
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feet that Melchior*s Kombukla group had given assistance to the Minembi in a largely non­
fighting capacity. Wikai, according to one Minembi Nambka informant, should have waited 
until after the 1992 election, after Pep’s second resignation, to contest the by-election in Dei. 
The masoning behind this lies with a belief that both Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp would 
have supported Wikai for the 1993 Dei Open By-Election if Wikai had supported Pep in 
1992. As it transpired, both Pep and Wamp vowed not to forgave Wikai for contesting 
against Pep in 1992, even though in the final analysis, Wikai’s candidacy made little 
difference, as Pep won quite easily. In a complicated sequence o f events following Melchior 
Pep’s second resignation after winning the 1992 Dei Open Election and subsequent by­
election, Wikai briefly lost his liberty and although it cannot be substantiated, many ordinary 
people suspected that his political enemies had something to do with i t
•  Philip Bobby (Kupakl), aged between 45 and 50, is a member o f the Tembokambo N u 
W urung section o f the Kentpi tribe. He is a school teacher by profession and this was his 
first attempt in political office, but it ended in disaster (see post-polling violence in this 
chapter; see also Ketan 1996), which ultimately led to his decision not to contest the 1993 
Dei Open By-Election. Following the Kentpi-Welyi fight after the 1992 elections, in which 
three men were killed, Tepuka leaders saw this as an opportunity to persuade Philip Bobby 
to step aside in favour o f Reuben Parua chiefly on die basis o f the argument that the Dei 
Open seat must be retained by the Raembka alliance and Reuben (through his father’s 
network) had a much better chance o f doing that than Philip. As a result, a deal was struck 
between these two Raembka candidates, ensuring Philip’s predominantly Kentpi supporters 
to vote for Reuben in the by-election, thus effectively transforming Philip Bobby’s status 
from one o f serious contender to that o f political henchmen. Philip Bobby has now 
switched his attention to growing coffee.
•  M ichael Y ona, aged between 35 and 40, is a member o f the Minembi Napakae clan. He 
QttpndpH Mount Hagen High School in the late seventies and briefly worked as a car 
salesman with what was then called New Guinea Motors (now merged with the giant Mount 
Hagen-based Wamp Nga group o f companies) before going into private business with .  
interests in trucking and haulage. This was his first attempt at elective office and, judging 
from his poll performance, appears to be his last After an especially disastrous attempt in 
politics and business, Michael Yona has finally returned to his previous profession as a 
salesman with Wamp Nga Motors.
O ut o f  the eight candidates, only four were serious contenders with Trig money*, resources and
strong support They were Koi Ranpi, Wikai Membi, Namba Parua and the incumbent Melchior
Pep. The others, in spite o f genuine interest they held in contesting, provided little competition
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for Pep and mostly ended up being used as political stooges by others for the purpose of 
splitting votes in opposition strong-holds. It was widely believed that Melchior Pep, with Pati 
Wamp’s assistance, encouraged Matrus Mel amongst the Tepuka and, possibly, Puri Ruing2 
amongst the Roklaka to split both Raembka and Pipilka votes, respectively. This facilitated the 
prevalence a id  dominance o f Welyi-Kuta in Dei. Either accidentally or by design, the choice of 
candidates available for voters somewhat favoured the sitting member. While the results indicate 
the employment o f the principle o f divide-and-rule, this, however, cannot be proven 
conclusively. The Dei Open election results are given in Table 7.3.
T able 7.3: T he 1992 D ei O pen E lection R esults
Candidate Votes Polled %
Koi Ranpi 3,437 17.19
Puri Ruing 1,989 9.95
Wikai Membi 2,345 11.73
Michael Yona 85 0.43
Melchior Mack Pep 5,435 27.19
Philip Bobby 2,079 10.40
Reuben Namba Parua 3,036 15.19
Matrus Dokta Mel 1,539 7.70
Informal 45
Total 19,990 100.00
Source: Papua N e w  Guinea Electoral C om m ission  (1992:115).
It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that Tepuka Kelmbo clansman Matrus (Dokta) Mel 
appeared to be emerging as a ‘power broker’ type of candidate in Dei generally and, particularly, 
in Raembka politics. He is, by virtue of tribal membership and a special relationship maintained 
with his maternal Kentpi uncles, in a unique position to influence stability in Raembka politics. 
Conversely, he could easily cause instability because o f his vulnerability to external forces. This 
appears to have eventuated in 1992. By accepting a campaign vehicle from Pangu Party 
president and Kombukla tribesman Pati Wamp, Matrus may have compromised his own 
position, in addition to jeopardising the chances o f his fellow Raembka candidates by splitting *I
2. In spite o f  what other people may have said and believed at the time, after having spoken to the candidate,
I am not convinced that he was a political stooge. That Puri Ruing has made a significant improvement 
during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election reinforces this view that he may have been a serious contender 
during both elections and will be an important candidate in years to come. In fact, he did win the 1997 
elections!
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their vote. But Matrus alone cannot be blamed for risking the position o f the Raembka group in 
Dei politics because all the Raembka candidates were equally responsible for narrowing 
Raembka chances. While one may have been a safe bet, for three to stand was always going to 
be risky.
As it turned out, Tepuka-Kawelka votes were mainly divided between Matrus Mel and his fellow 
tribesman Namba Parua, while a large proportion o f Raembka votes were spread between the 
three candidates. Although Matrus was expected to pick up a good fraction o f the Kumungaka- 
Kentpi votes, it is difficult to determine a more accurate figure due to lack o f relevant data. 
Progressive tally sheets, with records o f individual ballot-box counts, are essential for this type o f 
analysis. These, however, were not available at die time o f w riting3
Meanwhile, at Gumanch, fellow Pipilka candidates Pun Ruing and Koi Ranpi were pitted against 
each other in a contest which would ultimately determine the fete o f Pipilka as a unit in Dei 
politics. The Pipilka, now also a registered business name, historically4 comprised the mainly Dei 
resident Kimka, Roklaka, Remdi, Waklupka tribes and the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer 
resident Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair (Burton 1988:1.5). This indicates Pipilka’s relatively small size in 
Dei and the difficulties involved in trying to win elections. But Puri Ruing won in 1997, proving 
that the biggest group does not necessarily win (see Chapter Eight for comparable discussion).5
It can be argued that Puri Ruing was able to collect votes which otherwise may have gone to Koi 
Ranpi. Furthermore, he picked up Waklupka votes which otherwise may have gone to Philip 
Bobby and Namba Parua. Yet, it can also be argued that had Puri Ruing not contested, his votes 
would not necessarily go to Koi, because the Waklupka votes would have gone to Philip Bobby 
and his fellow Raembka candidates.
Even at this crude level o f analysis, it is clear that a Raembka candidate was never going to win. 
It was boxed in from all comers right from the beginning. Pipilka, likewise, was never going to 
make it either. With the Kimka-Roklaka alliance thrown behind Puri Ruing Koi Ranpi 
depended entirely on his own Remdi tribe with a bit o f help from some Kawelka and a few
3. Pending results o f challenges in the court o f disputed returns, the chief electoral commissioner, Reuben 
Kaiulo, is understood to have instructed his officers not to release any results (but see footnote 18).
4. The historical roots o f Pipilka are very remote, suggesting that it could well be a more recent construct, 
based on the business association o f the same name founded by Michael Mel, to facilitate the plantation 
acquisition scheme in the 1970s (see discussion in Chapter Two and Three).
5. Puri Ruing*s win in 1997 however does not constitute as a win for the Pipilka coalition because he was a 
Kimka-Roklaka candidate, and was opposed by Willie Wundaki, a candidate from with the Remdi half o f 
Pipilka. Puri Ruing won because of an electorate-wide perception that he was the best man for the job. A 
devout Christian, Ruing was perceived as a humble man who could be trusted. The other reason was that 
William Pik was quite effective in splitting Reuben Parua’s votes (see Gxpter Eight).
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others. Although the Kopi tribe belong to the Pipilka alliance, they live closer to the Tepuka and 
are in fact Namba’s matrikin. Namba, therefore, picked up most o f the Kopi votes and Koi only 
a few.
The Welyi-Kuta group, on the other hand, were well in control. The votes o f their principal 
candidate, Melchior Pep, mainly came from his own group, the Kombukla, the Minembi Papeke 
clan who reside on Kombukla territory, as well as ‘bloc votes’ from the Welyi tribe. That was 
enough to give him a good foundation. He made up the extras from the Kawelka Kundmbo 
clan, through his relationship with, Pik Ruin6, and he may have picked up the usual marginal or 
swing votes from all over. Considering that he was a minister in the Namaliu government, his 
chances o f picking up swing votes were pretty good.
Figure 7.1: Group performance in 1992 Dei Open Election
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That Namba Parua was able to come third must be a strong warning to the others because no 
one expected him to do that well Although his father, Parua Kuri, was a former MP, Namba 
was believed to have been rejected by some Raembka leaders in favour of his younger brother, 
Ilam (Robert) Parua, during the planning stages. But he insisted on standing as an independent 
Even his own father, who was silently entertaining the idea of re-entering national politics 
himself, did not endorse Namba’s nomination. This became more apparent during Namba’s 
abduction by Nengka tribesmen when Parua was said to have 'celebrated* with two cartons of 
beer at his Urunga home: “What did I say? Go tell his mother, Kopi amb (woman)..., to go and
While Pik Ruin does enjoy a special relationship with Melchior Pep, the Kombukla-Kawelka Kundmbo
relationship is an historical one. For example, Strathem's analysis o f  marriage patterns showed that 
’’Kundmbo have intermarried mainly with groups among the Minembi and Kombukla with which they do 
have either traditional military alliances or recently developed exchange partnerships" (1972:134). See 
Chapter Seven for further discussion on the relationship between Melchior Mack Pep and William Pik 
Ruin.
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get him” (Kawelka informants: pers. comm.). Part in anger, part in remorse at his helplessness, 
he appeared to have blamed those who had endorsed his son as a Raembka candidate and 
Namba for not consulting and listening to advice offered by his father. Whatever the case, what 
matters most now is the fact that Namba attracted enough support to come third, after winning 
candidate Melchior Pep and runner-up Koi Ranpi. With Melchior Pep’s political career in the 
balance, pending the outcome o f the Leadership Tribunal hearing o f charges of misconduct, 
Namba could well give competitors a run for their money either in a by-election this year or in 
five years time. Clearly, in the years to come, Namba Parua will be a force to be reckoned with.7 
The primary political support bases o f these candidates have been discussed in Chapter Three. I 
shall now discuss election-related violence.
Figure 7.2:1992 Dei Open Bection Results
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‘E lectoral Violence*: Cases and E xplanations
‘Electoral violence’, as a term denoting various types of violence during elections, is being 
deliberately avoided here mainly for analytical reasons. This is because of the argument that there 
is no such thing as ‘electoral violence’ per se. And that purported ‘electoral violence’ cannot be 
fully understood without knowledge of the underlying historical and structural organisation o f 
the groups involved. The term, election-related violence, is used in stead. Election-related 
violence can be divided into three broad categories: (1) any form of violence that occurs before 
polling (2) violence during polling and (3) violence that occurs after the polling period.
Following Melchior Pep's resignation, Reuben Namba Parua won the 1993 Dei Open By-Election with 
4 494 votes, improving on his 1992 position with 1,458 votes. Again, Koi Ranpi came second with 3,522 
votes, only 85 more than his 1992 score o f  3,437. Puri Ruing made a significant improvement, from 1,989 
to 3,138 (a positive difference o f  1,149 votes).
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‘Pre-polling violence’
"Pre-polling violence is a term that can be used when referring to election-related violence 
which occurs before the polling period. It includes any form o f violent act; ranging from fist- 
cuffs to the total destruction o f property and lives. During the 1992 Dei Open election a number 
o f  cases fitting these criteria were observed. The first involved the alleged "kidnapping’ o f 
Raembka candidate, Reuben Namba Parua, in which he was said to have been forcefully taken 
by members o f the Nengka8 tribe. Allegedly, Reuben angered the Nengjka by jumping onto the 
bonnet o f a car they were driving and tried to rip the mesh on the windscreen. Afraid that he 
would damage the vehicle, the dnver shifted into gear and took o ff abruptly, whereupon the 
force sent Reuben sprawling onto the roof. He was pulled over into the back o f the utility as the 
vehicle accelerated towards Kotna and away from his home. His Tepuka tribesmen gave chase 
rather gallantly but in vain. According to Remdi informants, he was taken into Nengka territory 
and held captive until his release was negotiated by a fellow candidate (Koi Ranpi) and his 
supporters on the following day.9
The second case involved a fight between supporters o f Melchior Pep and those o f two other 
candidates, which resulted in damaged vehicles and minor bruises. Pep’s supporters were alleged 
to have set up a road-block between Kotna and Kondopina in an effort to stop other candidates 
from "poaching? votes. Vehicles belonging to Puri Ruing and Wikai Membi were stopped at this 
road-block and during the ensuing struggle, Ruing’s vehicle was extensively damaged while 
Membi’s escaped with m inor dents.10 The next day, a PMV bus owned by a Kombukla big- 
men, Krai, was confiscated by Ruing’s Roklaka tribesmen in a road-block at Gumanch and was 
damaged in revenge.
Case three also involved the impoundment o f a vehicle. But this time the vehicle did not belong 
to either the candidates or their supporters. It was the Returning Officer’s official vehicle which
8. Nengka are traditional enemies o f the Tepuka and a number of Raembka allies. In 1970 former Dei MP 
and Tepuka tribesman, Parua Kuri (father to Reuben) sustained serious axe wounds to his cheek after an 
attempt was made on his Kfe at Muglamp by members o f the Nengka tribe. This violent attack, according 
to Strathem (1984:25), was an attempted revenge for an earlier event in which a Mul driver was killed 
inside Dei. Consequently, a member o f this Mul Council tribe was sentenced to jail for a lengthy period 
because o f the attack on Parua.
9. When questioned about the incident two weeks later, Reuben Parua, however, shrugged his shoulders and 
brushed aside the issue as anything but important
10. Wikai Membi's Land-Cruiser station wagon was said to have escaped with minor dents because o f the
extensive wire mesh and iron reinforcement on the windscreen and side glass. Wikai’s Minembi tribe is a 
traditional pair partner o f Melchior Pep's Kombukla tribe; Puri Ruing's Roklaka tribe had fought a war 
against the Kombukla over land (see Strathem 1984:24-25).
was taken. Melchior Pep's supporters were alleged to have seized the vehicle from the Assistant 
Returning Officer11 while he was returning to MugLamp station from an official run.
These examples show that violence arising from issues to do with the structural and historical 
relationship between Hagen groups is becoming increasingly important in elections. Reuben’s 
apparent act o f aggression towards the Nengka can easily be explained in this context Naturally 
he was suspicious o f the presence o f Nengka tribesmen inside Tepuka territory during an 
election period. Certain historical events were carved into his young mind at an early stage and 
probably will remain important in his life. At a tender age he witnessed the brutal attack on his 
father, then as a young man he watched his father being toppled from power and now he saw 
his clan’s traditionally loyal Raembka supporters turn their back on him. It is widely known that 
a large number o f Raembka voters were successfully courted by Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi. 
The Nengka, owing to their traditional ties with the Remdi, were perceived by Reuben Parua as 
supporters o f Koi Ranpi. In this context, their unceremonious flight from Tepuka territory, with 
Reuben as captive, is quite understandable.
Likewise, the second pre-polling incident can also be understood from a structural and historical 
perspective. Wikai Membi’s vehicle may have escaped with minor dents because o f its 
precautionary reinforcements but one must consider the fact that Wikai Membi is a Minembi 
tribesman and Pep needs Minembi numbers in order to win elections. Any attempt by Pep’s 
supporters to hurt Wikai’s supporters or damage his property would be seen by the Minembi as 
an offence against them as a group. Pep, therefore, would do his utmost not to offend Minembi 
voters. Conversely, to offend Puri Ruing and his Roklaka tribesmen would not be o f major 
electoral consequence to Melchior Pep. It is generally believed that Pep does not rely on Roklaka 
votes because they are not only traditional enemies but also a relatively small tribe.
The third incident involving Pep supporters and the Assistant Returning Officer can also be 
explained in terms o f structural and historical relationship o f Hagen grouping. The Remdi are 
traditional enemies o f the Minembi-Kombukla pair and modem business enterprises are 
organised along similar lines. It is obvious that Pep supporters were suspicious o f a Remdi 
tribesman, albeit an electoral official, found inside their territory with a government vehicle. In 
this instance, it is also reasonable from a Hagen world view to suspect rival candidates and their 
supporters o f Voter-poaching’ inside one’s own territorial boundaries, also known as a base-vote 
area. Elsewhere, I have discussed the composition of a base-vote group, how its nurtured and 
protected from rival candidates, and other similar strategies designed by local groups in an 
attempt to win elections (see Ketan 1995). *
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u. The Assistant Returning Officer, Steven Korowa, happens to be a fellow Remdi tribesman of Pipilka 
candidate Koi Ranpi.
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This pre-polling violence fitted the patterns o f conflict which already existed, but flared up in the 
context o f inter-group rivalry during the elections. In many instances, personal confrontations 
between powerful individuals often made situations very volatile, invariably resulting in assault 
on persons and destruction o f property such as vehicles.
‘Polling violence*
The term ,polling violence, is used here when referring to instances o f violence which occurs during 
die polling period While some cases o f violence during this period can be explained in terms o f 
traditional relationship between groups, it is disturbing to see that state-generated violence12 is 
on the increase. Dissatisfaction over the logistical organisation o f the elections resulted in heated 
arguments between electoral officials and candidates, which culminated in the punching o f a 
Returning Officer.13 Generally, polling in Western Highlands was peaceful, with minimal 
disruptions. In Dei it was no different; it was particularly pleasing to see that polling in the 
home-base o f candidates was exceptionally peaceful and very orderly.
There were only two reported cases o f violence during polling in D el According to electoral 
officials, a bus-load o f Pep supporters was attacked by Wikai Membi supporters at Kumbunga 
village.14 Compensation o f K90 was later paid to the Pep supporters and the conflict resolved.
The other incident involved an attack on Reuben Parua's supporters by those o f Melchior Pep. 
Informants claimed that a vehicle hired by Reuben for his supporters was smashed, a man was 
injured and a substantial amount o f cash was stolen from the truck.15
It is significant to note that the incident involving Pep and Membi supporters was resolved so 
quickly while the case o f the missing money and the attack on Reuben’s supporters was not 
treated with similar urgency. Again, it is a reflection o f the kind o f relationship that exists 
between the various groups. In this light it would not surprise me should Reuben decide to drop 
quietly the case o f the missing money.
12. This refers to violence in response to action, or inaction, by polling officials, such as non-delivery of 
ballot-papers, coupled with an apparent lack o f police presence at polling stations.
13. Western Highlands Provincial Returning Officer, Kapping Isong, was attacked on the 16th June 1992 at 
Kagamuga, allegedly by supporters o f Paias Wingti, over the non-delivery of ballot-papers. Mr Isong, 
when questioned in Port Moresby over the incident, blamed die Electoral Commission for the delay 
which resulted in his attack, but said he was reluctant to lay charges against the assailant
14. This information was supplied by Assistant Returning Officer Steven Korowa and Presiding Officer 
Henry Rumints. Stationed at Kumbunga polling place, Mr Rumints, who was on site, agreed that Wikai 
supporters possibly resented the Kombukla intruders.
is. As revealed by Robert Parua, a victim o f an incident at Mitamp on the eve of elections, two of Reuben's 
campaign vehicles were allegedly attacked by Kombukla tribesmen, with damages valued at almost K3,Q00.
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‘Post-polling violence*
Any form o f election-related violence which occurs after the polling period is referred to as post­
polling violence here. This also includes violence that continues even after the election results have 
been announced. Whilst the data on post-polling violence is insufficient, my own assessment, 
based on election monitoring studies, suggests that post-polling violence usually culminates in 
tribal fights, but not always. Again, these conflicts are organised along tribal and coalition-style 
alliance lines, although its potential to escalate into full-scale alliance-based warfare, or it being 
resolved more peacefully, depends on kinship networks. Since kinship networks cross-cut clan 
and tribal boundaries, it can be a prime factor in conflict resolution.
Since the election, in June 1992, there has been only one serious case o f post-polling violence 
reported for the Dei Open electorate. It was widely believed that more than one case o f tribal 
warfare would eventuate, and people gave predictions o f considerable violence during and after 
the 1992 elections, but only this one resulted in fatalities. It has seen three brutal deaths, several 
hospitalised with serious injuries and massive destruction o f property. A few months later the 
situation had reached a temporary truce phase but was still very tense and, therefore, anything 
was possible.
The conflict, referred to here as the Welyi-Kentpi War, started over the fatal shooting o f a 
Simbu tradesman while employed by a business group representing Welyi-Kuta interests. The 
deceased was one o f many Simbu workers employed by the company to work on its coffee 
estates. He lived at Yan, a small Simbu settlement inside Kentpi territory, with his family and 
friends. Owing to their residential status, the Simbu migrants were expected to 'block-vote' for 
the Kentpi candidate Philip Bobby but, as it turned out, they were already committed to their 
employer. It is commonly held that most o f them voted for Welyi-Kuta strongman Melchior 
Pep.16
According to Raembka informants, the deceased was allegedly attacked by a gang whose motive 
is believed to be robbery. Informants say, the gang members were after the labourers' wages and 
coffee money which was kept at the factory office. The Kentpi and their Raembka allies 
maintain that the deceased was an unfortunate victim o f circumstances and that there was no 
foul play.
But the Welyi blamed the Kentpi, saying that they were upset over the election results and that 
this was their way o f attempting revenge. Kentpi denied this and put the blame back on the
is. In the absence o f progressive tally sheets containing results o f specific ballot-box counts, voting patterns 
were largely based on assessment o f information supplied by scrutineers. Polling officials are an ideal 
source o f information, but accessibility can be a problem for the casual observer.
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Welyi. Warfare erupted and in the battle two Kentpi warriors were killed. A Welyi sustained 
injuries and is believed to have recovered in hospital
From an analytical stand-point, two explanations are possible: (1) that a murder was committed 
as part o f an attempt to restore tribal authority; or (2) that robbery was the motive leading to an 
unplanned death, which triggered off conflict in an already strained relationship. If murder was, 
in fact, committed then it must have been a desperate act o f restoring tribal authority. The 
Simbu settlers owed their jobs to the Welyi but the land to the K entpi By supporting the Welyi 
in their election bid, they clearly compromised their neutrality, an act which could have been 
interpreted as defiance o f Kentpi authority. Retribution comes in various forms —  some more 
hideous than others —  and death might have just been one o f those. And, o f course, the 
inevitable mayhem had to follow.
However, it is also possible that this may not have been premeditated murder; that the initial 
motive was robbery and the Simbu man —  a m otor mechanic —  might have been shot on the 
spur o f the m om ent In this instance, the shooting o f the Simbu could have been taken by both 
the Welyi and Kentpi as a good reason to wage war on each other. In any case, it is quite certain 
that relationships may have deteriorated to an extent where both sides had to resort to violence. 
That the outbreak o f war was so sudden, with litde attempt at exploring avenues for a peaceful 
settlement, was indicative o f an unfriendly relationship. Hostility between the groups was so 
high  that an outbreak o f fighting could have followed anyone o f many pretexts.
The magnitude o f this hostility had loomed large, considering the possibility that the Kombukla 
and Minembi tribes could have thrown their support behind their fellow Welyi-Kuta coalition- 
style alliance colleagues. In which case, it was possible that fellow Raembka tribes o f 
Kumungaka, Nelka and Gulka may have joined forces with Kentpi. Even, Tepuka, in spite o f 
their differences, could have joined in with the rest o f Raembka members following suit That 
would surely have resulted in large-scale coalition-style alliance warfare —  something which has 
been unheard o f in recent times.17
Conclusion
Electoral politics remains as complex as ever and exact mapping o f candidate or group 
performance at die polls is still far too difficult a task to achieve. Only rural ballot box analysis, 
with knowledge o f structural organisation, would help us understand this process better. But at 1
17. According to accounts gven by a Kawelka big-man, Goimba Onombe, the last major coalition-style 
alliance war was fought between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta some time in the 1930s, when the Welyi 
were almost decimated by the combined forces o f the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their Klamakae, Kopi 
and Kimbo allies.
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this stage one must be content with the discussion on local group-based campaigning and 
associated factors such as election-related violence.
My analysis o f structural organisation in Dei leads to two major conclusions: (1) that Dei politics 
is still centred around neo-traditional coalition-type groups; and (2) election-related violence is 
largely determined by these underlying social and historical factors.
Dei politics largely revolve around the major phratries o f Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta. 
While tribal groups may compete against each other in endorsing candidates, it is, however, 
necessary for each candidate to court prominent leaders in attempting to gain coalition-style 
alliance-wide support. Fundamentally, this forms the central foundation for winning elections. 
Both Parua Kuri and Melchior Pep used Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, respectively, in order to win 
during various elections. Raembka, however, did not win during this election because o f a 
number o f reasons. Perhaps the most important one was that Raembka had three different 
candidates contesting the election, which resulted in the splitting o f Raembka votes. In addition, 
none o f the candidates was able to muster the support o f ‘neutral’ groups from both within and 
outside the coalition-style alliance. This raises an important point that in spite o f a primary kin- 
group, it takes superior capacity to mobilise support In other words, all candidates may claim a 
solid vote-base, comprising kinsfolk and clansmen, but it is the more skilful candidates who can 
convert that support into votes, and go even a step further by competing for votes in marginal 
areas.
Similarly, election-related violence is rooted in the kind of relationship maintained by individuals 
and groups in the area. The type o f relationship is often determined by historical and structural 
factors. The possibility and severity o f election-related violence depends on whose involved. 
Warfare such as the one between the Welyi and Kentpi indicates an already deteriorating 
relationship because other avenues o f resolving the conflict were not sought But the fact that it 
did not escalate into a full-scale alliance-based warfare was largely because o f cross-cutting 
kinship ties. Groups may be politically aligned differently, but individuals, including some very 
powerful and influential ones, have interests on all sides. Large-scale warfare, in this context, is 
almost an impossibility. Perhaps another reason why laige-scale warfare did not eventuate was 
because o f the higher priority o f the election. After all, the fighting leading to deaths occurred 
after the election, when the need for peace may have been less crucial, but once a by-election 
was imminent, the need for peace once again prevailed. In closing, I am convinced that there is 
no such thing as ’electoral violence' and that the reported instances o f violence during elections 
have deeper meanings than what meets the eye. Merely to concentrate on such cases would be 
symptomatic in approach, rather than identifying and addressing the root causes. As I have 
consistently argued throughout this thesis, election-related violence, warfare, criminal raskol gang
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activities, and economic sabotage in many parts o f the country represent powerful challenges to 
the state's authority. It also represents self-help methods o f asserting local group solidarity, 
sometimes in direct opposition to state-sponsored values. The biggest problem  remains: there is 
limited state penetration, and the state has yet to come up with effective strategies to  prevent or 
lim it violence in society. In the next chapter I present a detailed analysis o f local politics in order 
to highlight the preselection phase o f elections.
C h a p t e r  8
ELECTION CASE II: TH E 1995 PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION  
CAMPAIGN IN  KOTNA-TIKI CONSTITUENCY
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Introduction
Every national election in Papua New Guinea since 1964 has been studied by observers from  a 
wide range o f disciplines within the social sciences (see references cited in the Introduction o f this 
thesis). As aptly pointed out by Standish, “elections are striking events which no t only reveal 
political activity at its m ost intense”, but also because “they illuminate with singular clarity, the 
dynamics o f  state/local level interactions” (1992:10). For people in Hagen and many other PN G  
Highlands societies who feel that their needs are habitually ignored by governm ent officials in 
P ort M oresby, elections provide real opportunities for maximising wealth and power. In spite o f 
the fact that only a few stand to gain from election ‘investments*, many, if no t all, members o f a 
tribe/clan contribute towards the campaign efforts o f local candidates, if  only to ensure that the 
group ‘name m ust no t go down*.
M ost election studies in Papua New Guinea have concentrated on the output side o f politics.1 
Such studies, whilst providing im portant analyses on issues such as legitimisation o f rulers* claim 
to  rule over countries and command allegiances from its d ti2ens, often neglect the processes 
that take place before the formal campaign period. Studies that concentrate on the output side o f 
politics, like a good polaroid camera, may at times capture spectacular events, but the observer 
often leaves the field none the wiser as to why rifts occur within ideally solidary groups. This 
study suggests that if  we understand the input side o f politics, then it is possible to  predict not 
only why but where the rifts will occur. G roups, factions, coalitions and their leaders may 
choose to cooperate or compete with each other in elections for a num ber o f reasons. This 
chapter aims to show that explanations for such behaviour may be deeply rooted in historical 
events and the type o f relations maintained between the major players.
It hardly needs stating that elections are only a small part o f Hagen politics. By now it should be 
clear that Hagen politics is multi-dimensional, many parts o f which been presented earlier as a 
megacycle (see Chapter Six, see also Chapter Nine). M oreover, an im portant stage o f elections, 
involving various forms o f preselection and the securing o f assurances o f support from  non- 
aligned voter blocks, occurs years before elections (cf. Burton 1989a). This study differs - 
significantly from  other similar studies by examining the ‘preselection* phase o f elections.
This chapter provides a micro-analysis o f campaigning and voting in the Kotna-Tiki 
constituency o f the W estern Highlands Province. It contains a detailed analysis o f voter
1 . With few exceptions, notably H.K. and P. Colebatch, M. Reay, and A J. Strathem (1971), A J. Strathem 
(1976); and to a lesser extent, Kuabaal (1976); and Burton (1989a), all o f which discussed pre-election 
politics in an attem pt to examine the reasons why some groups cooperate in order to compete against 
others. Competition in elections is usually— but not always — based on a remembered history o f warfare 
between the competitors.
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mobilisation and election campaign strategies utilised by Hagen leaders. It is based on personal 
observation and information derived from interviews with key players, including candidates, 
their scrutineers, members o f campaign committees, big-men and other types o f leaders. 
Although focusing on a particular candidate, this study aims to provide significant insights into 
the dynamics o f Hagen politics and the way it relates to PNG state politics.
William Pik Ruin’s Election Campaign
In this second case o f M ount Hagen-style electioneering I present a fine-grained case study. 
While observing the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial assembly elections, I paid particular 
attention to Kawelka Kundmbo clansman William Pik’s performance, documenting significant 
events leading up to the announcement o f his candidacy and nomination, campaign strategies 
adopted by his team, his election as a member o f the provincial assembly (MPA) for the Kotna- 
Tiki constituency following the declaration o f election results, and his subsequent election to the 
office o f deputy premier o f the province.
Even after the formation o f government and appointment o f ministries in Western Highlands, I 
was able to keep in touch with the member on a regular basis until the abolition o f all provincial 
governments throughout Papua New Guinea in July 1995. His personal details are as follows:
William Pik Ruin, aged 35, was bom  at Golke, just beyond the Mbukl patrol post, on the 
Sepik-Wahgi Divide, where Andrew and Marilyn Strathem conducted m ost o f their 
early fieldwork. W ithout finishing his secondary school education, in the late seventies 
he left for Port Moresby, where he briefly ran a fast-food service with some Asian 
business partners. After the business collapsed in 1984, Pik formed a security company, 
with some assistance from Melchior Pep. His business prospered and by 1987 he was in 
a position to assist Melchior Pep in his attempt to oust Parua Kuri in Dei Open. Pep 
was successful and, after a brief spell in the government back-benches, was appointed 
Minister for Correctional Services in the Namaliu governm ent He promptly rewarded 
Pik with a ministerial staff appointm ent As Pep's henchman, Pik had direct access to 
government resources and, by disbursement o f such resources, Pik built up his own 
influence. Being a son o f an im portant Kawelka big-man, and also a capable orator, Pik 
quickly acquired the skills o f a modem politician. In 1988 he contested the Kotna-Tiki 
seat during the Western Highlands Provincial elections, but was narrowly beaten by the 
sitting member, Kar K il He returned to Port Moresby and continued working for 
Melchior Pep until 1992, when Pep was forced to resign despite retaining his seat during 
the national elections held that year. Pik sought employment with a local company 
specialising in car spare parts. Whilst employed as a workshop manager —  and also by 
exploiting forest products from the old Kuk Agricultural Research Station on the side
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—  he continued to extend his networks. During the peace settlement between the 
Kawelka and Minembi in 1990, Pik played an important part in negotiating peace, just as 
im portant as his role in the Kawelka war effort against the Minembi during 1986-1990.
The Preselection Phase
Political parties, as indicated in Chapter Six; are o f little relevance in rural Papua New Guinea. If 
political parties have yet to develop grass roots following, then how do people in Hagen, the 
Highlands region and elsewhere in the country select their candidates? Is preselection the same 
everywhere? As pointed out by Burton (1989a), there are few functional differences in the way 
Hageners, Australians, Americans or Britons assess a candidate’s suitability for office:
In  each case the first phase is a form  o f preselection to screen out the candidates w ho 
are perceived to  have a p oor chance o f winning. This can take place in  the m en’s house, 
a t party headquarters o r m ore publicly as in  the U.S. B ut in  all the systems m uch w eight 
is placed on  a nom inee’s acceptability to  as many as possible o f the interest groups 
w ithin the com m unity. A  com parison betw een the Am erican system and P N G  practice 
bears analysis. In  the U.S., D em ocrat and Republican presidential candidates attem pt to  
w in vote guarantees through die system o f primaries; in  P N G  electorates like H agen, 
preselection is a  m atter o f a candidate and his campaign team  securing arrangements 
w ith o ther sections and clans o f the tribe that they will back him  and no t nom inate their 
ow n people. As in  America, this is undoubtedly w here personal leadership qualities 
m ust shine (B urton 1989a:277).
Indeed, this chapter attempts to show that, despite significant differences in preselection 
processes throughout the wodd, the way in which Hagen clans chose their candidates is just as 
effective as any political party system in advanced liberal democracies. Although die interests, 
motives and strategies o f key individuals and groups may differ from society to society, the aim 
is fundamentally the same —  that is, to get the best possible candidate to represent the 
aspirations, hopes and dreams o f a group. In this section I present a discussion o f the way 
strategies and ploys adopted by one Hagen tribe, the Kawelka, in an attempt to achieve a 
collective goal o f getting one o f their members elected to the provincial assembly.
The Mapa meeting: A  kind of preselection
A  meeting o f Kawelka elders, representing each clan, was convened at Mapa in October 1994. 
Two major issues were discussed: (1) the resignation o f Kawelka Membo councillor, Nicholas 
Namba, and identification o f candidates for the councillor’s post; and (2) the endorsement o f 
William Pik as the only Kawelka candidate for the Kotna-Tiki constituency in 1995.
During this meeting it was resolved that each clan contribute K50 towards Pik’s nomination fee 
o f K500, a strategy designed to show potential Kawelka candidates that Pik alone had the total 
support o f all Kawelka clans. Pik was nominated by the Membo clan for reasons discussed later
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in tins chapter (see section on The Campaign). Although there was no expression o f interest from 
anyone else for candidacy, the absence o f Klambo clan, with the exception o f Ongka Kaipa, a 
well-known major big-man o f that clan (see A.J. Strathem 1979), was taken as an indication o f 
protest by Klambo who were believed to be supporting their own candidate. It was later 
revealed that a section o f Klambo, led by Yap Roklpa, a former councillor and prominent 
Kawelka leader, was in favour o f Max Poka, a Port Moresby-based taxi operator. In the speeches 
that followed, it was emphasised —  perhaps overemphasised —  that this would dramatically 
reduce the chances o f a Kawelka candidate winning, and many warned Ongka that his clan 
would be held responsible for failure in this instance. Ongka’s clan had suffered primarily at the 
hands o f Membo and Kundmbo clansmen, following the loss by Pik during the 1988 provincial 
elections, but he remained calm and composed, despite barely concealed threats made by most 
speakers. He suggested that Max Poka could be persuaded not to contest the elections, but 
would not take the task upon himself because modem politics, as he aptly pointed out, was a 
game played by young educated men. Thus, Ongka, being a shrewd operator, shifted 
responsibility and possible blame for an election loss away from himself and his family.2
Following the Mapa meeting a series o f minor meetings took place mostly at the subclan level 
In these meetings, each subclan discussed Pik’s candidature and their role in the campaign effort 
The Membo clan, for example, resolved that they would spearhead the election campaign, not 
only by supplying economic resources but also by providing manpower to actually go out and 
campaign, thus, sending out a signal to their allies that Pik, albeit a Kundmbo clansman, was 
now a Membo candidate. That, Membo leaders argued, was the key to winning because Membo, 
th rough moka and war alliance networks, had a much wider field from which to draw votes than 
Kundmbo. As a Kundmbo candidate, Pik’s chances o f winning would have been minimal 
because o f his clan’s status as the elpukl wua (‘fight root men5), or ‘owner o f the fight9, during the 
Kawelka-Minembi war. All seemed well and the stage was set for a smooth election campaign.
Nonetheless, there was an immediate problem to be solved before nominations opened in 
November. Max Poka was the problem. He was considered an election risk because o f his 
background: he was young and inexperienced; belonged to the smallest Kawelka clan and he 
lived in Port Moresby. The following is a record o f what transpired at a meeting o f selected 
individuals, mostly leaders and some young educated elites, at Kuk-Rungamundi hamlet in 
William Pik’s manga rapa (‘men’s house9) in November 1994.
During the previous provincial government elections, William Pik was beaten by the incumbent, Kar Kil, 
by less than a hundred votes. It was alleged that Ongka’s clan was largely responsible for the loss, which 
led to several incidents (see below). Ongka’s family suffered most because it was claimed that his son, 
Namba, had taken a number o f voters to the Kil camp.
Election Case U: Kotna-Tiki Constituency 2 7 1
P ik’s supporters meeting a t bis m anga rapa (men’s house)
D uring this meeting o f Pik supporters, at Kuk-Rungamundi, a strategy to  dump Max Poka was 
put in place. M embo leaders, with K ont Klent, Yap Goimba and Yap Pokl, led the discussion. 
The M embo leader, K ont, who had lost his son, Eki (see Appendix P7), during the previous 
election in post-polling violence, was very vocal in pledging his support for Pik. H e expressed 
his desire for Pik to win the election as well as his desire for Pik’s Kundm bo dan to make wua 
peng payment for the loss o f both his son and those who were killed during the Kawelka- 
Minembi war. While no t being explidt in their approach, it was implicit in their speeches that 
Membo speakers were reminding Kundmbo o f their war obligations towards their allied clans. 
M oreover, it was implied that their support for Pik ought to be considered as part o f the wua 
gifts, solidting for wua peng payments. That was made perfectly dear and understood by the 
Kundm bo. But Kundm bo leaders, led by Ruin and Rai, reminded Membo that the job was still 
unfinished, pointing out that Membo still had a task ahead in dissuading Max Poka from 
running.
W ith a view to discouraging Max Poka and his group, two major approaches were considered. 
The first was a direct approach suggested by Kom orui o f Membo Keiyambo subdan to  solving 
the dual candidacy problem. A renowned fiery speech-maker, Kom orui suggested that they 
express disgust at Klambo’s irresponsibility in sponsoring their own candidate in Poka. 
Furtherm ore, he wanted to  raise historical issues, particularly one in which the M andembo 
section, comprising Kurupm bo and Klambo dans, had engaged in battle with the Tepuka 
Oklembo clan. It is said that Klambo fled the fighting scene, leaving behind Kurupm bo, who 
were outnum bered and consequently lost several big-men. Kurupm bo would have lost more if  it 
were not for M embo’s intervention, which ultimately won them the war. This argument was a 
simple ploy designed to win Kurupmbo support for the M embo-sponsored candidate, William 
Pik, while effectively reducing Max Poka’s chances by discrediting his group.
The second approach put forward by Kawelka Membo leader, Yap Goimba, was more subtle 
and involved coaxing and persuasion. Membo spokesmen, Yap Goim ba and Yap Pokl, took, 
upon themselves the task o f gently persuading the Klambo to withdraw Poka’s candidature. 
Kundm bo leaders, especially Ruin and Rai, being the pukl wua (‘owners’) o f this enterprise 
favoured this strategy so others endorsed i t
But in the end a compromise was reached: (1) that William Pik, with the assistance o f Membo 
and other clans, would reimburse Max Poka’s expenses incurred during pre-election 
preparations; (2) Membo leaders would persuade the Klambo to  withdraw Poka’s candidacy; and
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(3) the fieiy Kom orui either control his speech o r to refrain from speaking (unless necessary, 
that is, should Klambo show signs o f stubbornness).
Pik Versus Poka: A  Process o f Confrontation and Elimination
The following day, 12 Novem ber 1994, a Kawelka general meeting was convened at Kuk in 
front o f the form er .Agricultural Research Station office complex. Those present, around 200 
persons (including some women and children), assembled in two roughly separate but adjoining 
camps: the Klambo on one side and the M embo-Kundmbo-Kurupmbo on the other. Even 
before a word was spoken, one could sense that this was no ordinary meeting. The atmosphere 
was very tense. A fter a brief and precise opening speech by Yap Goim ba (Membo clan leader 
and village court magistrate), stating the purpose o f the meeting, it was handed over to die 
aspiring candidates —  William Pik and Max Poka —  to present their cases, mainly to state 
reasons for their respective candidacies. William Pik took the opportunity to remind voters that 
he had lost the last election by a very narrow margin. Owing to post-polling violence, in which 
his supporters had caused massive destruction o f property and the subsequent death o f Eki3, Pik 
added that he had been reluctant to contest the elections, but the Membo endorsem ent had left 
him  with no choice but to stand as a candidate. Pik further pointed out that because o f his 
Membo endorsem ent, and with backing o f all Kawelka clans, he was confident o f winning with 
a big majority.
Max Poka, on the other hand, pointed out that it was Pik’s announcement not to contest future 
elections, especially after the post-polling violence, which prom pted him to contest. And he 
w ent on to claim that it was far too late for him to pull out o f the race, especially after having 
expended considerable resources on the campaign effort H e, too, claimed the support o f many 
Kawelka, including some from within the Membo clan, and said he was currently courting 
support from segments o f groups traditionally allied to the Kawelka.
Both Pik and Poka claimed solid support from  the Kelmbo clan, a segment o f Tepuka which 
was split between the aspiring Kawelka candidates and the incumbent, Kar Kil, a Tepuka Kintke 
clansman. Poka’s cause, however, was not helped when it was revealed that Matrus Mel, a* 
Kelmbo candidate in the previous three national elections, had throw n his considerable weight 
behind William Pik’s candidacy. That was a big blow to Max Poka because Poka and his 
Klambo clansmen had always counted on Matrus Mel to deliver the votes when it mattered 
m ost —  on polling day. Poka was apparently disappointed with Mel for not reciprocating
The circumstances leading up to Eki’s death ate discussed in the next section (see M ax Poka’s Compensation,\ 
A  more detailed version is given in Appendix X I).
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support which he had received from the Klambo and a handful o f Membo, largely through 
Poka’s initiatives, during the 1992 National Elections.
W hen it became obvious that neither camp would bow out gracefully, a select band o f leaders, 
mostly prom inent clan leaders, took the stage. M ost o f them took a middle stand, choosing their 
words carefully, but emphasising the need for a single Kawelka candidate, until Membo 
Komorui came out with a barrage o f words aimed at Klambo, blaming them for trying to 
jeopardise Kawelka’s chances o f winning the election. But before he had done too much 
damage, Membo Yap salvaged a rather tricky situation by taking control o f the meeting and 
offering compensation o f two pigs and K1,000 to Poka for his campaign expenses.
However, Poka was not ready to go out without a fight He had to make a stand, for not doing 
so would not only disappoint his supporters but also undermine his future in provincial politics. 
Having already recognised the intention o f the speakers and the purpose o f the meeting —  to 
dump him —  Poka questioned the motive o f the speakers. And, further, he asked: “What am I 
going to do with these pigs and cash o f K1,000?”
Although Poka’s question may have been a genuine reflection o f his dilemma, an unwinnable 
position in which he was tom  between his desire for political office and his clan’s precarious 
position in Kawelka politics, the Pik camp took offence and launched an attack. It was really a 
case o f closing in on a cornered and seriously wounded animal for the kilL Led by Yap Goimba, 
the Membo and Kundmbo speakers switched from normal to veiled speech mode. In a brief 
review o f Kawelka history, the Klambo were reminded that it was Membo who had won wars 
for them at Mbukl4, reclaimed lost land at Kuk (see Appendix X  for a brief history o f the 
Kawelka), and made peace with potential enemies amongst the Kwi tribes o f Hagen Central by 
sponsoring large moka prestations.5
Leaders o f Kurupmbo and Klambo, to their discomfort and embarrassment; were reminded o f the 
Mandembo section’s lack o f participation during the Kawelka-Minembi war in the 1980s, and previous 
instances in which acts o f cowardice were suspected.
One such moka prestation was made by Goimba Onombe to the Jika Kilampei dan o f the Andapunts 
section in the early 1960s. Others followed and wives were given and taken, induding Goimba’s own 
daughter, Beldepa-Mbo, being one o f the first Kawelka girls to be given as a bride to the Jika. Beklepa- 
Mbo’s marriage to Jika Kilampei Put, presently an important Kilampei leader and son o f an important big- 
man, Anda, strengthened Kawelka’s relations with Jika at such a crudal stage, when factions o f Kilampei, 
led by an important big-man, Maip, were opposed to the Kawelka’s return to Kuk. Another Kilampei big- 
man, Waluwa, played an important role in the reoccupation o f Kuk. At a colonial land dispute hearing, 
Waluwa testified against Maip’s group, supporting Goimba’s claim to the land. A patrol officer— whom 
Goimba remembers as ‘Krepen’ (Griffin) —  ruled in favour o f the Kawelka and Waluwa was rewarded in 
mokavntix gifts o f pigs and a woman o f the Kawelka Kurupmbo dan given as a wife.
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Max Poka’s Compensation: Elimination o f a R ival
Eventually the meeting resolved the issue o f dual candidacy and Max Poka’s supporters, through 
Klambo big-man Yap Roklpa, accepted the two pigs and K1,000 as adequate reimbursement for 
Poka’s campaign expenditure. Yap Roklpa, a former local government councillor and skilful 
orator, could tell in which direction die speech-makers were heading so he quickly stepped in 
front o f Poka and accepted what was offered, thus effectively shielding Poka from 
embarrassment and his clansmen from being subjected to further insult Although sufficiently 
veiled, or so it seemed to women and children, it was apparent to most men present —  
including some from groups which were politically opposed to Kawelka —  that restrained 
recital o f historical events would soon give way to graphic accounts o f contemporary incidents. 
W hat Yap tried and succeed to do was prevent more recent incidents, including two very 
sensitive cases o f perceived betrayal, from being raised.
The first had occurred in 1988 when a young Membo clansman, Eki, the son o f an important 
Kawelka leader, Kont, was killed in Port Moresby by a man from another tribe. One o f a new 
breed o f warriors in gun warfare, his death was considered a major set-back to the Kawelka war 
effort against the Minembi (see Chapter Three, see also Chapter Five). His death occurred only six 
hours after he arrived in the national capital from Mount Hagen. He was met at the Jacksons 
airport by a Klambo man who drove him in his taxi to the assailant’s house at the Administrative 
College, Waigani, where they got themselves entangled in a brawl At around 9:00 p.m., 
according to the taxi driver and three other witnesses (all Membo clansmen), he was struck 
down while attempting to stop a “deliberately staged fight between two men from the assailant’s 
tribe”.6 The Klambo man fled in his taxi and so did the others, while the victim was bleeding to 
death. He was not taken to the Port Moresby General Hospital until some six hours later, 
around 3:00 a,m. on the following day, by some neighbours o f the assailant, but once there he 
died in less than three hours.
Immediately after his death several telephone calls were made to Mount Hagen: one such call 
probably saved the life o f a community school teacher, a clansman o f the assailant but m arried 
to a Kawelka woman o f the victim’s subclan, while others reached various people and the 
terrible news was relayed in whispers. Even so, none o f Eki’s kinsmen nor any Membo 
clansmen received any message regarding the tragic event until more than forty-eight hours later. 
It was alleged that the calls were made from a Klambo man’s house and that one such call was 
received in Mount Hagen by his brother who deliberately kept the news from the Membo for
According to one witness, the fight was deliberately staged between the assailant and his own clansmen. 
The victim was an innocent by-stander, which fuels rumours and allegations o f a conspiracy to murder 
him, thereby eliminating an important fight-leader (see Annex XL for details, including names and historical 
references).
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m ore than forty-eight hours. There are two im portant questions w orth asking: (1) had the taxi 
driver no t fled from the scene but raced the victim to the hospital, would he have survived?; and 
(2) had the M embo been informed earlier would they have avenged his death via pay-back 
killing? M ost Membo men I have spoken to have no doubt that Eki certainly would have 
survived if  he had been taken to the hospital earlier. Opinion on the second question is divided: 
some believe he would have been avenged (probably through the killing o f  the school teacher); 
while others only expressed anger over the fact that the assailant’s clansmen had been informed 
ahead o f the victim 's relatives. W hichever the case may have been, there was a strong impression 
that Klambo as a clan was guilty o f disloyalty to the tribe even though what was involved was 
clearly the action o f a few individuals only.
The second case o f perceived betrayal is believed to have directly resulted in the death o f a 
Kawelka Kundm bo man in 1989. H e was travelling on a PMV to Mbukl when the vehicle was 
forced to stop at an enemy (Minembi) roadblock inside Kombukla territory on the Hagen- 
K otna road. Soon after being identified as a member o f the Kawelka tribe, he was pulled o ff the 
PMV (public m otor vehicle) and hacked to death by Minembi tribesmen in front o f horrified 
fellow passengers. It was claimed that a member o f the Klambo clan had supplied information 
to the waiting enemy. This, however, was not substantiated. But the feeling amongst the 
Kundm bo, as expressed by some to me, was that Klambo were responsible for this death.
A nother point that would have been raised by Pik's supporters in their speeches was the 
defection o f some Klambo who voted for a candidate opposed to  Pik during the previous 
provincial elections. Since Pik stood as a Kawelka candidate, endorsed by the tribal leaders, a 
punitive raid was organised in which the homes o f the defectors were burnt, pigs killed and a 
woman allegedly raped.
These and other similar incidents would have been raised if  no t for Yap Roklpa’s quick and 
calculating m ind Yap intervened for two basic reasons: (1) the fiery talk would have implicated 
im portant individuals and their families; and (2) given the case that there was a coalition o f 
Kawelka clans against his own small clan, Yap knew that Klambo would not have survived any 
serious confrontation.
The recital o f historical incidents involving indiscretion and cowardice can cause much 
discom fort but they are often raised in veiled speeches, especially during intra-dan conflicts. 
And, while individuals are responsible for the various transgressions, it is the group which will 
collectively be blamed in speeches as part o f political manoeuvring. However, when 
contemporary incidents are raised in an effort to discredit both individuals and groups, conflicts 
can easily escalate to serious levels, often resulting in various forms o f fighting —  hair-pulling
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(peng-nti mat), fisticuffs {ki-kum mal}, stick-fights (tembuklmal), aimed warfare (el-kupanda mat) —  or 
even serious rifts leading to the breakdown o f military alliances,7
William Pik’s Nom ination
W iliam  Pik Ruin’s nomination at Kitip High School in November 1994 was witnessed by over a 
hundred people, including many supporters who braved the rainy weather to attend From  Kuk 
he had taken two truckloads o f about fifty supporters who were joined by some Welyi, Tepuka 
and other supporters at Kotna. Still many others came out o f curiosity, perhaps to get a personal 
view o f Pik and others who nom inated As registered on the common roll, Pik was nominated 
as Pik Ruin, using his father’s first name as his surname, rather than both his own name, William 
Pik, as he was commonly known throughout the constituency. That caused a slight problem  
with voters so Pik's team had to spend some time educating the voters about the change o f 
name and how it would appear on the ballot-paper.
In addition to Pik, five other candidates nominated to contest the Kotna-Tiki seat There were 
two Welyi candidates, Oikai Pana and Buldung Apa, one Tepuka Kintke, Kar Kil, and two 
Minembi, the Elyipi candidate David Nema and Kimbo candidate Joseph K it K it, a school 
teacher, whose dan, although structurally part o f Minembi, is currently in a military alliance with 
Pik’s Kundm bo clan, was no t very happy with Pik and his Kundmbo clan because he had been 
told that Pik would step aside in his favour. W hen he heard o f  Pik’s candidacy, he refused to 
enter into any preselection deals and went ahead and nominated instead, thereby threatening to 
split Pik’s votes. However, it seems highly unlikely that he made some sort o f deal with Pik’s 
principal rival, Kar Kil, nor is it possible that there were other vote-splitting deals involved, as 
happens in national elections.
The Campaign
Election campaign strategies employed by candidates cover a wide range o f possibilities and 
have been discussed in a general context earlier in Chapter Six, but here I only deal with Pik’s 
campaign in detail As previously indicated, William Pik’s candidacy was sponsored by a clan, 
other than his own as part o f solicitory gifts (wua ombil) requesting reparations (wua peng) for men 
lost while assisting Pik’s Kawelka Kundmbo clan during a recent war against an alliance o f 
Minembi clans. Owing to  Kundm bo’s status as elpukl wua (‘fight root man’) and since not all o f
As confirmed to  me by Membo big-man, Kont, these issues were raised after the elections, during a 
homicide compensation settlement between the Membo and Klambo. A young Membo girl suspected o f 
courting a married Klambo man was killed by one o f his wives. Although a compensation o f K9,600 and 
80 pigs were paid, relations between the Membo and Klambo have since deteriorated to a level where 
joint ventures such as election campaigns and business enterprise would be extremely difficult to negotiate 
(see discussion on Aftermath, below).
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its allies (including Membo) were compensated for losses sustained, mobilising support for Pik 
or any other Kundmbo candidate would have been difficult. This was further complicated by 
Pik’s close association with former Dei MP, Melchior Pep, a Kombukla tribesman, whose 
kinsmen could not vote for Pik because they belonged to a separate provincial assembly 
constituency. This problem was replicated on a larger scale involving Pik’s clan which has 
traditional ties with groups that are based either outside of, or residing in areas considered 
peripheral to the Kotna-Tiki constituency.
The densely populated Muka valley, in the context of political activity, is the heart o f that 
constituency. Previous provincial assembly member, Kuma Rukla, the incumbent Kar Kil, 
former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, and the then incumbent Dei MP, Reuben Parua, are all based in the 
Muka valley and are members o f a single tribe (Tepuka). By supporting Melchior Pep, who 
unseated Parua Kuri in 1987, and again in 1992, when he beat Parua’s son Reuben, William Pik 
may have jeopardised his own chances in the Muka valley. Table 8.1 shows the elected 
representatives o f Dei in both the national parliament and provincial assembly.
T able 8.1: E lected R epresentatives: D ei O pen and K otna-Tiki C onstituency
Dei MPs and MPAs Tribe Tribe-pair Constituency Period
Parua Kuri Tepuka Tepuka-
Kawelka
Dei Open 1972-1987
Melchior Pep Kombukla Kombukla-
Minembi
Dei Open 1987-1992
Reuben Parua Tepuka Tepuka-
Kawelka
Dei Open 1993-1997
Puri Ruing Roklaka Kimka-
Roklaka
Dei Open 1997- present
Kuma Rokla Tepuka Tepuka-
Kawelka
Kotna-Tiki 1980-1984
Kar Kil Tepuka Tepuka-
Kawelka
Kotna-Tiki 1984-1994
William Pik Kawelka Tepuka-
Kawelka
Kotna-Tiki Jan-July 1995
That is where Membo came to the rescue. Whilst Kundmbo maintains strong ties with the 
Kombukla, Membo have equally strong ties with the Tepuka, particularly with Parua Kuri’s 
Keitipi clan and its Oklembo clan-pair. Since the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair forms the core of 
Reuben and his father’s base-vote, it is highly unlikely that any of its members would have voted 
for William Pik if he had not been sponsored by Membo. As a Membo candidate, and with 
Membo clansmen actually on the ground in Tepuka territory, Parua and his clansmen could not
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ignore him. For doing so would have been an insult not to Pik but to Membo who are 
predominandy Parua supporters. And so William Pik was accepted as a Membo candidate by its 
allies and Keitipi-Oklembo clans were split almost equally between Pik and their fellow 
tribesman, Kar Kil.
Having resolved the candidacy status problem and once the campaign parameters were 
established, through the classification o f target groups, it was business as usual on the campaign 
trail. Individuals with strong personal connections were appointed as campaign committee men 
and sent out to live with the target groups. The committees were assigned the primary task o f 
mobilising support using their own social networks. Most o f them were leaders and had few 
problems being recognised, some were there to reactivate old moka ties, while others depended 
on the goodwill o f their relatives to mobilise support.
Based on the degree o f support received from external groups and the type o f relations 
maintained with them, target groups were classified into three vote categories: (1) Kawelka base- 
votes; (2) external support votes; and (3) marginal votes. These, together with the number o f 
promised votes, are given in Table 8.2.
T able 8.2: V ote C ategories and  num ber o f prom ised votes
Kawelka Base-votes Expeded 
Votes
External Support 
Groups
Votes
Promised
Marginal Areas 
and Groups
Votes
Promised
Kuk 1,403 T. Keitipi 250 Kenamb 5
Mope 430 T. Oklembo 120 Ruina 50
T. Kelmbo 175 Mam Gor 15
Welyi 150 M. Elyipi 3
M. Engambo 250 M. Kimbo 10
Kopi 100
Klamakae 75
Kurunga-Pakl 45
Total 1,833 Total 1,165 Total 83
Source: Based on information supplied by William Pik and his campaign committee.
Note: An estimated grand total o f  3,081 votes. A  comparison o f  this figure with that o f  actual number o f  votes
polled will give an indication o f  the successes and failures in the conversion o f  support into actual votes 
(see Results, below).
Since the first category constituted the Kawelka setdements o f Mbukl (Mope) and Kuk-Mbakla, 
campaigning was limited to speeches during meetings and no economic resources were required
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in mobilising support from within the various dans and subclans. That task was left to the 
persuasive skills o f dan  and subclan leaders.
All economic resources were channelled towards the campaign effort covering the second and 
third categories. A total cash sum o f K12,500 and 25 pigs were given as gifts to the various 
groups in exchange for promise o f votes. A further sum o f about K2,500 was spent on store 
goods —  mostly on frozen meat, sugar and coffee —  to  feed visiting groups. Also, a great deal 
o f  pork hindquarters presented to individuals via personal networks were used in entertaining 
guests. Almost two-thirds o f the cash and nearly all the pigs were presented to groups from the 
second category who visited the candidate at hom e, while a third o f the cash was exchanged for 
promises o f  votes with ‘name-list* groups during visits to their respective areas. The claims o f  
‘name-list* groups were investigated by campaign committees and only after being verified were 
they paid cash. M ost o f the ‘name-list’ groups were from marginal areas but some also came 
from  the second category. In m ost instances, leaders o f ‘name-list* groups represented genuine 
voters, but there were a few fictitious ones too. It was the job o f the committees to  separate the 
fake from  the real and generally they did a fine job in isolating swindlers. In  m ost cases when 
swindlers are identified, skilful candidates will opt not to expose them publicly, but play along in 
the hope that they can eventually be persuaded While no money is given, they will be treated 
politely and excuses will be given for non-payment o f cash.
Target Groups and Committees
Target group I: W elyi
Although the Welyi are m ajor traditional enemies o f the Tepuka, and Kawelka, by virtue o f the 
Tepuka-Kawelka alliance, have fought them as m inor enemies in warfare before European 
contact, they have in recent times established strong ties with Kawelka through inter-marriage. 
The Membo in particular through its Oyambo subclan have very strong relations with the W elyi 
There are three sisters o f im portant Oyambo big-men —  including K ont Klent and Yap Pokl 
—  married into Welyi while at least five Welyi women are married into the Oyambo subclan. 
Because o f this relationship three Oyambo men, K ont Klent, Yap Pokl and Rembil Toki, were 
selected to lead the campaign amongst the W elyi The Welyi connection is expressed in terms o f 
intermarriage ties outlined below (see Table 8.3).
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T able 8.3: M em bo O yam bo m arriage ties w ith Welyi
Oyambo women 
married to Welyi
Year Child-Age
(Years)
Oyambo Men married 
to Welyi
Year Child-Age
(Years)
Nukundi Klent 1950s >30
Rangmba Pokl 1960s Childless Talke’ Puklum 1960s >25
Kum Pokl 1960s Adult Polti Pori 1970s >20
Kont’s sister 1960s Adult Rambil Toki 1970s >20
Kum Ukl 1970s Adult Dokta Ntip 1980s 5-10
Mou Nukundi 1980s 15-20 Ekip Pana 1980s Childless
Torou Nukundi 1990s 5-10
Source: Based on information supplied by Ben Kont, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.
Rambil Toki, who has two adult sons and had once lived with the Welyi for some years in the 
1980s, was asked to spend the entire campaign period in Welyi territory. In his day to day 
activities he was assisted by Kont’s nephew, himself a young leader, and also by Kum’s son, Fred 
Rop, who has dual residency with both the Welyi and the Oyambo. Both Kont and Yap made 
daily trips and were sometimes assisted by a Kurupmbo clan leader, Kei Akil, who also has 
strong connections with the Welyi Kei’s mother and grandmother were both abducted by 
Membo Oyambo big-man, Ntip Dong, from the Welyi during a war in the early 1930s, but the 
Kurupmbo big-man, Akil (a fearless warrior himself), was allowed to mart}7 the girl because Ntip 
claims to have been not yet ready to settle down with a wife. Although now firmly established as 
a Kurupmbo leader, he is often affectionately referred to as Welyi Kei’ for his connections to 
that tribe. He was able to mobilise his kinsmen with whom he still maintains active relations. 
Together they brought in a total of about 150 supporters from the Welyi.
Target group II: Tepuka
Two field camps were established amongst the Tepuka: one at Ambukla, managed by Tepuka 
Kelmbo clansmen; and the other at Muka with the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair. Two campaign 
vehicles, including one donated by a Kelmbo clansman, had Kelmbo drivers and were virtually 
based there, operating out o f Ambukla.
Kawelka’s relationship with Kelmbo is a recent one, established largely through the initiatives o f 
an aspiring national politician and businessman, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, who has in successive 
elections since 1982 tried to court traditional Parua Kuri-supporters among the Kawelka with 
some degree o f success. Like William Pik, Mel is closely associated with Kombukla leaders,
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Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp (see Chapter Seven). Although they initially built their own ties 
through this common Kombukla connection, they have in recent years extended those ties to 
their own subclans. This was reaffirmed in 1994 at a Kelmbo ceremony in which Pik and some 
other Kundmbo leaders were presented with gifts o f pork.
The Kelmbo team also called upon the support o f Kawelka sisters’ sons, including a young 
leader, Kont Ruing, who has strong ties with the Membo Elpuklmbo subclan. Kont’s mother is 
the daughter o f an important Membo big-man, Goimba Onombe. Moka ties between the 
Kelmbo and Membo were initially established through this connection. And Matrus Mel utilised 
this network by gaining some Membo votes during both the 1987 and 1992 elections. Mel now 
has a strong supporter in K onfs uncle and Goimba’s eldest son, Nukundi, an important 
Elpuklmbo subclan leader. The Kelmbo team, through these connections, were able to bring in 
about 175 supporters from within the Kelmbo clan.
The Keitipi-Oklembo field camp at Muka was headed by a young Oklembo leader, Merowa 
Doa, who was assisted mosdy by Membo leaders, some o f which have affinal and moka ties, 
others being sons o f  Oklembo women, or descendants o f Oklembo men accepted as refugees 
o f war (see Table 8.4; see also Table 8.5a and 8.5b). Merowa has strong ties with the Kawelka in 
general and especially with his maternal uncle, Kei Akil and his Kawelka Kurupmbo clan.
T able 8.4: D escendants o f O klem bo w ar refugees w ith M em bo clan
Name Status Age Subclan
Pana Nurum1 Big-man Recendy deceased Oyambo
Ropa Nurum1 Big-man 65-70 Oyambo
Kontil2 Minor big-man >50 Oyambo
Mel2 Ordinary man >50 Oyambo
Gena2 Ordinary man 45-50 Oyambo
Poiya Mel Ordinary man 35-40 Oyambo
Miti Mel Ordinar)7 man 25-30 Oyambo
Ai Mel Ordinar man 20-25 Oyambo
Plang Mark Minor big-man 35-40 Elpuklmbo
Note: Despite their historical ties to Oklembo, these men are fully recognised as members o f  the Kawelka tribe,
with as many rights as anyone else, and many o f  them would have difficulty tracing their genealogy (for 
whatever its worth; see discussion in Chapter Three on non-agnates and genealogies).
1. Pana and Ropa are brothers; their father, Nurum, was a boy when his Kawelka Oyambo mother brought
him back to her natal group. Both Pana and Ropa are important Kawelka big-men; they married many 
wives and had many sons. Pana’s sons are: Tiptip, Kingal, Ouwa (Ou’ndi), Timbi, Pati, Miti, Ekip, Kerot
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Noki, and Burrdi Puri. Ropa’s sons are: Rumint Rungwua, Philip Pepa, Simon Makop, James Ntembari, 
Eldi Put, and Raema Rumbndi. The information on Pana and Ropa were given to me by Ben Konts, 
Membo Oyambo clan.
2. Kontil, Mel and Gena were young boys when their Kawelka Oyambo mother, Karekl, brought them back
to her natal group. Poiya, Miti and Ai are Mel’s sons, while Plang’s father, Mark, was adopted as a young 
boy by the Kawelka Elpuklmbo big-man, Goimba Onombe.
The Membo, as noted earlier, are closely associated with the Keitipi-Oklernbo pair, previously 
through military alliances and currently by political alliances. This has been reinforced by intense 
moha exchanges and more wives are given and taken. Former Dei MP, Parua Kuri’s mother, for 
instance, was given to Keitipi big-man, Kuri, as part o f a big moha prestation made by the 
Membo before European contact. Since then, other moha prestations, including ‘Ongka’s big 
mokd o f 1974 (see A.J. Strathem 1979), followed. These events involving massive economic 
resources and astute entrepreneurial skills culminated in 1984 during Parua’s moha to the 
Kawelka. This relationship has been nurtured by important big-men on both sides. Significantly, 
Tepuka’s most important big-men, Parua Kuri, Kuma Rokla and Dei businessman, Goimba 
Kot, are all sons o f Kawelka women. While Keitipi-Oklernbo women married into Kawelka 
generally are too numerous to mention, only those married into the Membo clan are given in 
Table 8.5a (and Membo women married into the Keitipi-Oklernbo pair are indicated in Table 
8.5b).
T able 8.5a: Kawelka M em bo m en m arried to K eitipi-O klernbo w om en
Membo men married to 
Keitipi-Oklernbo women
Status of husband Wife’s clan Year/Period of 
Marriage
Child-Age 
(Ywrs)
Ntip Dong Big-man Keitipi 1950s Adult
Kuntil Dong Minor big-man Keitipi 1950s Adult
Ken Ripa Big-man Keitipi 1950s Adult
Mepa-endi Kaukla Ordinary man Keitipi 1950s Adult
Koim Goimba Son of big-man Keitipi 1970s >20
Rumint Ropa Minor big-man Keitipi 1970s >20
Ekip Engdi Rop Ordinary man Keitipi 1970s >20
Paul Wamp Emerging big-man Keitipi 1980s Childless
William Kumi Ordinar}7 man Keitipi 1990 <10
Jim Ken Minor big-man Oklembo 1970s 15-20
Timbi Pana Minor big-man Oklembo 1970s 15-20
Pah Engk Ordinar big-man Oklembo 1970s >20
Bob Waklup Ordinary man Oklembo 1970s 15-20
Dokta Pun Ordinary man Oklembo 1990s <10
Source: Based on information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.
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T able 8.5b: K awelka M em bo w om en m arried  to K eitipi-O klem bo m en
Membo women 
married to Keitipi- 
Okembo men
Relationship to Membo 
men
Husband's
clan
Year/ Period 
of Marriage
Child-Age (Y?ars)
Memb-amb1 Kuntil and Ntip 
Dong’s sister
Keitipi 1930s Adult
Nengi Kont Klenfs sister Keitipi 1940s Adult
Geunt Andpi’s daughter Keitipi 1960s Adult
Kaka Waema’s daughter Keitipi 1970s Adult
Yara Pana’s daughter Keitipi 1970s Adult
Kuipa Ropa’s daughter Keitipi 1970s Adult
Pora Kontil’s daughter Keitipi 1980s childless
Unknown Puklimp’s daughter Oklembo 1965-1970 Adult
Dokta Tiptip Tiptip Pana’s daughter Oklembo 1970s 15-20
Baem Tiptip Tiptip Pana’s daughter Oklembo 1980s 10-15
Noman Kingal Pana’s daughter Oklembo 1990s Childless
Source: Based on information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.
1. Memb-amb (‘Membo woman’; real name: Nomani), is the mother o f  Tepuka’s major big-man and former
Dei MP, Parua Kuri. She was given to the Keitipi big-man, Kuri, as part o f  a large moka prestation during 
the 1930s. The marriage itself is as significant as the moka which set in motion a chain o f  events, including 
many reciprocal moka exchanges and an alliance system based on cooperation in warfare against major 
enemies such as the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair. The association between Kawelka and Tepuka was 
later extended to cooperation in m odem  politics and business enterprises.
That William Pik was assured the support o f 250 Keitipi and 120 Oklembo members was 
generally attributed to the Tepuka-Kawelka tribe-pair alliance and more specifically because o f 
Membo’s special ties with the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair.
Target group III: Minembi Engambo
The Minembi Engambo, like most other Minembi clans (except Kimbo), are major traditional 
enemies and recent relations with the Kawelka are one o f intense hostilities. However, there are 
individual links through intermarriage and blood ties suggesting that there may have been 
alternating periods o f warfare and peaceful relations. Although Andrew Strathem, who began 
fieldwork in 1964, reported in some detail on relations o f alliance and enmity between groups in 
the area, his discussions are mostly o f events prior to European contact in the 1930s and does 
not give us clues towards establishing time periods in which those events took place. My 
discussion here and elsewhere, however, is based on accounts o f warfare given to me by Hagen 
informants as well as on personal observation o f a more recent conflict (see Case 2 in Chapter 
Five).
Whilst individual ties still exist, any threads o f relations at the corporate level were drastically 
severed by the Kawelka-Minembi War fought between 1986 and 1990. Given these unfortunate
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circumstances, especially with the high num ber o f deaths and massive destruction o f property 
on both sides, Minembi dans were not considered as major campaign target groups during 
William P it’s election campaign. That is why their approach with a promise o f 250 supporters 
was received cautiously and with scepticism. But when a delegation o f Engambo clansmen was 
sent to Kuk, inside die heart o f enemy territory, not once but several times, bringing with them 
gifts o f store goods to assist with the campaign effort, William P ifs  supporters received them 
with open arms and treated them as long lost brothers. In fact, when reunited with some o f their 
kinsmen for the first time in more than ten years, many cried with tears o f joy and vowed that 
there would be no such war again.
The Engambo were praised for initiating peaceful relations and rewarded with gifts o f cash, pork 
and a pig on one occasion. Although the gifts were exchanged in the context o f an election 
campaign, the individual donors and recipients themselves viewed them as initiatory gifts, which 
would be reciprocated in moha items some time in the near future. As for the election, the 
Engambo leaders (including a son o f a Kurupmbo woman) came to William Pik, rather than 
their own candidate, a Elyipi clansman, because they believed that he had the best chance o f 
winning and wished to see him bring some form o f ‘development’ —  in schools, roads and 
bridges —  to their area. Owing to a num ber o f factors such as warfare and the rugged nature o f 
die terrain, the Engambo and a num ber o f other Minembi clans live in virtual isolation and have 
been somewhat systematically marginalised by successive governments at both the national and 
provincial levels. By coming to William Pik, who was not only an enemy but a leader o f a dan 
seen by many as perpetrators o f the Kawelka-Minembi War, the Engambo were making a 
powerful political statement —  the implications o f which I explore elsewhere (see discussion on 
Shifting Allegiances in Chapter Six). Simply, they were asserting that there are more im portant things 
in life than just warfare; that there had been enough killing and suffering on both sides; and that 
it was now time for peace, all o f which conforms with a consistent pattern in Hagen o f 
alternating relations o f peace and enmity.
Target group IV: Others
The Minembi Elyipi and Kimbo clans, each had sponsored candidates so they were avoided. 
But the other m arginal groups such as Kopi, Klamakae and the Mapkli-Palke tribe-pair were 
covered by both Kundmbo and Membo leaders. These groups did not receive campaign 
committees to their areas mainly for economic reasons but were visited occasionally by 
campaign teams operating out o f Ambukla and Kuk. All o f these groups, however, sent 
delegations representing ‘name-list’ groups who negotiated cash for promise o f votes on polling 
day. But, as indicated by the election results, these and other categories o f target groups did not 
deliver in fulL
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The Kuk Rally: A Show of Strength
Some weeks after William Pik’s nomination a political rally was organised at the old Kuk school 
grounds in December during which candidates for the Kotna-Tiki constituency were invited to 
give speeches. It needs to be stated at the outset that such rallies are major election events 
involving numerous groups and the distribution o f economic wealth on a grand scale8. Amongst 
other things, such rallies are organised by a candidate’s supporters to serve two basic functions: 
first, a rally provides an avenue through which an opponent can be tested; and second, it is 
usually used as a show o f strength o r support for the local candidate. This particular rally 
attracted representatives o f m ost candidates but only the incumbent Kotna-Tiki member and 
provincial works minister, Kar Kil, attended in person. The other candidates did not give 
themselves much chance against Pik in his base-vote area since he was what Hageners call a ‘hot’ 
candidate. Kar Kil, however, has in previous elections managed to pick up not only votes o f his 
fellow Kint-Kengeke clansmen who reside inside Kawelka territory but some Kawelka votes as 
welL
The absence o f rival candidates —  with the notable exception o f the incumbent MPA Kar Kil 
—  at William Pik’s rally conforms to a general pattern in which candidates deliberately avoid the 
base-vote o f certain candidates, especially in instances where a particular base-vote is believed to 
have been secured by die local candidate. Some base-votes, therefore, are more secure than 
others. Rival candidates concentrate only on those which they believe are loosely constituted, 
such as those founded upon weak principles or within which there is internal conflict In this 
particular case, where William Pik as a Kawelka candidate was popular qua Kawelka —  an 
extremely rare position enjoyed by very few candidates in any election —  his opponents 
believed it a waste o f time attending the rally (which could be seen as provocative). Moreover, at 
no stage o f the election did they make any serious attempt to lure voters away horn Pik’s base- 
vote. Pik accepted it as a sign o f respect and reciprocated by staying away from their base-vote 
areas, except in a few instances where he was specifically requested to attend meetings organised 
by interest groups.
The rally, as intended, was used by leaders representing various groups from within the 
constituency to pledge their support for Pik. By assembling them in respective groups, many o f 
which were distinguished by dance costume, it was almost a head count o f Pik’s supporters, 
which gave his campaign team a fair indication o f what to expect on polling day.
As previously mentioned in Chapter Six, in many ways electioneering involves redistribution o f wealth in 
varying scales, from simple cash handouts inside a haus-man (men’s house) to  ceremonial prestations on a 
grand scale involving thousands o f people. Iambakey Okuk’s distribution o f 4,000 cartons o f beer, 
together with pork and other goods, at Kundiawa airport during the 1982 national elections ranks as one 
o f the m ost spectacular o f all time (see Domey 1990:21-23).
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The opening speeches were made by leaders o f ‘neutral* groups9 such as clans who had not 
endorsed their own candidates o r those residing in neighbouring constituencies. M ost speakers 
emphasised the need for a more peaceful election and criticised politicians in general for 
election-related violence and misappropriation o f public funds. In short, they were asking for 
equal distribution o f wealth and more accountability in government office.
In  a short speech on rural development, or lack o f it, William Pik was more direct in his criticism 
o f Kar Kil’s performance in office. W hilst serving two consecutive terms as a provincial 
government minister, Kil, according to Pik, had done nothing for the people o f the Kotna-Tiki 
constituency. Furthermore, Kil was asked to explain how he had spent funds intended for his 
constituency.
Although Pik’s criticism was mild and certainly not unusual o f election rhetoric, to the 
intoxicated mind it can be interpreted quite differently. In this case, Kar Kil was attacked as he 
came forward to respond to William Pik’s queries. The assailant, a Membo man who operates a 
beer black market even during liquor bans (as in this instance), was drunk. H e also damaged the 
windscreen o f  Kil’s vehicle. Both Pik and Kil have affinal ties with him —  one o f his sisters is 
married to Pik while another is married to a man from a clan which is closely paired with Kil’s 
own clan. Because he was said to have been drinking with some Tepuka men earlier that day, Pik 
believed the incident was deliberate sabotage designed by his political opponents to hinder his 
election campaign10.
O n the following morning, when asked to explain his behaviour, he blamed it on the alcohol, 
but failed to make a contribution towards the compensation. A compensation o f K200 and a pig 
was offered to, and accepted, by Kar Kil and his supporters, thus resolving the matter peacefully. 
Three Membo leaders, led by Yap Pokl who has some Kint-Kengeke connections as well as 
with the Minembi, were chosen to  represent Pik at this prestation. Pik himself being an obvious 
target for retaliation was advised not to attend the ceremony. It was im portant to make peace 
with Kil’s group because his Kint-Kengeke clan-pair control access into the Muka valley, which 
is the heart o f Kotna-Tiki politics. Apart from having the capacity to provide an effective barrier 
into the area, Kar Kil’s group would have sought retribution for this cowardly attack on him.
While their groups can be considered ‘neutral’, open to courting and being bought by candidates, the 
leaders who make speeches at such rallies are most often politically aligned to the candidate who sponsors 
the rally. One o f the speakers, Jika Kilampi councillor David Maip, for instance, was throwing his weight 
behind Pik Ruin. Others, o f course, can be spies for opposing candidates but their activities are open 
secrets since any information worth knowing would have been already made available to the local 
candidate via personal networks.
William Pik maintains a less than warm relationship with his immediate affines. The assailant was in fact 
against Pik’s marriage to his sister in 1986. She, a high school graduate, became Pik’s second wife, which 
obviously did not sit too well with her brother who had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the marriage by 
physically attacking Pik.
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A One day Poll
D uring the 1992 National Elections, W estern Highlands was one o f the four Highlands 
provinces which opted for a one day poll. It was considered a success logistically but met with 
considerable security problems (see Standish 1996; see also Ketan 1996). In spite o f this, the 
W estern Highlands again opted for a one day poll in 1995 provincial elections. Once again, it 
resulted in m ost polling booths operating w ithout police protection, which meant that in many 
instances voters and polling officials were left at the mercy o f candidates and their henchmen. 
Specific instances o f  voter coercion, infringement o f electoral regulations and the use o f violence 
in elections, and the wider implications o f competing legitimacies have already been discussed 
(see Chapter Six). Here, I deal with events that transpired at William Pik’s home booths o f Kuk 
and Mope.
Polling commenced soon after 9:00 a.m. on the 9th o f January 1995. The polling station at the 
old Kuk D PI station was already packed with voters by the time the polling team arrived just 
after eight Despite the lack o f police presence, polling was mostly orderly, with Pik's henchmen 
keeping voters assembled in sub-clan blocks and ensuring that all eligible members o f a 
particular lineage or family voted when it was their turn.
Having been personally involved in the updating o f the electoral roll as well as in the creation o f 
a supplementary roll, Pik and his campaign team knew exactly how many people were on the 
roll and made it their business to learn their whereabouts. O n polling day they made sure that 
everyone was present; the young and able were told to walk while the old and physically 
handicapped were transported to the polling station in a number o f vehicles. Following a general 
pattern in Hagen, voter turnout at home polling booths is very high and this one was no 
different Only those living outside the Highlands region did not vote. Just five out o f nearly one 
hundred Kawelka residents in Port Moresby, for example, flew home to vote. The others could 
no t make the trip mainly because o f AirNiugini’s expensive airfares (K270 return fare in 1994).
One incident which almost resulted in violence occurred at Kuk. The presiding officer was 
forced to turn away m ore than 300 voters because o f shortage o f ballot-papers and the indelible 
ink used to marie fingernails as people vote. Since it is the responsibility o f a Returning Officer 
to assign the correct num ber o f ballot-papers, the presiding officer in this case was let o ff lightly 
and the Assistant Returning Officer, a Tepuka Keitipi clansman, was blamed for this mistake.
It may have been an unfortunate oversight but, in view o f the problems associated with Tepuka- 
Kawelka relations, as previously mentioned, this was interpreted differently. The Assistant 
Returning Officer, Mr Mapa Konge, was alleged to have conspired with his fellow tribesman 
and sitting-member, Kar Kil, to  jeopardise the Kawelka candidate’s chances by supplying less
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than the required num ber o f ballot-papers to William Pik’s home booth. It was further alleged 
that the shortage o f ballot-papers and ink was deliberate and, in fact, a strategy designed by the 
Assistant Returning Officer, with foil knowledge and endorsement by prom inent Tepuka 
leaders.
Soon after the polling team left; for Muglamp station, where ballot-boxes were gathered for safe­
keeping, a quick meeting o f Kawelka leaders was convened to propose and discuss a course o f 
action. After much confusion and heated arguments, it boiled down to two options: (a) to 
confront the Assistant Returning Officer directly, thus taking die law into their own hands by 
handing out tribal justice; o r (b) to seek legal advice and trust the introduced state structures to 
work in their favour. In the end it was decided that further information was required before any 
action could be considered. Although apparently angry and frustrated by what they considered 
to be an unfair o r unjust treatment from the Assistant Returning Officer, the supporters o f the 
Kawelka candidate decided to investigate further the causes o f the problem. More than twenty 
young men followed the polling team to Muglamp to seek an explanation from the Assistant 
Returning Officer, while the others gathered around the nearby ceremonial ground, discussing 
the matter in small groups.
In the evening, amidst the deafening sound o f gun-fire from across the valley, where fighting 
had already began, some insisted on seeking retribution by way o f physical attack but m ost saw 
reason; common sense, however temporarily, prevailed- Late that night a message came through 
that m ore ballot-papers would be provided for polling to continue on the following day. Many, 
mostly womenfolk, slept but others stayed up discussing the matter in separate houses, while 
church-goers stayed up till the early hours o f the morning praying for peace.
Polling did continue the next day and voters turned away previously were able to cast their vote. 
But when the polling team took the ballot-box into town, they were met by rival candidates who 
protested that this was highly im proper and demanded the box be excluded from counting. 
They even threatened to throw the box out when the Assistant Returning Officer, who by this 
time was safely inside a police Land-Cruiser surrounded by armed policemen, ignored their 
complaints. This meant that Pik had to organise his own security to guard the provincial 
electoral office where the boxes where kep t All rival candidates and their supporters were 
warned to keep away from the premises. One particular supporter, that o f Kar KH, who did not 
get the message was manhandled by Pik’s supporters and thrown into police custody. Others 
were chased away.
The poor Assistant Returning Officer was now caught in a ‘catch-22’ situation as he was sought 
for retribution by both his own group, for what they considered to be betrayal o f tribal loyalty, 
and those o f other candidates’ for allowing an ‘extra’ box from Pik’s home booth. Faced with
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the possibility o f retribution from his own group, especially the supporters o f the sitting- 
member, the Assistant Returning Officer tried unsuccessfully to seek refuge among William 
Pik’s supporters. Given that there is often widespread violence o f massive proportions —  
including murder, rape and plunder, destruction o f property and burning o f houses —  following 
the declaration o f election results in the W estern Highlands, the Assistant Returning Officer’s 
fears were real and pressing. His is an unenviable job, especially when he is seen to have 
compromised his neutrality as a public servant H e should never have been asked to work in his 
hom e electorate, where there is clearly a conflict o f interest between his job and his tribal 
allegiances.11
Results: W illiam Pik’s Victory
As expected in William Pik’s, case and consistent with a generally observed pattern in Hagen, the 
conversion o f supporters into votes rarely meets with a hundred per cent success rate, even at 
the hom e polling booths o f candidates. There is no indication that William Pik’s performance 
changed that trend, even though he won the election quite comfortably with 2,421 votes, beating 
his nearest rival and sitting member, Kar Kil, by more than 300 votes. Even at his base-vote 
areas o f  Kuk and Mope, despite dose scrutiny from his henchmen, he failed to score a hundred 
per cen t As indicated in Table 8.6 (see also Table 8.7 and Figure 8. /), the bulk o f his votes came 
from his base-vote areas, Kuk (1,399) and Mope (405) and the rest from Tepuka (265), Minembi 
Engambo (103), K opi (95), Welyi (58) and Klamakae (51). Apart from the Kawelka settlements 
o f Kuk and M ope, where he scored 99.71 and 94.19 per cent, respectively, he also did well (in 
terms o f conversion rates; see Table 8.6) amongst the K opi (95%) and Klamakae (68%), which 
are both currently in alliance with the Kawelka and were recently compensated for losses 
sustained while assisting Kawelka during the Kawelka-Minembi War, fought between 1986 and 
1990.
As illustrated in Figure 8. 7, a total o f 1,804 or 76 per cent o f William Pik’s votes came from his 
Kawelka base-vote, while 12 per cent o f the vote came from Tepuka dans, notably the Keitipi- 
Oklembo pair and Kelmbo. The Minembi and Kopi voters contributed five and four per cent o f .  
Pik’s winning vote o f 2,421. *
Returning Officers already operate under difficult situations, many have received threats, some have fled 
for fear o f being killed, others have been physically assaulted. All because o f a common, if somewhat 
misguided, perception that polling officials have not been completely neutral in the conduct o f elections. 
One way o f reducing this problem would be to appoint Returning Officers from other provinces, and 
presiding officers from outside the district or constituency. Previously I have pointed out this problem to 
the PNG Electoral Commission but no action was taken during the provincial election. Let us hope that 
this was an oversight and that the problem will be rectified in future elections.
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Amongst the Tepuka groups, Kelmbo delivered 63.43 per cent o f the promised votes, while 
Keidpi managed 45.6 and Oklembo 29.17 per cent William Pik picked up 5 votes from Kar 
Kil’s home polling booth where it was least expected. The Oklembo promised 120 votes but 
delivered only 35, which reinforces a widely held belief that Oklembo big-man and former 
Kotna-Tiki MPA, Kuma Rokla, made a private deal with Kar Kil (who got 138 out o f 258, or 53 
per cent, o f the total votes cast at the Oklembo polling booth o f Nunga I (see Table 8.7 and 8.8). 
Rokla pulled out o f the campaign just before nominations opened. He accepted an offer of 
compensation from some prominent Tepuka leaders who believed that Kar Kil had a better 
chance o f retaining his seat if there was no competition from within the tribe.12
In the other areas, Minembi Engambo delivered 41.2 per cent o f the total 250 promised votes, 
while Welyi managed only 38.67 per cent o f the 150 promised votes. However, Pik’s overall 
performance suggests that his campaign money was well spent and a good percentage o f 
promised votes were actually delivered on polling day. He picked up 78.58 per cent o f a total 
expected votes o f 3,081, which is an excellent conversion rate.
While the results clearly show that Kar Kil did not get the rest o f  the Tepuka Oklembo votes, in fact 
losing 120 to his rivals, Kit (47), Pik (35), Pana (29), Nem a (6) and Apa (3), it does, however, raise an 
important point here — doubts about the assumption that big-men can control or deliver on at least swing 
votes in their groups.
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T able 8.6: C onversion R ates: V otes P rom ised V ersus V otes D elivered
Target Groups Votes Promised Votes Delivered Conversion Pate (%)
Kawelka (Kuk) 1,403 1,399 99.71
Kawelka (Mope) 430 405 94.19
Tepuka Keitipi 250 114 45.60
Tepuka Oklembo 120 35 29.17
Tepuka Kelmbo 175 111 63.43
Tepuka Kint-Kengeke — 5 —
Welyi 150 58 38.67
Minembi Engambo 250 103 41.20
Minembi Kimbo 10 — —
Minembi Elyipi 3 5 166.67
Kopi 100 95 95.00
Klamakae 75 51 68.00
Pakl 45 4 8.89
Others 70 40 57.14
Total 3,081 2,421 78.58
Source: Based on information supplied by William Pik’s campaign committees assigned to the various target
groups and also on tally sheets kept by scrutineers during the count. Despite several attempts to collect 
tally sheets from the PN G  Electoral Commission in Port Moresby, I have been repeatedly told that they 
were not available- All my data on election results, therefore, is based entirely on tally sheets kept by 
individual scrutineers.
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T able 8.7: B allot-box C ount
Count Box
No.
Village PANA A P A KIL PIK m ’ NEM A
1 0687 Mamgol 5 121 6 1 — —
2 0141 Engki — — 40 25 23 —
3 0181 Pakl 165 — 14 4 5 5
4 Uk Uk 166 — 10 9 27 4
5 Uk Uk 335 — 29 6 6 —
6 Uk Uk — — 4 — 1 241
7 0022 Kinapkla
School
1 — 51 60 — 7
8 0646 Mope 1 — 3 405 22 2
9 0293 Kentkena 263 124 30 21 3 17
10 0072 Nunga (I) 29 3 138 35 47 6
11 0172 Ambukla 145 9 197 111 43 7
12 0253 Kenimba 12 — 8 5 8 240
13 0285 Nunga (II) 41 2 272 114 41 5
14 0096 Kinapkla 1 — 19 10 66 —
15 0588 Kurunga 248 4 — 1 — —
16 0183 Keiya 399 2 15 2 2 —
17 0080 Kimbiki 131 337 46 33 2 25
18 0487 Tiki (!) — — 2 — 588 —
19 0287 Kotna Station 15 4 6 — — —
20 0262 K in t® 21 4 616 2 — 15
21 0269 Kint (II) 1 4 550 3 12 —
22 0027 Tiki (II) — — 4 51 134 —
23 0120 Paklgi — 11 45 103 99 142
24 0018 Kuk(T) 1 4 — 1023 — —
25 Uk Kuk (II) 1 — 1 376 — —
26 Uk Uk — — 1 22 31 —
TOTAL 1981 629 2107 2422 1160 716
Some: Based on preliminary results, as announced via Radio Western Highlands, and also on progressive tally
sheets kept by scrutineers.
T here is a slight possibility o f  m inor discrepancies between m y data and that held by the P N G  
Electoral Com m ission —  i f  such data is still held —  w hich means that ballot-box m apping w ith
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a high degree o f precision is not possible here. However, that does not concern us here because 
the primary aim o f the present exercise is to determine the performance o f  candidates in their 
respective home-booths. The data on home-booths is fairly accurate for rudimentary analysis, 
such as the one I attempt here. As indicated in Table 8.8, only three candidates —  Pik (98.1%), 
Kil (94.95%) and Kit (92.68%) —  scored more than ninety per cent o f the total votes in their 
home booths.
T ab le 8.8: C andidates’ hom e-base perform ance
Candidate Horn-booths Total
Votes
Votes
Tolled
% Votes Host %
O ikai Pana Kentkena 458 263 57.42 195 42.58
Kurunga 253 248 98.02 5 1.98
Keiya 420 399 95.00 21 5.00
Total 1131 910 80.46 221 19.54
B uldung A pa Kimbiki 574 337 58.71 231 41.29
Mamgol 133 121 90.98 12 9.02
Total 707 458 64.78 249 35.22
Kar Kil Kint (I) 658 616 93.62 42 6.38
Kint (II) 570 550 96.49 20 3.51
Total 1228 1166 94.95 62 5.05
W illiam  P ik Mope 433 405 93.53 28 6.47
Kuk (T) 1028 1023 99.51 5 0.49
Kuk (II) 378 376 99.47 2 0.53
Total 1839 1804 98.1 35 1.9
Joseph  Kit Tiki (J) 690 588 85.22 2 14.78
Tiki (II) 189 134 70.90 55 29.10
Total 779 722 92.68 57 732
D avid N em a Paklgi 420 142 33.81 278 66.19
Kenimba 273 240 87.91 33 12.09
Total 693 382 55.12 311 44.88
Source: Based on preliminary results, as announced via Radio Western Highlands, and also on information
supplied by scrutineers.
An amazing score o f 98.1% success at home-booths most certainly laid the foundation for 
William Pik’s win. He lost just 35, votes, 22 at Mope to Kit but compensated for the loss by 
picking up 51 at Kit’s Tiki (II) home-booth (see Table 8.7). Pile won because he was able to keep 
his base-votes almost intact, whilst consistently picking up votes from the other polling booths. 
Moreover, he scored well in polling booths from within his rivals’ tribal bases: over 250 votes
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from Kil’s Tepuka, more than one hundred from Kit and Nema’s Minembi, nearly sixty from 
Pana and Apa’s Welyi group.
Despite the differences in base-vote population size and the shifting allegiances o f non-aligned 
voter blocks, the results cleady show that ‘primordial’ factors are at work here. All seven 
candidates polled more than 50 per cent at home booths, with Pik, Kil and Kit each having 
scored more than 90 per cent, Oikai Pana managed 80 per cent, while Apa and Nema were not 
far behind with 65 and 55 per cent, respectively. The candidates’ particularly strong 
performances at their respective home booths is schematically presented below (see Figure 8.2).
In this context, Pik’s performance (compared with others) conforms to Burton’s generalisation 
that “candidates owe their success (or lack or it) to the occurrence o f rifts within their 
opponents’ tribes and their ability to keep their own tribes united” (1989a:273). He further goes 
on to note that:
The structural division o f  tribes do not determine when rifts will occur or how severe 
they will be, but — like geological fault-lines — they do determine where the breaks will 
come. The ultimate reasons for competition between tribes and for splits between the 
sections o f  tribes are often found in a history o f warfare and alliance (Burton 
1989a:273).
The historical military situation is that the Kawelka Membo and Mandembo have paired against 
the Kundmbo-Kimbo pair in minor warfare but combined against Minembi in major warfare, 
fought between 1986 and 1990. The Membo-Mandembo pair have in a similar way fought 
against the Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo pair in minor warfare but combined against the Welyi and
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Minembi in major warfare. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, the Kawelka Membo-Mandembo and 
Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo groups have also combined against a similar group, the Tepuka Kint- 
Kengeke and Mkuembi Elyipi alliance (For a more detailed analysis o f the historical military 
situation, see Case 2 in Chapter Five; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b; 1971:Chap.2; 1972:179-80).
F igure 8.3: T he K otna-Tiki field o f w arfare and  alliance system
The Tepuka- 
Kawelka pair
compete against the 
Kombukla- 
Minembi pair in 
warfare, elections 
and in business 
activities. There is a 
traditional el paraka 
(major warfare) 
disjunction between 
the Tepuka-
Kawelka pair and 
the Kombukla- 
Minembi pair.
The Kintke-Kengeke pair 
and the Minembi Elyipi 
clan have combined 
against the Keitipi-
Oklembo and Membo
Mandembo pairs in major 
warfare. The Kintke
Kengeke and Elyipi 
alliance was formed across 
the so-called el paraka or 
major warfare disjunction 
between the Tepuka-
Kawelka and the 
Kombukla-Minembi tribe- 
pairs.
Pairing 
In Alliance
Source: Based on A.J. Strathem (1966b; 1971:Chap.2; 1992) and on personal observation.
All o f William Pik’s rivals were clearly disadvantaged by rifts within their tribes: the Welyi were 
split between Pana and Apa (most probably along structural lines); the Minembi were split 
between Kit and Nema (definitely along structural lines because o f the war, although the 
situation is complicated by the displacement o f the population by the same war); and the 
Tepuka, despite having a single candidate, were fragmented due mainly to the political
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aspirations o f Matrus Mel and Reuben Pania at the national level. At Ambukla polling station, 
Mel’s Kelmbo clan gave 197 votes to Kar Kil (whose group is structurally part o f their own), 145 
to Oikai Pana (who belongs to a group which is structurally different but shares a common 
border with them)13, and 111 votes to William Pik (a close associate o f Matrus Mel; their tribes 
are also closely associated). Meanwhile, at Nunga (II) polling station, Matrus Mel’s arch rival 
Reuben Parua’s Keitipi clan gave 272 votes to Kil (whose group is structurally part o f their own) 
and 114 votes to Pik (who is personally associated with Parua’s rivals, Matrus Mel and Melchior 
Pep, but was corporately sponsored by a clan which has very strong ties with Parua’s clan).
Figure 8.4: The Rift within Tepuka clans
Oikai Buldung Kar Kil William Joseph David
Pana Apa Pik Kit Nema
Candidates
The rift within Tepuka is a significant one which I believe had a major impact on the election 
and ultimately contributed to Pik’s win and, conversely, just as much as in Kil’s loss. The rift, as 
illustrated in Figure 8.4> resulted in a three-way split (almost but not entirely along structural lines) 
between Kil, Pik and Pana.
Pik’s nearest rival, Kar Kil also scored well at home. He lost a total o f 62 votes from his Kint 
home-booths, 22 to Pana, 15 to Nema, 12 to Kit and eight votes to Apa, but reciprocally gained 
45, 12, 6 and 46 votes from their respective home-booths. Like Pik, Kil’s overall performance
The Tepuka Kelmbo support for the principal Welyi candidate, Oikai Pana, is an interesting case which 
reinforces Burton’s assertion that “a principle o f  social propinquity, taking into account affinal and 
exchange system ties, clearly does operate when lain fails to guide voters in their choice, or has been 
disabled by hostilities with the structurally nearest candidate’s clan” (1989a:272-273). Accordingly, the 
Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo voters were split between the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, and the Tepuka 
candidate, Kar Kil. Pik’s sponsorers, the Kawelka Membo, are closely associated with the Keitipi-Oklembo 
pair. They share territory, intermarry closely, in the past have given refuge to each other, and have 
combined against Kar Kil’s Kint-Kengeke clan-pair in pre-colonial warfare.
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was good and, whilst securing more than ninety per cent o f the votes in his home-booths, he 
consistently picked up votes from rival candidates’ home-booths. His biggest problem, however, 
was in not securing voters from within his own Tepuka tribe. As a result, other candidates were 
able to pick up Tepuka votes which otherwise may have gone to K il Among the Tepuka 
Kelmbo (Ambukla), for example, Kil scored 197, compared with Pana, 145, and Pik, 111, and 
Kit, 47 votes. A similar pattern was continued in the Tepuka Keitipi polling booth o f Nunga (II) 
—  where Kil scored 272, compared with Pik, 114, Pana and Kit, 41 each —  and other Tepuka 
polling booths (see Table 8.7). Even at his wife’s Kopi polling booths o f Kinapkla, his 
performance was matched by Pik, 70, and Kit, 66, compared with Kil’s 70 votes. Similarly, 
amongst the Minembi, who are traditionally allied to his own Kint-Kengeke clan-pair, he 
performed no better than his rivals. In Paklgi polling booth, for instance, Kil scored only 45 
compared with Nema (142), Pik (103) and Kit (99). Kil did not win because: (1) he failed to 
secure voters from within his own Tepuka group; (2) he lost his traditional supporters from 
groups such as Kopi and Minembi; and (3) he suffered from a common problem of 
incumbency, where the people obviously wanted someone new with fresh ideas. Kil’s overall 
performance within Tepuka polling stations is given below (Table 8.9).
T able 8.9: Kar Kil’s Perform ance w ithin  T epuka polling stations
Tepuka Clans (and Tolling 
Stations)
Pana Apa Kil Pik Kit Nema
Kelmbo (Ambukla) 145 9 197 111 43 7
Keitipi (Nunga II) 41 2 272 114 41 5
Oklembo (Nunga I) 29 3 138 35 47 6
Kintke (Kintke) 21 4 616 2 — 15
Kengeke (Kengeke) 1 4 550 3 12 —
Total (Tepuka) 237 22 1773 265 143 33
Note: Kar Kil scored 1,773 out o f  2,473 votes cast in Tepuka polling stations (excluding Jikimbo-Wanyembo) _
compared with William Pik who polled 1,804 out o f  1,839 votes cast in Kawelka polling stations. Kil 
collected 1,166 from within his own Kint-Kengeke pair and a further 607 votes from other Tepuka clans 
(Kelmbo and Keitipi-Oklembo pair). However, he lost 700 Tepuka votes compared with Pik who lost 
only 35 Kawelka votes.
The Welyi candidates, Pana and Apa, virtually knocked each other o u t Although Pana had an 
overall success rate o f eighty per cent at his home-booths, he lost (or shared) 124 votes to Apa at 
Kentkena, whilst picking up 131 from Apa’s Kimbiki home-booth. Apa managed to poll 64% at 
his home booths, but, like Pana, failed to perform consistently in other polling booths.
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Together, however, they scored over 2,600 votes, which suggests that a single Welyi candidate 
could have gone dose to winning.
lik e  the Welyi candidates, K it and Nema may have effectively cancelled each other out at home 
whilst not being able to perform  consistently in other areas. Nema lost a total o f 278 votes at 
Paklgi, 103 to Pik and 99 to Kit, but foiled to score convincingly in other candidate's home 
bases, nor in other areas. H e only managed 55 per cent at home. In contrast, K it did well at 
hom e, polling 92 per cent o f votes at his hom e-booths o f Tiki, but performed poorly in other 
polling booths. Both, however, suffered from small base-votes.
Apparendy, the Kawelka-Minembi War (see Chapter Five) had an effect on the performance o f 
some candidates in the sense that the size o f some candidates' base-votes were reduced through 
population dispersal, whilst that o f one or two others' may have increased. The Minembi Elyipi 
candidate, David Nema, for instance, may have lost potential voters because o f his clan's elpukl 
uwa, o r ‘owner o f fight', status. Joseph Kit, owing to his clan's unique position —  which is 
structurally part o f Minembi but closely associated with Kawelka Kundmbo clan and which 
fought against fellow Minembi clans — was caught in between. Consequently, K it was unable to 
attract votes either way: Minembi voters obviously considered him an enemy whilst Kawelka 
voters viewed him  as a political opponent Another candidate who lost votes as a consequence 
o f the war was Kar K il H e has strong connections with both Kopi, through marriage, and 
Minembi Elyipi, by way o f group alliance. Since both groups were at war against each other, it is 
possible that one may have suspected Kil o f aiding and abetting the other. It is not unusual for 
rival groups to accuse each other o f receiving assistance from politicians. In this case, however, 
there is no evidence suggesting that Kil favoured one group over another and it is possible that 
he may have been a victim o f circumstances.
W hilst the war may have contributed to Kil's loss, and Nema and Kit certainly did lose votes, it 
is no t clear why Pik scored well amongst his Minembi enemies. This raises an important point in 
that some candidates may claim solid base-votes, but it requires superior capacity to mobilise 
support (Ketan 1996), even amongst enemies, as demonstrated by Pik's performance.
Superior capacity best equates with the concept o f ‘strength', a composite quality, which 
according to surveys, is made up o f factors such as personal leadership qualities, educational 
background and campaign resources (see Saffu 1989; 1996). ‘Strength', therefore is a major 
factor which determines a candidate's success or failure in elections (cf. Burton 1989a).
In Hagen O pen, Paul Pora's success during the 1987 national election, for instance, was 
to such ‘strength' based on his involvement with the formation o f the National Party 
in the early 1970s and continued association with the party into the 1980s, success in business (as
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one o f the m ost successful businessmen in Hagen, with interest in the haulage and coffee 
marketing industries), and his experience in various local and national offices (Burton 1989a). 
Owing to his status as one o f Hagen’s first millionaire businessmen and his strong association 
with the National Party, he was “seen as having the greatest personal campaign resources, as well 
as having the full weight o f  the N P party machinery behind him” (Burton 1989a:258).
Like Pora in Hagen O pen, William Pik’s success in Kotna-Tiki Constituency can also be 
assessed in terms o f personal ‘strength’. The basis o f Pik’s ‘strength’, nonetheless, differs from 
Pora’s in the sense that Pik’s leadership qualities were assessed in the context o f local conflicts 
while Pom’s were obviously tested in a much broader field William Pik’s previous attempt at 
political office was an unsuccessful one in 1988 during the provincial elections, but with a strong 
association with former Dei MP, Melchior Pep, Pik was able to build his influence and extend 
his network through the disbursement o f government resources. His leadership qualities, 
however, were best displayed during the peace settlement between the Kawelka and Minembi in 
1990. In negotiations leading up to the settlement, Pik exhibited exceptional skill in dealing with 
highly sensitive issues o f truce between warring factions and arranging reparation payments 
between allied groups.
Since m ost negotiations are public events, witnessed by government officials and leaders from 
neutral groups, speech-makers tend to choose their words carefully in order to make an 
impression on the listeners. For an intending candidate such as William Pik, these events 
provided the opportunity to impress as many people as possible. I personally witnessed two 
such events, both traditional wua paka (lit: ‘uplifting man’) formal funeral ceremonies, during 
which William Pik (among other leaders) spoke to hundreds o f people:
•  first at Mbukl in January 1987 where at least three thousand mourners from the Kawelka- 
Kopi-Kimbo- Klamakae alliance, plus several hundred others from friendly and neutral 
groups, were gathered to present their grievances (amongst other things) to the then 
W estern Highlands Provincial Police Commander, Robert Korus, and his deputy, Jefferry 
Kera, over the alleged killing o f a Kawelka Kundmbo man (which initially triggered the 
Kawelka-Minembi War) and subsequent deaths during the early encounters; •
•  then in July 1989 at Kuk where more than two thousand Kawelka mourners and a further 
hundred o r m ote delegates from neighbouring tribes were gathered to make a similar 
appeal for justice after Minembi violated a combined Church and state-sponsored truce 
agreement by killing a Kawelka Kundmbo clansman, Kupakl, at a road-block on the 
Hagen-Kotna road (see Case 2 in Chapter Viv$).
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The latter event was witnessed by provincial government officials, including the then Acting 
Provincial Secretary, Oseah John, who also spoke to those present at die ceremony, appealing 
for peace and promising to look into the matter. William Pik in particular was impressive in 
presenting Kawelka’s case, pointing out that Kawelka were the aggrieved party here, while at the 
same time, warning state officials that inadequate or lack o f police intervention had in the past 
resulted in death and destruction o f property, a situation that would easily get out o f hand if 
unchecked In addition to acting as the principal mouthpiece for the Kawelka, Pik was equally 
impressive in one other area —  that o f disbursement o f economic resources. During KupakTs 
funeral, Pik had in his possession the use o f a new four-wheel-drive utility (believed to have 
been hired by Melchior Pep, then Minister for Correctional Services) which was used to 
transport food and other items required for the ceremony. Im portant visitors, such as leaders 
from neighbouring clans, were accommodated by Pik and his Kundmbo clan leaders, which 
means that this would have given Pik a further opportunity to make his intentions known in 
addition to gauging the views o f such men o f some consequence.
And so it was this particular kind o f ‘strength’, coupled with a somewhat misguided perception 
that Pik had access to corridors o f power in Waigani, Port Moresby, and more significantly to a 
seemingly limitless supply o f economic resources, which set him ahead o f the less influential and 
younger rival, Max Poka, during the Kawelka preselection in November 1994 —  as well as 
obtaining assurances o f support from clans o f other tribes, notably the Minembi Engambo and 
Tepuka Kelmbo.14
Supposing that ‘strength’ was the only factor determining success or failure in elections, my 
analysis o f the results would m ost certainly lend me to a predictable conclusion: that the 
Kawelka candidate, William Pik, won because o f superior leadership qualities. Assuming that this 
is correct, does it mean that the Tepuka candidate, Kar Kil, the incumbent and a provincial 
government minister, was less ‘strong’ than William Pik? W hat if  all candidates were equal in 
‘strength’ (measured in one form or a combination o f several factors), would the candidate from 
the biggest tribe win?
First, ‘strength’, as measured by leadership qualities’ and campaign resources, is in practice not 
the only factor in election wins or losses. In this respect, Kar Kil was probably as ‘strong7 as Pik, 
if  no t stronger, considering his experience as a provincial government minister and his strong 
association with former Dei MPs, Parua Kuri, and his son, Reuben Parua.15 William Pik won not
14. Compare with Paul Pora’s success in securing assurances o f support from the eastern Mokei o f Hagen 
Open Electorate during title 1987 elections (see Burton 1989a).
15. Apart from political associations, Kar Kil also has kinship ties with Parua Kuri and his son, Reuben. Both 
Kar Kil and Parua Kuri are married to sisters from the Kopi tribe, which means that Kil is an uncle, o r as 
Hageners say, a father, to Reuben and a brother to Parua Kuri.
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because o f superior leadership qualities but because o f a combination o f factors, which I take up 
later in this section.
Secondly, it is practically impossible for all candidates to be equal in ‘strength’; in fact, the 
candidates here and elsewhere (see, for example, Burton 1989a) differed in ‘strength’, and their 
circles o f support varied greatly in size. All the candidates did well at home booths, scoring 
between 50-90 per cent o f the vote, but generally struggled at other booths.
Thirdly, the results indicate that the biggest tribe does not necessarily win. This is clearly 
illustrated by the performance o f Kar Kil’s, whose group with over 5,000 people outnumbered 
Pik’s with 4,000 (see Table 8.10). From  a total o f 2,473 votes cast in Tepuka polling booths —  
excluding the Jim i valley resident Jikimbo-Wanyembo clan-pair —  Kil polled 1,773 votes but 
lost 700 to his rivals: Pik (265), Pana (237), K it (143), Nema (33), and Apa (22). The situation 
here generally approximates to Burton’s (1989a) ‘segmentary enclavement’ model o f voter 
behaviour, whereby:
... segmentary enclavement of support is evident, but it is modified by (a) a weighting 
attributable to leadership qualities’; (b) the effect of a factor... called ‘social propinquity’ 
overriding structural closeness; (c) true floating voters; and (d) the shifting allegiances of 
non-aligned voter blocks (Burton 1989a:279).
Kar Kil’s failure to secure Tepuka votes and the rift within his tribe (discussed earlier) fits well 
into this model, but understanding William Pik’s success in holding his own tribe together while 
at the same time securing significant support from clans o f other tribes (including Kil’s Tepuka 
tribe) requires one to go beyond this model and explore the dynamics o f the Hagen megacycle. 
As previously mentioned, Pik’s Kundmbo clan were the ‘owners’ o f the Kawelka fight with the 
M inembi (see Chapter Fire). The Kundmbo owed their allies —  comprising Kopi, Kimbo, 
Klamakae and other Kawelka clans —  reparation payments for losses sustained while assisting 
them  in fighting against the Minembi-Nguni alliance. The Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae were 
recently compensated for war deaths, but in the case o f the Kawelka Membo, payment was not 
forthcoming as easily as it did in other cases, which meant that some ‘greasing’ was required to 
speed up the process. Hence, the Membo sponsorship o f William Pik’s candidacy, thereby 
‘commoditising’ votes as solidtory gifts for reparation payments, a significant point to which I 
shall return later in the concluding section o f this chapter.
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T able 8.10: C andidates and  G roups: population  data
Candidate Tribe 1979 residents 1990pop.2 1995 est. Votes cast3
counts1
Oikai Pana Welyi 1,476 3,1094 4,500 2,623s
Buldung Apa Welyi As above As above As above As above
Kai Kil Tepuka 2,575 3,3516 5,000 2,4737
William Pik Kawelka 1,631 4,168s 4,000 1,839
Joseph Kit Minembi 1,524 2,0319 3,000 1,45210
David Nema Minembi As above As above As above As above
7,206 12,659 19,500 8,387
Notes.:
1. Data from Rural Community Register (NSO 1982). These figures are for people deemed to be ‘residents’.
2. Data from 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993).
3. Total votes counted in polling booths within each candidate’s tribal group.
4. Rurual Non-Village Census Units (Kotna Mission Station and Kitip High School, Penga Station, and the 
two plantations, Tremeami and MamgogI) have a total population o f  897 persons, which brings the overall 
total to 5,006. These, however, cannot be included here because all o f  them contain predominantly 
migrant populations (originally from Simbu, Southern Highlands and other parts o f  the Western 
Highlands).
5. There is a strong possibility that this figure may well be far below the actual number o f  votes cast in Welyi 
polling booths. For instance, a total o f  785 votes from three ballot boxes (Counts 3, 4- and 5; see Table 8.7) 
were not included here as Welyi votes because o f  difficulties encountered in matching ballot boxes with 
the actual identity o f  voter blocks. Although the principal Welyi candidate, Oikai Pana, performed 
exceptionally well here, collecting 666 votes and conceding only 119 to his rivals, Kil (53), Kit (38), Pik (19) 
and Nem a (9), the other Welyi candidate, Buldung Apa’s failure to score any votes at all suggests that these 
may not be exclusively Welyi votes but instead a combination o f  Welyi and possibly Mapke-Palke, 
Klamakae and a few Tepuka votes. If, however, we were to include these as Welyi votes, on the basis o f  
Pana’s strong performance, the total Welyi vote would come to 3,408 —  a not too unlikely figure, taking 
into account a large population o f  around 5,000 people (including those in Rural Non-Village Census 
Units w ho more often than not would vote with their hosts).
6. Suspected underenumeration; Total Tepuka population is believed to be at least 5,000 persons.
7. Excluding Jikimbo-Wanyembo votes.
8. Including some Tepuka, Poika-Ayka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk.
9. Population data for the Minembi clans —  Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo — which are part o f  the Kotna- 
Tiki Constituency. The rest o f  the Minembi belong to the Gumanch Constituency. The total Kimbo- 
Elyipi-Engambo population is believed to be at least 3,000 persons —  underenumeration is 1990 Census is 
very likely to have occurred mainly due to population dispersal through the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986­
1990).
10. Minembi Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo votes.
Election Case II: Kotna-Tiki Constituency 303
Figure 8.5: Kotna-Tiki vote: by population El 1995 pop.est 
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The data presented in Table 8.10 and Figure 8.5 reinforce an important point made in Chapter 
Three o f this thesis that there is a tendency for smaller groups to be more united than large ones. 
In other words, the level o f cohesion within groups is largely dependent on factors of size, 
historical military alliances and contemporary social relations. In this context, simplistic 
assumptions about size, social class, political parties, and policy platforms as factors in elections 
were easily discredited here —  an important point to which I shall return in the concluding 
section o f this chapter. I now turn to some specific problems faced by William Pik, in order to 
highlight the effects o f powerful external forces on local politics.
A fterm ath: Problem s for a new  M em ber
Following the declaration o f the election results in Western Highlands and in the subsequent 
process o f government formation William Pik was elected Deputy Premier in a predominantly 
National Party-based government led by Premier Lucas Roika. Pik was chosen ahead o f more 
experienced politicians backed by major political party-aligned groups such as Jika and Yamka. 
This was a major victory for William Pik and his small Kawelka tribe because Pik had contested 
as an independent and this was his first term in office.
In an ideal situation, after his victory Pik’s Kundmbo clan, with assistance from Membo, would 
have hosted a large pig festival in which several hundred pigs and some cows would be 
slaughtered for mass distribution amongst his supporters. Following that, his Kundmbo clan 
were to make reparation payments in the form of a large rnoha to the Membo for losses 
sustained, including many deaths, while assisting Kundmbo in their fight against the Minembi.
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That was the plan, as agreed upon by Kawelka leaders, before the election. Alas, it was not to be! 
Pik’s plan to reward the Membo and other supporters was thwarted by unforeseen events: two 
murders and the abolition o f the provincial government system in Papua New Guinea.
The compensation payments for both murders were covered by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation who were making a film on Kawelka big-man, Onkga, in May 1995. Charlie Clay, 
who was researching for the film, called Ongkall, reported th a t
T he K awelka w ere em broiled in  tw o considerable com pensation paym ents. B oth were 
efforts to  settle m urders... T he first m urder was w ithin the [tribe]; a young m an was 
arranging his th ird  m arriage w hen his second wife fought and killed his bride to  be. T he 
second m urder was n o t an intra-[tribe] affair. Tw o Kawelka lads had becom e involved 
in  a drunken braw l w ith  m en from  another H agen group, the M okei. This had resulted 
in  the death  o f  one o f d ie H agen m en  Life had becom e very difficult for d ie Kawelka; 
threats o f  payback killings m eant th at they w ere forced to  stay w ithin their ow n clan 
territory. F o r a prom inent Kawelka politician, such as W illiam  Pik, this was disastrous.
H e was unable to  go to  tow n and carry ou t his job until the situation was setded (Clay 
1996:10).
In the first murder, the victim was a young Membo girl. She was stabbed to death at a small 
market beside the old Kuk D PI station. The assailant, originally from the Kumdi tribe, was the 
second wife o f a Klambo man. Contrary to Clay*s statement, the Klambo man was not arranging 
his third wife. The assailant had struck merely upon suspicion that her husband may have been 
courting the girl- However, when confronted at an informal hearing in November 1994, both 
the girl and the man denied having had a relationship or having one. Both were warned at the 
time to keep away from each other. Given this background, the Membo, as told to me by 
Membo big-man, K ont, were furious when the young woman was killed by the same man's wife* 
As it were during the Pik versus Poka confrontation, the Klambo were again the target o f 
combined Membo and Kundmbo anger. The assailant's husband was Poka's brother. And Poka, 
according to Pik's supporters, had failed to deliver his supporters to Pik, as agreed during Max 
Poka's compensation. The following is part o f a veiled speech delivered by Membo K ont during 
the compensation ceremony:
Y ou w ere the one w ho dipped your cassowary plum es in  w ater,
Y ou w ere the one w ho sm ashed your axe on  stone;
Y ou w ere the one w ho drove the car;
Y ou w ere the one w ho m ade the telephone calls;
Y ou w ere the one w ho stole cash and pigs from  us b u t did n o t help secure votes as 
prom ised;
N ow  you have taken my girl’s Hfe;
W hat have I  n o t seen th at you will give me?
The first two points, referring to cassowary plumes and axe-smashing, were made in reference to 
the Kawelka-Minembi W ar, in which Klambo leaders made war speeches inciting warriors to gp 
to war against the Minembi but failed to supply any warriors. The second and third points refer
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to Eki’s death in Port Moresby when he was driven by a Klambo man to the house o f the 
assailant’s house where he was killed and Klambo’s telephone calls which warned the assailant’s 
clansmen who thereby escaped possible payback killing. The fourth point is in reference to Max 
Poka’s compensation, in which it was agreed that Poka would deliver his supporters to Pik in 
exchange for reimbursement o f election expenditure. Here it is alleged that Poka and his 
Klambo clansmen lied and in a way stole horn Pik’s supporters. The sixth point is in reference 
to the actual killing o f the girl, while the last point is in fact a warning that Membo would not 
setde for less than maximum homicide compensation16.
The pre-eminent Klambo big-man, Ongka, who had been trying to get his son, Namba, to 
hospital in Australia for heart surgery, was yet again distancing himself from his clansmen who 
had failed to support him17. A segment o f Ongka’s clan, the Poka-Pekaem lineage, has PMV 
businesses in both Hagen and Port Moresby. Ongka expected but did not receive assistance 
from this group. It was this particular group who were causing much worry for the clan, first 
with Max Poka's candidacy and, now with the murder o f a young girl Furthermore, much o f the 
speech directed at Ongka was not because o f Ongka’s personal failures but largely because o f 
actions o f the Poka-Pekaem segment, particularly Max Poka’s immediate brothers who made the 
telephone calls and were alleged to have deliberately delayed getting the message o f Eki’s death 
to his Membo kinsmen. Yet again, Onkga was the centre o f unwarranted attention.
There are two general points worth mentioning here. First, there is the general shift o f balance 
o f power from traditional big-man, such as Ongka, to entrepreneurs. This has been largely 
attributed to access to cash —  those with large amounts o f cash can command considerable 
power and influence. Secondly, a successful big-man, like Ongka, cannot be completely 
outmanoeuvred. Owing to his position, he constantly shields his group from attack from other 
groups, just as he can be an arrow-head for his own group’s attack on others. He can take credit 
for group achievements, just as he takes blame for group failures. That is the way o f the true big- 
man.
In the end, the matter was resolved peacefully. The assailant was jailed and Ongka’s Klambo clan 
came up with a compensation payment that was agreeable to the Membo. As reported by 
Charlie Clay:
While there is no set amount for homicide compensation, the average size for Hagen would be within the 
range o f K10,000 to K50,000 and a hundred pigs or more. Homicide compensation payments for men are 
usually higher than that o f women because o f their higher status in Hagen society.
W ithout the support o f his clansmen, Ongka was not able to raise funds to send Namba to Australia for 
heart surgery and sadly lost his eldest son soon after the conclusion of the compensation. Despite Pik’s 
initiative and my own efforts to have Namba sent to Australia (where I had hoped to take care o f him), all 
was in vain because of an apparently higher corporate priority placed on homicide compensation.
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By the tune the (BBC film] crew was ready to film, Ongka m his own indomitable style 
had wrapped up the first compensation. Ongka had organised nearly 100 pigs, K10,000 
and a [15-seater] bus to help settle the murdered {girl’s] group. The situation was still 
tense, but people were once more free to gp about their daily business (Clay 1996:10).
The correct amount, according to the Membo councillor, Nicholas Namba Komorui, was in fact 
80 pigs, a cash sum o f K9,600 plus a PMV bus, valued at K5,000, and a cassowary.
Although Clay makes no m ention o f William Pik’s role in this particular compensation, it is 
understood that Pik, as a newly elected MPA and Deputy Premier, played a significant part here. 
He mobilised neutral groups o f mainly Kurupmbo and his own Kundmbo and even some 
Membo to contribute towards the compensation, while Ongka worked within his own Klambo 
group. Also, Pik urged Membo youth to exercise restraint, especially after the PMV 15-seater 
bus was forcefully taken by the victim’s paternal uncle.
The second homicide compensation directly involved Pik because the young man principally 
held responsible for the murder o f the Mokei man was a Kundmbo clansman. Pik’s 
involvement here was motivated by several factors: (1) the crises, albeit a local one, in the Hagen 
world view, was an ideal test o f character for him as a relatively inexperienced provincial 
politician; (2) he was an obvious target for payback killing, which meant that he had little choice 
but to mobilise resources for the compensation; and (3) this provided yet another opportunity 
for him and his tribe to better the previous record compensation payment in a seemingly never 
ending game o f one-upmanship.
In hindsight, William Pik did quite well. Together with Ongka and other leaders, he came up 
with a compensation payment that was no t only acceptable to the Mokei but also widely 
acclaimed as a record payment in Hagen. Homicide compensation, owing to various 
implications —  including the ever present threat o f payback killing and its potential to escalate 
into armed conflict —  is a serious and complex matter. It requires strength and courage on the 
part o f leaders, such as Pik, who must accept responsibility for the actions o f their tribesmen. In 
this case, Pik’s task was made even more difficult when the culprit went into hiding. Charlie Clay 
reported that: *
The lad held principally responsible for the second murder had run away. He had 
disappeared and nobody knew where he had gone, not even his reputed partner in 
crime. This was bizarre behaviour and almost social suicide. The man in question’s only 
real hope of rejoining society was to go to jail and take his chances with the courts while 
his dan setded the dispute through compensation. The Mokei wanted those responsible 
in jail and were waiting for the court system before they were prepared to talk 
compensation. This was quite a headache for Pik, and he tried every available means to 
find his clansman. Cars were hired to scour the Highlands Highway, photographs 
distributed, and local radio station ran the story and a substantial reward was offered.
But to no avail Common sense prevailed and finally the compensation got off the 
ground without the satisfaction of the accused being behind bars. Ongka and Pik
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mobilised the various men’s houses and factions within their group to raise an amount 
that dwarfed the previous month’s payment It was a hard and tricky task, fraught with 
many difficulties, but finally things came together. Ongka cajoled, persuaded and bullied 
the Kawelka to donate pigs and money while Pik scoured the Dei Council area in his 
ted pick-up truck, visiting other clans, calling upon old alliances and debts to add to the 
total (Clay 1996:10-11).
Although Clay did no t mention the total num ber o f items included in this compensation, 
according to  Councillor Namba Komorui, the Kawelka gave K28,000 in cash, a total o f 150 
pigs, together with 4 cows, 4 cassowaries, 2 horses, and a egg o f a wild cassowary as a symbol o f 
peace and friendship, in a ceremony witnessed by the Premier, Lucas Roika, and other senior 
officials from die Departm ent o f W estern Highlands.
If  the m urder cases were only stumbling blocks to William Pik’s plans, then the real knockout 
blow was yet to come. It was one that Pik probably least expected The abolition o f the 
provincial government system by the PN G  National Parliament in July 1995 broke his heart and 
shattered a collective dream. lik e  his colleagues in government, Pik’s campaign effort costing 
massive amounts o f economic resources and thousands o f man-hours was for a full five year- 
term  investment, but lasted only five short months. W hen I last spoke to him in June 1995, it 
was a despondent William Pik who lamented th a t
What we say about possum hunting with dogs is true; the trail is warm and the dog has 
a good strong scent, but the possum is not at home.
Pik used the Melpa phrase, mua mukl etpa, kui nambokJpa etim ni mel em> which literally translates as 
‘the dog was hot on its trail but the possum was not home’. Here, William Pik was referring to 
how close he had come in his attempt to become the link between his people and government 
resources. W hat appeared to be a promising prospect, almost a dream start in provincial politics 
w ith the second highest post in the new government, was to end cruelly. Since hunting is 
commonly a team effort and major game-meat is shared, Pik’s election campaign was his 
hunting and his subsequent win and ministerial appointment can be seen as getting close to the 
prey, which is access to government funds and economic resources for his supporters, but 
unexpectedly the metaphorical possum bolted away!
Needless to say that William Pik’s term in office was prematurely terminated and, consequently, 
his supporters were robbed o f their pig-killing ceremony, while the Membo dan will have to 
wait much longer for their moka from the Kundmbo.18
Recent reports from M ount Hagen, however, indicate that the Kundmbo clan had made a large reparation 
payment o f 400 pigs to the Membo clan in October 19% for the Membo men who died fighting 
alongside the Kundmbo against an alliance o f Minembi clans, including Elyipi, Engambo, Papeke and 
Ruprupkae (personal communication; and The National October 16, 19%, p.2). For details o f this event 
and its political implications, see discussion on The Merging of Traditional* Mount Hagen and Modem PNG  
Arenas o f Competition and Cooperation in Chapter Nine.
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Conclusion
W hat I have tried to show here is that election campaigning in M ount Hagen society is a much 
m ore complex process than meets the eye. There is more to it than just fanfare, beer parties and 
violence. Election campaigns are highly coordinated events involving meticulous planning and 
deliberate exploitation o f underlying social and political relations between local groups. Existing 
relations o f military alliances, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent moka 
exchanges, are prime targets o f aspiring politicians. This is because election campaigns are 
essentially tied in with moka sequences, reparation payments, and military alliances. It is based on 
die principle that once you fight one way, you are bound to vote the same way because it speeds 
up the reparation payment process. It is a sound principle and one which had been previously 
used by several politicians, including former Dei MP, Parua Kuri (see Chapter Seven) and William 
Pik in his first attem pt during the 1988 W estern Highlands provincial elections.
However, a major problem  lies with the fact that a ‘fight-root-man’ (elpukl mta) does not always 
attract enough supporters because his group already owes allies reparation payments for losses 
sustained in war. Sometimes a ‘fight-root-man’ is able to persuade supporters from allied groups 
to vote for him , thus ‘commoditising’ votes as solicitory gifts for reparation payments, but, as 
both Parua and Pik will attest, this is a rather tricky game and very few have claimed success.
The way around this, as in Pik’s case, would be to seek sponsorship from another group, 
preferably a kui wua (dead man") group, one which is owed reparation paym ent In this case, Pik 
was sponsored by the Membo clan, which is the only group among Kundmbo’s allies yet to be 
compensated (see discussion on Reparation Payment in Chapter Five). This leads us to the next 
point on how local relations can be affected by national and provincial events.
William Pik’s political aspirations and his group’s relations with the Membo and other 
supporters now hangs in the balance because o f the abolition o f the provincial government 
system by the national governm ent After having reached the second highest post in Western 
Highlands, Pik’s next step would be to contest the Dei Open seat in 1997, and his clansmen 
would argue at least on sentimental grounds that the tribal dam e must not go down’ (mbi mana 
nepanka), but that remains an extremely difficult task.
Pik and his Kundm bo clan have now caused a situation o f disequilibrium in their relations with 
others. To balance the system would require correct reciprocal action in terms o f reparation 
payments to allies, rewarding voters for their votes, repaying supporters for their campaign 
contributions, and settling debts with creditors, such as those who contributed towards the 
Mokei homicide compensation. Even if all these tasks were successfully accomplished, or 
alternative arrangements were to be mutually reached, Pik would still need to convince his
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political m entor, one M elchior Pep, to step aside in his favour. Pep, however, may consider Pik 
as a more attractive alternative than Matrus Mel as a political stooge. Pik may even prove more 
effective in splitting Reuben Parua’s votes during a contest for the Dei Open seat
M elchior Pep opted to resign before the June 1992 election in order to avoid facing charges 
under the Leadership Code. Pep was then no longer subject to the Leadership Code, nominated 
in April and won his old seat back. The Leadership Code then applied to him and he was found 
guilty o f breaking the Code and expelled from Parliament, creating a vacancy in Dei Open. 
Following Pep’s dismissal, Reuben Parua (the son o f former Dei MP Parua Kud) then won the 
1993 Dei O pen By-Election (Ketan 1996).
Both William Pik and Matrus Mel are closely associated with Pep, almost in patron-client 
manner, and have in the past received assistance from him: Mel received a Land-Cruiser wagon 
from Pep’s fellow Kombukla tribesman and Pangu Party president, Pati Wamp, during the 1992 
National Elections in an attempt to split Reuben Parua’s votes; and Pik has worked mostly as a 
henchman for Pep. The danger for Pep is that Matrus and Pik in particular could break with Pep 
and get strong enough to defeat him in a future contest for the Dei Open. In fact, Pik did 
contest the 1997 elections, but, as indicated in Chapter Seven, Pik and Pep both lost to Puri Ruing.
In an attempt to secure assurances o f support for William Pik during the 1997 elections, the 
Kundm bo clan in O ctober 1996 made a reparation payment o f 400 pigs to the Membo clan for 
three men who died while fighting alongside the Kundmbo during a recent fight against an 
alliance o f Minembi dans. According to one informant, the Kundmbo did not indude some key 
individuals, including an im portant fight-leader, who have since shifted allegiance from Pik to 
rival candidates, espedally the incumbent, Reuben Parua. Furthermore, Pik did not honour his 
commitment to the Membo leader, K ont Klent, to whom he had promised nm  ombil (“man’s 
bones’), o r reparation, payments but failed to deliver after the provincial elections. Apparently 
dissatisfied over Kundmbo’s reparation payments in 1996, K ont and his sons, Ami and Ben, 
shifted allegiances to Reuben Parua after receiving a cash sum o f K2,000 from Reuben, 
ostensibly as an additional compensation for the death o f K onfs son, Eki, in 1988. In the 
aftermath o f the 1997 elections, Pik’s supporters expressed their anger over this apparent 
betrayal o f tribal loyalty by assaulting K ont and his sons.
A final point w orth emphasising here is that the lower the levd o f political competition, the 
greater the chance o f a tribe splitting. Overall, though Pik was able to sustain group unity and get 
m ost o f the votes from within his tribe (plus external ones) and so was able to lift up Kawelka’s 
name in a m odem arena o f competition, in a similar way as older big-men such as Ongka, K ont 
and Goimba did m ore than a couple o f decades ago- These three outstanding leaders —  all o f 
which represented their tribe in the local government council —  have been particularly
Injection Case II: Kotna-Tiki Constituent 3 1 0
successful in lifting up the name o f Kawelka. The Membo leader, Goimba, Kawelka’s first 
councillor, reclaimed the Kawelka territories in the Upper Wahgi Valley (at Kuk and Baisu) after 
defending his land claim in a colonial court, which is no mean feat for someone with knowledge 
o f neither the courts, no r the Tok Pisin language. His successors, Ongka and K ont, have been 
innovative in incorporating new resources such as m otor vehicles in moka exchanges.
In the final analysis, simplistic assumptions about size, social class, political parties, and policy 
platforms as factors in elections were easily discredited here. William Pik won because o f skilful 
use o f the Hagen megacycle and its sub-cycles such as warfare and reparation payment as 
political resources.
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Introduction
This study has thus far presented what is essentially a micro-analysis o f processes o f political 
competition in the M ount Hagen area o f Papua New Guinea, relating these to a combination o f 
interests in the arenas o f sociocultural anthropology and political science. The combination o f 
approaches was essential because o f the difficult and highly complex nature o f the data and the 
problem s inherent in their interpretation. An effective strategy applied here was the methodical 
shifting o f the voluminous anthropological literature on the New Guinea Highlands, especially 
Hagen, and arriving at independent conclusions regarding social structure and leadership, which 
were then fed into this account o f political competition in the 1980s and 1990s. The dynamics o f 
local-level politics, covering the main arenas, fields and sub-fields o f political competition and 
the principal actors, have formed the central focus o f analysis in this thesis.
In  the final chapter we shall consider the main findings and conclusions o f the Hagen case 
studies in the context o f wider theoretical issues. A major aim here is to demonstrate how 
revealing local-level politics can be in our understanding o f national political cultures. Such an 
exercise is especially vital in our scholarly pursuit o f knowledge o f kinship-based societies such 
as those in Papua New Guinea, where the state at the local level is a m inor player and parochial 
straggles, nepotistic patronage and the pervasive practice o f one-upmanship represent the main 
game.
This concluding chapter o f the thesis is organised into three major sections: the first contains a 
summary o f the main issues raised in the study; and the second deals with a process described 
earlier as the incorporation o f the PN G  state and its events into the Hagen megacycle. The third 
section looks at the relevance o f these findings and associated issues for the future o f PN G , 
compared to other Third W orld states, and contemplates some o f the issues involved in state 
collapse in tropical Africa to assess their relevance for PNG. Thus, the discussion, # 
correspondingly, moves from a fine-scale empirically-based analysis to a more broad level o f 
abstraction. A t times it may even appear somewhat over-stretched, but this is necessary to place 
the Hagen case studies on political competition into a broader context and draw out their 
broader implications. The cumulative effects o f globalisation, and the powerful and effective 
roles o f external forces in Third W orld societies, provide a compelling justification for analysing 
the dynamics o f Hagen society in the wider context o f developments and problems in PN G  and 
the Third Worid.
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My study on local-level politics has been to provide a Papua New Guinea corrective to 
assumptions in W estern theory about the centrality o f state institutions in regulating society. It is 
also, I hope, a corrective to any tendency to think o f politics in non-W estem societies, especially 
in the PN G  H ighlands, as ‘tribal conflicts’. Contrary to the stereotypical and highly prejudiced 
view o f PN G  Highlanders as belligerent warriors, my study shows that politics is highly 
integrated in the Highlands, where even the state and its agencies and political cycles have now 
been incorporated into the local megacycle.1 More significantly, this study shows that state 
politics is firmly connected to local politics chiefly because o f the interstitial role o f politicians. In 
Hagen, nationally prom inent leaders such as Paul Pora, Michael Mel and Paias Wingti operate in 
the nexus between parallel moral worlds.* 2
While concentrating on the dynamics o f Hagen politics, I have shown how the PN G  state and 
Hagen society feed o ff each other through an exchange o f ideas and values, economic resources, 
and political practices. The principal agents o f transmission here are leaders who operate at both 
local and national levels. In Ekeh’s (1975) terms, the local power-base o f a politician represents 
the ‘primordial public’ while the state forms the ‘civic public’. The primordial public, comprising 
members o f the primary kin-group, dan or tribe, is moral while the dvic public is amoral which 
means that it is morally acceptable to milk the state in order to feed the primordial public (see 
Ekeh 1975:100). Ekeh’s theory is based on studies on Africa and more specifically Nigeria. My 
study has shown that the phenom enon o f conflicting moral realms is not unique to Africa, since 
Hageners, too, have moral concepts and values regarding what is right and wrong, which 
contrast strongly with state-sponsored ones.
My examination o f the patterns o f political competition and cooperation in Hagen indicates that 
the m odem  state o f Papua New Guinea faces difficult problems —  mainly o f conflicting 
identities and allegiances, which create competing legitimacies; o f limited state penetration, as
Admittedly, Highlanders can be fierce competitors and have therefore been extraordinarily successful in 
business, politics, and in other spheres, but so are the Tolais, Bougainvillians, and Sepiks. As Ted Wolfers 
constantly reminds me, we need to ask whether Highlanders are in any way more different than Keremas, 
Morobeans, or Manusians are from the rest o f Papua New Guinea? Surely, this is a m oot issue. It would 
be quite pointless to carry the argument further along these lines. Suffice it to say that there are remarkable 
similarities between the various ethnic and regional groups in Papua New Guinea, just as there are 
important differences between them, yet there is no outstanding characteristic that can be used to 
distinguish one ethnic group from other PNG groups.
Others have made similar observations: See Standish (1992) for comparable discussion o f Simbu leaders 
benefiting themselves and their groups by “working in the nexus between the state and clan” (p.246); See 
also A J. Sttathem (1993b) for a discussion o f the conflicting roles o f contemporary Hagen politicians, as 
tribesmen and national leaders.
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evident in the state’s inability to regulate society; and o f glaring social, political and economic 
disparities. The resurgence o f inter-group conflicts, an escalation in crime and violence, and the 
subversive actions o f militant landowners in Bougainville and economic sabotage in other parts 
o f the country are manifestations o f these problems. The discussions in this study, though 
solidly based on empirical evidence, also reflect my informants’ hopes and fears about the 
prospects and problems o f the country.
Political stresses, such as those arising from the secessionist movement in Bougainville, the 
persistence o f group warfare in the five Highlands provinces, and the escalation o f urban crime 
and violence in Port Moresby, Lae and other metropolitan centres, are o f course quite well 
known through extensive media coverage, both locally and internationally. But international 
observers in Australia, N orth America and Europe hear little about the enduring trials and 
tribulations o f the liberal democratic process in the modem nation-state o f Papua New Guinea. 
My overall case study shows that state formation is a difficult process, with political pitfalls 
which must be overcome by Third W orld leaders and peoples in attempting to construct 
national identities from politically, culturally and linguistically fragmented societies. It also shows 
that, despite the best intentions o f national leaders, the nation-building process in PN G  has 
been constrained in a number o f ways by Melanesian cultural values and indigenous political 
practices, quite apart from the well known problems o f limited resources, poor management, the 
pillage o f state resources and limited capacity for pokey planning and implementation, which are 
collectively all problems o f governance.3
State-Society Relations
Case studies on ‘traditional’ arenas o f competition and cooperation such as warfare and the 
payment o f compensation demonstrate die resiliency o f indigenous Hagen political institutions, 
whilst at the same time emphasising the weakness o f state capabilities. O n the one hand, the 
incorporation o f new resources —  such as cash, cattle, beer, m otor vehicles and guns —  into 
local arenas o f competition does indicate cultural innovation, which is simultaneously a
3 , The relative strength and resiliency o f Melanesian kastom and the relative weakness o f the post­
independence state has already been explored in Chapter Six. It will suffice here to  say that many o f the 
problems currently faced by PNG are in fact manifestations o f a weak state, driven by competing 
legitimacies and conflicting loyalties. O ther studies have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, 
Standish 1992, 1994 and 19%; Dinnen 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b and 1998; Regan 1997d; and May 
1998). See also Kabutaulaka (1998) for comparable discussion o f the importance o f kin-group, regionalism, 
and the wantok system in state politics in the Solomon Islands. Larmour ([ed.] 1995 and [ed.] 1998) provide 
useful discussions on issues o f ‘governance’ and ‘good government* in the South Pacific generally.
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dimension o f incorporation into the global economy. O n the other hand, however, the use o f 
Hagen ideologies in justifying dubious political action at national and provincial levels suggests 
that Hagen values dominate state values. In analysing such processes, a number o f factors have 
been identified as pertinent: the state as an entity with alien values; the resiliency o f indigenous 
institutions; competing legitimacies and competition for the allegiance o f individuals; powerful 
parochial loyalties and nepotistic patronage (as manifest in the Melanesian cultural practice called 
the rnntok system); and the weakness o f the state and the relative strength o f local society. The 
latter has been a major focus o f discussion in Chapter Six> so I shall deal with the other issues 
here.
The State as an Aden Entity and the Residency of Indigenous Institutions
An obvious conclusion to be derived from analysis o f die Hagen case studies is the resilience o f 
indigenous political institutions and the use o f Melanesian cultural practices and values in 
m odem  arenas o f competition and cooperation. Also apparent is the alien nature o f the state. 
But since imposition o f the state and the subsequent incorporation o f Hagen and other small- 
scale Highlands societies into the global economy starting sixty-five years ago, the people have 
neither explicitly rejected nor fully accepted the state’s claims o f monopoly over the legitimate 
use o f violence, sovereignty over territory, and authority to enforce its laws. Rather, they have 
contested with the state for the allegiances o f individual citizens, and, at times, have subverted 
the state when it suits them. The decisions people make in dealing with the state are largely 
motivated by self-interest and group interest, rather than fear, respect, or a sense o f loyalty and 
attachment to the state. W hilst the state is recognised as an important source o f resources, it is 
rarely now seen as an entity for which an individual’s rights or group rights should be limited in 
return for security, a situation which may only be possible in a remote future when, as Peter 
Lawrence has speculated, the average individual has completed his “metamorphosis from 
kinsman to dtizen-isolate” (1969:37). For the present time, however, this seems highly unlikely 
because a closer scrutiny o f state activities in PN G  will reveal that the state, through its clumsy 
and retributive reaction to crime and violence, has in effect consistently waged war against its 
own citizens (see ChapterFive; see also Mapusia 1986; Mangi 1992; Standish 1992,1994 and 1996; 
D innen 1996b and 1998). The Hagen case study suggests that individuals have in fact gone back 
into the relative safety o f their tribal cocoons rather than metamorphosing into dtizen-isolates. 
Selective engagement with, and withdrawal from, the state thus emphasise the contradiction 
between the state as an alien entity and its subsequent incorporation into the Hagen megacycle
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as one o f the prizes o f competition.
Parochial loyalties
The case studies on elections show that parochial loyalties override national sentiments, and that 
official responsibilities o f state officials are often neglected. Politicians, for instance, occupy 
ambiguous and interstitial roles between local and national politics; their situation is very much a 
case o f playing conflicting roles in which their loyalty is pulled in opposite directions by the state 
and by their local groups. Since politicians are local creatures as much as national leaders, where 
do we draw the line between social obligation and bribery when it comes to cash handouts? The 
use o f cash, as indicated in Chapter Six, is a major factor in elections, but it must be used cleverly 
because handouts do not automatically open eyes or win votes. Cash must be given in the 
context o f historical relations and personal networks. In other words, cash given within the 
‘moral community’ o f a candidate can be justified as honouring social obligations, while cash 
given outside such a boundary can be construed as bribery, just as crime and violence committed 
against people from outside a certain group (subdan, dan, or tribe) is acceptable (even praised) 
while similar offences committed against the members o f one’s dose groups are not acceptable 
(see Yamka K or’s case in Chapter Five). The Hagen ideology o f group solidarity and particularly 
the cus-versus-them’ principle has been used to justify theft, especially armed robbery against 
businessmen, and the misappropriation o f public funds by politicians.
The Hagen Megacycle
The PN G  state, like its colonial predecessor, is unquestionably weak in terms o f institutional 
capabilities. Its claims o f legitimate authority to regulate sodety are broad in scope but severely 
limited by a distinct lack o f capadty for policy planning and implementation and by a political 
culture largely based on nepotistic patronage- Like a wide blanket o f morning mist over 
Highlands peaks and valleys, the state’s claim o f jurisdiction spreads over the land and sodety, - 
yet its presence makes little or no difference to those beneath and within i t  There is a kind o f 
institutional vacuum in which the Hagen mode o f politics takes shape. The Hagen megacyde, 
comprising a chain o f positive and negative exchange cycles, is a local institution which can be 
interpreted as almost a pre-emptive response to the state’s impotence in restoring public order.
In  the expanded Hagen field o f competition, a number o f processes are at work. The first is the 
actual merging o f spheres, where one event (a reparation payment) follows another (warfare) and
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is timed to finally culminate in elections which are a test o f group strengths. On the one hand 
local events are built around elections, while, on the other hand, elections have been 
incorporated into the local megacycle o f competition. Secondly, what appears to be an example 
o f integration into the m odem  PN G  state system is in fact a process o f ‘tribalization’, where new 
indigenous power blocs are continually created as a result o f the incorporation o f the Mount 
Hagen people into a centralised national state (see A.J. Strathem 1992). A third process at work 
is the physical widening o f the sphere o f competition, where ‘traditional’ fields o f competition 
have been expanded to link into other fields, beyond electoral boundaries. In this thesis an 
expanded field o f political competition, involving a network o f confederacy-type alliances, 
linking three electorates —  Dei, Mul and Hagen —  has been described in the context o f large- 
scale alliance warfare (see Chapter Vive). My case studies on elections indicate that, ultimately, the 
state itself—  the national government and its resources including business resources —  enters 
this expanded field o f competition, yet it is im portant to realise that it does so through a process 
o f selective engagement on the part o f the people rather than effective penetration by agents o f 
the state.
Discussion
The Hagen that I know is full o f paradoxes, where the distinction between ideology and 
sociological facts can be difficult to separate. O n the one hand, Hagen is a classic case o f a small- 
scale, historically stateless society caught in the seductive and powerful grip o f externally 
controlled forces, while on the other hand, the innovative manner in which Hageners have 
included the state as one o f the prizes in their political competition suggests that the Hagen case 
may provide us the analytical tools with which to understand some o f the complex processes 
currently at work in other Third W orld societies.
Despite considerable acculturation and western-style education, the dominant trend is still the 
Hagen mode o f politics, where components o f the state and its events have been fitted into the 
local megacycle. Yet, paradoxically, significant factors like the timing o f elections, world 
commodity prices, acculturation, education, parliamentary motions o f no-confidence, and vital 
economic resources (and their value) are all controlled by external forces. Are Hageners losing 
control o f the new megacycle they have constructed? If so, will the powerful external forces 
prevail and thus transform  and possibly marginalise Hagen society completely? O r will Hageners 
find ways to co-exist with them  —  win or lose? In the context o f such short- and long-term
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dichotomies, will the Hagen mode o f politics last? If  politics in PN G  turns into something akin 
to  collapsed state polities, with the only rule by state warriors such as army brigands and police 
gangs, then w hat role would remain for Hagen politics, or in fact local politics everywhere in 
PNG? O r will there be rule by millionaire businessmen (who can ignore the welfare o f the state 
and the ‘name’ o f the tribe)? These and other similar questions are considered below.
W hilst there is no doubt that Hageners have successfully incorporated the state into their own 
political competition, such incorporation itself may contain the seeds o f its own destruction: the 
bigger the megacycle, the more likely the chance o f it collapsing as it becomes increasingly 
difficult to manage —  as occurred when the old shell money economy was superseded by cash 
in the 1960s. Clearly the dynamics o f capitalist accumulation are a disincentive for the conduct o f 
traditional Hagen institutions such as the moha exchange system. Furthermore, Hageners may 
choose different paths —  such as the university or the military —  to gain control o f 
com ponents o f the state rather than merely incorporating bits o f it into their local megacycle 
These processes have much wider implications. Is this already a case o f successful adaptation or 
one system triumphant over another? It is still only a single generation since political 
independence. In the longer term, are we observing the strengthening or the destruction o f 
Hagen society and the moka system as we know it in Hagen? Those who are familiar with the 
great Highlands pig ceremonies would know that pigs put up one hell o f a fight before 
succumbing to death. Is the analogy o f the spasms o f a dying pig appropriate here? Forecasting 
the future is problematic, but those who care about their country do ask: Mipeb strongyet hngg> 
bet, o pasin nogut bilong mipela bat bakrapimyutnt olgeta? (‘Will we prosper as a nation or will we be 
destroyed by our own excesses?3). Apparently there are no straightforward answers to such 
questions, but they are worth raising here and it is useful to discuss some o f them in light o f the 
cases presented here as well as in the context o f more recent crises involving issues o f probity at 
the highest levels o f national politics in PNG.
The strengths o f small-scale societies, such as Hagen, Enga and Simbu, lie in their tremendous 
capacity to absorb, adapt and influence change, through innovative mechanisms such as the 
Hagen megacycle. Considering that such societies exhibit a considerable degree o f internal 
fragmentation, it is perhaps amazing that in Hagen a megacycle requiring an exceptionally high 
level o f political integration has been achieved. The conflicting political goals and interests o f 
local and national leaders, taking into account the rivalries between local groups, mean that such 
a level o f integration would be difficult —  but not impossible —  to replicate at either the
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provincial o r national level Here lies the major weakness o f the megacycle: it revolves around 
the activities o f a small group o f prom inent individuals, mainly politicians and local leaders 
engaged in patron-client relations. The political ambitions o f aspiring leaders and power 
struggles between factional leaders often undermine the stability o f groups and coalitions within 
the megacycle. The fragility o f the megacycle is reflected in the complaints made by local leaders 
against politicians for exploiting the megacycle for votes without honouring their obligations 
(see Chapter Right). In addition to the shifting allegiances o f voter blocs led by disgruntled local 
leaders, there is a virtual certainty that truly floating voters in elections, like mercenaries in 
warfare, will disregard corporate policy to sell their votes to the highest bidder. Because such 
action is considered a betrayal o f group loyalty, defectors are consistently punished, so far. 
Destruction and deaths resulting from such retributive actions will be a crucial test for the 
megacycle, as they could erupt in a payback cycle, which could even break down into 
unstructured conflict
A further weakness is that the megacycle is strongly constrained by electoral, geographical and 
cultural boundaries. The megacycle is effective only within a specifically defined local political 
field, such as the Dei Council field described earlier. The chances o f a megacycle being extended 
beyond electoral boundaries are limited. Whilst individual cycles o f moka exchange, military 
alliances and business networks can cross-cut electorate and local government council 
boundaries, a megacycle such as the one described here cannot be consistently linked up across 
many or even several electorates or provinces.
Implications for PNG and the Third World
The trends and patterns o f political competition in Hagen indicate that the political and 
economic transformations promised by political development and modernisation theorists have 
been proven highly unrealistic. The Hagen case studies also expose unrealistic assumptions by 
state agents about state power and authority. The colonial state, for instance, exaggerated the 
range o f its control outside the major urban centres and neglected or ignored the extent to 
which local groups, factions, and coalitions could act to protect their interests, at all levels —  
local, provincial and nationaL As a result o f this historical legacy, the post-colonial state 
commands, yet fails to cultivate, obedience and loyalty among its citizens. Clumsy efforts by the 
police force in attempting to restore order through retributive action has often antagonised 
citizens, thereby turning them against the state rather than winning them over.
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Despite the superimposition o f a centralised state structure on PN G  societies, the kind o f 
cohesion still found at the very local level has not been replicated at the national level. Thus, two 
decades after political independence, the contemporary nation-state o f Papua New Guinea still 
remains at a very rudimentary level o f integration and its leaders face great difficulties in dealing 
with m ounting problems o f public order. An escalating level o f violence during elections, the 
resurgence o f tribal warfare in the PN G  Highlands region, coupled with increasingly violent 
crime in urban centres, indicate that the PN G  state, as Standish (1994) says, exists in the midst o f 
a turbulent society. These are clearly manifestations o f an ongoing and momentous struggle 
between the colonially-imposed state and indigenous political units— with both sides ultimately 
competing for the allegiances o f individuals.
A t die core o f this struggle is Weber’s ideal type model o f the state’s legal-rational authority and 
the state’s claim as the ultimate regulator o f the legitimate use o f force within its territory (Weber 
1964 [1947J:156; see also Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1992:6; Dahl 1976:10). By implication, this 
particular claim o f a monopoly over the legitimate use o f force has been consistendy contested 
by PN G  Highlanders in the arena o f tribal warfare, where all signs indicate that the PN G  state, 
despite its impressive raw power (the army and police), is losing the struggle for control. If  the 
state, as suggested by some observers (see, for example, Burton 1989b, 1990a, 1990b), has not 
paid enough attention to warfare, then that may well be because its leaders see no real point in 
continuing an engagement in which the only outcome will be defeat for the state. A t times in 
central government circles it was thought in the early 1970s that for as long as the tribal warfare 
issue was tucked away in isolated pockets o f the Highlands, there would be no real danger to the 
state’s proclaimed legitimacy (Bill Standish, personal communication, 1996). However, with the 
opening up o f the Highlands region, through agricultural development and more recent major 
gold and oil projects, the region is no longer isolated from the rest o f the world and provides 
crucial revenue for die state. If, however, the dent made by persistent Highlands tribal warfare in 
die arm our o f state authority has been minimal so far, then the magnitude o f the Bougainville 
secessionist problem, with economic and fiscal costs and loss o f life, and the amount and level 
o f negative media coverage it attracts, m ost certainly does rank as a major blow to the state’s 
legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. The H ollands conflicts have huge destructive 
potential, yet, as described for Hagen, the people have found ways to limit their escalation and 
make peace —  notwithstanding the widespread introduction o f guns —  usually without direct 
state help.
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Despite the apparent weakness o f the state, the country o f PN G  has shown a remarkable 
capacity for surviving crises. The evidence present«! in this study and in other similar studies 
suggests that the PN G  state has failed to assert its authority in key areas o f public order and 
safety, including urban crime and violence, in tribal conflicts, election-related violence, and o f 
course the Bougainville rebellion (see, for example, Clifford, Morauta and Stuart 1984; Harris 
1988; G ordon and Meggitt 1985; May and Spriggs ed  1990; Standish 1992 and 1994; Dinnen 
1996b; D innen, May and Regan ed. 1997). The March 1997 Sandline controversy, which arose 
when the Chan government hired mercenaries to kill rebels (and probably civilians) on 
Bougainville, clearly indicated the desperation o f a state with flawed decision-making capacity 
and limited military capability. Street demonstrations supporting the military (which opposed the 
mercenary contract) and massed protests at Parliament showed popular hostility to government 
(O’Callaghan 1997a; see also Dinnen, May and Regan eds 1997; Martin 1997; Standish 1997). A t 
a different level, in November 1997 televised videos exposed some o f our m ost powerful leaders 
drunk, boasting o f violence by and allegations o f corruption against Prime Minister Bill Skate 
and Police Minister Thomas Pelika (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 28 November 1997; 
see also O’Callaghan 1997b; Skehan 1997a; 1997b). These are contrasting examples from a range 
o f political crises that PN G  is now facing. They appear to result from limited political capacity 
and state weakness, the rural o rigins o f which have been demonstrated in this thesis.
Reacting to crises, rather than preventing them through coordinated pro-active policy 
implementation, is a common practice in Port Moresby (see Regan 1997), but the normal 
demand and response procedure in politics can be a painfully slow process. Hegarty (1989) has 
flagged some useful concepts to describe PN G ’s situation. At times Charles Lindblom’s (1959) 
notion o f ‘muddling through’ crises, with a definite tendency toward the ‘slow fix’, or even ‘no 
fix’ rather than the ‘quick fix’, is appropriate. Hegarty also mentions Myrdal’s (1968) idea o f a 
‘soft state’ and Tinker’s (1965) concept o f a broken-backed’ state. The lack o f capacity for policy 
implementation and difficulties involved in enforcing laws and the general maintenance o f 
public order are clear manifestations o f a "soft state’, and an increase in corruption 
correspondingly matched by declining standards o f probity among high-placed politicians and 
officials are both instances and causes o f the lack o f political legitimacy and societal integration 
found in a Sveak state’.
Tinker’s concept o f the broken-backed’ state, as argued by Standish (1994:61), is applicable 
where the state cannot exert its authority throughout the country and the application o f law is
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uneven. The case studies given here clearly demonstrate the state’s lack o f control Furthermore, 
there is a widely held view in rural areas like Hagen that officials in the capital have little regard 
for people in rural areas. This is largely based on the somewhat misguided view that Port 
Moresby is a separate world, far removed from the rest o f the country and its problems. The 
over-inflated bureaucracy, for instance, is almost like a big jungle in itself, where constituent 
departments and divisions often do not know what the others are doing and consequently end 
up replicating tasks and responsibilities, thereby wasting scarce resources. That government 
officials in Port Moresby in early 1998 were still politicking over food-aid intended for drought- 
stricken areas, while many people in rural villages were suffering starvation, is indicative o f not 
only an isolated, insensitive, divided and obstinate government but also an indication o f a state 
with limited capabilities.
It is precisely this kind o f government incompetence that has had a major influence on 
Highlands people’s decisions regarding engagement and disengagement with the state. It has in 
fact led rural people to see the post-colonial state as largely irrelevant to their lives, choosing to 
engage with the state only when opportunities for personal gain are m ost cleady pronounced, 
for instance at election times. Tinker’s ‘broken-backed’ model resonates again here. Despite 
considerable violence and disorder, diminishing legitimacy o f the state and frequent breakdown 
o f the national machinery, society need not disintegrate into a state o f anarchy according to 
Tinker (1965:117). life , as he says, will continue (as usual) in the rural areas, which I suggest is 
perhaps because o f the ‘strength’ and resilience o f indigenous societies. Tinker attributes this 
continuity to the loose’ (or generalised) nature o f non-westem societies (1965:118), which 
appears similar to Migdal’s notion o f the strong society, one which has strength because o f its 
autonomy.
Yet, in spite o f all the evidence o f weak state capabilities, o r ‘softness’, in terms o f the difficulties 
involved in delivering services or enforcing law and order, and in spite o f all doomsday or 
apocalyptic predictions, the PN G  state is far from collapsing. State collapse, as evident in parts 
o f Africa, the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, is a much more serious problem 
than political disintegration, or even a combination o f any o f the conditions described above. It 
is in fact a more narrowly defined political phenomenon with serious social and economic 
implications. As recently argued by William Zartman, “state collapse is a deeper phenom enon 
than mere rebellion, coup, or rio t It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate 
power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or
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new” (1995a:l). He further aigues that:
Collapse m eans that the basic functions o f the state are no longer perform ed, as 
analysed in  various theories o f  the state. As the decision-m aking centre o f  governm ent, 
the state is paralysed and inoperative: laws are n o t m ade, order is n o t preserved, and 
societal cohesion is n o t enhanced. As a symbol o f identity, it has lost its pow er o f 
conferring a  nam e on  its people and a m eaning to  their social action. As a territory, it is 
no  longer assured secunty and provisionm ent by a central sovereign organisation. As 
the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, w hich is therefore up fo r 
grabs, and so has lost its right to  com m and and conduct public affairs. As a system  o f 
socioeconom ic organisation, its functional balance o f inputs and outputs is destroyed; it 
no  longer receives supports from  nor exercises controls over its people, and it no  longer 
is even the target o f  dem ands, because its people know  that it is incapable o f providing 
supplies. N o  longer functioning, w ith neither traditional no r charism atic no r 
institutional sources o f legitimacy, it has lost the right to  rule (Zartm an 1995a:5).
An emphatic “no” would be the answer if  we were to ask whether the Papua New Guinea 
nation-state is in a condition o f collapse. Even in rural areas like Hagen, where the state is weak 
and often absent, it has not collapsed and the strengths, as I have defined them, o f local society 
everywhere as a kind o f state substitute. Despite the stresses, the syndrome Zartman describes 
has so far not occurred in PNG. Despite its weakness in PNG, there is a state that functions, in 
an uneven fashion. Yet there are signs suggesting that we could possibly be starting to go down 
the same well-wom path which many African countries took before reaching their present 
predicam ent A major characteristic shared by PNG and African countries (under their old 
regimes) is the primacy o f what has been called the ‘political kingdom’, a situation where the 
economy is not treated as a separate sphere where people can wheel, deal, and enrich themselves 
even if they have no control over the levers o f political power (see Ottaway 1995:243). The 
economy becomes so politicised and subject to political patronage that, as Ottaway says, there is 
little to be fought over except political power (ibid). Also relevant here is Zartman’s (1995a:6) 
assertion that politics and economics are localised; and the centre becomes peripheral to the 
workings o f society. The evidence from the Hagen case studies suggest that such a situation may 
already have taken root in Hagen and other parts o f the country. The actions o f nationally 
prom inent Hagen leaders such as Paias Wingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel are fundamentally 
dictated by local agendas and interests rather than national policies and issues.
Although the PN G  state is still functioning, it is on trial in all parts o f the nation and there are 
warning signs o f impending disaster. In the concluding section we shall discuss such warning 
signs by looking at other Third W odd nations, and whether there are parallels with Papua New 
Guinea. How do we know that states are in danger o f collapsing? As pointed out by Ng’ethe 
(1995:261), one o f the m ost im portant signals o f  collapse is the failure o f the state to pay salaries
Conclusions: Incorporation of the State 3 2 4
to the civil service, and perhaps the final signal is the failure to pay the military. Thus the 
crumbling o f the civil service represents the m ost ominous sign o f the collapse o f the state {ibid). 
A t times, recent Papua New Guinea governments have had difficulty finding funds to pay their 
servants, but have so far avoided systemic collapse.
Conclusion
The Papua New Guinea nation-state, like many other Third W odd countries, can be seen as part 
o f a flotilla embarking on a journey into uncharted waters. Some o f die craft may turn out to be 
unstable canoes, others may be dangerously overloaded, and a few may seem unseaworthy, but 
all o f them  are taking this trip. Notwithstanding workmanship and weather, the survival o f each 
craft will depend crucially on die capabilities o f the crew and the captain, especially their skills in 
making running repairs and undertaking ships reconstruction. Those with myopic captains 
however will be among the first ones to sink.
Among Third W odd countries there is considerable variation in terms o f their economic 
resource bases, political practices, cultural values, demographic composition, and potential for 
development (see Chazan et al 1988). Yet, all o f them are in our metaphorical flotilla because o f 
their shared history o f colonialism. As Chazan et al (1988) reported for African countries, most, 
if  not all, Third W odd countries inherited at independence a number o f shared historical 
constraints, including “the burden o f economic weakness” (p.25), “a history o f external 
dependence” (p.25); “a small, Western-educated elite, quite distinct from the bulk o f the 
population” (p.26), “fragile state institutions” (p.26), and an “absence o f a constructive political 
culture” (p.27). PN G  matches these descriptions. Completing the journey for these ex-colonial 
countries depends on a shared sense o f purpose in constructing statehood and a common desire 
for economic prosperity and social well-being. However, whether such goals can be achieved is 
debatable. A t this stage o f development o r progression whether Third W odd peoples can ever
■m
qualify for First W odd or other industrialised status is, again, debatable. Considering that First 
W odd countries, for example, do not stop and wait for Third W odd countries to catch up and 
are happy to continue neglecting and /or exploiting them, it seems ludicrous to think that it is 
possible for many Third W odd countries to progress in the foreseeable future to the level o f 
development now experienced by Western countries. The Second (socialist) W odd role model 
seems to have vanished in confusion in the last decade. Will social scientists invent new models 
to cover options such as the Asian (paper-money) Tigers o r die authoritarian developmental 
regime o f Latin America? Such unknowns can be seen as uncharted waters.
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Leadership in politics and administration remains a significant factor in each Third W orld 
country’s direction o f developm ent Competent, far-sighted, enlightened and selfless leaders are 
assets while incompetent, myopic and selfish ones are liabilities to their countries. The 
experiences o f some countries in Africa, for instance, show that political leadership —  whatever 
styles (and modes o f operation) there may be: charismatic, patriarchal, autocratic, populist, or 
tyrannical —  is a key variable in effective state formation and also in state collapse (see, for 
example, Zartman ed. 1995).
Clearly, there are lessons here for PNG as well as other Third World countries. Surely, PN G  is 
much wealthier in terms o f mineral deposits and other resources than many African countries, 
and we have been so far lucky in not having tyrannical monsters as leaders; but we must always 
remember that African countries, such as Kenya, were once rich, too, with coffee and other 
agricultural commodities. Others have fish and are rich in minerals such as copper and gold, and 
even diamonds and uranium. Their situation and strength comes down to the question o f 
management, accountability for and equitable distribution o f scarce state resources. As recently 
noted by Ottaway (1995:235), the collapse, or threatened collapse, o f many African states at the 
present time has its ultimate cause in the mismanagement and pillage o f resources, and in abuses 
by authoritarian regimes that leave the majority o f the population without a stake in the existing 
system. In addition to mismanagement, corruption, and mediocre leadership, PN G  shares with 
Africa other characteristics. As pointed out for Africa by Ng’ethe (1995), social scientists o f the 
early 1970s modernisation school warned that successful state formation would confront 
numerous crises:
These w ere (1) the crisis o f  identity, through w hich people leam  to  identify them selves 
as citizens o f  the nation-state rather than as m em bers o f a particular ethnic subgroup;
(2) the crisis o f  legitimacy o r the developm ent o f the sense, on  the part o f  the governed, 
th at the governm ent in  pow er has the right to  rule; (3) the crises o f penetration o r the 
developm ent o f  the state’s capacity to  enforce all decisions w ithin its territorial 
jurisdiction; (4) the crises o f  participation, o r the provision o f m eans and opportunities " 
fo r the citizens to  influence state decisions; and (5) the crises o f distribution, o r the 
evolution o f the will and the m eans to  solve at least the m ost glaring aspects o f social, 
political, and, especially, econom ic inequalities (1995:254-255).
The evidence presented in this case study —  o f parochial loyalties overriding national 
sentiments, o f nepotistic patronage, o f serious challenges to the writ o f centralised authority, and 
o f the significance o f primordial factors (or localised support) in elections —  shows that the 
PN G  state is currently experiencing these crises in Hagen, and, I would argue, across the country 
o f Papua New Guinea. Firstly, the PN G  state has yet to overcome the crises o f identity, as most
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Papua New Guineans still actively maintain a mind-set o f primary attachment to kin-group, 
language, and cultural identities which they hold to be emotionally and materially more 
significant than the ones sponsored by the state,4 This is compounded by the fact that the 
primary kin-group, unlike the state, offers the individual a stronger sense o f security and purpose 
than any other political attachm ent Unlike in industrialised countries, where individuals depend 
mosdy on the state for personal security, social welfare and the provision o f economic 
opportunities, in predominantly kinship-based societies like Papua New Guinea, individuals 
regularly identify with, and naturally owe their first loyalty to, the entity which can perform these 
functions. This is especially true in rural areas where people's livelihood is entirely based on the 
land and relations with local groups. The state promises but rarely delivers in these areas. In 
contrast, the kin-group is m ost effective in fulfilling absolutely fundamental requirements.
Secondly, the crisis o f legitimacy stems from the first condition, which is the issue o f the primary 
identity. As pointed out by A.J. Strathem (1993b), we cannot expect an automatic 
acknowledgment o f the legitimacy o f the state from people who depend on their kinsmen, 
wantoksy and friends for their livelihood. At the very least, it is perplexing for people dependent 
on these types o f social relations to comply with rules made by a state which, in their view, is 
irrelevant to their needs. W hether or not the government in power has some internationally 
ordained right to rule is o f litde consequence to those who feel that their basic needs are not met 
by state officials sheltered and pampered by a faceless power structure based in the capital, Port 
Moresby.
Thirdly, the crisis o f penetration stems from the state's inability to enforce its laws evenly 
throughout the country. As a self-proclaimed guarantor o f internal security for its citizens, the 
state has failed miserably. It has neither the capacity nor the resources to maintain public order, 
and has very limited capabilities in policy implementation. Its major law enforcement agencies 
—  notably the police force and the courts —  are overwhelmed by the escalating rate o f crime» 
and violence. As also noted by Standish (1994), this is compounded by the fact that the police in 
particular suffer from inadequate training, poor salaries, and poor discipline.
Fourthly, the crisis o f participation partly derives from political parties' inability to develop
For comparable discussions, see Standish (1994); Dinnen (1994,1996b); See also Clatk 1997 for an impressionist 
approach to the analysis o f identities in PNG (from a Wiru and Tan perspective); Kabutaulaka (1998:132) for parochial 
loyalties in Solomon Islands; and especially Ekeh (1975) for an excellent discussion on conflicting identities, loyalties and 
moral realms from an African perspective.
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followings at the local level and to be accountable to tbeir supporters. A further contributing 
factor is tbe rudimentary nature o f civil society in Papua New Guinea. Apart from isolated 
episodes such as the active role o f the churches and NGOs in the recent Sandline crises which 
led to the rejection o f the use o f mercenaries on Bougainville, the kind o f “developed civil 
society” considered by social scientists as “essential for a functioning and viable democracy and 
for good and efficient governance” (Standish 1997c:78), such as is found in the advanced liberal 
democracies o f the W est, is virtually non-existent, or is at a rudimentary level o f development, in 
Papua New Guinea. Both conditions can be attributed to the fact that approximately 85 percent 
o f the country’s four million citizens are rural-based, predominantly illiterate, and have little 
access to mass media and communication services. As recently pointed out to me by Dei MP, 
Puri Ruing, “our people are far too ignorant about government policies and role played by their 
elected representatives” (personal communication, January 1998). Hence, their inability to 
influence state decisions. Recent events, however, suggest that even if they tried there is no 
guarantee that the outcome would be necessarily in their favour. The 1997 elections were a case 
in po in t Many voters believed that they had successfully voted out the ruling coalition, and 
indeed half the seating MPs were defeated, but what they got was a government in which many 
o f the same people were back in power (either as part o f the current government or as behind 
the scenes power-brokers).
Fifthly, the crisis o f distribution. In terms o f natural resources, PNG is wealthy by international 
standards. It has, for instance, some o f the largest gold and copper deposits in the world, in 
addition to large oil and gas reserves. Distribution, or, more precisely, equitable distribution, 
however, has been a big problem. Some o f our leaders and their expatriate cronies have become 
very wealthy, while the vast majority o f our people still live under kurni grass and scgo leaf 
thatched houses in villages and hamlets, without clean water supplies, electricity, schools, or 
medical services —  the basic essential services that most people in Port Moresby and elsewhere 
in the developed wodd take for granted. Cleady, the political will and means to solve at least the 
m ost glaring social, political, and, especially, economic disparities have yet to developed in PNG.
Overall, as Ng’ethe (1995:256) says, the crises o f identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, 
and distribution —  and the overall failure o f economic development —  all have something to 
do with the collapse o f the state in Africa, and all are conceptually linked to leadership and 
governance. Many Third W odd countries in Africa and Latin America, despite the influence o f 
rhrifthan moral values and considerable wealth in natural resources, have almost completely
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been destroyed by their leaders through mismanagement and systematic looting.
W hat does all this mean for PNG? Tilings are certainly not yet falling completely apart But the 
country*s political problems are accumulating and taken together may be far more serious than 
they currently appear to us. The crises experienced by the country can be explained in terms o f a 
modified version o f Zartm an’s (1995) car crash analogy. In the Highlands o f Papua New Guinea 
a m ost com m on practice during the 1970s coffee boom  was the competitive purchase o f m otor 
vehicles. As a reward for contributors, respective Hagen dans regularly organised trips to 
Goroka and Lae. O ften these vehicles were overloaded with men, women and children. Large 
quantities o f alcohol were often consumed during these journeys. Inexperienced drivers, rough 
roads, fatigue and intoxication almost inevitably resulted in many accidents. Sometimes when a 
vehicle goes o ff the road on a steep hillside like Daulo Pass it collides with rocks and trees, then 
the driver may appear to regain control till the next little cliff and the car may appear to right 
itself again. A part from dents and scratches, the vehicle may still function and may be driven off, 
but every time such an accident happens, the vehicles systems are breaking down and eventually 
the vehicle cumulatively reaches a stage where recovery is impossible and it can go nowhere. 
This car is in a collapsed state. So far the PN G  state has largely recovered from its upheavals.
In closing I should mention that this study has been about political competition, covering 
various local arenas, fields and sub-fields o f competition which impinge on the country as a 
whole. Groups and individuals in human societies everywhere compete for things which people 
hold dear to their hearts. In this respect, Hageners are no different from Papuans, Africans, or 
Australians. Perhaps what is m ost striking about Hageners is their conviction that their ‘name 
m ust not go down*. There are different ways in which the name can go down, depending I 
suppose on whose or which name we are thinking of: the tribe, Hagen, the Highlands, o r Papua 
New Guinea itself. So that fundamental conviction remains an im portant issue. In seeking to 
support their own name, Hagen groups, and other strong groups elsewhere in the country, have .  
to be aware o f the danger that their efforts could help bring down the ‘name* o f the whole 
country. They may be strong, at one level, but, as the Tok Pisin song o f a self-proclaimed 
Hagener, Nadia Dubrowski, says, Yumi mas noken spak na longlong olsem ol Highway driver, nogut hoi 
yumi oJgeta bakrap long rot! (W e must not behave like drunken Highway drivers because we can 
easily end up destroying ourselves [and our country!5]).
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Figure 1.1: Tepuka Segmentary Structure
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Figure 13: Kombukla Segmentary Structure
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Figure 1.4: Minembi Segmentary Structure
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Table 2.1: Tepuka population data
CU Number Census Unit Clan Section 1979° 1990“
boi Ambuga Kelmbo-W aembe 680 933
016 Kints 1 Kengeke 610 685
017 Kints 2 Kintke 354 359
033 Nunga 2 Keitipi-Oklembo 470 661
037 Rank jikimbo-Wanyembo 461 713
Total 2,575 3,351c
Source and notes:
3. Data from PDS (NSO 1982). 
b . Data from 1990 Census (NSO 1993).
C. Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; total Tepuka population is believed to be at least 4,000 
persons.
Table 2.2: Kawelka population data
CU Number Census Unit Clan Section 1979° 1990b
002 Buk (Mbukl) 1 Mandembo 994 498
003 Buk (Mbukl) 2 M embo 346 992
004 Buk (Mbukl) 3 Kundmbo 291 1,018
045 Golke Kundmbo N o t counted 465
050 Kuk-Bagla M embo N o t counted 1,195
Total 1,631 4 ,168f
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Including some Tepuka, Poika-Ayka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk
Table 2.3: Kombukla population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979° 1990*
008 K enem bo 1 565 675
009 K enem bo 2 373 419
010 K enem bo 3 591 604
011 K enem bo 4 733 823
044 Bitam N o t counted 418
Total 2,262 2,939'
Source a n d  notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993)
C. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Bitam Plantation (CU 502), Kentagl Vocational School (CU 506) 
and Kenembo Station (CU 519), with a total population of 558, were not included here (which would 
otherwise bring the overall total to 3,497 persons.
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Table 2.4: M inembi population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979' 1990b
013 Keta 676 921
018 K om apana 1 & 2 991 516
020 Koraldung 538 492
029 M oga 477 649
035 Palgi 673 403
039 T ig i l 531 630
040 T ig i2 320 470
043 Y iem 390 N o t  counted
047 K enem bo N o t counted 528
Total 3,596 4 ,6 0 9 f
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Suspected underenumeration in 1990; total Minembi population is believed to be at least 5,000 and 
approaching the 7,000 mark in 1997.
Table 2.5: Welyi population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979' 1990k
007 Keia 453 924
021 K otna 1 428 N o t  counted
022 K otna 2 595 N o t counted
046 K enam b/K eiya N o t counted 456
049 Kentkena N o t counted 468
051 Kurunga N o t  counted 376
058 Rulna/Plage N o t counted 576
061 Tsipump N o t counted 309
Total 1,476 3 ,109'
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Kotna Station (CU 509, pop. 117), Tremeami (CU 515, pop. 
247), Mamgogl Plantation (CU 521, pop. 303), and Penga Station (CU 522, pop. 230), which have a total 
population o f 8 9 7  persons, were not included here because of a predominantly migrant population 
(originally from other provinces). If, however, we were to consider them as part of the Welyi (as it is often 
the case at fWW»n when they vote with their hosts), die overall Welyi total would come to 5,006 
persons.
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Table 2.6: Kentpi population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979a 1990b
014 Kinjibi 488 639
015 Kinjibi 1 742 780
024 Mala 1 451 1,519
025 Mala 2 359 729
026 Mala 3C 514 374d
055 R om ania N o t counted 457
056 Rombanga N o t counted 1,034
Total 2,554 5,532=
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. A total population of 514 Kumungaka have been included here with the Kentpi in 1979 and 374 in 1990.
d. Underenumeration suspected here; total Kumungaka population is believed to be at least 1,000 persons.
e. This figure includes the small Prandike, Gulke and Punti groups which share territory with, and have 
almost been incorporated into, the Kentpi tribe. It also includes 374 Kumungaka in 1990. The Kinjibi 
plantation (Rural Non-Village), with a predominandy migrant population of 254 persons, has not been 
included here (which would otherwise bring the total to 5,786 persons).
Table 2.7: Kimka-Roklaka population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979' 1990
005 Gumants 1 600 936
006 Gumants 2 . 781 N o t  counted
Total 1,381 936 '
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (1982).
b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Underenumeration in 1990 Census; Gumants 2 has been unaccounted for —  a population of 781 in 1980 
virtually disappeared in 1990.
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Table 2.8: Remdi (‘Lower Remdi’) population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979‘ 1990b
030 M uglamp 1 649 84
031 Muglamp 2 339 503
Total 988 587 '
Source an d  notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; Muglamp 1 population of 649 in 1979 drastically reduced 
to only 84 persons in 1990. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Gumant Plantation (CU 504, pop. 
832) and Muglamp Station (CU 512, pop. 168), which have a total population of 1,000 were not included 
here because of a predominantly migrant population. I£ however, we were to include such population, die 
total would come to 1,587 persons. Taking into account of underenumeration, a more likely estimate 
would place the Remdi village population at more than 2,000 persons in 1997.
Table 2.9: Roklaka-Waklupka population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979’ 1990t
023 Kutinga N o t counted 401
036 Penda N o t counted 614 .
Total 1,015
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Table 2.10: Nelka population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979’ 1990*
032 N unga 1 770 321
057 Ruti N o t counted 795
Total 770 1,116
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
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Table 2.11: Kopi population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979° 199(f
041 T ig i3 545 233
042 T iff 4 419 281
Total 964 514C
Source a nd  notes:
3. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Population dispersed by the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990); Kopi Ku-mundi dan residing at Engki 
were not counted in 1990 Census. A more realistic Kopi population figure would therefore be around 
1,500 persons.
Table 2.12: Klamake population data
CU Number Census Unit 1979° 1990"
038 Rodllna (Ruina) 581 335c
Source and notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C. Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; a more likely figure would be around 1,500 persons.
Table 2.13: Minembi (Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo clans)
CU Number Census Unit Clan Section 1979° 199Ú'
035 Palgi (Pekli) Engambo 673 403
039 T iff 1 Kimbo 531 630
040 Tiff 2 Kimbo 320 470
047 ' K enem bo Elyipi N o t  counted 528
Total 1,524 2,03 I e
Source a nd  notes:
a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b . Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C- Engambo and Elyipi population were dispersed by the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990); total 
Engambo, Elyipi and Kimbo population is believed to be at least 3,000 persons.
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A p p e n d i x  I I I
SELECTED D EI CLANS AND LEADERS
Key to Symbols:
H—1—h Outstanding leader 
(‘super-big-man5)
++ Major big-man
+ Big-man
' - + Aspiring big-man
- Not a big-man
3.1. TEPUKA CLANS AND LEADERS
Nine Tepuka Clans: Kiteipi-Oldembo pait, Jildmljo-W#etel5Q pai% the tiny Htimbo 
group, Kelmbo-Waimbe and the Kint-Kengeke pairs j^egihehtaiy itruciure is given 
elsewhere; see Appendix II: Segmentary Structures; see also Aj^peh3ix;iII for population 
data). " *
Table 3.1.1: Tepuka Kiteipi
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father’s Position
Parua Kuxi Former Bosboi, President of 
Dei Local Government 
Council, MP for Dei Open 
1972-87, and businessman
+++ 4 Major big-man
Reuben Parua Former MP for Dei Open 
(1993-1997) and Port Moresby- 
based businessman '
1 Former MP for Dei 
(see Parua Kuri)
Konge Kundi - + 2 Minor big-man
Pep Kuri - + 2 Big-man
Pukla Kuri - + 2 Big-man
Huidui Lama - + 2 Minor big-man
Engdi Ok Village Court Magistrate + 1 Minor big-man
UklOk - + 2 Minor big-man
Pangk Mek Former Committee + 1 Big-man
James Papa Ugl District Coordinator, Hagen 
North, and former Sports 
Officer with Provincial Youth 
Affairs, Western Highlands 
Province
3 Big-man
James Koiya O.I.C., Koma Health Centre, 
and church leader
-  ’ 1 Ordinary man
Kerowa Rop - + 3 Big-man
Rumint Mel -  . + 2 Minor big-man
Rokpa Nikint - + 2 Minor big-man
Kaip Nikint - + 2 Minor big-man
Wai Diting - + 3 Big-man
Jacob Rumint - + 2 Minor big-man
Tiptip Jimi - + 2 Big-man
Puklum Numdi - + 2 Minor big-man
Moti Koldop - + 2 Minor big-man
Wei Reilka - + 2 Minor big-man
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Table 3.1.2: Tepuka Oklembo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Kuma Rukla Former Local Government 
Councillor, Provincial 
Government Member and a 
National election candidate 
(1972)
++ 1 . Big-man
Pulii Kont Aid-post Orderly (APO) + 2 Big-man
Jaep Kewa - -  + 1 Ordinary man
Merowa Doa - -  + 2 Minor big-man
Napil Warike Village Court Magistrate + - 1 Big-man
Muld Rukla -  ' + 2 Big-man
Pen Eik - + 1 Big-man
Konga Eik -  . + 2 Minor big-man
Gou Goi - + 1 Ordinary man
KuimbKit - + 2 Ordinary man
Wakupa Mel - + 2 Big-man
Wamp Mara Church leader + 1 Big-man
Table 3.1.3: Tepuka Jildmbo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Posihon
Onn— Former L.G. Councillor ++ 2 Unknown
Rumini Onn — ■ + 2 Big-man & Ex­
Councillor
Eink— -  . + 2 Ordinary man
Muka Pana -  . + 2 Ordinary man
Pep Meka - + 1 Big-man
Moen Waema - + 3 Big-man
Kuni Paeng - + 2 Big-man
Miti Paeng - _ + 1 Big-man
Table 3.1.4: Tepuka Wanyembo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Uklwang Doa - + 3 Big-man
Wamp Pank Local Government Councillor ++ 2 Big-man
ReiyaTiki - + 1 Big-man
Puri Pena Church Leader -  + Not
Known
Ordinary man
WunumPena - -  + 1 Minor big-man
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Table 3.1,5: Tepuka Eltimbo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Goimba Kot Businessman; former Chairman 
of Dei Development 
Corporation, former Lutheran 
Mission Worker, and a National 
election candidate (1972 and 
1987)
++ 1 Minor big-man
KuiKot Lawyer, Public Solicitor’s 
Office, Goroka, Eastern 
Highlands Province
1 Minor big-man
Table 3.1.6: Tepuka Kelmbo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Matrus Mel Chairman, Raembka 
Investments, Accountant, 
Councillor and National 
election candidate (1982, 1987, 
1992,1993 by-election)
++ 5 Big-man
Konga Dekni Village Court Peace Officer + 1 Big-man
Muld Mel Committee + 2 Big-man
Pim Manga Small businessman + 2 Big-man
Ruing Rumba - + 2 Minor big-man
Kipa Rumba - + 3 Minor big-man
Koiyati Okiti - + 1 Minor big-man
Opum Kul - + 1 Minor big-man
PoklWat -  . + 1 Ordinary man
Koi Konga - + 2 Minor big-man
Kont Ruing Teacher + 2 Big-man
Apeli Nema Church Elder + 1 Minor big-man
Opa Nori -  ■ + 2 Minor big-man
Moka Kei - + 2 Ordinary man
Konga Rai Church leader + 1 Big-man
RaiTei - + 3 Big-man
Ninfi Kzi - + 2 Ordinary man
Mokei Anda - + Nil Ordinary man
Nunumdi Mokar Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 2 Big-man
Pun Kad Church leader + 1 Big-man
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Table 3.1.7: Tepuka Waembe
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Nukunt Kumi Chairman, Dei Council Peace 
and Good Order Committee
++ 4 Minor big-man
Wulana Burdui Village Court Magistrate + 1 Big-man
Poiya Koipa - + 1 Minor big-man
Kein Gung Small businessman + 1 Ordinary man
Gong Konga Small businessman + 1
Table 3.1.8: Tepuka Kengeke
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Yei ]imi Village Court Magistrate ++ 2 Big-man
Romrui Kop Locai Government Councillor ++ 1 Big-man
Hai Ripa - + 2 Minor big-man
Mouldi E1 - + 1 Minor big-man
Rank Rumba - + 1 Big-man
Tit Rumba - + 3 Big-man
Kapi Rumba - + 2 Minor big-man
Rank Moep Former Local 
Councillor
Government + 2 Unknown
Non Monga - + 1 Minor big-man
Noti Rumba - + 2 Ordinary man
Kuriti Rai Former Local 
Councillor
Government ++ 2 Ordinary man
Kewa Rai - + 1 Big-man
Dami Koklarui - -  + 1 . Minor big-man
Koparui Koklarui - -  + 1 Minor big-man
Huldui Lama - + 1 Minor big-man
Table 3.1.9: Tepuka Kintke
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father’s Position
KarKil Councillor and Former 
Provincial Government 
Member
++ 1 Ordinary Man
Maet Miti - + 1 Minor Big-man
KalgMoka Former Committee + 1 Minor Big-man
Kuruwa Kundl Aidpost Ordedy (APO) -A - 1 Ordinary Man
Puri— - + 1 Unknown .
Dami Nikint - 1 Minor Big-man
Kuie — - + 1 Unknown
Ken Rumba - 2 Ordinary Man
Pengk Onn - + ' 1 Ordinary Man
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3.2. KAWELKA CLANS AND LEADERS
Four Kawelka clans: Membo, ICumpmbp-Klâmbp pair, ândl̂ ^âMbpi |séèAppcn Î̂? 1 
segmentary structure and AppendixH forpopulatipn data^l , ,1 ’ * *
Table 3.2.1: Kawelka Membo '
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Kont Klents Former Committee, Local 
Government Councillor, 
Village Court Magistrate, and a 
Provincial election candidate 
(1980)
++ 3 Big-man
Gip Andpi _ _ + 3 Big-man
Yan Kael — _ + 2 Big-man
Han Andpi A.OG. Pastor -  + 1 Big-man
Kingal Pora Lutheran Mission Worker -  + 2 Big-man
Rumint Ropa _ -  + 1 Big-man
Kum Kaukla + 1 Big-man
Konga Moka _ -  + 1 Big-man
PalimMang -  + 1 Ordinary man
Ken Ripa Former Committee ++ 4 Big-man
Yakla Ken - -  + 1 Big-lhan and former 
committee
Dokta Ken -  + 1 As above
Pati Manga _ -  + 2 Minor big-man
Onom Moka Lutheran Church leader + 1 Ordinary man
Kingal Nikint Former Committee 2 Big-man
Yap Pokl Former Peace Officer + 1 Big-man
Tengdui Kram Lutheran Church Worker and 
small businessman
-  + 1 Ordinary man
Ropa Nurum _ + 3 Big-man
Yap Goimba Village Court Magistrate, 
former Chairman of Muglamp 
■Village Court Area, gifted 
orator
++ 3 Big-man and former 
Tultul and Local 
Government Councillor
Goimba Onombe Former Tultul and Local 
Government Councillor
++ 3 Ordinary man
Palim Muka _ -  + 1 Ordinary man
Aoel Kiri _ + 2 Ordinary man
Kui Apel Important Fight Leader and 
Orator
-  + 2 Big-man
Pupdi Goimba Circuit Councillor, (F.LC-PN G) + 1 Big-man and former 
L.G. CoundEbt
Namba Kum Local Government Councillor 
& ELCOM employee
2 Big-man
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Table 3.2.2: Kawelka Kurupmbo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father’s Position
Ru Kundil Author of an autobiography 
and the main character in a 
documentary film, Amb Kor 
(Female Spirit Cult)
++ 4 Big-man
Kei Akel Former Committee ++ 3 Big-man
Goimba Nui Catholic Church Elder + 1 ' Big-man
Nema Kor - -  + 2 Ordinary man
Oklom Kor - - +  . 2 Ordinary man ’
Pim Kuiupa -  ' -  + 1 Big-man and Warrior
Nykint— -  ' + 1 Unknown
Table 3.2.3: Kawelka Kundmbo
Leader Position man Wives Father’s Position
Ruin Kapi Local Government Councillor 
and skilful orator
++ 2 Big-man
Pik Ruin Former Deputy Premier, 
Western Highlands Province, 
and a National election 
candidate (1997)
++ 3 Big-man
Rai Kum Village Court Magistrate and 
skilful orator
++ 3 Big-man
Kael Kont - + 3 Big-man
Raem Mark - + 1 Big-man
Malt Korope -  ' + 2 Ordinary man
Tamai Muld - + 2 Big-man
Kuntil Ai Committee + 2 Ex-Tultul & Bosboi
Damba Koldpi - ++ 3 Ordinary man
Nykint Damba Former Local Government 
Councillor
++ 3 Big-man
Kitan— - + 1 Unknown
Makla Kundi - + 2 Big-man
Minimbi Kien Former Local Government 
Councillor
++ 4 Big-man
Pora Minimbi - -+ 2 Big-man
Pup Epkla - - + 1 Big-man
Kuri Makla - -+ 1 Big-man
Paldi— - -+ 1 Minor big-man
Appendices 3 4 8
Table 3.2.4: Kawelka Klambo
Leader Position Big-man Wives Father's Position
Ongka Kaipa Former Tultul & L.G. 
Councillor and very skilful 
orator
++ 4 Big-man
Puklum Pundukl -  ■ + 1 Big-man
Komorui Kuklup Lutheran Church Elder + 1 Ordinary man
Yap Roklpa Former Local Government 
Councillor, currently Chairman 
of Mend-Want Pty Ltd, 
businessman, and skilful orator
++ 1 Big-man
Pakl Roklpa Former Committee + ' 1 Big-man
Penge Geklmba Port Moresby-based PMV and 
Taxi Service Operator
- 3 Minor big-man
Wakri Kaip Village Court Peace Officer - 1 Ordinary man
3.3. KOMBUKLA CLANS AND LEADERS
Seven Kombukla Clans: Kumane, Mandeng, Pukaenimbo, Ayndpei, Ron^ng, KSinaangke 
and Waklmakai (see Appendix I for segmentary structure, ¿nd u^pentfi* i f  for pSptilation 
data). ' ;;"rf
Table 3.3.1: Kombukla Kumane
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Mapa Nykint Village Court Magistrate + 2 Ordinary man
Bom Nuke Former Tulttul + 4 Big-man.
Minimbi Kein — + 5 Big-man
Krai Malt Member, Peace & Good Order 
Committee, and former Tultul
++ 3 Big-man
Reiya Mok — ++ 5 Unknown
John Mas Former MPA and LG. 
Councillor
++ 1 Big-man
Kupal Minimbi — + 3 Minor big-man
Put Krai L G . Councillor - 2 Big-man
Moka Kuntil — + 3 Big-man
Opa — — + 2 Minor big-man
Kuntil — Former Committee + 3 Minor big-man
Reiya Moka Former Village Court Peace 
Officer 2nd Magistrate
- 3 Big-man
Ruk Dat — + 3 Minor Big-man and 
Fight-leader
Korowa (Etpac; 
Yapi
— + 2 Minor big-man
Hupe Dat — + 1 Minor big-man
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Table 3.3.2: Kombukla Mandeng
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Pangk Nui Former Committee 4 3 Big-man
Rangk— — 4 1 Minor Big-man
Roimb Rui — + 1 Minor Big-man
Kai Para Church Leader + 1 Big-man, Fight-leader 
and former Tultul
Ninkint Pangk — + 1 Minor Big-man
Panga — Former Committee + 1 Minor Big-man
Pukla Kont — 4 1 Minor Big-man
Kont Pelga Peace Officer ' - 1 Big-man
Waelye — — + 1 Minor Big-man
Table 3.3.3: Kombukla Pukainembo
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Konga Owa Councillor 4 1 Big-man
Ruing Keat — + . 2 Minor Big-man
Puklum Kuri — + 1 Minor Big-man
Wauldi Rape Village Court Magistrate - 1 Big-man
Makla Kont — + Not
Known
Minor Big-man
Ruk Kaip — + 1 Minor Big-man
Paenga Kaip — + 1 Big-man
Puklum Ok Committee + 1 Big-man
Yakla Kumbdi Village Court Magistrate + 1 Minor Big-man
Bopi Yangke — + 1 Big-man
Namba Kuri — + 1 Big-man
Table 3.3.4: Kombukla Aundepei
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Mulkae Kumbakl Village Court Magistrate 4 2 Minor Big-man
Romb Kumbakl — 4 1 Minor Big-man
KeingTei Committee + 1 Minor Big-man
Plep Kundl Former Local Government 
Councillor
4 1 Minor Bjg-man
Pei Mel 4 2 Big-man
Table 3.3.5: Kombukla Rondong (Rondou)
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Melchior Pep Former MP and businessman 4 4 4 Big-man
Pati Wamp Pangu Pati President and 
businessman
4 7 Big-man
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Ruing Wamp Businessman + 4 Big-man
NambTei — + 2 Minor Big-man
Table 3.3.6: Kombukla Mando (Mandong)
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Pangk Nukunts — + 1 Minor Big-man
Rot Mel Foreman, Department of 
Works
+ 1 Minor Big-man
D ot Polnei — + 3 Minor Big-man
Table 3.3.7: Kombukla Kaimangke
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Kitan Manga National Election Candidate + 2 Big-man
K en— Committee - 1 Minor Big-man
Paul — — -I- 2 Big-man
Nikints Moni — + 1 Minor Big-man
Robin Kuri Businessman + 1 Big-man
Manga Kut Former Councillor + 1 Minor Big-man
Table 3.3.8: Kombukla Waklmakae
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Miti Muka Village Court Magistrate + 1 Minor Big-man
Kewa Kuntil — + 1 Big-man
Mama Warike ^ Committee + 1 Big-man
Pup Konga ' Committee - 2 Minor Big-man
Papa Worinu — + 1 Minor Big-man
Rumint Ruk Peace Officer - 1 Big-man
Huwa Noki Committee - 2 Minor Big-man
Roimb Dot — + 3 Minor Big-man
Kewa Miti — + 1 Minor Big-man
KuriTimbi — + 1 Big-man
Note. Some of these Hve with the Warike near the Wahgi River (Kindeng and Avi settlements). The 
Kombukla are sometimes historically linked with die Warike of Anglimp-South Wahgi as well as with 
the North Wahgi group, Komblo, of North Wahgi (see O ’Hanlon 1989). However, the Kombukla, 
now paired with the Minembi, have no special ties with the Komblo, but do have some dealings with 
the Warike.
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3.4. M INEM BI CLANS AND LEADERS
There are some eleven Minembi dans, but onjjr severi' a i t  xcptesented here:' Papekc^ 
Engarnbo, Nambkae, Ropke, Rapake, Mimkae andNapdcae. Not induded here are thè 
four dans Etyipi, Kìmbó, Komoankae and Rupruf>kae L — winch were disposed through 
recent-warfare during 1986-1990 (see Appendix I  fofsegmfe^tary stmnture and Appendix 6  
for population data). ' \  . : : :
Table 3.4.1: M inembi Papeke
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father’s Position
James Kewa Local Government Councillor - Not
Known
Big-man
Kuk Andpei — + _ 2 Minor Big-man
Toua Kor . Catholic Mission Worker • + 3 Big-man
Porya Koi — + 1 Minor Big-man
KahvaTei — + 1 Minor Big-man
Mark Tapi Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 4 Big-man
Mamb Nukundi Former Village Court 
Magistrate
+ 1 Big-man
Tiptip Tapi — + 1 Big-man
Olga Makinda — + 1 Minor Big-man
Kopi Rangk + 1 Minor Big-man
Table 3.4.2: Minembi Engambo
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Kapis Mulgae Local Government Councillor + 1 Big-man
Pik Tapi Village Court Magistrate + 1 Big-man
Yakla Kum Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 2 Minor Big-man
Mamb Tei — + 1 Minor Big-man
Punum Koipa Village Court Magistrate + 3 Big-man
HkiRaklpa Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 2 Big-man
RukTei —  . + 1 Minor Big-man
M aid  Topa Peace Officer + 1 Big-man.
Rama Poua Small businessman and 
Lutheran Pastor
+ 1 Big-maa
Kouga Moka — + 1 Ordinary Man -
Kar M bb — + 1
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Table 3.4.3: M inembi Nambkae
Leader Position Big-Man Wives . Father's Position
Korowa Mel Local Government Councillor 
and Tice President (Dei LGC)
+ 1 Big-man
Raima Yopa Former Committee + 2 Big-man
Nentipa Konts —  . + 2 Minor Big-man
Kahal Kundl Committee + 1 Minor Big-man
D ot Manga —  ' + 1 Ordinary Man
John Keplga Driver (PMV) + 1 Big-man
Konga Pena — + 3 Minor Big-man
Rumints Tapi —  . + 2 Minor Big-man
Nikints Pena — + 1 Minor Big-man
Malinta Dopaim — + 3 Big-man
Dapena Olga — + Nil Minor Big-man
Kerowa Peil Village Court Magistrate + T Big-man
Bauir Opa Provincial election candidate + l Big-man
WikaiMembi National election candidate and 
businessman
+ 4 Big-man
Pun Kaip Major, PNGDF and national 
election candidate
- 1 Big-man
Goimba Tapi — + Not
Known
Unknown
Table 3.4.4: Minembi Ropke
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Mark Tei Local Government Councillor + 2 Big-man
Waluwa Koim Village Court Magistrate + 3 Big-man
Weimba Tei — + 2 Minor Big-man
Makla Pirn — + 1 Minor Big-man
Ongka Kupakl — + 2 Big-man
Bien Kandakli — + 1 Minor Big-man
Gabriel Roimb Catholic Mission Leader + 1 Unknown
Table 3.4.5: Minembi Rapake
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Pilep Nikints Local Government Councillor + 2 Big-man
Kund Aants Village Court Magistrate 4» 3 Big-man
Kilt Dupae —  ■ + 2 Minor Big-man
Rape Koi Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 4 Big-man
Gapa Wai National election candidate + 3 Minor Big-man
Wesley Ruk Provincial Government 
Member
+ 2 Big-man
Nema Wai —  ' + 1 Unknown
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Koim Mäkle Provincial election candidate + 3 Unknown
Table 3.4.6: Minembi Mimkae
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father’s Position
Rombukl Konga Local Government Councillor + 2 Big-man
Kaemb Tei — + 1 Minor Big-man
Weilya Koim Former Committee + 1 Minor Big-man
Wangdui Gouya Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 1 Big-man
Table 3.4.7: Minembi Napakae
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father’s Position
Pupdi Welya Small businessman + 2 Minor Big-man
Goimba Noki — + 2 Minor Big-man
Konga Galdo — + 2 Big-man
Rapa Mapa Wai — + 2 Minor Big-man
3.5. WELY LEADERS
Table 3.5: Welyi
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Wara Koi Local Government Councillor ++ 3 Big-man
Apa Korope Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 2 Big-man
Maip Ken Village Court Magistrate + 1 Big-man
Kaipa Miti — + 4 Minor Big-man
Sapom Kipa Businessman and former 
Director, Wely-Kuta Business 
Group
+ 1 Big-man
Kumin Dei Former President of Dei Local 
Government Council
++ 2 Big-man
Pok Pim Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 4 Big-man
EINum — + 1 Minor Big-man
Rombukl Wara National election candidate + 3 Big-man and L.G. 
Councillor '
Kingal Pop Village Court Magistrate + 3 Big-man
Nurum Kuntil Former Village Court Clerk + 1 Ordinary Man
Dokta Mel + 1 Minor Big-man •
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3.6. REMDI LEADERS
Table 3.6: Remdi
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Maip Kei Former Provincial Government 
Member and Local 
Government Councillor
++ 3 Big-man
Raem Kei Nominal director, Pipilka 
Development Corporation
+ 1 Big-man
Pen Kei — + 4 Big-man
IvanTau Captain, PNGDF and 
businessman
+ 2 Big-man
Jerry Yar Rombina Ex-Police corporal & gifted 
orator
+ 2 Big-man
Puklma Kopi Company Secretary, Pipilka 
Development Corporation, and 
businessman
++ 2 Big-man
Stanley Pii Former MP (Madang Open), 
businessman and rugby league 
administrator
++ 1 Big-man & Ex­
Committee
Wakupa Pep Village Court Magistrate and 
Chairman of Muglamp Village 
Court Area
+ 1 Fight Leader
Koi Ranpi Councillor & National election 
candidate (1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992)
++ 3 Big-man
Henry Tiki Businessman and Agriculture 
Bank Employee
+ 2 Big-man
Henry Rumints Accountant, Mount Hagen 
Town Authority
+ 2 Big-man
Rumint — — + 1 Unknown
Koi — Former police corporal + 1 Unknown
Eric Ranpi Businessman (Highlands Gold 
Resources)
+ 1 Big-man
Moni Orth Port Moresby-based PMV 
operator .
+ 3 Big-man
i\elc  Onlv 'Lower’ (or Dei Council) Remdi leaders are given here. The most notable 'Upper (Mul Council) 
Remdi leader would of course be none other than Met Nukuntz, dte former MP for the Mul-Baiyer 
electorate.
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3.7. KUMUNGAKA LEADERS
Table 3.7: Kumungàka
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Reiya Mara Local Government Councillor + 1 Big-man
Jacob Wani National election candidate + 1 Big-man
Kar Mek — + 1 MB .
Paraka Moka Former Local Government 
Councillor
+ 2 MB
Mou Mark Small businessman + 2 Big-man
Mark Kumb — + 2 Ordinary Man
Yana Koklpei — + 2 MB
Yap Yona — + . 1 MB
Miti Mek Peace Officer + 1 Ordinary Man
Wakii Mek — + 1 Minor Big-man
NoriWakupa Church leader + 1 Big-man
3.8. GULKE LEADERS
Table 3.8: Gulke Dapei Kakaparambo
Leader Position Big-Man Wives Father's Position
Tei Kumi President, Dei Locai 
Government Council
++ 3 Big-man
Rumint Non Small businessman + 3 Big-man and former 
Dei L.G.C. President
Kaemb Non Small businessman and 
Supervisor, Works and Supply 
Department
1 Big-man
Koi Nori — + 2 Big-man
Kulua El — + 3 Big-man
Kuntil Kerowa — + 2 Ordinary Man
Kenan Kupa — + 1 Big-man
Eik Kupa — + 1 Minor Big-man
Rurdi Kupa — + 1 Minor Big-man
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APPENDIX IV:TRIBES OF HAGEN
T here are at least 85 tribes in the H agen cultural-linguistic area, com prising som e 160,000 
M elpa and Tem boka speakers. T he D ei Council area has the highest number o f  tribes (28), 
fo llow ed by Nebilyer (21), Anglim p (14), Hagen (13) and M ul (9). M ost these are either 
paired or in close association with one or two others, w ith w h om  there is frequent 
intermarriage and exchange relations and may cooperate in warfare, elections, and in other 
activities. T hey may even share territories and have com m on corporate property. A  number 
o f  smaller groups, after having been dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, share 
territories with, and are almost incorporated into, the larger groups from w hich they sought 
and were given refuge.
Tribes of Hagen: by Census Division
Hagen Central Dei M ul Anglimp Nebilyer
Jika1 Kombukla-
Minembi
Kum di-Rem di3 Kuli-Warike Ulka
Mokei1 Kimka-Roklaka Munjika-N engka Roni-Maninge Kulka
Yamka-Kinjika Tepuka-Kawelka Mile Kinapukl-
Mungka
Upuka
Elti-Penambi Kumungaka-
Kentpi
Milaka-Klalka6 Tungei-Menjpi Mujika-Laulka
Kemi-Kukilka Mapkle-Palke Kenapkla7 Andakelkam Kopia-Kubuka
Kungunka-Palka Epilkae-
Dakapkae
Punti7 O nom be Poika-Palimi
Ruruka-Mimka Mungapka-Purke Lati Tea-Dena
‘K um ’ Kopi2 ‘K opon’ Kopi2 N okpa8 Tola-Wanaka
Remdi3 Mamalke N  okpa8-Anamiyl
Nelka Koukla Kusika-Midipu
Gulke4 Epola-Alva
Dapi4 Lalka
Punti4 Tilka
Prandike4
Opei
Welyi
Okknoni
Klamakae
Waklupka
Kiklpukla5
Ndilika5
13 28 9 14 21
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Sources: Based on A.J. Strathein (i971:230-231; Appendix I); A.M. Strathem (1975:434; Appendix 4); Burton 
(1989a:257; Table 2)-, Medan and Rumsey (1991) and on personal observation.
1. The Hagen central area (Hagen Open electorate) is notable for the dominance of two very large tribes, the 
Jika and Mokei, with estimated populations in 1997 of around 20,000 and 15,000 respectively. These two 
are sometimes paired as the most numerous groups in Hagen, but their members have little to do with 
each other, and the pairing is not as strong as it is for the other pairings in the area.
2. The ‘Kum’ Kopi in Hagen Central are paired with the Anglimp and Nebilyer resident, Nokpa. Although 
there are two other Kopi groups, 'Kopon’ Kopi in Dei and Kopia in Nebilyer, there is little cooperation 
between them in arenas of competition because of divergent political fields. 345678
3. The Remdi are split across the Dei-Mul electorate and local government council border. The *Lower’ 
Remdi in Dei are closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, while ‘Upped Remdi in Mul are 
paired with the KumdL
4. Previously dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, diese tiny tribes (or what is left of them) are closely 
associated with the Kentpi tribe. Gulke, Dapi and Punti are almost incorporated into Kentpi whilst 
Prandike acts independently in some events but combines with Kentpi in other areas such as elections.
5. Some members of the Kiklpukla and Ndilika tribes are almost incorporated into the ‘Lower’ Remdi 
section.
6. Previously dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, some members of the Milaka-Klalka pair are almost 
incorporated into the ‘Upper’ Remdi section.
7. Also dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, some members of the Kenapka and Punti tribes are almost 
incorporated into the Kumdi tribe.
8. The Nokpa are split across the Anglimp-Nebilyer electorate and local government council boundary. 
Those in Anglimp are paired with ‘Kum’ Kopi while the other half in Nebilyer are paired with Anamiyal.
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APPENDIX V: SPECIFIC CASES OF M U LTIPLE VOTING (1995)
T h e follow ing is a record o f  specific cases o f  double or multiple voting witnessed 
personally in a number o f  polling stations during the W estern H ighlands Provincial 
G overnm ent Elections in January 1995. Gross infringement o f  constitutional rights and 
violation o f  electoral regulations have been pointed out by numerous studies, but no effort 
has been made towards reducing this and other problems, and it is pointless to carry the 
argument towards this end. Suffice to say that the P N G  Electoral Com m ission has a lot o f  
w ork to do before the National Elections in 1997. Instances o f  double or multiple voting;
•  A n  Engan migrant voted six times, thus causing premature closing o f  polling 
station. But the presiding officer was threatened and forced into re-opening and 
voting continued;
•  A  wom an, also Engan, w ho voted twice was identified by the presiding officer. 
Supporters claimed her being an identical twin sister o f  the one w ho voted earlier;
•  A n old w om an claiming to be the absentee wife o f  a youngster follow ed him  into 
the polling booth to vote. H e was mocked by supporters w ho called: “H e  who 
sleeps with old wom en, hurry up”, implying that she was an imposter;
•  A  female attempting to vote under the name o f  an absentee male was told o f f  by 
the presiding officer “What are you? Male or female?”;
•  A  man taking the place o f  a wom an was turned back by the presiding officer but 
supporters claimed typographical error, pointing out that the ‘F ’ (for female) 
marked beside her name should correctly read £M ’ (for male); •
•  Persons thrown into the polling booth to vote on  behalf o f  absentees and the 
deceased often forgot the names o f  those they claimed to be w hen the presiding 
officer asked for their names;
•  A n underage school girl, in grade six, voted on behalf o f  an adult absentee; and
•  A  husband and wife, both known to the presiding officer, were represented by an 
Engan man and a Simbu woman. The presiding officer looked up and said: “So, I
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see, your name is Jane1”, and to the man, he said: “A nd yours Jack? Since w hen did 
you becom e Jane and Jack?” Embarrassed, they both were turned away (but 
believed to have voted later). I f  only they had know n that the presiding officer was 
Jane's brother. W hen the presiding officer m et Jack after the polling was 
com pleted, he said: “I did not see you earlier, but I think you did cast your vote”, 
clearly implying that som eone else had voted under Jack’s name. *
Although the events described are real and .did occur in a number of polling stations during the 
1994/95 Western Highlands Provincial Elections, names of individuals mentioned in the text, like 
Jane and Jack, are pseudonyms.
Appendices 3 6 0
APPENDIX VI: PNG NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS (1972-1997)
N a tio n a l
E lection
Governments form ed follow ing 
elections
S u cc tsfu l no-confidence 
m otions
'Prime M inister Period
1972 Michael Somare as Chief 
Minister
Michael Somare 
(Chief Minister) 
Michael Somare
1972-1975
1975-1977
1977 Michael Somare and Julius 
Chan as Deputy Against Somare in 1980 
by Chan and Iambakey 
Okuk
Michael Somare 
Julius Chan
1977-1980
1980-1982
1982 Michael Somare with Paias 
Wingti as Deputy Against Somare in 
November 1985 by 
Wingti and Chan
Michael Somare 
Paias Wingti
1982-1985
1995-1987
1987 Paias Wingti with Julius Chan 
as Deputy in November 1987. Against Wingti on the 
4th July, 1988, by Rabbie 
Namaliu and Akoko Doi.
Paias Wingti 
Rabbie Namaliu
1987- 1988
1988- 1992
1992 Paias Wingti with Julius Chan 
as Deputy on 17th, July 1992. Against Wingti on 30th 
August, 1994, by Chan 
and Chris Iveta.'
Paias Wingti 
Julius Chan
1992-1994
1994-
Source; Based on information supplied by John Kewa (23 January 1996), as told to him by officers within the 
office of the Governor of Western Highlands, Paias Wingti.
N ote; Only Michael Somare and Paias Wingti, backed PNG's largest political parties, Pangu and PDM, 
have been able to form governments following national elections, but were replaced twice through 
no-confidence motions. All of diem have been coalition governments. 1
1. In September 1993 Wingti resigned while Parliament was in session and was re-elected minutes
afterwards. Wingti’s ploy to preserve his position against a vote o f no-confidence for a further 18 
months was challenged by the leader of the Opposition [Chris Haivetta] who argued this action was 
unconstitutional and took the issue to the Supreme Court which rejected the challenge (Turner 
1994:230). The leader of the Opposition, however, won on appeal in August 1994 and Wingti was 
ousted from office.
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APPENDIX VII: INTERGROUP CONFLICTS IN  HAGEN (1980-1990)
Case Groups District Proximate Cause Escalated into 
War
Peacefully
Resolved
1 Remdi-Minembi Dei Beer +
-
2 Kawelka-Minembi Dei Beer + —
3 Kopi-Nguni ' Dei-Mul Theft o f  pig +
-
4 Kimka + Roklaka-Kombukla Dei Land + -
5 Tepuka Wanembo-Palke Dei Woman - +
6 Tepuka Keitipi-Kawelka Membo Dei Beer - +
7 Tepuka Kengeke-Kintke Dei Theft - +
8 Kumdi-Nengka Mul - + -
9 Munjika-Kopelka Mul Land + -
10 Munjika-Klgupka Mul Land + -
11 K um di Oynamb-Kumdi Mul Children's game +
-
.12 Nengka Elpuklmbo + 
Kaklamb-N engka Kinmbumb
Mul Historical + -
13 Jika Andapunts-Remdi Dei-Hagen Historical + -
14 • Jika Rukumb-Jika K om b + 
Akelemb
Hagen Beer and 
woman
+ -
15 Jika Maipngel-Kukilka Hagen Marijuana + -
16 Uklga + Ukupka-Kuklga Nebilyer Woman + -
17 Rokla + Wanke-Teiyandena Tambul-
Nebilyer
Land + -
18 Kepka +  Tepaka-Kuklmint 
Yapo
Tambul-
Nebilyer
- + -
19 Ukni 2-Ukni 2 Baiyer Land + -
20 Krupka-Miamka South
Wahgi
Rascal gang 
activity
+ -
21 Kondika-Konumbka South
Wahgi
- + -  '
22 Tangilka-Kukika South
Wahgi
- + -
Source: Based on information supplied by participants at an ELC-PNG conference at Kuk-Mbakla village in
January 1991. Informants: Pastor Petro Timbi, Wahgi Congregation, Jesky Koi and Kelly Ken, Kotna 
Circuit, Komori Ongky, Tengdui Kram and Jimi Doa, Kuk-Mbakla village, Mount Hagen.
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Appendix VIII
Average number of candidates per electorate (1964-1997)
Election Year Number o f 
Electorates
Number o f 
Candidates
% Increase Average number 
o f Candidates 
Per Electorate
1964 54 298 —  ■ 5.5
1968 84 484 62.4 5.8
1972 100 611 26.2 6.1
1977 109 879 43.9 8.1
1982 109 1125 28.0 10.3
1987 109 1513 34.5 13.9
1992 109 1655 9.4 15.2
1997 108 2343 41.6 21.7
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Figure 1.5: Number of Candidates (1964-1997)
ELECTION (YEAR)
— ♦—  CANDIDATES 
- • — ELECTORATES
2  15
10
Figure 1.6: Lowest to Highest Candidate categories in 
1997 elections ....
1..5 6..10 11..15 16..20 21 ..25 26..30 31 ..35 36..40 ' 41 ..45 46..
Candidate Categories
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Figure 1.7: Candidate Categories in 1992 and 1997 
National Elections
Table 1.3(?): Candidate Categories ïri 1992 and 1997 National Elections
Candidate Categories 7992 1997
1-10 ' 36 15
11-20 48 39
21-30 16 31
31-40 7 18
41- 2 5
Total 109 108»
Appendices
Sources and notes:
Based on PN G  Electoral Commission (1992); Saffu (1996\Appendix A); Post-Courier, April 
24, 1997, “Election *97 Special Supplement” (page 1-8); and Post-Courier, April 25, 1997, 
“Provincial News” (p.20-21).
Excluding Huon Gulf Open electorate.
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APPENDIX IX: T H E  M INJ FUNERAL CASE
T his is a classic case o f  conflict betw een traditional and introduced ideas about death rites. 
T he denial o f  a full traditional funeral cerem ony to the deceased angered his relatives, 
especially Jo  Mangi and his younger brother, w ho considered this as an infringem ent o f  
individual rights as well as a violation o f  traditional custom . T he dispute resulted in  Mangi 
pulling a stunt on  his clansmen, w hich eventually cost him a pig. .
M angi and his younger brother were so upset by the manner in w hich the funeral was 
conducted that they decided to teach them a lesson by arranging for a chemically-induced 
self-illuminating incandescent tube to be tied onto a tree at the cemetery where their uncle's 
body was buried. Accom plishing this proved easier than imagined. T he m en were gathered 
inside the nearest house beside the cemetery, where in groups o f  three or m ore took  turn in 
guarding the cemetery against ‘w itches’. Protection o f  the corpse against so-called 
cannibalistic witches {kum koimb-nui warnp) is a widespread phenom enon throughout the 
W ahgi and parts o f  Hagen. These ‘witches’, mostly female but som e male also, supposedly  
have supernatural abilities to approach the cemetery in the form  o f  mainly dogs (as well as 
other animals) to take the body w ithout physically disturbing the burial ground and coffin. 
In this case, as one shift was com ing off, Mangi and his colleagues kept them  busy with 
debates about elections in general and the approaching 1987 elections in particular and 
w hether or not W ingti would return to Parliament as Prime Minister, whilst M angi’s 
younger brother and two others offered to take the next sh ift T hey took this opportunity  
to fasten the candle-like tube onto a branch o f  a tall casuarina tree in the centre o f  the 
cemetery. Soon after the plastic object was bent in half, two separate chemicals contained  
within the halves merged and the chemical reaction gave out a bright greenish light. It wjas 
first noticed by neighbouring groups from other hill-top hamlets. They started yelling, 
“koimb (‘witch’) has arrived”, and soon others joined in the shouting. U p on  hearing the  
shouting from across the hills, the m en in the house with M angi came out w ith their 
w eapons and started firing arrows at the strange ligh t This w ent on  for several hours, but 
the light w as still up there in the tree. After a while som eone suggested that it could not b e  
a koimb, but instead, the Holy Spirit A nd so they called in the church elders and started 
praying. Soon a pastor from the local Nazarene church and a Catholic priest am ved to  
conduct a lengthy service which ended at dawn. A t first m orning light a man discovered  
sh oe tracks leading into and out o f  the cemetery and follow ing this into the cemetery he  
noticed the same prints on the freshly dug grave-yard and the unmistakable yellow clay o n
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the trunk o f  the casuarina tree, up on w hich  the light hung from  a cotton string. The 
offending object was promptly rem oved from  the tree and in a subsequent investigation 
blam ed the U P N G  team for the offence, w hich w e may add was a serious one. N o n e  o f  the 
U P N G  team  m em bers claimed responsibility and amidst the confusion w e left for Minj 
tow n. Later, M angi admitted to deliberately attempting to playing a practical joke as revenge 
for lack o f  respect show n to his uncle, and consequently had to com pensate his clansmen  
with a big pig for offending them.
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APPENDIX X: A BRIEF HISTORY OF T H E  KAWELKA AT KUK
A ccording to the Kawelka origin-story, the Kawelka tribe originated at a place called 
K oum pouppukl, near present-day Kelriga mat kundkona {ret-pela graun, ochre), less than ten 
m inutes drive w est from M ount H agen township. O ne day, an old man (putative ancestor) 
and his sons were roasting a pig inside the clan sacred grounds w hen a cordyline (keiya- 
koemer, tanget in Pidgin) leaf fell upon the earth-oven. Interpreting this as a bad om en, the 
old m an and his sons left the place without eating the pork. Since that day, the ketya-koema 
becam e the Kawelka mi or taboo substance, a proscription, or a ‘do not’, w hich carries with 
it supernatural sanctions. Oaths o f  allegiance to group, o f  innocence w hen accused o f  
certain crimes, and o f  similar kind made upon the mi may result in sickness and ultimately 
death i f  not honoured, for it is said that the ketya-koema is a taboo substance am ong the 
Kawelka (keiya-koema tetim ni).2
A ccording to oral historical accounts given to m e by the Kawelka big-man, Goim ba  
O nom be, the Kawelka, as opposed to a com m on perception, are n ot a Kopott group, but are 
in fact o f  Kama origin.3 H e m entioned Kimininga, Kuamp, D o b el and Lganga as Kawelka 
settlements before Kenta, Mapa and Kuk. T he first two (Kimininga and Kuamp) are 
presently occupied by the Jika Milakamb clan, while third and fourth (D ob el and Lganga) 
are currently occupied by the Yamka Pepka clan and the fifth, Kenta, is n o w  occupied by 
the Jika Kilampi dan. T he last tw o are presently h d d  by the Kawelka. There w ere two  
brothers, K onga and Makla, still living at Kuamp in the late seventies, but have since 
migrated to K u k  Similarly, at Kenta, there was a large Kawelka population in co-existence  
with the Jika Kilampi and only recently in the early dghties m oved to  Kuk and Mapa. Som e
2. The observation o f taboo substances is common among Hagen groups; die m  substance for die
Tepuka, for instance, is die neng plant, die m i for the Remdi is the wantep tree; and the Mragmba tm  is 
the stone. For a more detailed discussion of die Kawelka origin-story and the taboo substance, see 
A.J. Strathem (19~2L
\  Kuma » d  K tfm  appear to be arrhair Mdpa directional terms for 'west* (jw kuma) and 'north* (met
kspm f), bnt m a u m  thcv are commonly used when referring to different cfenatic zones: kapcu for 
low tempexase areas «m-ti as the Baiyer and Jinu valleys; and kum a for high altitude areas such
as Ogdbcng ar»H Tokpa {dams. The opposite of kuma ('west*, wulhand), as a directional term, is mdpa 
feast*, a! melpa), from whence comes the cultural-linguistic labels, die Kuma o f the Wahgi and Melpa 
of Hagen. To the Simbu, the people of the Middle Wahgi, or the Minj-Banz area, are the ‘Kuma’, 
whilst the Middle Wahgi people themselves see Hagen people as the ‘Kuma Hagen*, and the Hagen 
people, in turn, call those living west of Tokpa as the *Kuma’. In a similar way, the people living west 
of Tokpa refer to those in Hagen as the ‘Melpa’, but the Hagen people themselves refer to those in 
the Middle Wahgi and Simbu as the ‘Melpa’.
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K aw elka still have their coffee  gardens at Kenta, but others have planted new  coffee trees 
at K uk,
W hile living at Kuk, oral history has it that the Kawelka tribe underwent a massive 
population explosion; such was the growth that high platform s ipaka angtek ik netung> were 
required for leaders to  address public gatherings such as singsings and ceremonial exchanges. 
D u ring  such festivities, the dancers w h o  were organised in several rows, were described as a 
‘sea o f  m en ’ (ivua numpitim). There is som e exaggeration here, as is usual o f  Hageners when  
speaking o f  their ow n  groups, but there is also som e truth in this statement because, 
eventually, numerical strength brought the Kawelka their downfall. It is said that the tribe 
grew  so  large that it becam e very difficult to  function cohesively as a unit, that it was highly 
fragm ented, and m ore importantly, its m embers becam e increasingly belligerent. Strangers 
w h o  passed  through Kawelka territories were said to have been regularly attacked, robbed, 
w o m en  raped, and in  som e instances, m en from other tribes w ere killed. Som e o f  them  
w ere notorious criminals, preying upon the innocent, m ostly weaklings such as w om en  and 
the aged, in packs o f  tw o to five young m en —  som ething n ot to o  different from w hat our 
contem porary raskal gangs are doing.
It is said that one day, the K wi tribes, obviously upset by the constant Kawelka 
belligerence, formed into a confederacy-type coalition and attacked the Kawelka. A lthough  
the attack w as initially triggered by a particular incident involving the death o f  a Jika 
A ndapunts m an called W amnapi, w h ose death was blamed on  the Kawelka after he was 
found in his house with a cassowary bone-tipped spear lodged in  his ribs, the underlying 
relations betw een the Kawelka and their K wi neighbours had significantly deteriorated to  
such a low  level that peaceful avenues o f  conflict resolution were never considered a viable  
option. A ccording to on e Kawelka informant, Jika W amnapi was n o t killed by the Kawelka, 
vet the Kawelka were victim ’s o f  their bad reputation; and he pointed out that the real killer 
w as in fact a Yamka Pepka man w h o  was the son o f  a Kawelka w om an.
T h e  subsequent war was an absolute disaster for the Kawelka w h o  were com pletely  
outnum bered, overpowered and massacred. A n  area near the o ld  K uk D P I station, w hich  
was initially expected to becom e a principal battleground, becam e a slaughter ground wh ere 
hundreds o f  Kawelka are said to  have been killed. T he D P I  station itse lf was buih in the  
1960s after the swam p was drained o f f  into the W ahgi river. It was here that hundreds o f  
K awelka are said to have had their skulls cracked open w hile half subm erged into the- 
sw am p. O nly a few  managed to escape, telling each other: “Mbuklpa, Mbakla paf’ (‘G o  to
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M bukl, g o  to  M bakla1), the nam es o f  the other Kawelka territories in  the Sepik-Wahgi 
D iv id e.4
T h e  present Kawelka territory at K uk was reclaimed by Y ap’s father, G oim ba O nom be, 
then a Local G overnm ent Councillor, in  the early 1960s. T h e Kawelka, as m entioned  
above, w ere violently evicted from  Kuk after losing a war to a confederacy-style alliance o f  
K w i groups, com prising mainly Jika Andapunts, som e M okei arid Yam ka clans. Y ap’s 
grandfather, O nom be, as a young man fled —  together with a few  lucky ones (including 
O ngka’s father, Kaipa, and Y ap’s great-grandfather, K und M end) —  to  M bukl, another 
K awelka setdem ent situated on the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer D ivide. A fter hearing stories about 
K uk and the war from his father, G oim ba decided to  return to the former Kawelka 
territory in the Upper W ahgi sbon after pacification had been im posed  by the Australian 
colonial administration in the 1940s.
*. The Mbukl-Mbakh territories were colonised by a Kawelka man called Etemp Wantep, the founding 
ancestor of die Kawelka ‘Kopon-pei’ section of the tribe. A.J. Sera them (1972) provides a genealogy 
of Etemp Wan tep’s descendants.
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A PPEN D IX  XI: BACKGROUND TO EKTS DEATH
A fter graduating from  the Administrative College, Waigani, in N ovem ber 1984, Eki was 
posted  to the Southern Highlands Province as an Executive O fficer to the Kagua T o ral 
G overnm ent Council. After two years o f  em ploym ent with the council, he was transferred 
to  the Baiyer-Lumusa Local G overnm ent Council in late 1986.
H ow ever, the outbreak o f  the Kawelka-Minembi war in late 1986 prevented him  from  
taking up his new  post. Eki, like his peers, took up arms and w ent to war with the rest o f  
the Kawelka warriors. During the Kawelka-Minembi war, n on e fought m ore bravely than 
Eki, w h o was feared and hated m ost by the enemy. Apart from  being one o f  a new  breed 
o f  warriors w ith knowledge o f  gun warfare, Eki’s main role, together with one other fight­
leader, w as that o f  a roving shield-man, w hich means that hé personally did not kill anyone, 
yet he played a significant part in the overall Kawelka war effort. H e  was also involved in 
the brutal eviction o f  the M inembi Elyipi, Papeke, E ngam bo and Ruprupkae clans from  
their Tiki and neighbouring territories during the inception o f  the war in late 1986.
D uring a mutually reached truce period in June 1988, William Pik contested the W estern 
Highlands Provincial E lections for the first time. This was also the first time that Kawelka, 
as a tribe, had ever sponsored one o f  their ow n tribesman to contest in an election for 
either provincial or national governm ent.5 Again, Eld felt obligated to offer his specialised 
expertise in election campaigns. H e was used as a campaign coordinator in Pik’s election  
campaign. Pik and the Kawelka gambled and lost a lot o f  m oney and other resources 
during the election. W hile the ideology o f  group solidarity was expressed in bloc voting by  
m embers o f  the Kawelka clans, it was how ever believed that som e Kawelka, together with  
som e Tepuka tribesmen w ho reside with the Kawelka at Kuk, defected to the opposition. 
A s in  1995, Pik’s principal rival in 1988 was Kar Kil, a Tepuka Kintke clansman and a 
protégé o f  the former D e i M P, Parua Kuri.
A ccording to Pik’s supporters, Pik lost by 21 votes, a situation which could easily have 
resulted in victory i f  he had the support o f  A c  defectors and the Tepuka w h o  live with  
Kawelka but voted with their Tepuka tribesmen. Consequently, a punitive raid was 
organised by William Pik’s supporters, during which a num ber o f  houses were burnt dow n,
5. There was one other Kawelka candidate in a previous provincial government election, but he did not
have tribe-wide support Eki’s father, Kont, in fact, contested the Kotna-Tiki seat during the 1980 
Western Highlands provincial elections, but was beaten by Tepuka Oklembo clansman, Kuma Rokla.
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a w om an was allegedly raped, and som e people were assaulted. Armed with a shotgun, Eki 
was on e o f  the leaders o f  the raiding party. A m ong those w h o lost houses and property 
w ere three prom inent Tepuka Keitipi clansmen, K onge, Kuntil and Ronom , all 
polygam ists, each with three wives. T he Keitipi clansmen and their families fled to their 
m ain territories in the Muka valley, leaving behind land, pigs, coffee plots and food-crop  
gardens.
P ik s  supporters justified their actions by using the H agen ideology o f  group solidarity, 
expressed in the M elpa language as Ur tila ptk, kutkona tila tek iti natitemon, (‘on e does not 
live in  one house and have a toilet in another^, which implies that the Keitipi clansmen and 
their families should have voted with their Kawelka hosts in  stead o f  follow ing structural 
lines.
A fter these events, Eki took a trip to Port M oresby on 22  August 1988. O nly six hours 
after his arrival in Port Moresby, he was murdered around 9:00 p.m., ironically at the 
Administrative College, where he had received his training as a council adviser. A  Tepuka 
K eitipi clansman was charged with murder, but sentenced to less than five years for 
manslaughter, after the defence argued that it was an accident T he Kawelka, however, 
believed that this was no accident, but a pay-back killing for the defendant’s father, a 
Keitipi big-man, w hose death was blamed on the Kawelka big-man, Ongka (who, to  this 
day, denies having anything to do with him). This belief was reinforced by the fact that Eki 
was direcdy involved in the election-related violence causing damage to  property ow ned by  
the three Keitipi clansmen, one o f  w hom  was the defendant’s brother, and the other was 
the father o f  the man w ho allegedly instigated the brawl in which Eki was killed.
A ccording to Eki’s brother, Ben K onts, one o f  the three M em bo witnesses, they were 
picked up in a taxi at the Jackson’s Airport around 3:00 p.m. by a Klam bo m an w h o  drove 
them  to E ki’s uncle’s house at the Administrative College. U p on  arrival at the college they 
discovered that the uncle, Kingal, also a Tepuka Keitipi man, was not at hom e. In  the taxi 
w ere six men: the Klam bo driver, the four M embo m en (including Eki), and a Keitipi man 
(John Berum).
A s they turned around and w’ere on  their way out w hen stopped outside the assailant’s 
house by a group o f  Tepuka Keitipi men, where the one o f  them attacked John Berum. 
Berum ’s attacker, according Ben Konts, was Mapa K onge, the son  o f  on e o f  the Keitipi 
m en w h o lost property during the 1988 post-polling violence. Eki and another M em bo
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(John Yap) were the first to get out o f  the car. Ben maintains that John Yap tried to stop 
the fight betw een Mapa and Berum while Eki was only a spectator. B en rlaiwwl that Mapa 
then  attacked him. D uring the com m otion, Eld, according to John  Yap, was struck down  
by the assailant, Hui Romba. W hen asked why John Yap did n ot warn Eki that he was 
about to be struck, John Yap claims that he thought H ui was only feigning. B en maintains 
that Eki w as a marked man and his death was no accident IrTstead, his murder, Ben 
believes, was a ruthlessly calculated one; the fight betw een Mapa and Berum was 
deliberately staged in order to cause confusion during which the target, Eki, was easily 
picked ou t by Romba. Kawelka informants, including Ben, believe that the assailant, Hui 
R om ba, had sufficient m otive for killing Eki. T he murder was widely interpreted as 
payback killing for both the assailant’s father’s death and m ore specifically for the m assive 
loss o f  property and humiliation suffered by his brother and other Keitipi clansmen at the 
hands o f  W illiam Pik’s supporters w ho were led by a gun-toting Eki during the W estern 
H ighlands provincial elections in June 1988.
T h e K lam bo taxi-driver and the tw o M em bo men (including B en K onts) fled in the taxi, 
leaving the unconscious Eki behind. It is not clear what exactly happened to John Yap, 
w h o  w as also left behind, but Eki was taken to Port M oresby General hospital som e six 
hours after the attack, around 3:00 a.m. on  the follow ing day, by neighbours o f  the 
assailant But he died in less than three hours, around 6:00 a.m., at the hospital.
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